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Q - The talks with the Russians ended without any results. Can you give us your assessment of the situation? Where do we stand?
I've no direct information from Moscow. Before I came here, I read, like you, that the talks had ended. Apparently the plan, if I've understood correctly, is to resume them a bit later on, but I will remain cautious in this. Let's wait for the Russians to tell us the content of their talks with the Iranians. That will allow us to form an opinion.
Q - Would any compromise that envisioned the continuation of sensitive activities in Iran, even with a moratorium, resumption on a very small scale and further off in the future, be unacceptable for the Europeans?
Our line is still the same. We would like Iran to comply with the demands of the international community, the demands of the IAEA board of governors, to revert to complete suspension of enrichment and reprocessing-related activities.
That's our position. A number of things have been said and written, especially about the proposals reportedly made by Mr. El Baradei, but we've no confirmation of such proposals.
So I invite you to move closer to the IAEA which said that these proposals had not been made by Mr. El Baradei.
In addition, we've said all along that the Russian proposal was interesting, with one important element in our view, which is to allow enrichment activities to take place outside Iran. That for us is very clearly the interest of the Russian proposal.
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Q - About India and Iran. France has signed a preliminary agreement to delivery nuclear power plants to a country that has not signed the NPT. Doesn't the different treatment of India and Iran over nuclear power say something?
In general, France is entirely favorable to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful ends. It's something we fully recognize, especially when it meets the energy needs of an important country like India. If there's no recourse to nuclear energy, it implies turning to other sources of energy, with the known consequences, especially regarding climate change.
Secondly, France isn't alone in having contacts with India on the nuclear question. There are also contacts between India and the United States in this domain.
Thirdly, in order to correct slightly what you just said, we did not sign a pact during President Chirac's visit to India. We signed a declaration confirming the fact that we have begun negotiations on a bilateral cooperation agreement and stipulating the range of this agreement, in the expectation of a change in international rules which should make it possible to implement the commitments made by India. That is an important point which must be emphasized. We did not sign a pact, we signed a declaration expressing objectives, which presupposes a number of developments before they can be realized.
Lastly, it's not a matter for us of waiving the NPT or IAEA rules since nothing in the NPT bans nuclear cooperation for peaceful uses with states that are not signatories to the NPT, providing that such cooperation is placed under IAEA safeguards. That's an important point.
Q - When you're negotiating with India, is there an IAEA representative there?
We're not at that stage. We've made a declaration; all of this will then be reflected in an agreement that presupposes in effect that a number of safeguards are provided. We're not at the end of the process. We're embarking on this path, but we're not at the end of the road.
Q - It's easy to understand that there's competition for trade, but the different treatment between Iran and India doesn't pose a problem for you?
The cases are different. I've explained the spirit in which we signed the declaration with the Indians, and the idea, in the case of India, is to have access to civilian nuclear power with certain conditions and under certain guarantees. What is more, this is all being decided taking into account the multilateral context, we're not deciding things unilaterally.
More basically, the difference between India and Iran on these nuclear questions--and others have said this besides me-is that it is also a question of confidence in the country with which one is engaged in dialogue. With Iran, we're trying to establish a climate of confidence that will allow Iran also to have access to civilian nuclear energy. We're not disputing Iran's right to civilian nuclear power. Simply we want to see it done in conditions of confidence that can satisfy the international community.
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