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Q: Concerning the London meeting on Iran in a 5+1 or E3+3 format, is there a new approach to the Iranian nuclear issue with the new U.S. administration, which wants to actively participate in the negotiations? . . .

A: As you noted, there was a meeting of political directors of the E3+3 this past Wednesday in London. Its conclusions were simple: they reaffirm the importance of the approach defined by the Six. This approach combines a stated desire for dialogue with an offer that we consider very positive and with which you are already familiar, and firmness based on respect for both Security Council resolutions and IAEA commitments. The meeting reaffirmed that dynamic and signaled that the new U.S. administration wanted to be fully engaged, as the U.S. has said, in all discussions within the E3+3 framework.

The advent of a new U.S. administration may raise new opportunities for Teheran to finally engage in negotiations on the principles defined in the E3+3 and U.N. frameworks. There's a new dynamic. France welcomed the decision to have direct contacts between the U.S. and Iran.

What was reaffirmed on Wednesday was the collective six-party framework in which the new U.S. administration says it wants to be fully engaged, at all levels of discussion. That's the major element of Wednesday's meeting.

It is hoped that a six-party meeting will be organized in this framework in the very near future with the Iranian leaders, at Javier Solana's behest.

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Q: What's your feeling on the technical progress of the Iranian nuclear program? Politically speaking, do you think that announcing that the program is continuing to move forward sends a positive signal at a time when we are proposing to negotiate with Iran? Technically speaking, how much credibility do you attribute to President Ahmadinejad's indications on the new types of centrifuges, their number, etc.? The Americans don't seem very convinced of their authenticity.

A: His statements are troubling. Now, we obviously have to verify the reality of the announcements. For that, we are relying on the IAEA. We are waiting for the IAEA's forthcoming report. For now, we have legitimate concerns on an announcement regarding which we lack substantial evidence.

We hope Iran will abide by the IAEA's demands. That body was concerned, notably in its last report, by the lack of responses as well as the continuation of activities without civilian justification.

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Q: You said there's no tie between the question of disarmament and the question of proliferation. What is the logic behind that? If you ask the North Koreans and Iranians to disarm, we in the West have to do the same thing. We can't ask them to be virtuous if we aren't ourselves.

A: We situate ourselves in an international framework and we respect the relevant international texts, and notably the non-proliferation treaty. We adhere to all the provisions of this system and we respect them. We are asking North Korea, Iran and other countries to comply with the law and the international framework as it exists.

Moreover, within this framework, which we fully respect, we have an active, open and transparent approach-on several of these subjects, we have been the only country, or the first one, to take initiatives.

We distinguish between the issue of disarmament and that of proliferation because it is logical to differentiate between them legally. We fully respect the international legal framework. Historically, let me remind you, the risks of proliferation have increased when ambitious programs to reduce nuclear stockpiles were implemented in the countries that mastered those technologies.

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