"It needs to be borne in mind that lack of identified or known criteria or timelines, on the basis of which Iran could organize itself for robust inspections, has required Iran to provide information or to grant access primarily after requests were made by the Agency."

The explanatory report said that however in the spirit of cooperation and as confirmed in the report of the IEAE Director General, action has been taken to satisfy the requests of the Agency in the fullest and most speedy manner possible. The report said over 670 person-days of inspections have been carried out in Iran since February 2003, amounting to one of the most robust and intrusive verifications in the history of the Agency. It said in spirit of the fact that the complementary access envisaged in Article four of the Additional Protocol could legally be granted only after the declarations have been submitted to the gency. Iran has voluntarily granted 12 complementary accesses even prior to the submission of its declarations, most of which with two hour notice or even less.

The report said all contaminations have been caused by foreign imported components and the information and explanations provided by Iran on the other major outstanding issue, that is the P2 centrifuge program, have been full and consistent and all have not in any case involved changing or contradictory information.

It said Iran's account of the laser enrichment program has been orrect and consistent and through full transparency and cooperation by the country since October 2003 coupled with intensive and robust verification by the Agency, there is now sufficient confirmation to enable the Agency to begin a normal process of verification in accordance with the normal implementation of the Additional protocol in a technical and not political environment.