Dr. Kharrazi Speech at International Conference on Nuclear Technology and Sustainable Development

March 6, 2005

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

In the Name of God Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm pleased to begin by extending my warm welcome to our distinguished guests and express my appreciation to the organizes for the excellent arrangements made for this conference. Mr Chairman, Distinguished Participants The nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan by the United States and its catastrophic human dimensions revealed that proliferation and stockpiling of nuclear armaments constitute the most serious threat to the survival of human race and to the international peace and security and also that as long as such weapons continue to exist, there is a temptation to use them again.

In view of such a threat, the international community, in the cold war era, endeavored to put in place effective arrangements to stop the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible time and materialize the virtual goal of nuclear disarmament.

The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) was a substantial step taken at the time to attain this goal. In articles, of the energy of the member Articles 4 and nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In this context, the nuclear and non- nuclear member states have undertaken a combination of mutual obligations. Under Article 2 of the NPT, the non-nuclear member states have undertaken not to seek to manufacture, or otherwise acquire and receive nuclear weapons, while the nuclear states, under Article 1, have undertaken not to transfer nuclear weapons to or assist or encourage non-nuclear states to acquire such weapons.

return for the obligations envisaged in these two the NPT has explicitly recognized the inalienable right member states to research, production and use of nuclear for peaceful purposes without any discrimination.

Most mutual obligations which reflect the commitment of all states to nuclear disarmament are included in 6 of the Treaty. An objective review of the implementation and achievements of the NPT, after 35 years since its inception, can be both encouraging and frustrating.

Encouraging in that the NPT has been successful, to a large extent, albeit not completely, in prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and contributing, on its own part, to international peace and security.

And, frustrating in that progress in nuclear disarmament and cooperation in peaceful use and transfer of nuclear energy is slow and alarming and, above all, the treaty is not yet universally implemented after 35 years.

A clear case in point in the Middle East is Israel, which has refused to accede to the NPT and has developed a secret nuclear weapon program which stands as a major barrier to the realization of the initiative of a nuclear-free Middle East. These are the main challenges facing the NPT which, seem to us, to be assuming deeper and wider dimensions.

Such a treaty can be sustained and effectively implemented only when all nuclear and non-nuclear states are equally and fully committed to its provisions.

Unfortunately, nuclear sates, in defiance of their obligations under the Treaty, have failed to take any steps to remove or reduce their nuclear weapons, and some of them, particularly, the United Sates have moved to design and develop new nuclear weapons including new systems of tactical nuclear weapons.

The United States by opposing the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations on FMCT is challenging the efforts launched to enhance the provisions of nuclear disarmament.

It is by no means acceptable to the international community that the nuclear states renege on their commitment to nuclear disarmament and, conversely, try to develop new nuclear weapons to bolster their political and military strength, which is against the letter and spirit of the NPT.

following intensive negotiations which lasted for four years, the nuclear states undertook to take 13 essential steps for the furtherance of nuclear disarmament.

In the upcoming conference of the NPT which will convene after 5 years in New York to review the implementation of the provisions and obligations of the Treaty, the nuclear states should account before the international community on the required 13 essential measures.

The member states expect the nuclear states to remain more committed than others to the provisions of the NPT and the decisions of the review conferences.

In the meantime, while no effective step has yet been taken to address the threat of nuclear weapons, there are efforts launched by certain circles to undermine peaceful exchange of nuclear materials technology NPT, and as the sole legal instrument governing proliferation of nuclear weapons, has banned the proliferation and expansion of nuclear weapons and at the same time, stressed the need for free and guaranteed exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and has further obliged the member states to promote such exchanges.

Article 4 of the NPT has envisaged a solid and lasting can or should be allowed to undermine the provisions of this Article of the Treaty.

We believe that the concern expressed by some states party to the Treaty over peaceful exchanges among the member states is merely a pretext to restrain other members from exercising their legitimate right to use nuclear energy for scientific, research and medical purposes and generation of electricity.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole specialized global agency responsible for regulation of cooperation among states in peaceful use of nuclear energy has provided strong legal grounds to ensure peaceful nuclear exchanges among countries.

The additional protocol which includes the most intrusive inspection mechanism is the latest comprehensive international initiative to ensure non-deviation from peaceful use of nuclear energy approved after many years of intensive negotiations among the member states.

While we are, at the international level, in need of encouraging countries to accede to the additional protocol, a new plan has been set in motion to further limit access to nuclear fuel cycle for developing countries which are party to the NPT and are enforcing the provisions of the additional protocol, which has caused further concern among the member states.

Unfortunately, the Group of Prominent Persons appointed by the UN Secretary General has proposed in its report that the fuel cycle be ceased for countries which have sophisticated nuclear technology.

Presentation of such a proposal indicates, more than anything else, a lack of trust in the efficacy of the additional protocol. Access to nuclear fuel cycle should not be obstructed as long as it is not intended for military purposes and is conducted under the surveillance of IAEA.

In addition to its adverse political and legal implications, such a proposal will set a new precedent of discrimination between the developed and developing countries and help institutionalize and perpetuate the current economic, technological and industrial gap between them.

Mr Chairman, Distinguished Participants, The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in this connection, is to build further confidence.

To promote such confidence and demonstrate the transparency of its nuclear activities at the international level, my country has signed and implemented the additional protocol.

Iran has so far accepted various IAEA inspection teams to demonstrate that it does not will to acquire nuclear weapons. After consecutive visits by its inspection teams to Iran` s nuclear facilities, IAEA has concluded that Iran has not made any effort to gain access to nuclear weapons.

I wish to reiterate that, in its defense policy, the Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention whatsoever to seek nuclear weapons, which we believe will seriously imperil our own security.

However, my country insists on the need for respecting the right of the NPT member states to have access to peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Distinguished Participants, The Nuclear, Non-proliferation regime is now at a very crucial stage and any decision which is made, at the international level, will leave drastic impact on the future of this regime and the policies of states with regard to the NPT. And such a decision ought to be made with great care and vigilance so that it will not constitute grounds for new threats in the future.

Any politically-charged, rash decision in this regard could prove quite dangerous as its destructive implications can not be easily addressed.

In conclusion, I wish you fruitful deliberations and exchange of views in this conference.