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Question: We read in the Russian media the other day that Russia had invited Hamas leaders to visit Moscow. Can you confirm or deny this information? My second question concerns Iran. What is Russia's position with regard to attempts to push for quick new sanctions against Iran?

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Lavrov: Now the second question on Iran. We are in close contact with our colleagues in the "3 +3"group, with Iranian officials and with IAEA representatives. We regret that Iran apparently finds it impossible to accept the formula that was proposed to it for the production of fuel for the research reactor in Tehran. We believe that additional efforts are necessary, both on this particular question and more broadly on the question of resuming talks to resolve all aspects of the Iranian nuclear program. Our goal is absolutely transparent. We want the international community to have no doubt in the exclusively peaceful nature of this program. With that understanding, no one questions the right of Iran to use peaceful nuclear energy. So the situation is not simple, it is not eased by the internal political situation in Iran. However, I think we all need to act with utmost responsibility. Yes, of course, the Security Council could consider additional measures to be taken, but I hope that all those on whom future likely solutions depend will be guided solely by the interests of strengthening the nonproliferation regime and preventing its erosion, and not by any other agendas.

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Question: You have already mentioned that you would like the world community to have no doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. But over the past year, has Iran not undermined the foundations of such trust itself?

Lavrov: The doubts appeared much earlier, and the entire activity of the "3 +3" group is directed to clear them up. With regard to Iran's actions, we would certainly like to see them constructive, particularly since everybody has the impression that during the group's Geneva negotiations with Iranian officials very useful agreements were reached, but the implementation of these agreements has stalled. The question, I repeat, is complicated. If our logic is to punish Iran, or if we take up the posture of the offended - how can it be that we have proposed, and they do not want to discuss it - then I suppose this will not be a very sober approach.

A sober approach should be based primarily on the responsibility, first and foremost, of the nuclear powers for the non-proliferation regime and for eliminating all risks of violation of the non-proliferation regime. Of crucial significance in this regard are ongoing IAEA activities in Iran. We must not take any steps that could open up risks to the work of the agency in that country. And, of course, within the "3+3" group, within the UN Security Council and in any other format, we must heed the opinion of the IAEA because experts of the organization are the most experienced and most knowledgeable in this area. It is the experts of this organization, as an impartial international entity, that have the casting vote in making judgments about how great are some or other risks. But most importantly, I repeat, we ought to do everything in our power to prevent undermining the nonproliferation regime.

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