Foreign Minister Lavrov: From the outset we agreed to work the six of us. This all began, as you remember, when three European countries a year ago started a dialogue with Iran. We formally at that stage did not participate in this process. We maintained close contacts with the trio and Iran and did our very best to help create conditions for this process to end successfully.

Subsequently, after the coming to power of Iran's new president and the Iranians' rejection of the offers that were formulated by the Europeans in August 2005, we sought to help overcome the pause that arose, and worked actively. As a result the negotiation process was resumed, now with the participation of Russia and China together with the European trio.

In May this year a very important qualitative step forward occurred, when the United States decided to join the talks. We consider that this was indeed an important decision which made it possible to work out a collective position reflecting the approach of all the important parties for Iran in this matter. In June the Six, now acting unitedly, formulated the proposals regarding what benefits Iran would get in case of the start and successful completion of negotiations, including benefits concerning the development of peaceful nuclear energy and civil high technologies and from the viewpoint of the unfolding of a dialogue with the full-fledged participation of Iran on regional security issues. These proposals are now the subject of discussions. Iran responded to them with delay, but still it did. Iran is principally ready to cooperate, but does not consider possible, for the period of negotiations, a freeze on the work now being conducted on a research cascade of 164 uranium enrichment centrifuges. The Six feel that to create an atmosphere of trust in the negotiations it is important to freeze that work for their period. This situation, as I have described it to you, will be discussed in London today.

There are, as you know, the decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors, which contain definite requirements to Iran. These requirements were made mandatory by the relevant UN Security Council resolution, which has the provisions written down that in case of failure of these efforts we will have to consider in the Council some additional measures that could stimulate Iran to sit down at the negotiating table on the basis of the proposals submitted by the Six.

Having said all this, I probably will after all answer your question in the affirmative. There is something new in this situation, because contrary to our initial agreement in the Six to act collectively, our American partners on October 1 passed a law, which President George Bush has already signed, on anti-Iranian sanctions. The sanctions are wide enough. It is not the first time that America imposes sanctions against Iran. Until now these sanctions affected individual companies and organizations which in one way or another, from America's point of view, are involved in activities that may facilitate the creation of Iran's nuclear potential. Now, however, the law presupposes introduction of sanctions against states whose companies - both private and state - participate in any aspects of nuclear cooperation with Iran, including peaceful cooperation - I mean cooperation in the area of the peaceful atom - and which supply Iran with modern arms, regardless of whether these are offensive or defensive arms. Of course, this is not exactly a partner-like step, because, as I have already said, the agreement was to act collectively. That's the exact point, which was set into the Six format.

Therefore today's meeting will be somewhat unusual, compared to the previous ones. We have as a not quite favorable background the unilateral decision of the US Congress, and the law signed by President Bush. Although the law provides that the US President will have power to suspend the sanctions, the very possibility of their legislative introduction will, of course, dominate. And of course Iran knows about that. And of course this will not facilitate searching for solutions which can induce Iran to make a compromise.

Question: Can the additional measures you spoke of be considered at this meeting?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: If everything were as before, without surprises, we would surely be ready in accordance with the UN Security Council decision, under which we signed, to consider some additional measures of pressure on Iran. Measures which - and this is again the agreement of the Six - can be neither the punishment of Iran nor a vehicle for the isolation of Iran, but must be, firstly, gradual, and secondly, proportionate to the real threat for the nonproliferation regime that the actions of Iran pose. Only the professionals of the IAEA can determine the real level of threat in this regard. The most important thing is that these measures pursue the sole aim of inducing Iran to respond favorably to the IAEA requirements, endorsed subsequently by the UN Security Council.

If the US, having passed its unilateral law, is thus trying to set the standard for discussion in the Six, then we absolutely cannot agree with such a standard. This does not meet the criteria we agreed upon, which I have just mentioned. They are rather wide sanctions inadequate to the present state of affairs with the Iranian nuclear program. I repeat it, apart from the 164 centrifuges, which, according to IAEA data, operate at a very unspeeded pace, fair to middling, nothing other than that is occurring. From the viewpoint of the mastering of enrichment technologies, Iran probably knows what's what already. Therefore it is necessary to act proceeding from the task of finding a way to prevent a further aggravation of the risks to nonproliferation and not proceeding from the resentment that Iran is not ready 100 percent to accept all the conditions, primarily the conditions of a freeze on its enrichment activities. This is a delicate theme, it also involves the prestige of the Six, the prestige of the Security Council of the United Nations. But there are two approaches towards the same problem of prestige and losing face. One approach is that irrespective of what events have occurred in the world, in real life, all that which we wrote down several months ago must be fulfilled simply because that was written down or otherwise supposedly we won't be taken seriously. To a certain degree this is, I would say, the considerations of a falsely understood prestige. The second approach is to prevent a situation where the Six or the UN Security Council will adopt decisions which will drive us all into a confrontational state with Iran and which, rather than strengthening the nonproliferation regime, will give cause for undermining this regime; decisions which will provoke the similar, also emotional, response actions of Iran to limit its cooperation with the IAEA. This we don't want. The IAEA, even though not to the degree we would like, does continue to be present in Iran, monitoring the activities Iran conducts under its nuclear program. The IAEA so far sees no evidences that this program has a military branch, even though it cannot assert that there is no such branch. But its presence in Iran is, of course, an important instrument for the world community in terms of the observation of what is happening there.

So that, you see, I have openly set forth to you the not simple questions, the not simple dilemma that we face. We will make up our minds depending on the position of the partners, and guiding ourselves by the chief objective - not to harm the nonproliferation regime.

Question: We are still against sanctions?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: We do not rule out additional measures. But, as I have already said, the unilateral "surprise" of the United States does not at all help the elaboration of a collective position in this matter. There are chances that we can yet as the Six find a solution which would open the way to negotiations. For this purpose it is necessary to take our position, our proposals, to take the response of Iran and have a look where there are coinciding elements in the approaches, which are many: there are much more of what coincides than what does not, and simply give diplomacy the chance to find a solution which would not allow either side to say we have won and which would not allow either side to feel that it has lost.

Question: We are going with some proposals for the Six from the Russian side or simply for discussion?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: We have our proposals, which consist in that the Six has undertaken to consider measures of pressure on Iran. And we shall consider them. The coverage of these measures must be proportionate to what is actually occurring. We do not want Iran to get access to sensitive dual-purpose technologies. All the possibilities exist to agree on formulations which would call for the nontransfer of such technologies to Iran.

In the most general terms I describe to you what, in our opinion, the talk should be about if we want to remain within the bounds of the accords of the Six on the possibility of additional measures, which will be gradual, proportionate and aimed at inducing Iran to cooperate.

Question: Can you name at least one measure?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I have already named it. Sensitive technologies tied to the nuclear fuel cycle, technologies which can have a dual purpose. There is no secret in this regard, even. No one wants to deprive Iran of the right of access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, but no one wants Iran to get access to military technologies, either.

Question: Are there any new aspects concerning North Korea?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Everything should be done to prevent the situation from sliding towards crisis. The threats, the intentions of North Korea, which Pyongyang has announced, to test a nuclear device, worry us. We are doing everything to make sure either that these intentions remain a mere declaration, or, if such plans do exist, persuade Pyongyang not to implement them in practice.