Unofficial translation from Russian

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Question: How do you evaluate the outcome of the talks with the Iranians in Moscow and Teheran? In what stage is the project for setting up a JV for uranium enrichment on Russian soil? How could you respond to the views that the US is currently trying to remove Russia and the trio and begin direct talks with the Iranians on this question?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: The talks that were held during the last few weeks regularly enough in Moscow and Teheran between the Russian and Iranian sides, unfortunately, did not produce the result we had counted on. Our offer to establish on Russian soil a JV involving Iran which would in a guaranteed way supply all the requirements of Iran in fuel for its peaceful nuclear industry was made in a bid to agree a compromise package which would ensure a settlement of this problem. It was made in the context of the other component parts of the overall package, including the need for Iran to come back to the moratorium on activities related to uranium enrichment, the return by Iran to the regime of observance of the additional protocol, Iran's subsequent ratification of this protocol signed by it earlier, and of course, the necessity of continued work by inspectors from the IAEA to clear up the questions that still remain unclarified and which relate to the previous nuclear activities of Iran, which were generally closed to the world community, although they had to be reported to the IAEA. It was because of those previous activities that doubts arose among most IAEA members, which made it impossible to simply carry on work with Iran in the IAEA in the usual mode. This long eighteen-year period, when Iran did not report to the IAEA on its nuclear program, gave rise to many questions. The IAEA has already clarified a whole array of them, but a number of questions still remain. In order to restore confidence, these questions have to be resolved. After they have been clarified and confidence has been restored, we see no obstacles for Iran to continue to fully enjoy its rights as an NPT member. Such was our scheme, which the European countries shared, which was backed up by China and which the United States agreed with. But our Iranian colleagues, as you know, unlike the assurances they gave, including those in December of last year, resumed in part their enrichment activities in the form of research. This was, of course, a move going beyond the parameters of the moratorium, as we understand it. During the subsequent talks, we tried to agree with the Iranians on returning the status quo. That did not occur. In accordance with existing agreements the Iran question was twice discussed in February and March in the IAEA Board of Governors and in accordance with the agreements the UN Security Council was informed of the results of this discussion. We favor the Security Council helping the IAEA restore the normal process with Iran on the fulfillment of the decisions which were adopted in the IAEA Board of Governors. Without the IAEA, any further work on Iran will no longer be productive and will not be able to be oriented towards the solution of the principal task, and we regard as such in the Iranian nuclear matter the inadmissibility of a violation of the regime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore the UN Security Council, which is a political organ, must act with extreme caution and not permit efforts aimed at the strengthening and nonviolation of the nonproliferation regime to be used for political purposes. The Security Council should responsibly approach its mandate. Our belief is that, at this stage, it should limit itself to support of the efforts of the IAEA and calls for Iran to respond in full measure to these efforts of the Agency, should cooperate with the Agency in the clarification of the issues still outstanding. Most importantly, we consider it necessary to work out a clearly defined line of action, because if a question, not necessarily the Iran question, is flung into the UN Security Council without a strategy for action to buttress it, this does not always lead to the desired result, especially as the Security Council is a machine which, once started, is very difficult to stop. Without having prior consensus on where this machine can lead us all to, we would not like to be drawn into any substantive discussion of the Iranian file in the UN Security Council. To express support for the IAEA - yes, probably, this has to be done. But it is only the IAEA that can professionally accomplish the process on the Iranian nuclear file.

As to the third question, there are many situations where multilateral formats of communication with this or that side exist. There is the Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia and there is the Quartet of international mediators and there is the format on Iran that has spontaneously emerged: the European trio, Russia, China and the United States. But the presence of all these formats does not mean that none of the participants should have any bilateral contacts with the side concerned. That was the vein in which we acted when we spoke with Hamas. We spoke on the basis of the agreed positions of the Quartet. It has been in such a format that we have been working with the parties in the former Yugoslavia when we have been promoting the agreed positions of the Contact Group. It was in this vein that Russia worked with Iran when we sought Iran's consent to the joint proposal of the Six. If the Europeans, the Chinese or the Americans pursue the same line, I see nothing terrible in this. Sometimes additional direct contacts can help move the matter off dead center. If that happens, I will only welcome it.

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