Foreign Minister Lavrov on Russia's Strategy During Talks for a New UNSC Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Program (Excerpts)

December 20, 2006

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

[Unofficial translation from Russian]

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Question: Mr. Minister, could you clarify the substance of the UN Security Council's resolution on Iran? What are the differences on the resolution with the United States? When will the vote on the resolution be held? Thank you.

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Work on the resolution reflects the continuation of the process of coordination of common approaches of the European Troika, Russia, the United States and China. Work in this format started nearly a year ago and the foundation was laid by particular accords. Those accords fix that we need to try to resolve all issues related to Iran's nuclear program through negotiations and diplomatic efforts. It has been agreed that the use of force is out of the question in dealing with that problem. The accords are that the UN Security Council should support the efforts by the IAEA, rather than replace the IAEA and should help start talks with Iran, rather than punish Iran.

If those principles are observed in our current activities, it might be possible to reach a common solution quickly enough. Unfortunately, we now have to overcome the formulas initially set in the draft prepared by European countries, which are at odds with the understanding I just explained.

Still, substantial progress has been made. In particular, in what concerns limitations on supplies to Iran of technologies, the Russian position was taken as a basis. It is that restrictions should not be all-embracing. They should only deal with spheres of particular concern to the IAEA: those include uranium enrichment, chemical processing of spent fuel, everything related to the construction of a heavy water reactor, and technologies that may be used to manufacture nuclear weapons delivery means. In this respect, I repeat, we have made a qualitative headway in our work on the draft, and this approach has been fixed. Unfortunately, our partners, while having accepted our logic, are trying to replay the situation in their favor by saturating other parts of the resolution by wording which will again make endless those restrictions to be introduced and would cut off channels for trade and economic ties with Iran in absolutely legitimate spheres. Besides, attempts are being made to put those legitimate cooperation spheres, not banned under the IAEA's position, under control of a UN Committee on Sanctions that it is proposed to set up under the UN Security Council. This is at odds with one of the fundamental principles -- the Security Council should not replace the IAEA or any other agency. It should rather help the IAEA promote the resolution of problems on issues on which the IAEA still have questions to Iran.

The draft still reflects attempts to limit those spheres of activities of the IAEA which the IAEA itself has voiced no concerns about. This is a wrong approach, given that we agreed that the IAEA should not be replaced by the Security Council. There also are certain provisions banning tours abroad by Iranian officials. We flatly regard them as an attempt to bring elements of punishment into the resolution. From the very beginning we agreed that this should not be done. I repeat, if we go back to those accords underlying the activities of the group of six countries and work fairly in line with them, we can quickly reach an agreement.

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