Joined already in session

HYDE: Opposed, "nay." The ayes have it. Then the motion is agreed to without objection. The staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes.

Iran presents perhaps the most difficult national security problem confronting the United States. Should Iran's clerical regime acquire nuclear weapons, as is its evident aim, it would be able to foment mischief in its region, or beyond, without fear of regime- threatening retaliation, other than from another nuclear power.

In a suicidal mood, it could well lash out at Israel, Europe or at American forces in the region. Inevitably, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia will seek nuclear weapons of their own, so that they will not have to rely on others to secure their survival.

Were Iran not in such an important location, its behavior might be of marginal concern, even though we would reprove it for its abysmal human rights record, and especially its record of religious intolerance. But Iran produces a significant portion of the world's petroleum resources. Moreover, it can threaten from its proximity to the energy fields of the Arab countries of the Gulf, and its ability to close the Straits of Hormuz, much of the world's energy supply.

While we are less dependent on Gulf energy than are some of our major allies and trading partners, any disruption in oil supply from the Gulf would, as we have known for decades, present a major economic and national security problem.

Given the current lack of non-Gulf excess production capacity, instability in the Gulf would cause world oil prices to spike significantly. Because of Iran's economic importance, it has thus far proven to be hard to isolate or pressure successfully.

Japan, for example, derives 15 percent of its energy from Iran, and fully 90 percent of its energy from the Middle East. What should a Japanese political leader do, if that country is asked to cut itself off from Iranian oil?

Because of Iran's size and military capacity, it's hard to coerce militarily. And it may prove to be exceedingly difficult to disable its nuclear assets. Any attempt to do so is likely to strengthen the most retrograde political forces there.

Iran's leaders know all this, which is evidently why they have continued to defy the world, breaking agreements and ignoring international standards of behavior with abandon. Iran's internal politics are dominated by a clerical clique that holds power by force, but which also enjoys the active support of a strong minority of the Iranian population and the passive support of a larger share.

Iranian nationalist sentiment can be stirred up easily. At the same time, the United States is popular in Iran, not least because we clearly oppose that regime and support the Iranian people's true aspirations for peace and economic progress.

The administration has begun reaching out even more strongly, and proposed a $75 million public diplomacy program in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental budget now under consideration.

The administration's approach to Iran in earlier years lacked focus. But for the past year it has found its footing and concentrated on a diplomatic strategy that has born fruit, not in the sense that Iran has been convinced to change its behavior, but in the sense that the world community is more united than ever on the proposition that Iran must change. This is a remarkable accomplishment, for which the administration deserves great credit.

We got Iran to the Security Council, not by bullying or sanctioning the IAEA's members, but by persistent and skillful diplomacy. We will move forward the same way. We need to keep that in mind as we craft legislation to deal with Iran, although I think the administration has sufficient tools and ample motivation right now.

The next step will require cooperation by states which have a lot to lose in the short term, by alienating Iran's regime. So, we must be able to show them that it is in their long-term interest to join us in the next, difficult phase of this effort.

I now yield to my colleague, Mr. Lantos, for any opening comments he may have.

 

OPENING STATEMENT OF

TOM LANTOS
A Representative from California, and
Ranking Member, House International Relations Committee

 

LANTOS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As we consider the question of U.S. policy toward Iran today, there is no room for naivete. We must be as clear-eyed as the French foreign minister, Mr. Philippe Douste-Blazy, was three weeks ago when he said, and I quote, "No civilian nuclear program can explain the Iranian nuclear program. It is a clandestine military nuclear program. Now it is up to the Security Council to say what it will do, what means it will use to stop, to manage, to halt this terrible crisis of nuclear proliferation caused by Iran."

LANTOS: Mr. Chairman, I haven't often had occasion recently to applaud statements from the French foreign ministry, but in this case, I do so emphatically and without reservation.

The Iranians are hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. If any leader, anyplace on this planet, still doubts this, he is in urgent need of medical attention. There is no other reasonable explanation for their nearly 20 years of lies and deceptions about their covert nuclear activities.

We need to come to terms with this fact, and we need to respond with resolve. There are no good options in this situation, Mr. Chairman, and it comes at a time when we confront numerous serious other crises globally.

These week, as we await the conclusion of the IAEA meetings in Vienna, and the shifting of the Iran file to the U.N. Security Council, one thing is clear. The long kabuki dance between Iran and the E.U.-3 has run its course.

There may be more meetings, but the oil-rich Iranians have decisively and contemptuously scorned Europe's offer of economic benefit as an incentive to end their nuclear program. As the statement by the French foreign minister makes clear, the Iranians gave the European Union a cold dose of reality.

Now there is a new kabuki dance, Mr. Chairman. And many people are pinning their hopes on a proposal to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil. But giving Putin's apparatchiks control of this process would be putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. Moscow has been the number one enabler, supporter and investor in Iran's nuclear program.

It built the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. For over a decade, Moscow resisted U.S. entreaties to halt its Bushehr work and to crack down on Russian scientists providing Iran with covert support.

As you recall, Mr. Chairman, sometime back I took a special trip to Moscow to meet with Russia's minister of energy on this issue. He gave a handsome necktie with the logo of the energy ministry. But I was as unsuccessful in changing Russian views as was former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and, indeed, the president.

Extending discussion of the plan to have Russia enrich uranium for Iran would just bolster Tehran's effort to stall the international community while it secretly pursues its nuclear capability.

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that every single Iranian move for a long time now has just been taken to gain time to develop their nuclear weapons. And willingly or otherwise, Western powers played along with this phony charade, which is palpably clear for a child to see.

A recent newspaper headline summed it up well. A nuclear confrontation, Iran bets that the world will blink first. That is exactly what the Islamic Republic of Iran is betting on, and that is exactly what the Iran Freedom Support Act, H.R.282, is intended to prevent.

Iran's quest for nuclear arms requires us to do two things -- squeeze Iran's economy as much as possible, and do so without delay. Our legislation, which this committee will consider next week, will require the U.S. government to sanction any company or nation that invests more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector. Current legislation to this end is set to expire this summer. Our new legislation will make it permanent.

The executive branch has largely ignored the current legislation. Our legislation will contain provisions that will require the administration to enforce the law. Moreover, it will require U.S.- based pension funds to divest themselves of foreign corporations that invest in Iran.

Mr. Chairman, there is no time to lose. We all know that Iranian nuclear arms would seriously destabilize the region. It would intimidate its neighbors and provoke them to seek nuclear arms, as well.

We all know that senior Iranian leaders are driven by a bloodthirsty fanaticism that characterize suicide bombers in Iraq and in the Palestinian Territories. We all know that hatred in the heart of the Iranian president, who denies the Holocaust, calls for Israel to be wiped off the map and speaks rapturously of a day when America will no longer exists.

This state run by wildly irrational terrorists simply cannot be allowed to possess the ultimate weapon of terror.

I call on all governments and all companies in Europe and Asia not to wait for our legislation. I call on them immediately to suspend and terminate their existing Iranian investments, just as the United States did over a decade ago.

Soon, I hope, the U.N. Security Council will require U.N. members to reject all investment and non-humanitarian trade with Iran until Tehran verifiably gives up its nuclear weapons production program. It should declare unambiguously that Iran's 20 years of nuclear deceit disqualify it from any right to possess nuclear material production facilities.

We cannot let Iran mock the international community's nonproliferation regime. If we do, that regime itself will become a joke. We must keep the pressure on our friends and allies, who mistakenly believe that continued trade and investment will persuade the Ayatollahs to end their single-minded quest for nuclear weapons.

We need to avail ourselves of all diplomatic, economic and strategic opportunities to avert a global danger -- the nightmare of Iranian nuclear weapons that would irrevocably and permanently change our already crisis-filled world for something dramatically worse.

In a word, Mr. Chairman, Iran must not and will not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Thank you.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

I will now recognize members, if they feel a compulsion to speak for one minute. We tried two minutes last time, and we consumed an hour and 14 minutes. I would prefer getting to the witnesses as quickly as possible, so we'll revert to one minute for any remarks a member chooses to make.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today is International Women's Day, and I'm very pleased to recognize some women who will be following me around in my activities today from Iraq and Ireland. So, hats off to them. Thank you for supporting women's rights worldwide.

Mr. Chairman, the potential threat to our security and interest is magnified by the fact that Iran is the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. The threat posed by Iranian terrorism became very clear in November 1979, when radicals stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, took Americans hostage and held them for 444 days.

Some of these brave Americans who endured 444 days in captivity are in the audience today. I would like to call them by name and have them be recognized.

Ambassador Bruce Laingen, Richard Morefield, Kathryn Koob, David Roeder -- please stand up -- Charles Jones, Bill Daugherty, Barry Rosen, Rodney Sickmann and Moorhead Kennedy, and family members also.

Let's give them a round of applause.

(APPLAUSE)

Thank you. And Mr. Chairman, to this day, Iran has not paid for this crime. And these witnesses to Iranian terrorism will tell you that failure to hold Iran accountable for its actions throughout the last 25 years has only served to embolden the enemy and continue its destructive path.

Today at 5:30 in Rayburn Room 2200, we're going to have a reception and a video presentation of "The First War On Terror," which is a short documentary film that examines U.S. and Iranian relations over the last 25 years.

Welcome and welcome. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Berman of California?

BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, the administration seems to have invested a great deal in this Russian effort to try and establish an agreement with Iran. And I have no idea whether Iran is likely to accept what the Russians are proposing.

But what I'm curious about, and hope your testimony elaborates on is, if, in fact, Iran was to accept the Russian proposal, just what are the specific nature of it, related to the suspension of conversion and enrichment of the parallel military programs of grabbing the materials that have already been converted in Iran, of continued inspections, both of the programs we know about and of the programs we suspect that exist.

HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired.

BERMAN: And whether or not, were they to accept that agreement, we, in fact, would have stopped the development of a nuclear weapon.

HYDE: Mr. Smith of New Jersey?

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman?

C. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, to do with your admonition...

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman?

C. SMITH: Hey, I'm...

HYDE: Just a minute. Just a minute.

ACKERMAN: A point of (inaudible)

C. SMITH: (inaudible), let me just finish.

HYDE: Just a moment, Mr. Smith. Who was seeking recognition?

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman?

HYDE: Is that Mr. Ackerman?

ACKERMAN: Indeed.

HYDE: What is it, Mr. Ackerman?

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I would like very much for you to please reconsider your position of allowing members only one minute to speak, and prefacing it by saying, if you feel compelled to say anything.

The people here on this committee, with all due respect, are very interested in policy issues. And to give them first an admonition, if they wanted a meager 60 seconds, and then limit them to that, is rather insulting to the intelligence of people who have come here to discuss policy, and have no other opportunity but to do that, when the chair decides to call a long overdue hearing on an issue.

I think that Mr. Smith and Mr. Berman, and everybody else, deserves to at least be able to finish a coherent sentence, and maybe to get out a thought or two, before the gavel is rapped upon them.

And I respectfully ask, especially if a hearing is held where a subcommittee has not held a hearing, to at least allow two minutes...

ROS-LEHTINEN: Hey, wait, wait. If the gentleman would yield, are you...

ACKERMAN: I would be happy to yield to the chairwoman, who had two minutes.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Ranking member of our Middle East subcommittee, we have held numerous hearings on the issue of Iran. And I would be glad -- at which you have pended and made opening statements as long as you wanted to -- and I would be glad to give you a list of those hearings, and perhaps you just did not remember them.

ACKERMAN: I was at -- reclaiming my time -- I remember very well, and I just said, in those instances...

ROS-LEHTINEN: But you said that we haven't had the hearings.

ACKERMAN: No. I said, in those instances where there are no hearings to allow the chairperson -- such as yourself, who was allowed two minutes, and the ranking member, who obviously will not be allowed two minutes, to have two minutes, if their subcommittee does not have a hearing on the subject that's called. And there have been quite a few hearings that have fit that definition, Mr. Chairman.

And I just respectfully, on behalf of all of the members on this committees, Democrats and Republicans, make that request, in the interest of policy, that we are here to seriously discuss, to further the interests of the United States, something we all care jointly about. Thank you.

HYDE: The chair notes with interest what Mr. Ackerman says -- always notes with interest what Mr. Ackerman says. And when you are chairman, Mr. Ackerman, you may give each member as long as they want, prior to hearing the witnesses.

HYDE: For myself, I choose to hear the witnesses, not a debate among ourselves, which we can have any time, any place we want.

We have brought witnesses here to instruct us on the subject under discussion. And the purpose of the hearing is to get to the witnesses, not to hear each other. At least that's my narrow interpretation of the function of the committee.

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I respect that deeply. And I have a tremendous amount of respect for you, your intellect and the contribution you have made to this Congress and to our country.

HYDE: Then you would understand...

ACKERMAN: But with all due respect, you're being here to hear the witnesses, and you and the ranking member take up as much time as the entire committee making opening statements. And some of us would like to just get our toe in the water.

HYDE: Well, I understand that. And I appreciate your position. And when you are chairman, I'm sure that will happen.

But until then, I prefer getting to the witnesses. And with...

ACKERMAN: Does that mean that the chair will limit himself to one minute as well?

HYDE: The chairwoman?

ACKERMAN: The chair. Would the chair limit himself to the same rules as the members are limited to, if that's what you're here to do?

HYDE: No. The chair is the chairman...

ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: ... and expects to use that prerogative in the most efficacious way to get to the witnesses, which I'm not doing a good job right now.

(LAUGHTER)

Mr. Smith of New Jersey?

C. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, in light of your superb statement, Mr. Lantos, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Berman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

HYDE: I didn't hear you, Mr. Ackerman. But Mr. Lantos, as the ranking member, gets special treatment. The chairman gets special treatment. And as the power of recognition rests with the chairman, and I intend to use it.

Mr. Ackerman?

ACKERMAN: Is this to respond to what the chairman said, or for my 60 seconds of contribution?

HYDE: I prefer your 60 seconds of contribution.

ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Last month, Secretary Rice announced a significant shift in our policy towards Iran. She's proposing to spend $85 million to reach out to the Iranian people. While most of this money will be spent on broadcasting, I'm concerned about the $10 million identified for empowering Iranian civil society.

My concern is not in principle, since I think whatever we can do to force the effective opposition to the mullahs inside Iran is to the good. It is the effective part I'm worried about, and our track record in this regard is not good.

First, we tried this sort of approach with Iraq, only to find out that the administration's favorite exile, Ahmed Chalabi, took our money, gave us bad information, and ultimately had no political support inside of Iraq.

So, I will be very curious to hear from the administration whom we've identified to receive this new money, and what sort of work they will carry on inside of Iran.

Second, I think we have great difficulty identifying successful recipients of this money, because frankly, our intelligence in Iran is not particularly good.

Iran is opaque to us. We don't see their decision-making process well. We don't understand Iranian society well. And so, we are handicapped in our ability to discern how decisions get made and who makes them. It means our ability to develop a policy, or set policies that will produce the desired outcome, is extremely limited.

And lastly, the secretary's proposal is about the long term, while we should be thinking and acting in accordance with our long- term interests. We do not have a more urgent short-term crisis on our hands.

We seem to lurch from deadline to deadline with Iran. While they drag out its negotiations with the E.U.-3 and the Russians, I fear diplomacy may be producing legitimacy for Iran, but doing little in the way of stopping its nuclear programs.

As I said at our hearings a year ago, that in order for our diplomatic partners to believe the Iran question is urgent, the administration needs to convince them that they believe it is urgent.

HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired.

ACKERMAN: I look forward to hear from our distinguished witnesses.

HYDE: Mr. Paul of Texas?

PAUL: OK. Thank you. Turned my mike off on purpose.

(LAUGHTER)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very quickly, I want to make a point or two.

Yesterday, our ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad, announced that it's turned into a Pandora's box of ethnic and sectarian strife. He also said that we have to be there to protect oil supplies. And the chairman today even mentioned how instability in Iran could contribute to a problem with the flow of oil.

Of course, since we've been in Iraq, oil went from $30 to $60. I'm just wondering whether our policy now of confrontation with Iran might not take oil from $60 to $120.

ElBaradei just think week said, quote, we have not seen indication of diversion of material to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, which we should take note. And also, Iran has never been ruled in violation of its international nuclear nonproliferation obligation, which I think we should take note.

But more importantly, I think our policy is not exactly in line with international law. The administration told Iran on Tuesday that any enrichment of nuclear fuel on Iranian territory was unacceptable.

And yet, the Non-Proliferation Treaty says, nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination.

We should pay attention to those comments.

HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Delahunt of Massachusetts?

DELAHUNT: I just associate myself with the contribution of my friend from New York, Mr. Ackerman. I share the same concerns, and I'd yield whatever time I have remaining to him, if he so chooses to utilize it.

HYDE: Mr. Rohrabacher of California?

ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much. First and foremost, let's remember through all of this kibitzing that we are at war, and Americans are losing their lives as we speak. We are at war with radical Islam. This is a very serious -- not a political issue -- a serious national issue.

If we win the allegiance of moderate Muslims who want their country to live at peace with the West, we may win this war and save millions of lives. If we do not, and if the Iranian mullahs end up the dominant force in that region and, indeed, in the Muslim world, we're in for real trouble. We're in for historic, historic, catastrophic incidences, especially if that's coupled with the Iranian mullahs getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

So, what we are talking about today is deadly serious. But let us remember that we can combat this threat. the threat posed by these murderous mullahs in Iran, through tough policies -- that's pressure from without -- but also by supporting the internal reformists, the internal people in Iran who want to live at peace with the West, Iranians who want to have a democratic government, live in a decent country.

So, as we've discussed this issue, let's not forget our points of leverage, not only pressure from outside, but supporting those moderates on the inside.

HYDE: Mr. Payne of New Jersey?

PAYNE: Thank you. In order to hear our witnesses, unless Mr. Ackerman would like to use my time -- are you -- if you have a point, I'll yield my time to Mr. Ackerman.

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have no desire to use the time of other members of the committee. I was just fighting for the right of everybody to be able to say what they want to say.

HYDE: As you know, Mr. Ackerman, you got to strike the last words at the end of the testimony. And I don't recall you ever being shut off from that process.

So, you'll have a chance to express yourself fully.

Mr. McCotter?

MCCOTTER: I've got nothing to say...

ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman?

MCCOTTER: ... but it's OK.

HYDE: Mr. Blumenauer?

BLUMENAUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am eager to get into the discussion.

I hope at some point the notion that your reference to the role that Iran plays, because of its energy resource, might reflect back on our urgency to do something about our dependence on that. A sound, solid energy policy reducing our dependency would, I hope, filter into that discussion at some point.

HYDE: I thank the gentleman. I suggest that's one of the major issues confronting us.

Mr. Royce of California?

ROYCE: You are right, Mr. Chairman, we should hear the witnesses. We should listen, and then we should speak.

I withdraw.

HYDE: Thank you.

Ms. Berkley of Nevada?

BERKLEY: I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Poe of Texas?

POE: The United States can make a bold statement by supporting freedom of the Iranian people from their repression. The State Department in their supplemental request is asking for $5 million for educational outreach. According the State Department, this funding will build bridges between the people of our nations.

I support democracy through this educational exchange idea. But the United States must use common sense, as we identify foreign students for enrollment in our universities. Just last week an Iranian graduate at the University of North Carolina calmly drove his truck through a campus meeting place at Chapel Hill, injuring nine people. He performed this despicable act to revenge what he called crimes against Islam. This is yet one more act of radical Islam extremists in our country.

It's interesting to note, he made sure he got his degree before he committed this crime. We must do our best to ensure that students who receive the opportunity to study in America do not use that chance to commit political crimes against us. We already have a Taliban student at Yale, and we must not allow further infiltration of our universities by those who would do destruction to the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Mr. Schiff of California?

SCHIFF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief.

I just, in addition to the questions that have already been posed by my colleagues, I would love to hear your comment on China. I think a lot of focus has been on Russia, and understandably so. But I'm equally concerned about China and their willingness to confront Iran over its nuclear program.

In particular, I think China will view this as an economic decision. And unless we make it very plain to China that there are economic consequences in terms of U.S. markets, there won't be anything in the other balance for them to consider.

And if this is truly the top national security issue facing us, as the chairman alluded -- and I think it certainly ranks up there -- we should be prepared to use our economic leverage. And I would be interested to know if you've considered that, and how you intend to employ that technique. Thank you.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Issa of California?

ISSA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for setting the tone with your opening remarks.

I come here with questions, not answers. And I want to hear the speakers, so I yield back.

HYDE: Ms. Watson of California?

WATSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for coming. I want to especially thank Ambassador Burns for taking time to come to the Hill. Your presence tells me that you understand that Congress is not an obstacle to the executive branch on foreign policy. Rather, when fully informed, we can be the most valuable ally, even on delicate issues such as this.

To confront Iran, the United States has assembled a global diplomatic coalition, and we have employed diplomacy to great effect. But the successes we have had, have depended on our defense of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We must not forget this.

If our actions elsewhere around the globe weaken the NPT at the very moment that we are relying on it to confront Iran over nuclear weapons, we risk undoing all of our efforts. And on issues of Iran's nuclear program, the stakes are too high for us to accept an American failure.

We're looking forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you very much.

HYDE: Mr. Chandler of Kentucky?

CHANDLER: I yield, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Ms. Lee of California?

LEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome and thank the witnesses for being here. I also am extremely concerned with regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world.

Especially, I have grave concerns regarding the threat that a nuclear Iran poses. But I believe that we must increase and enhance our diplomatic means to disarm Iran. We must take an active role in diplomatic engagement.

I think that we must decide whether there's an opportunity to engage the United States in bilateral talks with Iran, rather than seeking only to support negotiations of the E.U. or the efforts of Russia, to control the reprocessing of nuclear materials to the satisfaction of the international community.

Yes, Iran must be held to international standards and must disarm. I believe, however, Mr. Chairman, that we will not be well served by another military venture into the Middle East, and neither will the cause of nonproliferation. So, I think it's about time we enhanced and elevate our diplomatic efforts. Thank you.

HYDE: I want to thank the committee for your cooperation. We now can proceed to the witnesses.

We're privileged to have before us today two high-ranking and expert witnesses on the situation in Iran. Our first witness will be Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Nicholas Burns.

HYDE: Ambassador Burns has had a long and illustrious career in the Foreign Service in postings throughout the world. As Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Burns currently coordinates all U.S. diplomacy and State Department foreign policy efforts, and has taken a special interest in dealing with the situation in Iran.

Dr. Robert Joseph is the current Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Joseph is the principal State Department officer for non- and counter-proliferation matters, as well as for arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations and security assistance.

Previously, he served as special assistant to the president and senior director for proliferation strategy, counter-proliferation and homeland defense at the National Security Council.

Gentlemen, without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record. I ask that you limit your oral presentation to about five minutes, give or take, as is customary, so we may have as much time as feasible for you to respond to questions from members of the committee.

Secretary Burns?

 

STATEMENT OF

NICHOLAS BURNS
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

 

BURNS: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your invitation to Undersecretary Joseph and myself to be with you this morning. Thank you to Mr. Lantos and all the other distinguished members of this committee.

I have submitted testimony for the record. I shall not read it, in the interests of time. I just have a couple of points that I thought I should make in response to some of the opening comments by members.

But first, may I say how much I want to second Congressman Ros- Lehtinen's welcome to the American hostages.

Ambassador Bruce Laingen and his colleagues, who are here today, have gathered from across the United States to come to this hearing, and to come over to the State Department this afternoon. I look forward to meeting them, to give us their views on Iran. And I, for one, am intensely interested to hear their perspective.

They are American heroes. There were 53 of them taken hostage in November 1979, held unjustly for 444 days. And the fact that they've come out of that experience and contributed so much to our country is a source of great satisfaction to us.

Three of them continue to serve in the American Foreign Service, and we're very, very proud of them. I just wanted to mention their presence and thank them for coming today.

Mr. Chairman, the threat posed to the United States by Iran is as great, in our judgment, as any foreign policy challenge that our country faces. And the Iranians have issued, in essence, four challenges to our country's interests in the Middle East and globally.

The first is the clear pursuit of Iran of nuclear weapons capability.

The second is the fact that Iran is the leading director and chief central banker of the major terrorist groups in the Middle East, that have killed Americans and killed Israelis and Lebanese, and which stand in direct opposition to peace in the Middle East.

The third is the attempt by Iran, particularly under the regime of President Ahmadinejad, to exert a dominant role in the Middle East itself, and to make Iran into the most powerful country in the Middle East.

And the fourth, of course, is the repression of the people of Iran by this autocratic regime.

That, in essence, in our judgment, represents the totality of the threat that Iran poses to American interests, as well as to those of our friends and allies around the world.

What we have attempted to do, over the past year in particular, is not to have a go-it-alone policy of trying to confront Iran ourselves, but to create a large and diverse international coalition of countries -- on each of these issues -- designed to deny Iran a nuclear weapon, and to roll back its support for terrorism, and to influence the people of Iran, who we see as victims of the regime, and to assert a comprehensive and aggressive American foreign policy to counter Iran on all of these issues.

My colleague Bob Joseph and I have worked very closely together on all of these issues. He is our chief official responsible for nuclear policy, and he'll go into some detail on our analysis of their intentions. But suffice it to say that, the greatest immediate threat that we face is that Iran is clearly trying to create a nuclear weapons capability.

I made 11 trips to Europe and to the Middle East in the last year on this issue. And in the hundreds of conversations that I had with Russians, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, not a single person -- not a single official from any of those governments -- ever said that they doubted that Iran was trying to seek a nuclear weapons capability.

There is no international difference of opinion. There is no debate around the world about the essential fact of what Iran is trying to do. And that does inform our diplomacy and our national strategy.

What we've tried to do is to support those who would try to roll back the Iranians, engage them in negotiations and have them suspend their nuclear activities. So, just a year ago this week, Secretary Rice announced that we would support the European Three -- Britain, France and Germany -- in their efforts to negotiate with the Iranians.

And we did that for six months until the Iranians walked out of the talks with the Europeans, walked out unilaterally, and said they weren't interested in dealing with the Europeans. And then we worked throughout the autumn, because of that result, to create a larger coalition of countries designed to block the Iranians.

Secretary Rice went to Moscow in October. President Bush met President Putin in Asia in November. And we began to assemble this coalition of Russia and China -- India had already decided to be with us -- which resulted in the historic vote of the IAEA on February 4th, where more members of the nonaligned movement voted against Iran than with Iran, and where Russia and China and India and Brazil and Egypt and Sri Lanka, as well as Europe and Japan and Australia, voted with us to block the Iranians.

And then Secretary Rice had a very important gathering of the foreign ministers of the permanent five countries of the United Nations Security Council about five weeks ago. And all of those countries, led by the United States, decided that we would try to block Iran at the IAEA, but give them 30 days to reflect on their isolation.

The 30 days are up. And we believe that next Monday or Tuesday, the United Nations Security Council will begin a very active debate about Iran's nuclear ambitions. That debate will be designed to shine a very large and intensive spotlight on what we believe to be a clear Iranian program.

We'll likely see a presidential statement of (ph) the Security Council designed to condemn Iran. We would like, beyond that, to entertain the possibility of a Chapter 7 resolution designed to isolate it, and hopefully, influence its behavior.

But beyond that, if Iran doesn't respond to words and resolutions, then we believe that the world community should entertain the possibility of sanctions against Iran.

Now, our country, of course, has had sanctions in place for decades, across the board. There may be more that we can do as a country, to try to hit against those in Iran via sanctions, who build these nuclear programs and design them, and who lead (ph) the government's efforts.

But it's going to be incumbent upon our allies around the world, and interested countries, to show that they are willing to act, should the words and the resolutions of the United Nations not suffice.

Mr. Chairman, on terrorism, I'd be happy to -- we'll be happy to respond to questions on this, but Iranian support for terrorism, of course, affects every vital American interest -- and American lives -- in the Middle East and throughout the world. Iran is supporting Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

We have noticed the emergence of a nexus of these terrorist groups with Iran and the Syrian government, just over the last five to six weeks. And President Ahmadinejad had a summit meeting with President Assad of Syria and all these terrorists groups just recently, several weeks ago. It is of great concern to us, and we are working actively to try to turn back that terrorist challenge that Iran poses to us.

On democracy and human rights, the Iranian government has locked up dissidents. It has jailed journalists. Last month, bus drivers went on strike for better wages. The Iranian government sent armed thugs to beat them up.

Mr. Akbar Ganji, who has been held for many years as a journalist, may be released last week, but he's a celebrated human rights figure who deserves the support of all of us. And I know he has the support of the Congress, as well as the administration.

But we're concerned about the repression of the Iranian people. And as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, the great irony of this situation as we face this Iranian threat, is that a majority of Iranians in public opinion polls have a favorable view of our country.

They like American democracy. They want to study here. They want to have exchange programs. They don't particularly all support -- a great number of them -- the actions of their own government.

And so, as we go on to the next issue, Mr. Chairman, that is, how can we influence Iran, and how can the Congress and the administration work together, we hope that Congress will support Secretary Rice's and the president's $75 million supplemental request, which is designed to open up our ability to connect with average Iranian citizens.

We'd like to use $50 million of that money to expand our TV and radio broadcasts through Voice of America and Radio Farda into Iran. We'd like to work with some of the private, American radio and TV stations from the State of California and New Jersey and the Washington, D.C. area, to help them get the American message into Iran itself.

We'd like to use some of the money -- and Congressman Ackerman referred to this -- to try to do a very difficult job. And Congressman Ackerman, I agree with you; this is a high hill to climb -- but to see if we can work through nongovernmental organizations around the world, and with some of the European NGOs to try to plant some roots of democracy, of independent journalism, of civil society into Iran.

It's difficult to do in an open hearing. We can't say everything that we're intending to do, obviously. But we do hope that Congress will respond to the request for $10 million in funding.

And finally, a number of the members spoke about exchanges. We want to connect with the Iranian people. We don't want to be so blunt in our approach that we penalize innocent Iranians for the sins of their government. And so, we'd like to bring Iranian high school and university students to this country. We'd like to have exchanges among union officials, among teachers, among average citizens.

There was a time before the Iranian revolution when there were several hundred thousand Iranians studying in the United States. Today it's just 2,000 people.

It's part of the longer term effort that goes along with the shorter term policy that Undersecretary Joseph and I are talking about today.

And my final comment, Mr. Chairman, would be to say this. The presence of our hostages reminds us of how ill-equipped we are as a government to understand Iran, to have officials who can speak Farsi, and to engage Iranians around the world.

Since our hostages were taken, and since they were released -- of course, our embassy has been shuttered in Tehran -- we do not intend to reopen that embassy any time soon.

We have a policy of trying to isolate Iran. But it's important that we understand it, understand the country. And so, Secretary Rice has directed that we undertake a series of measures designed to bolster our capability within the State Department to be smart about Iran.

And so, for the very first time since 1980, she has just created in the last two weeks a new Iran desk in our Bureau of Middle Eastern Affairs in the State Department. It is up and functioning.

She has also directed that we establish an American presence post, a diplomatic post in Dubai, which will be solely concerned with Iranian affairs. We'll put about 10 diplomats in Dubai by this summer, and they will watch Iran. And they'll talk to Iranian dissidents and travelers from Iran, and understand that country in a way that we have not been able to do before.

And last, Secretary Rice has directed that we expand significantly our Farsi language training at the Foreign Service Institute, and that we try to produce a new generation of foreign service officers who understand Iranian history, culture and language, who can be deployed to embassies and consulates outside of Iran, but in the neighborhood, to do, in essence, what we did, Mr. Chairman, in the 1920s.

When we had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, we sent young diplomats like George Kennan to Riga, and we created Riga station. And that station watched the Soviet Union from a close distance, and a lot of those diplomats went on to have illustrious careers in the State Department.

We have lost the expertise that the generation of Bruce Laingen, who is here today, represented. Secretary Rice now wants to recreate that. And we do so, because Iran represents a generational challenge to American foreign policy.

And we must defeat Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, its sponsorship of terrorism and its subjugation of the people of Iran, in hope that better days will come for those people who deserve freedom and democracy in that country. Thank you very much.

HYDE: Thank you, Ambassador Burns.

Secretary Joseph?

 

STATEMENT OF

ROBERT JOSEPH
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security

 

JOSEPH: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, distinguished members of the committee. It's a pleasure for me to appear before you today with my colleague, Undersecretary Burns, to discuss what Iran is doing in terms of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, and what we are doing to blunt that effort.

I have submitted a written statement. What I would like to do, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, is simply summarize some of the main points.

JOSEPH: I begin from the premise that Mr. Lantos has articulated, and that is that a nuclear armed Iran is intolerable. Let me outline the reasons.

First, a nuclear armed Iran could embolden the leadership in Tehran to advance its aggressive and expansionist ambitions in and outside of the region, both directly and through the terrorists that it supports.

Today, even with an Iran that does not have a nuclear weapons capability, we are confronted by it and its surrogates in Iraq, Afghanistan, in Lebanon, and by Tehran's efforts to undercut peace between Israel and the Palestinians. If Iran possessed nuclear weapons, those confrontations would be sharpened and expanded.

Second, a nuclear armed Iran would represent, in my view, a direct threat to U.S. forces and allies in the region, the greater Middle East, Europe and Asia, and eventually to the United States itself.

Iran would be more likely to use force -- perhaps even chemical and biological weapons, which it is also pursuing -- if it believed that a nuclear shield protected it from retaliation. At a very minimum, Iran could seek to use nuclear weapons for intimidation and blackmail.

Third, as you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Lantos pointed out, a nuclear armed Iran could engender further proliferation and a reevaluation of security requirements across this vital region, undermining the very integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Fourth, a nuclear armed Iran would represent an existential threat to the state of Israel. President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly stated his goal of wiping Israel off the map. Many in Israel believe that he means exactly what he says, and I believe, for good reason; he is a true believer.

Finally, Iran is at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. If it has fissile material or a nuclear weapon, the likelihood of their transfer to a third party would increase, either by design or by diversion.

For these reasons, I believe we must not concede the inevitability of a nuclear armed Iran, but rather pursue determined diplomacy and defensive measures to preclude such an outcome.

Let me just turn very briefly to Iran's nuclear program. Today, we are challenged by a determined Iranian effort. Iran is pressing ahead on its centrifuge enrichment technology. It has, since January, put both feet on the accelerator.

Recently, it began to introduce UF6 gas, the feed material for centrifuges, into a 10-centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium at a pilot plant. This is the beginning of a much larger cascade, with hundreds of centrifuges at this pilot facility.

And Iran has openly notified the IAEA that this fall it will begin installing the first 3,000 centrifuges at an industrial enrichment plant at Natanz, which is, in fact, designed to hold tens of thousands of centrifuges.

Iran has already produced approximately 86 tons of feed material, uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for these centrifuges. If this amount of feedstock were enriched to weapons grade uranium, the result would be enough highly enriched uranium for about 10 nuclear weapons.

The only plausible explanation for the expansion and the urgency of the Iranian enrichment program, is to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

There are also disturbing indications that Iran is working on the next step, that is, weaponization. The IAEA has uncovered documentation in Iran for the casting and machining of enrich uranium hemispheres, which are directly relevant to the production of nuclear weapons components.

The IAEA is also pursuing information on high explosive tests and on the design of a specific delivery system, which clearly point to a military rather than a civilian, peaceful purpose.

In short, Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, but we are equally determined to stop it. The president has emphasized that all options are on the table to deal with this threat, but that our strong preference is to do so through effective diplomacy.

Undersecretary Burns has addressed some of our diplomatic efforts. I would just add a few points.

The IAEA statute requires that noncompliance with IAEA safeguards be reported to the Security Council. The IAEA board in November of 2003 -- now over 2.5 years ago -- decided to put off reporting Iran's noncompliance to the Security Council, to allow time for the United Kingdom, France and Germany, or the E.U.-3, to reach an agreement with Iran that would provide confidence that Iran's activities in the nuclear area were solely for peaceful purposes.

In November of 2004, agreement was reached in Paris between the E.U.-3 and Iran to suspend all uranium conversion and enrichment activities during the negotiations on a long-term agreement, and the United States supported that effort.

Russia also has put forward a creative proposal for a joint venture for uranium enrichment in Russia, but in a way that does not allow Iran access to sensitive technology, and would not permit Iran to conduct any enrichment related activities on Iranian soil.

While Iran continues to fain interest in such a deal with Russia and very cynically calls for negotiations and compromise, it has refused to agree to stop those enrichment related activities in Iran, which is an essential part of the package. And in violation of this Paris agreement, and in defiance of the will of the will of the international community, Iran resumed uranium conversion activity in August of 2004, and enrichment activities in January of this year.

In September 2005, the IAEA board found that Iran's many breaches and failures to comply with its safeguards agreement constituted formal noncompliance under the statute, and found that Iran's nuclear activities have given rise to questions within the competence of the U.N. Security Council.

In early February, the IAEA board, by a wide majority, instructed the Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, to report to the Security Council his findings on Iran, and he has since done so. We expect that the Security Council will take up action on Iran's noncompliance next week. The Council's actions will not supplement the IAEA's role, but rather enforce it.

It is imperative that the Council make clear to the Iranian regime that there will be significant, negative consequences if it does not step away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. The Security Council can take progressively firmer action to induce Iran to come into compliance with its NPT and safeguards obligations, to suspend all of its enrichment and reprocessing related activities, and finally, to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

While our diplomacy in the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council is an essential part of our strategy, we must do more, and we recognize that through the development of a broader strategy. We will work closely with other states to continue and, as necessary, to expand defensive measures to protect ourselves against the WMD threat from Iran, as well as from other proliferant states.

These defensive measures require an increasing array of instruments, policies and programs. At one end of that spectrum are programs like the Nunn-Lugar work that helps to prevent Iran, as well as others, from gaining access to enabling technologies and materials, to deny Iran and others a shortcut to a nuclear weapon.

At the other end are capabilities such as missile defense and other counterproliferation capabilities that we need to deploy in order to address the threats, to protect ourselves and to provide assurance and reassurance to our friends and allies.

Other defensive measures address the financial underpinnings of proliferation, including the president's June 2005 executive order authorizing the United States government to freeze assets and block transactions of proliferators and their supporters.

One of our most important defensive measures is the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, which is now expanded to include support from over 70 countries, and continues to grow. PSI action has stopped the transshipment of material and equipment for Iran's ballistic missile and WMD programs, including their nuclear program.

We continue to consider possible new or expanded defensive measures to combat the proliferation (inaudible) from Iran. This is -- I agree with what has been said -- the greatest strategic challenge we will face in the foreseeable future. We must and we will pursue multiple avenues to prevent the emergence of a nuclear armed Iran.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

HYDE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

We'll now get to questions under the five-minute rule. I don't usually ask a question, but to give you an opportunity to outline your concerns with H.R.282, will you tell us if the passage of that bill will help or hurt your efforts, and why?

Ambassador Burns?

BURNS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the opportunity to comment on H.R.282.

We believe that the current legislation in place, ILSA, has been a very effective tool for our foreign policy. Secretary Rice has said that quite often.

We are a country that's had a harder edge to its diplomacy than many others. And sometimes in international diplomacy you have countries that are out in front engaging, and other countries that stand behind with a great deal of solidity to their position. We've been that country standing behind the European countries, and the Russians and Chinese, with very effective sanctions in place.

We know that the ILSA, perhaps without Libya, in our view, will come up -- it needs to be reauthorized. Our view, Mr. Chairman, is that it ought to be reauthorized. And we think it can continue to be an effective tool for American foreign policy, and a good union of congressional as well as executive branch interests.

I would say this, Mr. Chairman -- it's in my written contribution -- when the bill is being debated, I think we'll want to have discussions with you and other members about ways that some of the provisions in the current draft could be modified, because one thing we don't want to do is divide the international diplomatic coalition that we've put together.

And we think that rather than focus some of the sanctions on our allies, we ought to focus the sanctions on the Iranians.

In our view, over the last 12 months, the most significant achievement of American foreign policy towards Iran has been to broaden the group of countries who are standing with us. The Europeans are solidly with us. Japan and Australia are with us.

But most importantly, India has voted twice with the United States and the IAEA against Iran. And now Russia and China have done so.

I know Secretary Rice prizes the fact that she has this -- we have this -- coalition in place. And rather than have new legislation that would really focus sanctions on our allies, we'd rather focus it on the Iranians.

So, as you begin your work -- or should I say, as you continue it -- we'll want to make that suggestion. We have some specific suggestions, Mr. Chairman, that we could put forward with respect to the members of Congress, and we'll be happy to engage further with you on this.

HYDE: Thank you.

Mr. Berman of California?

BERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few questions, but I just have to respond to Ambassador Burns' comment.

I understand reservations about this legislation. I can understand why you -- I myself would argue that Congress moving this kind of legislation creates an atmosphere which helps you push the impetus towards a multilateral and diplomatic approach to the problem, if for no other reason than the good cop/bad cop routine.

But I don't think you should try to sell the notion that ILSA has been effective. While it had some initial deterrent benefits on investment in the energy sector, the fact is, this administration and the previous administration, initially through the use of waivers, and now through the total unwillingness to make any findings, never acknowledges any foreign investment in Iran's energy sector; and therefore, nothing ever gets triggered.

So whatever the reservations may be about the legislation before us, I don't think we should try and sell how effective this legislation, the existing law has been. And as a sponsor of the existing law, I'm sorry to have to admit that fact. But I think that fact is clear.

My questions, though -- and perhaps, Secretary Joseph, you're the right person to direct them to. I raised this initially.

Is Russia, in the context of its proposal to Iran, pushing -- here are the few things I'd like you to respond to -- are they pushing for a complete suspension, not only of enrichment, but of conversion?

BERMAN: Are they pushing for continued IAEA inspections until all aspects of the Iranian program, including the evidence already available of a parallel military program? Are they pushing total access to individuals and sites as part of their proposal?

Are they seeking a time-limited agreement, or an agreement of indefinite duration?

Are the Russians going beyond simply the willingness to provide the enriched fuel, to provide assurances that there will be no research reactor, that there will be no research and development on these issues?

Just how broad is the Russian proposal -- that Iran may never accept, but if they do accept, it will be very hard to get Russia, then, to become an ally of imposing sanctions at the Security Council, if it's deficient. So I'm wondering, are we right in investing as much as we are in this effort?

And finally, could you give us your best guess, not about when Iran will have a nuclear weapon, but about the fastest in which they would have the independent capability to develop a nuclear weapon without explicitly or illicitly gaining technologies from outside Iraq?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like of you could just address some of those.

BURNS: Mr. Berman, if I could just deal 15 seconds with Undersecretary Joseph's permission, just to respond to the initial comment you made on sanctions and on ILSA.

We want to work with your committee -- this committee -- and with the Congress on a reauthorization of ILSA. We just would request a certain degree of flexibility, because what's ahead of us diplomatically is this process in the U.N.

And if the process of words, resolutions, doesn't work, that process will head towards the consideration of some kind of targeted sanctions, and that's the only point I wanted to make.

BERMAN: I wasn't arguing with that point, although I think movement of a strong bill can have some benefits. I was arguing with the point that ILSA has been effective.

JOSEPH: Mr. Berman, thank you.

In terms of the Russian proposal, the Russians first put forward some ideas that evolved into their proposal. They put forth those ideas last September, and they've been developing those ideas ever since.

The proposal, as I understand the proposal, as has been described to me by Russian authorities, is that it would prohibit on Iranian territory all enrichment related activities. It would, however, allow the continuation of conversion of uranium, which is ongoing at Isfahan as we speak today.

The Russians have been very supportive of the IAEA authorities. And in the context of their proposal, they have encouraged Iran, as part of the arrangement that they would try to negotiate, to adhere to the additional protocol, which would give the IAEA additional authorities to pursue their investigation. They have been very frustrated with Iran's unwillingness to cooperate fully with the IAEA, which has repeated successively in about nine -- I think the count is now at nine -- IAEA resolutions on this issue.

The Russians, I believe, are very frustrated that Iran continues to pursue its nuclear weapons capability, and I think it's quite apparent to the Russian authorities exactly what is happening.

In terms of the time limitation, I have not heard that there is any time limits associated with their proposal, other than rumors that have recently been circulating in Vienna, in the context of this board meeting. I do not give any credence to those rumors.

I think the Russian foreign minister, Lavrov, when he spoke to this issue here in Washington, made very clear that there is not a Russian proposal -- a new Russian proposal -- that would allow limited research and development in Iran in the area of enrichment activities.

In terms of Iran's capabilities, indigenous capabilities, it is my sense that Iran has a very large, a very capable scientific and technical community. Iran has access to tremendous resources, which you can see reflected in the scale of their investment in Natanz and in Isfahan -- their overall nuclear program.

My sense is that there will be impediments that Iranian scientists and technicians will need to overcome before they're able to master the enrichment process. They're currently now hooking up centrifuges into small cascades. It is not easy to go from individual centrifuges to small cascades to larger cascades.

But my sense is, they have the ability to overcome those problems in time. The issue is, how much time? I don't know that we have a good sense of how much time it will take Iran to master these technologies on their own.

There's always, of course, the concern that they can shortcut the process. They can either acquire fissile material on the black market, or they can bring in expertise to help them solve some of the problems that are associated with developing an enrichment capability.

A.Q. Khan, for example, provided expertise. We believe that we have closed down the A.Q. Khan network, but there may be others out there for hire.

HYDE: Mr. Smith of New Jersey?

C. SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Burns, Secretary Joseph, thank you for your tremendous leadership on behalf of our country. Let me ask a couple of questions.

Given the longstanding, bitter animosity between Iran and Iraq, how do you assess the immediate, the intermediate and the longer term threat of Iran to democratic Iraq, and especially as it relates to our troops who are deployed there?

Secondly, Iran, as we all know, is a country of particular concern, because of its ongoing egregious abuse of religious freedom. Has Iran's already bad record been made worse under the new president? And can you speak to the issue of evangelical Christians and the Baha'i? And what about the small Jewish community, which goes back thousands of years in Iran?

And thirdly, the issue of Internet companies. We held a joint hearing, Mr. Leach and I, just a few days ago on the ongoing complicity of many of our larger Internet companies -- including Yahoo, Cisco, Google -- with China and their secret police and their propaganda organs.

And I'm wondering if you can tell us, since we know that Internet use is very, very severely monitored by the Iranians, what has -- have any of our companies directly or indirectly been a part of that? Have they lent any of their technology, for example, to their secret police in Iran, to crack down on anyone who might seek freedom or justice?

And again, along those same lines, is VOA and Radio Farda bypassing Iranian jamming efforts?

BURNS: Congressman Smith, thank you very much for your leadership on all these issues. Let me just try to address them one by one.

We believe that Iran is playing a quite negative role in Iraq. First, there is evidence, and it's in my testimony again today, that the Iranians have supplied sophisticated -- they've provided explosive device technology to Shia terrorist groups. And those groups have used that technology against British forces in the southern part of Iraq, as well as against American forces.

We are very concerned about that development. It is not new. We've known about this for some months. Secretary Rice and Ambassador Khalilzad have discussed it publicly, and that's why we discuss it publicly again today.

But we have communicated with the Iranian government through the interest section -- the Swiss interest section -- that represents our interests in Tehran, that this is unacceptable. And that message, we believe, has been heard in Tehran.

We also believe that the Iranians, obviously, are trying to enhance their own influence in Iran. They do that in a number of ways. We don't think their influence has been, as our has, to suggest that Shia, Sunni and Kurd should live together peacefully and should form a government together peacefully. But rather, the Iranians have been trying to really speak to one community, and that's the Shia community in Iraq.

We also think that they have been exceedingly unhelpful in not using their influence to downplay sectarian violence. And so, we don't have anything good to say about what the Iranians have done as a country, as a government, in Iraq.

On your second question, one of the great tragedies of the last 26 years is that a country that previously had a reputation and history of some tolerance for religious differences within its society -- well, that has disappeared. And especially with this very aggressive form of, brand of -- group of leaders that have taken power in Iran over the last 25 years. They have persecuted Baha'i and Christian and Jews.

And in our annual human rights report, we document that. And I know you've done a lot of work on this yourself, Mr. Smith. And, of course, we've been sorely disappointed to see this.

We speak out against it. We ask our European allies -- all of which have embassies in Tehran, unlike us -- to use their influence, as well as Arab countries, to use their influence to speak up on behalf of persecuted minorities.

Third, on the question of American Internet companies, if I've understood it correctly, I would respectfully ask just to accept that question and give you a written answer. I simply do not know to what extent American companies may or may not be involved in working with the government of Iran.

As we do not have an embassy there and there are very few American citizens living in Iran, our ability sometimes to understand everything that's happening is quite limited. But I will take the question and look at it for you and get back to you.

C. SMITH: And Radio Farda? Any jamming?

BURNS: Yes. The Iranians have attempted to impede the transmission of Radio Farda, as well as the Persian language -- Farsi language TV stations that we fund. We expect -- and they obviously try to do that to blunt the private American and international radio and TV stations that broadcast into Iran.

But that's one of the reasons why the president and Secretary Rice have requested $50 million from the Congress to upgrade our ability to effectively transmit an American voice into Iran.

HYDE: Mr. Ackerman?

ACKERMAN: I want to thank both of our witnesses for their very thoughtful approach to this and so many other difficult issues.

Since our involvement in Iraq, we've not heard any mention of the other two participants in terms of calling them part of the "evil axis." They have each very strongly continued to try to procure a nuclear weapons program. They are very much alive.

First question is the Bush doctrine. Is that alive? We've not heard mention of it for awhile.

Also, shortly, one of our later witnesses is going to suggest that we cannot move ahead with a nuclear cooperation agreement until we resolve the Iran issue.

In that regard, I want to ask you about the relationship between what we're trying to achieve in Iran -- namely, stopping their nuclear program -- and what we're trying to achieve with India, and that is, providing them access to nuclear technology.

Not speaking specifically for myself, but in the minds of many, proceeding with the Indian deal undercuts our efforts to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

I'd like you to outline, if you would, for the committee, why the administration sees these as two separate and distinct cases, and why our progress with India will not hinder our efforts to stop Iran.

And then I would like, if you could, to address the question of whether our friends on the Security Council, which does include all of the members of the nuclear club, also sees these two cases as distinct.

JOSEPH: Mr. Ackerman, thank you very much. Why don't I try to address your first question.

We are, of course, under no illusions about the nature of the regime in Pyongyang or in Tehran.

I think the statements that have been made by President Ahmadinejad reflect the nature of that regime's statements that call for Israel -- and, by they way, the United States -- to be wiped off the face of the map, statements that deny the historical reality of the Holocaust.

This is a truly abhorrent regime, and we see it in many contexts. And clearly, the same is true with regard to North Korea, in terms of their violation of the basic, fundamental human rights of their own citizens, a nation that uses starvation as part of their national policy. Again, we're under no illusions.

In terms of the Bush doctrine, that can mean many things to many different people. My understanding of the Bush doctrine is the national strategy that we developed for combating weapons of mass destruction -- the first, truly comprehensive approach to dealing with the very complex and dangerous spectrum of threats associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It's a strategy that has three principles.

First of all, prevention, and this administration has put forth record requests for spending to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to build up the Nunn-Lugar and DOE type programs, so that countries like Iran and North Korea, and others, don't have easy access to sensitive materials and technologies. We've expanded that set of programs to include international funding through the G-8 Global Partnership, a partnership that has added approximately $7 billion in non-U.S. funds to this mission.

The second pillar is prevention. We know that we're not always going to be successful in terms of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we need to be able to deter and defend against that threat, both for our own protection, as well as for the protection of our friends and allies.

And here again, we've led the way through such measures as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which I mentioned before, which has resulted in, I think, significant nonproliferation results, including the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network, as well as the Libyan decision to give up its nuclear weapons program, as well as its long- range missile capabilities.

And the third pillar of this strategy...

ACKERMAN: If I might, Mr. Secretary, because I want to make sure that Ambassador Burns can answer the rest of the question -- I assume that's the way you're dividing it up -- if you could just cut to the chase on that.

Are we prepared to do in Iran and North Korea what we did in Iraq?

JOSEPH: The president has made clear that there are no options off the table, and that a nuclear armed Iran is intolerable.

BURNS: Mr. Ackerman, I'm pleased to respond to your second question about India and Iran.

Let's look at the differences between these two countries. India is democratic and peaceful, and a great friend of the United States. Iran is autocratic and adversarial, and one of the greatest threats facing our country today.

India, through the arrangement negotiated by President Bush last week, is seeking to bring the IAEA into India for the very first time, significantly, to place safeguards on the great majority of their nuclear facilities. Iran is trying to kick the IAEA out.

So, these two countries are going in opposite directions concerning their relationship with the IAEA. And we're looking forward, Bob and I, very much to coming up to brief all of you and also to testify, if you wish, Mr. Chairman, about this India agreement.

But if I could just say, the deal would call for 14 of the 22 current India nuclear power plants -- civil plants -- to be put under safeguards. All future civilian breeder and thermal reactors will be put under safeguards -- permanent safeguards in place, a moratorium on nuclear testing. If you rather...

ACKERMAN: If you might, Mr. Ambassador, just in the interest of time, I think most of us are familiar with the provisions so far.

But the question on, do our friends in the Security Council, and specifically those in the nuclear club, see it this way with regard to both programs?

BURNS: President Chirac, Prime Minister Blair, Prime Minister Howard and Mr. ElBaradei have all spoken out in support of the president's nuclear arrangement with India over the past week. And we think we are far better off bringing India into the nonproliferation system -- as this deal does -- than keeping it outside in isolation.

India is seeking inclusion; Iran is seeking exclusion. There's a great difference between the two. And we don't believe that an aggressive American policy on Iran means that we shouldn't have an inclusive American policy towards India.

HYDE: Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?

ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time. It's great to see you gentlemen again.

Secretary Burns, you had said in your testimony that, as the bill -- our Iran bill, H.R.282 -- is being debated, we would like to find ways to modify it. And with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, we have asked the administration for comments for over a year.

The bill now has 345 co-sponsors as it is. And I thank Chairman Hyde for helping us out and bringing it to a markup next week. Thank you, Chairman Hyde, for that help.

Secretary Burns, in your testimony you refer to a number of steps we have taken in the last year to blunt Iran's ambitions. You then proceed to discuss our support for the E.U.-3's proposal of far- reaching economic incentives, including access to, and assistance with, peaceful nuclear reactors.

So, how do incentives and nuclear assistance prevent Iran from crossing that nuclear threshold?

And also, related to that, then after Iran's proactive and provocative actions, in your words, why did we support -- why do we support Russia's proposal of having the fox guarding the henhouse? And would you agree that the time has come for punitive action?

And we have been working with you and we've done all we can to give the presidential waiver and the flexibility that needs to be reviewed every six months. And it's in the bill. And we do give the department and the administration a lot of flexibility.

I'd like to hear your comments.

BURNS: Thank you, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. And we're impressed by the 345 number. And we know how strong the sentiment is here in Congress to have an effective bill.

I apologize that we have not given you specific comments. I can assure you we will do so. We've just had a review within the administration of this bill.

I think you were out of the room when I said before in response to another question, we would like to see the reauthorization of the bill. We think the bill can be a useful tool, and has been. And so, we'd like to work with you on that basis.

But we do want some flexibility, given the diplomacy, which gets to your second question. We are certainly entering a new phase of diplomacy. The European Union's attempt to negotiate an end to their nuclear program was spurned by the Iranians. And now the attempt to have the IAEA be an effective tool to influence the Iranians, well that didn't work either. And so, we're turning to the U.N. Security Council.

Now, we'll begin a diplomatic phase there of conversations, discussions, presidential statements and resolutions. But should they not work, then we're going to have to have a harder edge, and I mean harder diplomatic edge to the policy. And that would be the consideration of targeted sanctions.

If we can have some flexibility in that domain as you write and finish your legislation, that would be greatly appreciated. I know Secretary Rice will be happy to talk to you about that in some detail.

And I would just say, in answer to your final question, the Russian government has played a constructive role, in our judgment, over the last five or six months. It doesn't mean we agree with everything Russia says or does on this issue.

For instance, we don't agree that Russia should be selling arms to Iran, as it has said it will do. We have never favored -- either the Clinton administration or this administration -- the construction of the Bushehr Reactor, with the help in Iran, with the help of the Russians.

But they've put forward a proposal, as Undersecretary Joseph said, that would effectively allow the Iranian people to have access to civil nuclear power, but none of the sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle would be on Iranian territory. It would an offshore arrangement.

And President Bush said on November 16th when he was in Asia, that we would support that proposal, if the Iranians accepted it.

Now, what have they done? They've rejected it.

The Iranians have played a double game here. They've said, well, we're interested in the Russian proposal, but we insist on our right to have enrichment on Iranian soil, which is a basic contradiction of the Russian proposal.

ROS-LEHTINEN: Well, thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Hyde.

I just am very disappointed with the disengagement from the Bush administration with Congress on the issue of Iran. And I think that we have seen a buildup of support that has been incredible for this bill.

And to come back over a year later and say, we want to work with you and we want to flexible, it's just incredible to me.

You have willing partners who reached out and did everything we could to engage you, and you wanted to go another way. And I thank the chairman for giving us the opportunity to mark the bill and pass it over.

Thank you.

HYDE: Mr. Delahunt of Massachusetts?

DELAHUNT: Ambassador, is a -- my friend from California talked about dialogue with the Iranians.

I noted where our ambassador to Iraq has been authorized by the president to engage in discussions with the Iranians regarding Iraq and stability in the region.

Have we made an effort to engage, or has the ambassador had communication? And if he has, has there been a response from the Iranians? And might there be an expansion of the agenda, if, in fact, those discussions are available and an option?

That's one question.

Secondly, in a memorandum prepared by CRS in preparation for this hearing, there's a statement that's made by the author, that the U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein appears to have benefited Iran strategically. Pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist parties have triumphed in two national assembly elections in 2005, essentially putting Tehran's proteges, or groups friendly to Iran, in power in Iraq.

Could you identify those parties for us? And what kind of influence are they bringing to bear in terms of stability in Iraq and in the region?

Also in that same memorandum, there's an observation that -- at least this is the inference that I drew -- is that the new president -- and I can't pronounce his name, so I'm not going to make that effort -- might not exactly be on the same page with the ruling religious elite.

There was a statement that they have granted new governmental advisory parties to a council that, in fact, is headed by his presidential rival, Rafsanjani.

I don't want to fall into the trap where there are no nuances in terms of our discussions relative to Iraq. If you see any nuances, such as a potential disagreement within the Iranian government as to its bilateral relations, could you relate that to us?

And a final question. I'm concerned, as Mr. Ackerman indicated, about that $10 million. I think one of our most serious mistakes was our reliance on Ahmed Chalabi for intelligence and for insights into what was occurring in Iraq.

You know, we have groups here that, I think, potentially would like to engage and influence American foreign policy. There's a terrorist group, MEK, that has considerable presence here in the United States through various front groups.

Are they still on the terrorist list? And I would hope that there would not be any consideration of support given for any group associated with them.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

BURNS: Congressman, thank you very much. I'll try to be brief in answering your four questions.

On the first question regarding our limited contacts with the Iranian government, since 1980, we have had -- there are available to us -- a series of channels through which we communicate to the Iranian government.

The first is the fact that Switzerland is our protecting power in Tehran, and so we have an ability to pass messages -- written messages -- through the Swiss to the Iranian authorities. And we -- every administration since President Reagan's has availed itself of that opportunity, including the current administration.

Second, there's an Algiers channel, a legal channel, which is meant to adjudicate concerns regarding government-to-government, but also private legal and financial issues between the two governments.

Third, as Secretary Rice I think mentioned to the HIRC -- I know she did to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when she testified three weeks ago -- she has authorized Ambassador Ron Neumann, our ambassador in Afghanistan, to be in contact with the Iranian ambassador in Afghanistan about issues there. And she has authorized Ambassador Khalilzad in the past to have the same type of channel.

Obviously, in an open hearing, I'd prefer not to give you a report card on those channels, on the results of those contacts, but I'd be happy to do that in classified session.

We believe -- and I think it's the question you're asking -- that with this current regime of President Ahmadinejad, it's better to isolate than to engage directly. I think the Iranians would like nothing better than to see business as usual.

BURNS: They'd like to see the United States reopen an embassy. They'd like to see the United States talk it every day. But this is, after all, the president who said that Israel should be wiped off the face of the map of the world and that the Holocaust didn't happen.

And as a matter of diplomatic tactics, the Iranians don't want to be isolated in the world. Perhaps the North Koreans; the Iranians don't. And so we prefer to isolate them and deny them the benefits that would come from a regular and normal degree of diplomatic relationship with the United States.

We're not going to change our policy on that issue.

On you second question, Iran's influence in Iraq -- as I said before in answer to a prior question, the Iranians are seeking influence in Iraq. You would expect them to.

They were of assistance to a lot of the Iraqi exiles during the regime of Saddam Hussein. Some of those exile figures are now figures of some consequence in the southern part of Iraq -- and so Iran is giving financial and political and other support to some of these leaders.

The Iranians, we think, have played a very unhelpful role because they've not encouraged internal cohesion or tolerance among the various groups or political moderation. They've tended to encourage more extremist activities, including sectarian violence.

And as I've said before, we believe they provided sophisticated IED technology -- at least their services have -- to militant Shia groups and those devices have been used to kill British soldiers and to attack American soldiers.

On your third question regarding President Ahmadinejad and his counterpart, the supreme leader, Mr. Khamenei, there are lots of different views as to who's up and who's down and who's influential and who's not.

I think you're right. You're very correct to say -- they're like any country; there is no monolithic internal political system in Iran. It's a very complicated system of government. There are all sorts of factions vying for power. There are factions who believe in internal reform or engagement with the United States. And there are factions that completely reject both of those propositions.

You refer to Mr. Rafsanjani, the defeated presidential candidate. He's chairman of the Expediency Council, which is named by the supreme leader to cast judgment on the actions of the government.

And so many have speculated that perhaps there's a competitive relationship between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad.

What we have to do ultimately -- we're interested in the parlor game in looking at the internal machinations of their political system -- we have to ultimately judge them by what they do.

And across the board, this is an entire regime that is quite radical. They have banned the playing of Mozart and of classical music inside their country.

They repress journalists and political dissidents across the board.

And they have mounted a terrorist campaign against the United States that has been unrelenting for 20 years.

So we judge them by those actions. But we are interested in looking at the internal configurations, as you are.

HYDE: Mr. Paul of Texas?

PAUL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First off, Secretary Joseph, I know you didn't come here to scare us, but I think you've frightened me a little bit in one of your answers to Mr. Ackerman, when he asked whether or not the Iraq option was off the table and you said no options are off the table.

Considering the results in Iraq, I would hope that our planning and our discussion now would concentrate on where we went wrong in Iraq -- because we can't find many successes there.

Another quick point I would like to make is that it is my understanding that Iran is not in defiance with the Paris Agreement because the agreement clearly states that is was totally voluntary -- purely voluntary -- and we do know that they have a legal right to develop nuclear power for peaceful means; and that the Paris Agreement was not legally binding.

But I approach this from a non-interventious viewpoint, which is not all that popular today -- and I know the interventions most everybody advises are well-intended, but interference in the internal affairs of other nations does not do much good for us.

Playing the policeman of the world has not been beneficial, and getting involved in nation-building had generally backfired.

Instead of it leading to peace and trade, too often it has led to war and protectionism.

A perfect example of how our policies have led to protectionism is this tremendous sentiment on the Dubai incident. We drum up this fear and hatred of certain types of people -- and all of a sudden, here we are, we are in a protectionist sentiment now.

It won't be just getting rid of one company. We may be seeing a lot of serious protectionism come about because of the type of policies that we follow.

And instead of getting peace and trade, we end up with concern about ultimate blow-back, unintended consequences, and unintended alliances. In fact, we all were surprised -- all of a sudden they have aligned themselves with somebody else.

And I think this is a policy that really is an open invitation for commercial interests to get involved in our foreign policy. And we've already mentioned oil -- and it's, frankly, admitted now that oil is a very important thing that we're involved in in the Middle East.

But in line of questioning, I would like to ask about this argument that is used by the administration that Iran has no right and no need for nuclear power because they have all this oil.

Well, that sounds fairly logical -- but why did we give them a nuclear reactor in the '50s when they had just as much oil or more oil then; they had used up less?

So this whole idea that at one time -- this is part of this intervention that I disapprove of -- we literally provided them technology back in the '50s and here now we are face with a great deal of difficulty.

And at the same time, how do we treat India? Does India follow all of the rules? They don't even belong to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and we reward them with technology and money -- the same way with Pakistan.

And then we get carried away with -- it just seems to be -- with trying to provoke and aggravate and looking for a fight.

I know it's a serious problem, but what we do and how we react is very serious.

But is it not true that the Iranians have a right to nuclear power? And is it not true that they have not been found in any violations? And is it not true that there is no absolute concrete evidence that they are developing a nuclear bomb?

And is it not true that the vary way we treat Pakistan and India, and even North Korea -- is it not true that this is a tremendous incentive for a country like Iran to get a nuclear weapon?

It just seems like what we do, no matter how well-intended, tends to backfire on us. And, I don't know, I just think that all these options on the table to do to Iran what we've done to Iraq ought to make us sit back and say, "What have we done these last three years? Isn't it time for reassessment?"

Then we do too much too fast and maybe we ought to sit back and cool off a little bit rather than going out and looking for the next place where we can send more troops.

JOSEPH: Mr. Congressman, thank you.

Let me say that, with regard to the Paris Agreement, that agreement was the basis for the negotiations between the E.U.-3 on the one side and Iran on the other -- and that agreement called for the full suspension of enrichment-related activities.

When Iran removed the IAEA seals in January and began enrichment- related materials, that was clearly in contradiction to the Paris Agreement. It shattered the basis for the negotiations. And, as the E.U.-3 foreign ministers made very clear, it drove that process to a dead-end.

Iran has consistently chosen confrontation over negotiation.

In terms of the question of a right, we have avoided the whole debate over theoretical rights -- because I can tell you that Iran does not have the right to enriched uranium if it's for the purpose of a nuclear weapon.

But Iran, like other countries, has cynically manipulated the provisions of the NPT -- which provide for the right of non-nuclear weapon states to a peaceful nuclear energy technology -- Iran has used that provision as a means a gaining access to sensitive technologies for the purpose of moving forward to acquire a nuclear weapon.

This is a major loophole in the regime and it's one that we are trying to address in a number of ways, including the provision of fuel assurances to countries if they forego this sensitive technology.

In terms of Iran and its violations, it is in violation of its NPT and IAEA safeguards commitments. That was clearly found to be the case in September by the IAEA Board of Governors. It was a clear statement in the resolution that these violations are inconsistent with Iran's obligations under its own agreements with the IAEA, and that is the basis for reporting -- under the statute of the IAEA -- reporting Iran to the Security Council.

In terms of no evidence of a bomb, I think that Dr. ElBaradei's most recent report makes very clear that, after three years of extensive, intensive investigations in Iran by the IAEA inspectors, he is still unable to state that there has not been a diversion.

And clearly, the outstanding questions that are identified in report after report regarding plutonium experiments and, even more recently, regarding evidence of weaponization, leads us to the conclusion that there is no doubt that Iran's intention is to acquire a nuclear weapon.

In terms of Iran and how it relates to Pakistan and India, Pakistan and India and Israel are the only countries that didn't sign the NPT. Iran has signed the NPT. Iran has committed not to acquire a nuclear weapon, and yet it is clearly determined to do exactly that.

HYDE: Mr. Blumenauer?

BLUMENAUER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burns, I appreciated your indication that -- as we come forward with H.R. 282, the Iran Freedom Support Act -- that you would have some observations.

I'm of the opinion that there are a number of people who -- in Congress -- who are obviously appalled, as is the administration, at Iran's actions over a number of periods of time. And so there may be some reflexive support for something -- and I understand that.

But I think, as I look at the bill, it's a long way from what I hope comes through Congress. And your offering of specific recommendations to shape the language -- so that we're clear about what we're saying, we don't have things in there that are unnecessarily harsh or undercutting your diplomatic initiatives, or sending the wrong signals you're trying to work with in the other sectors that you mentioned -- would be extraordinarily helpful, along with recommendations to make sure that there is appropriate flexibility for this administration, and the next administration, and the next administration to be able to use all the tools available to it.

I fear sometimes we in Congress pass -- with the best of intentions -- instruments that are somewhat blunt; and sometimes language comes back to haunt us and we've never met a sanction we didn't like, or I think about the only developed country that doesn't have a sanctions policy.

Maybe someday we will have a sanctions policy that tells us when we should implement them, when we get rid of them, how we know whether we are succeeding or failing.

But I would urge you to share with the sponsors -- and those of who have not yet sponsored it, because we don't think it has ripened -- those observations and thoughts so that, under the guidance of our chairman and our markup, if it's the will that it passes, that it's something that isn't counterproductive and works for the administration.

I want to go back to the issue that has been raised by several of my colleagues with the difference between India and the proposed agreement that's coming forward to Congress and your concerns about how we get our friends and allies -- and people who actually have friendlier relations with Iran and deeper commercial relations -- to understand the difference.

Now, we may agree that there are some pretty fundamental differences with the world's largest democracy, how it has treated nuclear technology, facts on the ground -- all of these things that I think even people who don't agree with what the administration has proposed, understand it.

But the issue here appears to be how we compel a China or a Russia -- that has a different relationship with Iran -- to understand how it's OK for us to draw these distinctions with India, but it's not OK for them.

BURNS: Congressman, thank you very much.

May I just say, on your first comment, we will get to the Congress -- to this committee -- written suggestions as to how the provisions of H.R. 282 -- I would just say this: I know it's Secretary Rice's strongly held view that we need to proceed carefully on the question of sanctions.

We do want to increase the pressure on the regime, on supporters of the regime. We certainly want to limit and prevent investment in any way that would help the Iranians to construct a nuclear device.

But we're very concerned about the dangers of a blunt sanctions regime that would hurt average Iranians who otherwise would have a very favorable view of the United States.

We want to make a distinction between the regime and the Iranian people. There's a great distinction -- politically -- in terms of their motivation.

On the question concerning India and Iran: In our judgment -- we reflected very carefully on this before the president agreed to the civil nuclear energy deal with India -- our policy towards India and this new initiative will not have a negative impact on our ability to prosecute an effective international response to counter Iran, and for the following reason:

India of course, has a very complicated history over the last 30 years, with the international nonproliferation regime, but India has not diverted its nuclear technology. It wasn't India -- like Iran -- that joined the NPT and then violated it -- and that's a crucial distinction.

BLUMENAUER: If I may, Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate that and I attempted to preface that.

The thrust of my question is how we persuade others that we can distinguish, vis-a-vis the United States and India and the international regime -- and so we set up a different sets of standards for India.

My point was that you're relying on China, and Russia, and other countries -- but those two in particular -- that have a different view of this regime and have a different relationship with this regime, and how we would somehow persuade them that they shouldn't be able to make the distinctions as we have done with India.

This seems to me to be -- even if I grant everything that you said; and I'm sympathetic to the differences -- seems to me to be something that puts us in a really difficult position to try and implement what you're talking about.

BURNS: I understand your question -- and let me just try to respond to it directly.

There are current international restrictions that prevent any country of the world from providing assistance to India's civil nuclear sector, restrictions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. They can only be altered by consensus.

We believe that there can be a persuasive case made to the NSG, that those restrictions should be altered at an exceptional basis only for India.

I don't think that if any other member of the NSG put up another country -- with a less satisfactory record than India -- you'd find that kind of basis for consensual change.

So therefore, India is an exception. We don't think that any other country will put up any other countries for that type of exceptional treatment or that a persuasive case could be made, perhaps, for any country but India at the present time.

BLUMENAUER: I'd work on that answer just with all due respect. You're good, but we've got...

BURNS: We look forward to further discussion with you.

(LAUGHTER)

HYDE: Mr. Rohrabacher of California?

ROHRABACHER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me just note -- and I am somewhat favorable to this proposal that we join with the Indians and try to develop their energy resources.

My subcommittee, with Chairman Hyde's permission, will soon be holding a hearing on a new technological breakthrough by General Atomics which has a reactor, a nuclear reactor, that will produce all the electricity someone needs or any country needs without any production of plutonium and with no possibility that, in the end, what we have as leftovers, can be made into a nuclear bomb.

And I would suggest that that new technology will revolutionize the whole concept of nuclear energy and get beyond some of the issues we're talking today.

I also might add that General Atomics is in a partnership with Russia in this reactor and a reactor is already in operation in Japan. So this is not theory. We have a technological alternative.

I'd hope the State Department pays attention. We will have a hearing in my subcommittee on that issue.

And let me state for the record that while Iran is being run by radicals and extremists, it is totally responsible to prevent Iran from coming to the point that they are in possession of a nuclear weapon.

It is irresponsible not to do everything we can to prevent radicals and extremists, like those people who run Iran, from having a nuclear weapon at their disposal.

And we must ask ourselves, is Iran's goal -- I see them marching in the street saying, "We deserve to have nuclear power to produce electricity" -- is their goal the production of electricity or is their goal the production of a nuclear weapon?

That is a no-brainer, and I wish that the leadership of Iran would quit insulting us and insulting the world by suggesting they are doing this just for power -- electric power -- and not to possess a weapon of mass destruction that could murder millions of people with the push of one button.

The mullahs in Iran should cut the obfuscation, cut the lies; let's discuss it with truth.

In terms of our own policy, we should also quit playing games -- and I although we recognize that your actions and the actions of the administration are governed by the 1979 Export Administration Act as amended and you seem to be moving forward with that -- and very cautiously, I might add -- let me suggest to you that the administration has been too cautious.

And I appreciate that you mentioned in your answer that we have to make sure that the people of Iran aren't hurt in what we're trying to get at their government.

But I think you have been too cautious and the people of Iran will understand totally. Because they are under the heal of these maniacs, they will understand totally our not cautious moving forward, but our aggressive moving forward with sanctions in order to pressure their government not to waste their money and not to make Iran a nuclear target.

The people of Iran will understand that. So let's not be cautious. Let's be aggressive and, while moving forward with those sanctions, we can at the same time reach out to the people of Iran by, again, a more aggressive policy than this administration has in trying to organize the democratic elements -- or not organize, but working to help those democratic elements in Iran who are trying to bring honest government and a peaceful-oriented government to the control of that country.

And, Ambassador Burns, you might want to comment on that. And again, I think you've been too cautious.

BURNS: Thank you, Congressman.

We think that our policy is the right policy and we think that this creation of the international coalition that we discussed this morning is the right way to go -- because we find so much more strength if we have other countries working with us than if we operated alone.

I would address your question directly -- and thank you for your comments.

It's a complication situation inside Iran. As best as we can determine by the various polling that's been done, the issue of nuclear power has become a nationalist issue within Iran itself -- and most of the polls show that the Iranian people take great pride in civil nuclear power.

What we'd like to do is suggest what the president has done -- that the Iranians have the right to peaceful, civil nuclear power, but that they don't have the right to nuclear weapons. And we'd like to try to divide the question on that basis.

ROHRABACHER: And I would hope -- because my red light is on -- I would hope, then, that the administration pays very close attention to this technological breakthrough that I just mentioned. It permits the construction of nuclear reactors without any byproduct that can be used for weapons. And the Russians are already involved with this project in a big way.

So that gives us an out and I hope someone pays attention to that. We will hold a hearing on that later.

Thank you.

HYDE: Mr. Chandler of Kentucky?

CHANDLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to first pay my respects, my personal respects, to the hostages who are here -- the former hostages. I was in college when you were undergoing your ordeal -- and I can tell you that it had quite a profound affect on how I viewed and view our country's role in the world.

I cannot imagine the ordeal that you were involved in. To me, you are real heroes to our country and we will never forget what happened to you and what happened to our country.

I want to agree with your all statements, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Undersecretary, that this problem with Iran is, in fact, our most difficult international problem that we face today. It concerns me deeply.

What I don't understand, though -- and I'd like for you to comment on this -- is how our policy in Iraq could possibly be aiding our efforts in the future to deal with Iran.

It seems to me that our adventure in Iraq has expended enormous resources that could otherwise be used to deal with these problems that we face in Iran.

Our adventure in Iraq has alienated many of our allies throughout the world, caused us increasing difficulties in any efforts we might want to make to form coalitions to deal with this problem in Iran.

It has also, in my view, potentially created a situation in Iraq where we may be creating a future ally for Iran in a powerful and dominant Shia leadership in Iraq.

So if you could, just give me some ideas to how you believe that our adventure in Iraq has done anything other than weaken our hand in dealing with Iran.

And also, I'd like to, if you could -- and maybe this can be part of an answer to that same question -- could you give me some idea about the relationship between the Iranian mullahs and the Shiite clerics in Iraq?

How close are those relationships and where will all of this lead us?

Thank you.

BURNS: Mr. Chandler, thank you very much.

Analytically, what's happened over the last five years is that Iran has felt pressured by the fact that United States military forces are in Afghanistan on the Iranian border and also in Iraq. And that's a good thing.

We're concerned about an expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East region, which we would find to be negative. We believe that is the ambition of the Ahmadinejad government. And so the fact that Iran feels pressured by the disposition of American military forces on two of its borders is to our strategic advantage.

There is no question that Iran is seeking opportunity in Iraq, but our sense is that any future Iraqi government is going to have a balanced set of interests as well as relationships.

The Iraqi Shia, in our judgment, while they have historical and sometimes close personal ties to members of the Iranian religious leadership -- and some of them were helped by the Iranians during their period in exile during the Saddam era -- the Iraqi Shia, and certainly the Sunni and Kurd leaderships of Iraq, want to see an independent Iraq maintained; they don't want to see Iraq dominated by Iran.

So our policy, in part, has to be designed to blunt the potential role of Iran in Iraq -- and that is the job of Ambassador Khalilzad, and he does it very well -- but it's also to recognize the longer-term interest that Iraqis have.

And while some of them may feel that it's to their advantage to have economic relations with Iran, clerical relations, we don't believe there's a dominant force that wants to tie the future of Iraq, in a subjugated way, to Iran itself.

That's how I'd answer your question.

CHANDLER: So you believe that we have, in fact, strengthened our hand vis-a-vis Iran by going into Iraq -- rather than weakened our hand?

BURNS: The Iranians are not 10 feet tall, the way they sometimes like to portray themselves. They have a great deal of opposition to the expansion of Iranian influence on the part of the secular Arab states -- moderate Arab states, I should say -- in the Gulf region.

The Afghans do not want to see a dominant Iran in the region, and the Iraqis don't either.

So if you look at it from a certain perspective, the deployment of American forces to Afghanistan and Iraq have been a strategic advantage to us in our long-term struggle to reduce Iranian influence in the Middle East.

HYDE: Mr. Royce of California?

ROYCE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Joseph, going to a point you made earlier about a debate that we avoided -- maybe it's a debate we should have had. We had a hearing last week of the Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Subcommittee that I chair, and we were looking at countries' rights, as some people call them, under Article 4 of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, to develop the full cycles, as Iran is attempting to do right now.

And as you know, enrichment capacity leaves countries only a few steps away, then, from developing nuclear weapons.

Now when we get to our position on this -- and it's a little cloudy -- but as I understand it, our opposition to Iran's nuclear program, at least legally speaking, is based upon the fact that it hid its activity for two decades and has refused to be transparent through the IAEA.

It is not based on the idea that it's undertaking enrichment, per se.

Now, several of our witnesses before the committee criticized -- and I think rightly so -- the interpretation of the NPT that says that this activity is permissible.

Common sense suggests that a non-proliferation treaty should not give countries cover to take every step just short of weaponizing their nuclear material.

And as I said at the hearing, my concern is that over time -- maybe not that far in the future -- Iran could come clean with the IAEA, win international support and successfully assert this right to develop its nuclear industry, including producing nuclear fuel.

What I'd like to know is how we got ourselves into this box on conceding this so-called right to Iran and other countries -- if, indeed, that is our position -- and what did we do last year at the NPT Review Conference to begin to push back on this interpretation?

And I don't have to tell you that, eventually, a world with many countries producing nuclear fuel is going to be a very dangerous world.

JOSEPH: Congressman, I certainly agree with your assessment. Let me just say that, for Iran, this has not been about energy. This is about nuclear weapons.

The E.U.-3, in August of last year, put forth a very attractive package, with tens of pages of incentives -- including nuclear energy incentives -- and Iran just considered it to be, in their words...

ROYCE: And I think you've made that point, Secretary Joseph. I certainly concur with that point. I was just trying to get you to engage on this point. If you don't want to, I understand. But I...

JOSEPH: No, I'd like to.

ROYCE: All right.

JOSEPH: I'd like to, sir.

We have not tried to reinterpret the NPT -- Article 4 or any other article. We do not think that that would be a productive exercise. In fact, we think that it could become counterproductive to try to do that.

What the president has laid out is a new path whereby we would look at -- in practice -- a restructuring of the fundamental deal that's reflected in the NPT as it was written back in the late '60s.

What the president laid out in his speech at the National Defense University in February of 2004 was a different deal whereby we would encourage all countries who have the ability to export technology associated with enrichment and reprocessing not to spread that technology any further -- any further than those countries that currently have that capability.

And to make this attractive to other countries who did not have enrichment and reprocessing, the president put forth the idea that we would come up with fuel assurances so that these countries would not need to invest in these very expensive technologies and proliferation -- risky technologies.

We are working very hard on that.

I think that resolution after resolution has indicated that the vast majority of the IAEA does not want Iran to go down this path without getting...

ROYCE: Thank you.

JOSEPH: ... into the issue of whether or not it's a legal right.

ROYCE: Let me go then to Ambassador Burns.

A very quick question.

I was glad to see the administration's supplemental request to broadcast into Iran. I understand the concept here of doing the cultural content of women can't -- under the mullahs -- listen to women sing in Iran, and so when we broadcast in, they listen to the programming.

But with all of the additional repression going on in the country, is it perhaps time to look at more hard news and information?

And we know it worked with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia -- we know that it was a certain type of information that built a basis of understanding of what was actually going on in those countries in terms of repression, the news around the rest of the world, and then sort of a new way to process that information so people could understand how they could help engineer their own liberty in Eastern Europe.

What I am questioning is why we don't use that template. Why don't we bring back the engineers of that policy? Because before we really recruited the right people to do that type of work, we did not have the pulse there; it wasn't working.

And under the Reagan administration, that was turned around. We found something that, according to Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, worked to change those societies.

I think we have a little bit to learn from them about how to go forward with Radio Farda.

Ambassador Burns?

BURNS: Thank you, Congressman. I don't think we disagree at all. You know, we don't have a perfectly constructed path forward. We're looking at a variety of ways to get information into Iran.

Radio Farda, if you will, and the Farsi language TV, are the inheritors of that brilliant mantel of VOA and Radio Free Europe of the '70s and '80s.

The problem in Iran is not lack of information. Iranians are wired. There are hundreds, if not thousand, of blogs that are being produced in Iran. The problem is accurate information and full information about how the world works.

And so we think that U.S. government radio and TV has a big role to play, but it shouldn't be exclusive. We would like to help some of the private American TV and radio stations that also can play a role.

ROYCE: But it has to be based...

HYDE: Gentleman's time has...

ROYCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: Mr. Wexler?

WEXLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm a little bit confused and I was hoping that Secretary Burns could help me out here.

As an aside also, I saw a interview you gave -- I watched on PBS, I think it was last night or the night before -- I thought you were excellent, as you always are. I think you do a phenomenally good job in presenting the administration's, the State Department's and America's best face forward on foreign policy -- and I congratulate you for that. And I think all Americans owe you a debt of gratitude.

I watched what the president did in India and I believe I support it in terms of the expanded nuclear cooperation. I think it's a bold, dramatic, positive step forward -- and I applaud the president for doing it.

And you rightfully mentioned -- at least once, maybe more -- that India voted twice with us in the context of Iran. And I think that should be more than noted, because that is both a terrific statement about India, a terrific statement about American-Indian relations, and I think it also reflects extremely well on you and your department from managing the diplomacy that, undoubtedly, it took to reach the conclusion where India chose to vote in the manner in which it did.

I congratulate you for that.

My confusion is this: Given what we are attempting to do with Iran, given that the president went to India and has embarked upon this very bold, new, expanded nuclear cooperation, why would the president of the United States -- when you and your department are engaging in this extraordinary diplomatic effort to isolate Iran -- why would the president of the United States go and give his blessing to a natural gas pipeline that goes from Iran to India?

How do we argue with a straight face -- "we" meaning the United States of America -- argue with a straight face that we're trying to isolate Iran and we just said, "Go ahead, build a pipeline"? If I understand it correctly, it's a $6 billion deal that would have fairly substantial cash-flows going to Iran.

And then to put it in the broader question, how do we mirror what would seem to be a totally contradictory decision -- how do we then ask all the players in Europe, the Russias of the world, the Chinas of the world, how do ask them to curtail their commercial relationships and we appear to have just blessed this commercial relationship?

How do we fit them all into a coherent policy?

Please.

BURNS: Thank you very much, Congressman Wexler.

I was in India and Pakistan with President Bush last week, and I was at the press conference in Islamabad last Saturday afternoon when the president answered that question.

I just think there's been a misunderstanding about it. And the president spoke to some of the congressional leaders yesterday when he reported on his trip to South Asia -- and said very clearly that it's the policy of our government that Iran is an unreliable business partner and oil pipeline partner for countries in the region.

And it has been our advice -- and Secretary Rice and I have both given this advice to the Indian and Pakistani governments -- that it's our advice that they ought not to enter into long-term oil and gas contracts or pipeline contracts with Iran because of the basic unreliability of the country.

And the president got a specific question and it pertained to Iran's nuclear programs. And I think the way he answered it, he just said, "Look, it's not about this. I don't want to comment about this. I want to comment the nuclear program."

I think that was just misunderstood. And I know that it was cleared up immediately. And I know that he spoke yesterday on this issue -- and our policy is quite clear.

And furthermore, when Secretary Rice made her first trip, I remember, to India and Pakistan back about 12 months ago, she spoke out against this deal and we've been doing it since then -- this pipeline deal.

WEXLER: So we do not support -- and this is not a trick question by any means; if it's an easy question, I'd like it to be an easy question -- so is the answer that we do not support that pipeline deal?

BURNS: Correct. The United States does not support that pipeline deal.

WEXLER: Thank you, very much.

HYDE: Mr. Leach of Iowa?

LEACH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to comment about some implications of prior statements on the panel and in response.

Friends and foes of this administration would agree that this is a government that is fairly muscular. It has a proclivity to muscularity. And so, if there's an implication that the Congress should play a good cop/bad cop role -- meaning you're the good cop and we're the bad copy -- that means Congress is attempting to out-macho a fairly macho administration.

And I would suggest to my colleagues that I think that this is very dangerous.

And when the assistant secretary of state asserts that the secretary of state is going to make an appeal to this committee to modify legislation to make it less macho, we are preposterously foolish not to concur.

And I want to be very clear on that. I mean, what there's unanimity about is concern about this country getting nuclear weapons.

What there is no unanimity about -- because all options are bad; I don't know a single option that isn't pretty awesomely awkward -- is that tactics matter.

And this administration has attempted, despite all the criticisms that it's unilateral in too many instances, to take a multilateral approach and to work with our allies and to work with the countries that matter to try to develop the consensus approach on Iran.

And this committee is about to put forth legislation that will undercut those negotiations. Isn't that something this committee oughtn't take fairly seriously?

And isn't there a time and place that we shouldn't defer to the executive branch, particularly when we as a Congress are objecting to an executive branch discretion that it's too macho in an increasing degree?

I also would like to stress that you have two issues with Iran that have some places for which there can be consensus. One is with the international community. One is with many people in Iran.

And so if the Congress, which symbolizes people-to-people relations, wants to take a very confrontational approach to Iran that implies people-to-people confrontation, that's difficult, too.

And that, if anything, this Congress ought to be suggesting to the Iranian people: We identify with your plight. We think your government's out of step. We want to express this in as many ways as we can, one of which might be new radio.

And by the way, I believe culture is far stronger than hard words. And I think anything that expresses the culture of the West is a very real positive, without necessarily over-inundating with what might be described as propaganda -- meaning a perspective of ours.

All of that can be part of something, especially if it's straightforward and honest.

I just would like an assessment on your part. And you're coming from a State Department that has lost a little moral suasion with this body for the precise reason that's been raised, that you are not advising -- as legislation develops -- to a very significant extent, over the past half-decade.

And this is something that I think is very serious, because this Congress is bringing bills to the floor without executive branch input, and sometimes bringing bills to the floor without committee input, only a few member input.

And I think the State Department ought to be working closer with us.

I will tell you as an individual member of this committee, it is my sense that this is a time frame that we ought to be working with the executive branch. When they're throwing out a negotiating approach and the Congress is suggesting a more macho approach, this may be the one time and place that there should be a little deference to that executive branch.

Would you care to comment on that?

BURNS: Thank you, Congressman Leach. I would just make a brief comment.

We do owe you our considered formal views on H.R. 282 -- and I apologized to Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen before that we had been late in getting that to you.

I think you're right. This is an important bill. And these are very difficult policy choices -- and part of the explanation for this delay on our side is that we have been wrestling with these policy choices having to do with tactics.

But we have come to feel that we think a reauthorization of ILSA would be an effective instrument for the United States.

However, in our response to you, we will suggest that some flexibility for the administration, particularly on the impact it will have on our allies, is going to be important for the following reason -- and I don't want to beat a dead horse, but it's important to say it: The most significant diplomatic achievement, I think, of the past year has been the emergence of this international coalition to isolate Iran.

And we wouldn't want to -- and we know Congress wouldn't either -- by a bill that was structured in a certain way, we wouldn't want to blow that coalition apart.

We want to keep it together because we believe that's the best way to roll back Iran's nuclear weapons program.

LEACH: Fair enough.

I just want to conclude with one brief statement, Mr. Chairman.

There are a few things worse in this worse than the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But that worseness can be compounded if we give reasons for people to use these weapons against us.

And sometimes we lose sight of the fact that actions of the United States at one time can precipitate responses that are increasingly going to be of concern to the American people as this globe gets to be small in the way it has.

And as we approach things, the greater the extent to which we can advance the unanimity of the world community and operate under law itself, I think the better off this country is going to be.

Thank you.

HYDE: I thank the gentlemen.

We're down to two members. The administration witnesses have been here for three hours. I'm going to appeal to Mr. Engel and Mr. Sherman to be brief, maybe hold their questioning down to two and a half minutes so we can get to the next panel, which has been waiting equally as long, and we can finish the hearing.

So may I have the cooperation of Mr. Engel?

ENGEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ambassador, and Mr. Secretary.

I believe that we need to take a hard line with Iran. I believe that Iran has to be stopped from having nuclear weapons at all costs.

But my fear is that we are so bogged down in Iraq that we cannot be as strong as we need to be in Iran. There's a limit to how thin we can be stretched.

And the Iranians know it. I think that's why we're hearing so much of their bellicosity.

Tell me I'm wrong? That's a big fear I have. Tell me I'm wrong.

BURNS: Congressman Engel, we agree that we should take a hard line in Iran. And I think the way we've laid out our policy -- I'd hope you would agree it is sufficiently tough, as it should be.

We have a tremendous diplomatic establishment in the American foreign service. We have a brilliant leader in Secretary Rice. We can walk and chew gum at the same time.

We can continue to have a focused, aggressive policy to succeed in Iraq -- and we certainly devote an extraordinary amount of time and attention to the Iran problem.

Undersecretary Joseph and I both work closely with Secretary Rice. She's focused on both. She's spending the right amount of time on both. We have lots of different people who are focused solely on Iraq; others focused solely on Iran.

We have the diplomatic strength and we certainly have the political will to treat the Iran problem as one of the great foreign policy challenges of our generation. It certainly is.

And I think that our administration has done very well over the last 12 months to create this international coalition. We've essentially isolated the Iranians. We've now got them in the Security Council starting early next week.

That's a considerable achievement. It doesn't mean we've succeeded in the ultimate goal, which is to deny them a nuclear weapons capability and to roll back their terrorist regime, but it's a good start.

And I'm supremely confident that we can focus on both of these problems.

ENGEL: Can I ask you -- we've heard lots of estimates about when Iran is capable of having the nuclear bomb.

On August 2nd of last year, The Washington Post reported that the most recent national intelligence estimate on Iran judged them to be about a decade away from manufacturing enough highly-enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon.

We've heard six months. We've heard a year. What is our real estimate about how far Iran is from developing a nuclear weapon?

JOSEPH: The intelligence community assessment has been that Iran is approximately five to 10 years away from a nuclear weapon's capability.

There are many unknowns, and the intelligence community is the first to acknowledge that there are many unknowns that go into that investment and there are many wildcards that could accelerate that timeline -- including, as we've mentioned before, assistance from outside or the acquisition of fissile material from external sources.

Some individuals and some countries have talked about the point of no return, which is not necessarily the point at which Iran has a weapon, but the point at which Iran will have the capability to move forward with enrichment and produce the fissile material that's necessary for a bomb --and that's the long pole in the tent.

ENGEL: And what's our estimate of the point of no return? Do we have an estimate of that?

JOSEPH: Again, I've seen many different estimates from months to a short number of years. We have many unknowns.

ENGEL: One final question. Ahmadinejad is a lunatic and the things that he says are really, really frightening. Who makes the decisions in Tehran? Is it the mullahs or is it Ahmadinejad?

And we always hear that the Iranian people like all things American -- blue jeans; they really don't like the control of the mullahs. We're having, as Secretary Rice told us, the $75 million, which I support whole-heartedly. I would double and triple it if we could.

What about the Iranian people? The reformers had always had the upper hand in elections. They were eliminated -- many of them -- from running from re-election. So we have Ahmadinejad. What do the people really think -- in Iran -- and of their leadership? And what does our intelligence tell us? And is it the mullahs or Ahmadinejad who really controls the power?

BURNS: Congressman Engel, we could probably devote a full hearing to both of your questions. They are very good and serious questions. I thank you for asking them.

I'll just try to give very brief answers.

On the decision-making process, it's a very -- as far as we can understand it -- a fairly complex government with lots of different factions vying for power and influence against each other.

The position of the supreme leader, of course, is as it says, "supreme" in the Iranian governmental structure.

But there's no question in our minds that Ahmadinejad has a great deal of influence. And what he has done, in contrast to his predecessor, is to strike out on a very radical course, both in internal policy in repressing dissent and repressing liberal behavior -- listening to classical music is defined as liberal behavior; firing 40 so-called overly reformist-minded ambassadors of Iran in European countries.

And he's also adopted a very hard line in terms of Iranian foreign policy. And a lot of our friends in the region -- in the Arab world and in South Asia -- talk about an Iranian policy that seeks to intimidate through the use of oil and gas.

But ultimately this regime, this clerical regime that has been in power of 26 years, is uniformly repressive. And we have to judge it by what it's done to us.

They have financed the terrorist group that killed Americans in Lebanon. And they killed Americans in Saudi Arabia. And the terrorist groups are now striking at the democrats in Lebanon, at the moderate Palestinians, and at Israel

And we have to take that seriously -- as well as what we've talked about this morning, in large part: they're seeking a nuclear weapons capabilities.

So whatever the internal differences are, we judge the state of Iran, the government of Iran, based on its actions.

And finally, on the Iranian people -- it's a very great country. It's one of the great civilizations in world history. And we tend to see the Iranian people as victims of the clerical regime of the last 26 years.

This is not a democracy. That was not a free and fair presidential election in August. There were 1,012 people who wanted to run for president and a little over 1,000 of them were not allowed to run for president.

In the Majlis elections of the previous February, all sorts of people who were elected had their elections annulled because the clerical regime didn't like the people for whom the Iranian people voted -- the politicians for whom they voted.

So we see the Iranian people desiring the kind of freedom and tolerant society and open and liberal society that exists in many other countries in the world, including in that region.

And so what we're trying to do with the $75 million request is to begin a longer-term effort to reach out to the people, as opposed to the regime.

HYDE: Mr. Sherman?

SHERMAN: Thank you.

I've got so many questions. I'll ask you to respond for the record. I want to associate myself with Mr. Royce and Mr. Wexler's questions -- and, as to Mr. Leach's, I wish he was here.

I think our policy toward Iraq has overflowed with so much surplus testosterone that is has hidden the fact that, when it comes to our using economic power to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons -- and even hinting to China that our economic power and our trade with them is dependent on their cooperation -- our policy toward Iran can only be called "no muy macho."

This has been, up until the last few months, a continuation of the feckless policy of the Clinton administration.

And while I hope that we're broadcasting Mozart and Beethoven into Iran with soprano voices, I hope that we are also able to broadcast an explanation to the Iranian people that their economy will suffer if their government develops or continues to develop nuclear weapons, and will prosper if it does the opposite.

SHERMAN: Speaking of radio, Ambassador Burns, I'm glad that you're talking about funding the private broadcasters. That is a very low cost per broadcast hour. The shows already exist. The satellite time's like a couple hundred bucks or less an hour. And I hope that we allow 100 flowers to bloom.

I should point out that the Iranians today in Vienna threatened America with harm and pain. And with them being the number one state sponsor of terrorism, perhaps we should take that seriously.

For nearly five years, the administration's continued the Clinton administration policy when it comes to economics in Iran. We've allowed the World Bank to make loans to Iran. We continue to import goods from Iran. U.S. corporations do business with Iran through their foreign subsidiaries.

And I was dumbfounded as to why all this was happening. And then Ambassador Burns explains to us that we're for strong sanctions on Iran as long as they don't adversely affect the Iranian people. Which translates into the fact that we're for economic sanctions as long as they don't affect the Iranian economy.

And I think we'll just have to agree to disagree as to how strong our economic efforts should be. But there's one place where we should not disagree, and that is the rule of law. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is law. You've explain why you think it might be a bad law, why it might put an onus on our allies.

But what bothers me is we're telling other countries about the benefits of the rule of law. When it comes to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, I'd like to add to the record of this hearing, if there's no objection, a list of over a dozen instances where the State Department has a very interesting approach to the rule of law. And that is to say, "Well, if no one told us, officially, that these investments were being made in the Iranian oil field, then we get to ignore them."

This is like a police officer who disagrees with a statute, so he begins his shift with a blindfold on. The rule of law means nothing if the executive branch is going to ignore the official reports to shareholders of Japanese oil companies, where they say they are making investments in Iranian oil fields.

But there's one area where I think that the State Department has been slavishly dedicated to a particular treaty, and that is the Algiers Accords. This is a document that should be viewed as void ab initio. There were guns pointed to the heads of the heroes that are in this room when that document was signed.

But more importantly -- just as importantly, isn't it an insult to the many Americans who have been killed by terrorist acts planned, plotted and financed by the Iranian regime after 1980 that we have not officially announced the Algiers Accords have been shredded by those bloody acts?

If we continue to adhere, officially, to this Algiers Accord after Beirut, after Saudi Arabia, after so many dead Americans, what does it take to void a treat of ours, or that we've entered into -- and, in this case, a treaty that was void ab initio I believe.

I've asked the State Department to lay out a road map for the MEK as to how to get off the terrorist list. Now, I realize that that is an organization engaged in terrible tactics in times past. But the response from the State Department that I received was basically: We don't want to do that.

There should at least be some acknowledgement from this administration that the MEK told the world about Iran's nuclear program, and that if it had not been for their actions, we wouldn't be in this hearing room today. And for us to say that we won't even talk about the MEK could do in order to get off the terrorist list is particularly peculiar, given the fact that Fatah and the IRA have been removed from that list. And they did not perform that same level of service to the world.

Finally, I think that it is important -- and I mentioned this before -- that we gain the support of China for what needs to be done at the Security Council, and that we at least be willing to hint to China that their continued access to U.S. markets cannot be assured if they feel that their anticipated $70 billion investment in the Iranian oil fields is more important to them than a world without Iranian nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to put these questions to the panel.

LEACH: The chair would note that you went almost double your time. But I would ask the panel to respond briefly if you could please.

BURNS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Sherman, we've had a chance to talk privately about some of these issues, and I've enjoyed these opportunities. I must tell you how much I disagree with your major points.

To somehow insinuate that our administration, or the previous administration of President Clinton, hasn't had as a first order of national importance opposing the Iranian regime, I think, is unfair. And I think it's inaccurate.

Our administration has led the international effort over the past 12 months to mount a united coalition against Iran on its nuclear policy and on its practice of terrorism. We have been the leading voice calling attention to human rights violations within Iran itself. And I think to suggest otherwise is simply wrong, and it's not balanced.

We have protected the sanctions regime that's been in place. I suggested in my formal testimony, and in answer to some of the other questions this morning, we're looking at additional targeted sanctions.

But I would respectfully say we need to be smart about how those additional sanctions are put into place. Do we really want to alienate the great majority of Iranians, who we believe should change their own government and form a democratic government in the future? Or do we want to put our emphasis on targeting the regime, which is the evil part of this equation?

So I enjoy the give and take, but I think you've been unfair in the way you've characterized what President Bush and Secretary Rice and the rest of us have been doing.

SHERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I hope we'll put in the record this list of over $100 billion in investments. CRS compiled this list, and the State Department's official position is none of this exists. I yield back.

LEACH: Without objection, the list will be put in the record. And without objection I do think the State Department is implicitly required to answer the gentleman's question about the legality of these investments. And will you do that in writing to us?

BURNS: Mr. Chairman, I think we should answer two questions. One, we would be happy to answer that question. I'm also going to be meeting with the former hostages this afternoon. And I want to listen to their concerns about the Algiers Accord and how it's had a negative impact on them.

We have had -- all administrations since President Reagan's have -- carried out the letter of those accords. But we certainly want to give a fair hearing to the former hostages. They are our people. They came from the United States government, and we want to be fair to them.

LEACH: I appreciate that. And we all recognize the heroes in their service to this country.

I want to thank both of you. I believe every member has had a chance to ask questions. And we'll now turn to the second panel.

Thank you, Ambassador Burns and Secretary Joseph.