The Committee on International Relations meets today on "United States Policy toward Iran: Next Steps."

Unlike our hearing last week on the Middle East peace process, this topic is one with respect to which good news is quite scarce.

Except for the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the difficulties involved in our relationship with Iran are overshadowed, if at all, only by the acute problem caused by North Korea's apparent nuclear breakout.

The Administration is currently reviewing its Iran policy and, it is reported, is both re-evaluating the conclusions of the intelligence community and updating its war planning.

The broad outlines of our policy are likely to be unchanged: it is difficult to imagine how the United States can reconcile itself to this regime possessing nuclear weapons.

Either "the regime will have to go" - that is, it will have to be replaced or its nature changed fundamentally, or "the nuclear weapons will have to go" - that is, nuclear weapons cannot come into Iran's possession with the regime unchanged.

Courses of action designed to bring about either of those options are enormously complicated. The United States has a wide range of policies in place designed to slow Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weaponry and the means to deliver them. They have to some degree been effective, but time marches on and so does the Iranian program, however handicapped it has been.

The President has noted that "[w]e're relying upon others, because we've sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran, to send a message . . . we don't have much leverage with the Iranians right now, and we expect them to listen to those voices." Thus, we support the efforts of the so-called EU-3 in their negotiations with Iran. On the other hand, we have - justifiably - been unwilling to commit to provide tremendous incentives for Iran in exchange for a return to responsible behavior on the nuclear front. Iran should expect no more than Libya received in return for its decision to abandon WMD. In fact, given Iran's record of active, recent gross misbehavior, Iran merits greater scrutiny and a tougher deal.

What is critical is that we and our European friends must arrive at a very clear understanding of the consequences for Iran if and when these negotiations end in failure, or if Iran once again fails to live up to its promises.

Those consequences have to be real and effective. They cannot consist of a referral to a United Nations Security Council, which is sure to be deadlocked over the imposition of new multilateral sanctions.

We cannot ignore the depredations of this regime even if it stays below some nuclear threshold; Iran cannot expect a free pass from the civilized world.

The problems we have with Iran's domestic and foreign misbehavior go to the nature of the regime. The people of Iran, if they had a real say in its affairs, would presumably not wish to meddle abroad and be known for supporting terrorism.

Last week we heard testimony about the outrageous efforts of Iranian-backed terrorist groups to disrupt the hard-won, tenuous cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians.

For those groups, and for their supporters in Teheran, it is a case of "the worse, the better." Cooler heads may prevail for now, but unless Iran withdraws its support from Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah, further violence on a large scale is inevitable. As we were warned, these entities are not above targeting new Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

Any hope we might have had from the reformist spirit which swept in President Khatami has been crushed, just as that spirit has been crushed.

The setbacks of the reform movement cannot mask the fact that the Iranian people want to be accepted in the world, and want the benefits that such acceptance brings - the better life for themselves that comes with unimpeded contact, investment, and trade.

Even more importantly, they want to live in a country that is capable of being accepted and deserves acceptance - and that means an end to the repression, torture, and murder of innocent Iranians, which are perhaps the worst features of the regime, and the establishment of a system in which the people's will, and not an unelected cleric's, is supreme.

We need to find a way to facilitate an outlet for what I am confident is a desire for change within the Iranian people, but to do so in a way that does not offend them and become self-defeating, but is at the same time effective.

This is similar to our task throughout the Middle East, but our task is particularly urgent in the case of Iran. There is no time to lose.

I would now recognize our distinguished colleague, Mr. Lantos, our Ranking Democratic Member, for any opening comments he may wish to make.