SEN. LUGAR: We now call upon our second panel of witnesses. And that panel includes Doctor Geoffrey Kemp, director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center; Doctor Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; Mr. George Perkovich, vice president for studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Doctor A. William Samii, regional analysis coordinator for Southwest Asia and the Middle East of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

(Chatter of senators while the panel is seated.)

Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming to the committee this morning. I'll ask you to testify in the order that I introduced you, and that'll be, first of all, Dr. Kemp. Let me just say that each of your prepared statements will be made part of the record in full, so you need not ask permission for that to occur. It will occur. And I will ask you to proceed as you wish, hopefully summarizing many of your comments, so we can then proceed to questions of the committee.

Dr. Kemp, thank you for coming again to our committee. It's always good to have you here. And please proceed.

 

STATEMENT OF

DR. GEOFFREY KEMP
Director of Regional Strategic Programs, Nixon Center

 

MR. KEMP: Thank you very much, Senator, and I'm delighted to be here again. And I'll give a summary of a summary.

Iran's extensive program to develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle has reached a point where, short of a counterrevolution, I would doubt if any future Iranian government would be prepared to dismantle it.

The focus of current negotiations between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and the European Union, on the other, is whether the Islamic republic would be willing to end some activities, such as uranium enrichment, in exchange for assistance with this nuclear power program.

In my judgment, Iran's leaders will never comply even with these demands unless the United States and the EU can offer the Iranian government far more incentives than they have so far been prepared to put on the table. At the same time, as long as talks are ongoing, they're unlikely to precipitate a crisis, at least not in the short term.

But absent some fundamental change in the Iranian leadership, combined with a willingness on the part of the Bush administration to take big risks, the United States is on course for a serious crisis with Iran at some point in the coming months.

No agreement between the United States and Iran on the nuclear question is possible unless two fundamental changes occur, in my judgment. First, there must be an Iranian government prepared to negotiate with the United States about the fundamental problems of the bilateral relationship.

Secondly, the administration here has to be prepared to negotiate on these issues with a regime that many of its policymakers and supporters wish to get rid of altogether.

What are the near-term options on this issue? A joint U.S.-EU decision to take Iran to the Security Council because of its violations of its NPT agreements could have a compelling impact on Iran, provided Russia, China and other U.N. Security Council members supported it and important countries such as Japan agreed to end economic ties to Tehran.

Under these circumstances, Iran's leaders might blink, especially if other Middle East developments were, from its perspective, going in the wrong direction; namely, American policy was succeeding better than we expect. This could include an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, an end to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon in its entirety, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the emergence of a pro-American democratic Iraq.

But these are a lot of ifs. Iran would have to be found in clear, unequivocal violation of the NPT to get the support of the majority of the Security Council. So far, the Iranians have been too clever to allow this to happen. Russia and China both have huge stakes in Iran and regard the Iranian government as a friendly power. These interests will only grow in the coming years, especially given China's insatiable need for petroleum to meet its burgeoning car- owning middle class.

The other alternative that was just briefly discussed here is, of course, the possible use of force. I mean, a massive military assault by the U.S. on Iran's infrastructure could cause significant damage to the program. But I think this option would have to assume the U.S. had no choice but to declare war on Iran, for this is what it really would be.

Such an act would probably be unanimously condemned, including by the Bush administration's closest ally, Britain. Given the loss of credibility over U.S. intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, proving that Iran has the bomb will be very difficult unless Iran obliges us by doing something reckless and out of character, such as testing a nuclear device.

If these options are not likely to work, what are the prospects for a political agreement that provides enough incentives on both sides to take them seriously? In my judgment, this will only happen if pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, conservatives emerge as decisive players in Iran's June 2005 presidential elections.

Could a leader such as Rafsanjani, the former president, contemplate such a deal? Could he sell it to his theocratic friends? Would the Bush administration be willing to negotiate with such a man and such a regime?

For the United States, the bottom line would have to be the end of Iran's nuclear weapons program, the end of terrorism against Israel, and cooperation with us in Iraq and Afghanistan.

For Iran, it would have to mean the end of U.S. economic sanctions; and this, I think, is the critical point -- the acceptance of the Islamic republic as a legitimate player in the region.

If, for whatever reason, a radical new approach on the part of both Washington and Tehran is out of the question, the best the administration can hope for is that we prepare for the coming crisis jointly with the Europeans as allies rather than at loggerheads. And in that regard, I have to say, Mr. Chairman, I was very pleased to hear Secretary Burns' testimony, which mentioned cooperation with the Europeans more times than I have heard in four years.

In the face of European-Atlantic solidarity, there's a chance that the Iranians will be prepared to fudge the program for a few more years. But ultimately, I think we have to accept there's no way the United States, Europe or the U.N. Security Council can stop a country, a proud country of 70 million people with abundant resources and lots of oil from getting the ingredients for a nuclear bomb if that is what their leaders believe they must have.

For this reason, it would be very prudent to engage in substantive dialogue, not just with our European allies, but other friends, particularly in the Gulf countries, about what to do if the Iranian bomb becomes a reality and preemptive war with Iran is considered an unacceptable option.

Most importantly -- and here I reiterate what Secretary Burns said -- the U.S. and Europe must bite the bullet and agree with each other on a common strategy that is unambiguous as to the limits of the carrots and sticks both parties are prepared to present to Iran's leaders and the international community.

In other words, we need to draw up a much more specific road map to establish clear responses to certain Iranian actions such as their decision to convert hexafluoride gas or their resumption of the uranium enrichment program.

The key, Mr. Chairman, must be to prevent Iran from driving a wedge between the U.S. and Europe on this issue. Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Dr. Kemp. Dr. Milhollin.

 

STATEMENT OF

DR. GARY MILHOLLIN
Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

 

MR. MILHOLLIN: Thank you very much, Senator. I'm very pleased to appear before the committee. I would like to -- the committee has asked me to concentrate upon the present negotiations between Iran and Britain, France and Germany. Before I do that, I'd like to point out that my organization does maintain a very large web site on Iran's mass-destruction weapon programs. It's known as IranWatch.org. And I would refer the committee to that site for additional information and analysis.

I'd like to begin by saying that the deal made in November was conceived to be tactical only. It was conceived to simply present an opportunity for continued talks and an opportunity to make a deal. It wasn't seen as a solution to the overall problem.

That solution, as has emerged, would have to include action by Iran to give up its ability to make fissile material, give up its ability to enrich uranium, give up its ability to make plutonium. And the Europeans are clear on that.

Neither of these materials is necessary to run Iran's civilian nuclear program. But the parties are still very far apart. In March, Iran proposed to run 3,000 centrifuges. It proposed to be able to restart its conversion facility, manufacture thousands more centrifuges, up to 50,000, and at the same time receive additional reactors from the Europeans. The Europeans consider this a non- starter, and it's obvious that it is.

So right now the question is, what's going to happen? Are these parties ever going to get together? If they don't, then one possibility is that the present freeze could simply continue for a while. If that happened, I think we would be seeing a situation similar to the one that existed after the agreed framework between the United States and North Korea was agreed to. That is, the North Koreans agreed to freeze their operation; they didn't agree to give it up or to dismantle their capability.

The same question basically is now facing Iran; that is, how long to keep the freeze in place. It seems to me that it might depend on two things: First, how much the suspension is really hurting Iran's nuclear progress, how much it's pinching; and the second one is Iran's assessment of how much pain it will receive by being referred to the Security Council, because that's what the Europeans have said will happen if the freeze is broken.

If the case does go to the Council, what will happen? Mr. Burns sagely declined to elucidate that. But I think we could probably expect that the United States and the Europeans would ask for a resolution under which Iran would agree to resume the suspension. There seems to be a fair amount of support for that.

If Iran did not comply, then the question would be a resolution compelling Iran to suspend. If Iran did not comply with that, the question would be sanctions. Nobody knows at this point what that would produce, including the Iranians. So I think in our favor is the fact that the Iranians probably don't want to face the uncertainties in going down that path at the U.N.

On the other hand, we would also face uncertainties; we, meaning the West. If the Security Council does little or nothing, what would emerge is the fact that a country can basically violate its pledges under the non-proliferation treaty and not be punished, which would be a great blow to the treaty and a great blow to the non-proliferation efforts we have made and the structures we have in place internationally.

So everybody has a lot at stake if this case goes to the U.N. Security Council. Right now there doesn't seem to be the kind of support it would take for an oil embargo or strong international trade sanctions, but that support may come after a while.

I think personally that we ought to start thinking about where this chain of events is going to wind up. And Mr. Kemp has mentioned that. I don't think international inspections will prevent Iran from success, and it's pretty clear that the U.N. is uncertain, so I think we ought to get used to the idea of thinking about what it would be like to live with an Iranian bomb, because if you just look at all the possible outcomes, that one is probably more likely at this point than any other, in my judgment.

So what would the world be like? What would the United States do in a world where Iran had the bomb? I think, first, we would have to consider adopting a policy of containment, which we would do, just as we did with respect to the Soviet Union. We'd be facing an overtly hostile nuclear power.

We would have to consider extending our nuclear or conventional umbrella to additional states. I think that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be candidates. Also I think that there would be a period of testing the waters. Iran would be exploring the boundaries of its new power. Somebody could make a mistake during this period.

To reduce that risk, I think the United States would have to formulate and promulgate what are known as red lines; that is, statements that if certain red lines were crossed, certain consequences would ensue. That's not a pleasant prospect. So the question is, how do we avoid that situation, which I think is, as I said, among the possible ones, at this point perhaps the most probable?

I think we have to make these negotiations succeed. And I agree with those who have said that we need to put more on the table for that to happen. Only the United States really could provide security assurances or comfort to Iran. That's just a fact. We have to be willing to accept that fact. And we have to start thinking about what kind of assurances we'd be willing to provide.

We've also heard that it would be helpful if Russia and China supported this process. I think it's essential for them to do so. And also it's essential for the neighbors, for Iran's neighbors to support the process.

If all that happened, if the world presented a united front to Iran, then Iran might decide that it would be better off without the bomb than with it. But if you just look at the whole situation, I think it's difficult to be optimistic.

You have to say that we are now in a process which could result in a willingness on the part of the world community to use sanctions or even the use of force. But we're not there yet. And I don't think we'll get there for a while. And before getting there, I think the United States and Europe in particular would have to convince the rest of the world that all the other options had been exhausted.

Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin. Mr. Perkovich.

 

STATEMENT OF

MR. GEORGE PERKOVICH
Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

 

MR. PERKOVICH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to pick up on where Mr. Milhollin left off, which is that I think if things don't change, then the outcome of Iran at least acquiring the capability to build nuclear weapons -- there's a fine distinction between that and actually having the weapons. I think that is the most likely outcome.

And I think that means logically and politically that we have to do some things to change also, because how we got to today is based on 26 years of Iranian behavior, our behavior and other countries' behavior.

And in that regard, I want to say that Secretary Burns's testimony, I thought, was remarkably positive and encouraging because it represented, I think, a real shift, a subtle but a real shift, in the U.S. approach and the recognition, for example, that we absolutely have to cooperate and be as one with Europe if we're going to change Iranian behavior.

And also there was a recognition in what he said and how he said it that the tone of America's presentation to Iran has to change, precisely because Iran is a country with a vibrant civil society, with an active political class and a great history. So all of those things that he did, while subtle, I think were very important and positive, and suggestive of a way that we could go on.

Let me talk a little bit about what may be a decision-making context in Iran. I was there in March and have been there other times and talking to some of their officials; certainly not a representative sample. But my sense is that Iranian decision-makers feel their situation is far from desperate.

They look and they say the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq was a great benefit to Iran. The removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a great benefit to Iran; moreover, that the U.S. campaign for democracy in the Middle East is a great benefit to Iran, because one of the consequences of that is that Shi'ite majorities, which exist in much of the region, now have a political hope and a greater opportunity to protect their minority interests than they ever had before, and there's great solidarity that Iranis for that, so that's welcome. So history that way is moving in their direction. And people recognize that they have a constitutional problem in Iran.

We haven't spoken of it in those terms here. We speak correctly about the problem of non-elected leaders and so on, that's in their constitution. So when we talk about wanting political change and complete popular sovereignty in Iran, there is a problem which the office of the religious leader is a constitutional office in Iran. And so we need to think more about how that change that clearly many Iranian people want and also one we want, how that comes about.

One of the things that I think any visitor in Iran hears is people are unhappy with their government. They're dissatisfied with especially the mullahs. But then they look and they say, okay, how do you change that. And they look at Iraq and they say what's happening in Iraq is definitely not what we want. Because what they see is the bloodshed and the chaos and the violence and they say this is not -- we welcome this. It's to our benefit but it's not -- if that's democracy we don't want to go down that road because lots of people are getting killed. And it harkens back to their own revolution which even the leaders of that revolution in many ways, the young people who were leaders now regret. They now look back on it and say my God, that was, lots of people died. They don't want to return to that possibility.

So they're kind of stuck. Yes, they want political change, but they want it to be peaceful and gradual and they don?t want it to come at the tip of a U.S. bayonet. And so they're -- they're in a sense confused but also worried that we're not going to be patient enough to let them figure out how to change their government.

All of that then forms part of the context in which we're engaging with them on the nuclear issue and these other issues.

The -- it is perceived that what we're trying to do is to keep Iran from being a developed, advanced, technological country. Because Iranian people believe what their government's saying which is all they want is to acquire nuclear technology for energy and to demonstrate prowess. Because most Iranian people you talk to say a nuclear weapon is a terrible idea for Iran. It doesn't accomplish anything for us. It just accomplishes, brings bad results, but we want the technology because great countries have the technology, we're a great civilization, we're really smart people, we should be able to do this. And why the U.S. is trying to stop us is you've never gotten over the revolution. You can't stand Iran as a nation, we know what you did with Mosadek in '53, you know you supported a repressive Shah, now you can't get over the revolution and so what you're trying to do is to retard us from being an advanced country.

And so they resist. They don?t resist and say we have to have the bomb; they don't think they're trying to get the bomb. But they want to resist this kind of pressure.

That leads to the conclusion that we have to change our policy and not be objective. The objective Secretary Burns laid out were right on, those were exactly the objectives that we should have. But in order to change Iranian behavior we have to recognize that you have to change the political dynamic in which the Iranians see this issue.

And I think there are three key points there.

One is that we can't do it unilaterally. We need to have with us other people that Iranians care about, in particular the European, and that coercion, sanctions, and pressure and denunciations aren't sufficient. And that's been our strategy for the last 26 years. That's insufficient.

So at a minimum we have to clarify that Iran stops supporting terrorist's organizations, and accepts that its nuclear program will be run without indigenous fuel cycles, they'll have a nuclear program, but it will rely on foreign supply, if they do that, that the U.S. is prepared to guarantee Iran's security. That the U.S. will not pose a threat to Iranian security and we'll deal with the constitutional government of Iran, even as we think that the Iranian people should change that constitution, we will deal with the constitutional government of Iran.

Secondly, we have to convey that we support Iran's technological modernization and would be willing to work with it on projects that are technologically advanced through international cooperation.

And thirdly, I think we have to convey that we've gotten over the revolution and the hostage crisis. Iranian people love the American people, they're not so wild about the American government, but when you're visiting in Iran, anywhere you go, people slap you on the back and say, oh God, it's great to see an American. Can I get you anything? America's a great country, and so on. By the way, our allied Pakistan, you get a very different response. But in Iran, people love visiting Americans. They're not so wild about the U.S. government and I think we need to signal that we've gotten over the hostage crisis and that we're not going to keep the Iranian people hostage to their government.

There are ways we can deal, we talk about it in the question but I think that's the extrapolation of the subtle shift that we heard I think today. We have to move farther in that direction.

Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Perkovich.

We just appreciate the fact that the witnesses are listening to each other, and supplementing these answers. And that's very helpful.

Dr. Samii.

 

STATEMENT OF

DR. WILLIAM SAMII
Regional Analysis Coordinator for Southeast Asia and the Middle East,
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

 

MR. SAMII: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity.

As it was referred to earlier, the Iranians are going to be holding their ninth presidential election in less than one month. But also, it's a deeply flawed process. And one of the problems that you were referring to, the problem with the constitution, it's a deeply flawed constitution which basically disallows any sort of real democratic process taking place there.

Iranians' efforts to elect officials to reform the system have failed to yield results. Unelected institutions and officials can overrule elected ones.

Iranians have also tried to express themselves politically through the press, media, Internet and so on. All these factors have really failed to yield any results.

But I have to express some caution here. For us to somehow expect that there's a democratic movement waiting in the wings, ready to move against the regime, with plans for its replacement, I believe is unrealistic.

The government uses extensive repression against its opponents. More than 100 mostly pro-reform publications have been closed down since the year 2000.

The Internet became a popular source for public expression, but a crackdown against online journalists began in autumn 2004, with -- excuse me -- complaints of torture while in prison, and also forced confessions.

The Iranian government has of course linked these issues with the United States. It blames some global network directive from the U.S.

We have very high expectations from young Iranians. This was referred to earlier. Some two-thirds of the Iranian population was under the age of 30, with 46 million out of a total population of 69 million.

However, there are only 1.2 million university students, so it would be a mistake, I believe, to expect a great deal from this group. These students, many of them are politically apathetic. They are more interested in work and earning a living than in politics.

They are discouraged by these pointless elections and elected officials who never fulfill their promises. The impact of this has been a brain drain. Young Iranians love America. They would love to come here to work and gain a decent living.

The student groups as disunited. The main student organization underwent some splits in the year 2000. It allegedly came back together in May of last year, but the reality of it is that the split still exists.

There is also government-backed student organizations. Again, the government uses repression against student leaders, and you have people being detained by unaccountable security institutions, a network of secret prisons which are very similar to the dirty war that took place in Argentina in the 1970s.

There have been calls for an election boycott by some of the student groups.

Then we have the exile groups that were referred to in the earlier session. These exile leaders and the groups don't have any measurable backing in Iran. The Mujahideen-e Khalq organization, known as the MKO or MEK, is hated in Iran for siding with Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran-Iraq war. Human Rights Watch yesterday issued a report about the MKO entitled: "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps."

Nevertheless, the regime is concerned about these exile groups. It complains frequently about the MKO personnel in Iraq, and demands their extradition to Iraq.

Also demonstrators in October of 2001 changed the name of Reza Pahlevi, the son of the former monarch of Iran.

There are practical steps that we can take to help the democratic process in Iran. We should assist carefully selected nongovernmental organizations. This kind of assistance can include the provision of laptop computers, satellite phones, cell phones, and even fax machines.

There is no independent labor organization in Iran. Collective action is rare, and workers are not free to express themselves. The United States could play a part in organizing workers and creating independent unions.

Ethnic groups also deserve attention. They complain of discrimination at the hands of the state, poor programming by state media, jobs going to Persians, low-quality schools.

In mid-April ethnic Arabs in southwest Ahwaz rioted against the government for almost a week, all because of a false letter which claimed the government planned to move them to other parts of the country and bring Persians to their predominantly Arab region.

Prospective Iranian leaders should be identified and their travel to the United States or other overseas locations facilitated. Once outside Iran they could learn more about the roles played by NGOs in other countries, transitions to democracy, and receive organizational training.

Ex-pats who travel to Iran could organize workshops and conduct training.

And just to summarize very quickly, things like pressure from other countries does have an influence in Iran, especially if it is connected with sanctions. The international community must continue to criticize the politicized court system that closes newspapers and jails journalists. And also criticism has come for the legal system in Iran, which discriminates against women and ethnic and religious minorities.

Thank you, sir.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Dr. Samii.

I'd like to recognize now Senator Biden, the distinguished ranking member, who may have an opportunity to give his opening statement as well as initiate questions.

 

OPENING STATEMENT OF

JOE BIDEN
A Senator from Delaware, and
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

 

SEN. JOSEPH BIDEN (D-DE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, my governor was in town. And I'm sorry I missed Ambassador Burns' testimony. And I would ask that my opening statement be placed in the record.

SEN. LUGAR: It will be placed in the record in full.

SEN. BIDEN: And I'll wait my turn for questions if you would like to begin.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much.

We'll have a 10-minute round on this occasion. And let me begin by once again summarizing some of the thoughts you have initiated so well.

Essentially we've heard in the committee before that the United States is held in high esteem by especially the young people of Iran as your foundation and others have conducted polls elsewhere in the world, asking for approval/disapproval. Frequently the United States does not come out well depending upon the question.

And that might be true in Iran as a whole, but at least the young people, and you've identified the young, perhaps two-thirds under 30, tend to like us.

Now this leads then some people to say, well, if that's the case, they must not have high regard for mullahs, old people that might be moving off stage in due course.

Perhaps so. But as everybody also universally points out, they are not in a rebellious mood. There do not appear to be indigenous cell groups and political activity, or if there has been, it has been successfully repressed by the government.

And likewise they may have the view, as you've expressed it, having taken a look at Iraq next door, that they would not want to see a repetition of bloodshed, disorder, and so forth. And as a result they may just sort of bumble through in the process, hoping for the best.

The mullahs understanding that may appreciate that they may not loved. On the other hand they do have the levers of authority. And some among that group, maybe not all, likewise have maybe some desire for an Iranian nuclear weapon for whatever reasons. Some may want to go short of that.

The problem in all of this is how does this ever resolve itself in Iranian society without there being substantial debates, some representative institutions, somebody who can object peacefully, vote and so forth. And this is not clear.

What seems to many Americans is that things are drifting despite the fact that two-thirds of the country might like us to a course of nuclear armament. So this led at least a couple of you to suggest, well, let's consider what happens after they have weapons. What do we do then, under those circumstances? And how well does the NPT work, or is it around at all at this point?

That conference has not been going particularly well in trying to define what the NPT is these days, and really what it's to mean. So that's unfortunate. And that might be laid at the door of part of our policy of maybe being less definitional about what we wanted from that conference or from the NPT.

But I keep having a feeling that despite the fact no one really wanted this to happen, the drift of affairs is that covertly, despite stops and starts, some attempt to satisfy the Europeans or us, that somewhere back in the weeds somebody is still working with centrifuges, attempting to find somewhere in the world maybe some fissile material that would hurry up the process. Might get lucky and somebody turns up some day with some material.

There is still some around, unfortunately, that could make that hastier, and that we are then left with this issue which some of you have suggested, and I asked in my sort of first round of comments or questions today, do we take military action? You suggested if we did it would probably be very unilateral, condemned even maybe by the United Kingdom, quite apart from the U.N. or anybody else.

Well, we could say that after all that's our burden, too bad others don't step up to the plate. But nevertheless, somebody has got to do the job.

But then some say, well, how are we certain we know where all of these installations are? The ones we think that have been closed down, or delayed, or the ones that may be out there somewhere unknown to us. And of course we don't know all that much I suspect.

So even then with military action, we cause destruction, we maybe change the course of events, but we don't really get the job done necessarily which regard to the nuclear weapon if that was the point.

And some would raise the question, well, how good is our intelligence? Is it better than pre-Iraq? How confident are we as we ask the American people for a declaration of war that we are after something here?

Well, that's a very good question. And we will all need to be raising those issues as we contemplate that.

Another prospect has been that we don't necessarily go to war but that we try to get economic sanctions that are of sufficient quantity and quality that they make a difference. Maybe they will. There are some who would say that the Americans are sensitive to this.

Certainly they would be sensitive if the world said that we're not going to buy your oil, period, we're just stopping. But we are not optimistic to think the world will come to that conclusion. In fact many Americans are either pessimistic or cynical, believing that a good number of countries in Europe and Russia have trade relations that are very strong, that their populations would say, hold on here. And before your foreign policy gets carried away, there is business to be done. There's unemployment abounding in Europe; no growth. We sort of need both the energy plus the commerce. So that would tend to mean we would bumble along further in that direction.

In essence, almost all of the signs dictate, although we may talk about going to the Security Council, we have the secretary general, Kofi Annan, saying caution light here. Members might not act in concert. As a matter of fact, the Russians and the Chinese may not like the idea at all.

And therefore we can debate the issue, but in terms of effective action, once again, are we left to go unilaterally or with the cause of the willing, or do we have this?

So I'm sort of looking for some ray of hope in all of this for our policymakers. And we listened to Secretary Burns, very forthcoming, those looking for more engagement would find it there, although some might argue there ought to be a great deal more.

But if it was, if the United States was fully engaged with these folks right now, and we got everybody to agree. We go to the Security Council, and we're still not sure exactly what's going on back in the weeks in terms of developments even while we're talking here. What is the hope for us in all of this? Is there a glimmer, at least, at the end of the day that the right policy might lead to, one, no development of nuclear weapons in Iran, and secondly, to an Iran that became a normal nation, that had some general relationships with us, with the Europeans, with the rest of the world, that would be in fact a country that was able to work in the Middle East constructively, in an area where there are all sorts of other controversies in which sometimes they become involved?

Can anybody offer a glimmer of hope, a scintilla at least of some light to this situation? Dr. Kemp, would you like to try?

MR. KEMP: Not in the short run, Mr. Chairman.

But I do think that if you look at the big picture over the years, it's clear that the regime is worried about its own internal stability for the long term, given the demographics, given the inability of the economy to truly reform.

And here I would say parenthetically I think sanctions have had a significant impact on deterring foreign direct investment in Iran.

Now, I think one of the dilemmas we have is that there is a great deal of confusion, both in Iran and I think here, about what we mean by Iran's going nuclear. It's one thing for Iran to develop nuclear weapons, put them on a missile, and declare like Pakistan and India have that they are a fully fledged nuclear power.

It's quite another for Iran to develop all the wherewithal to fabricate a nuclear warhead but not physically cross the line that we know of, a more ambiguous set of circumstances.

My judgment is that most Europeans support the Iranian government's arguments that they make in public, namely, that they have the right to develop the technology. But I'm not sure there has ever really been a debate in Iraq about how good would it be for us to actually have them armed.

In fact you find a lot of Iranians who say, we oppose the idea of the bomb. Indeed, the government says it opposes the idea of a bomb. We want the technology.

And one of the reasons I think there is great ambiguity about this because the Iranians themselves have to think through very carefully what impact a bomb in Iran would have on the neighborhood, and therefore, on them.

I think it is certainly possible that if Iran gets the bomb, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and possibly even Turkey would reconsider. Certainly the smaller Gulf states would turn more to us for help.

There would be huge downsides for the Iranian regime getting the bomb. And one of the things we can do, I think, is to encourage more of the debate in Iran about the benefits they get from crossing this awful red line.

SEN. LUGAR: Senator Biden.

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, you approached your question the way I was about. High regard, regime change not likely, nuclear capacity desired, pretty much across the board, acquisition inevitable, capability, and U.S.-Europe should stay the course but we're really not going to be able to do anything about it, is the essence of what I'm getting from you all.

If we go with the Security Council we may get something we didn't wish for, which is faced with the prospect that we have to basically accept or act unilaterally militarily -- and even then that's another question -- accept this inevitability, which basically says a nation that hopefully and recently defies the NPT, it's okay, there is no downside, which would further undermine this already shaky regime.

I have three questions. One of the things we don't discuss a lot, at least in my experience, is the impact of acquisition. The American people hear us say all the time it would be a disaster if the Iranians acquired a nuclear weapon and acquired the capacity to thrust that nuclear weapon some distance from their borders in a missile.

But there's very little discussion publicly about why that would be so disastrous for the United States. Some suggest that the likelihood of the Iranians ever using such a weapon knowing they would be annihilated if it were done, that this is one place where the doctrine of assured destruction still has relevance.

The other question I want to ask you about is the impact not only of acquisition but the impact of threats. We hear from varying quarters, those of us, all three of us here, who spend a lot of time focusing on this, from experts like yourself, from intelligence folks, from a whole array of people, that threats don't work very well in Iran. They actually may be counterproductive in terms of dissuading them from pursuing this acquisition capability.

And it has been said by some that we respect, I respect, that even sanctions have had a perverse impact of suggesting -- of not slowing the process, of not moving the process.

And so I'd like to know what you think about the impact of U.S. interest with acquisition of a nuclear capability; the impact of threats, physical threats, and sanctions combined; and I would like to ask the rhetorical question -- actually I'll ask it directly -- is -- if in fact as you have said, Dr. Kemp and others have said or implied, that the regime has a long term concern about the regime's stability, although it's not in jeopardy according to any one of you now, the likelihood of some spontaneous uprising of anti-regime forces in Iraq -- I mean in Iran -- is nonexistent in the minds of almost everyone I've spoken to at this point -- that there's a long term concern about their viability, then why isn't it a good idea for us to focus on short term efforts to have the effect of delaying the ability to acquire this technical capability.

Do you speak to people who are very steeped in the knowledge of the construction of, the acquisition of, the production of fissile material and the like? It is not an easy undertaking, and the Iranians aren't particularly close to that process at this point according to most people that I've spoken to.

So does it make sense for us to engage in objective -- seek objectives that have, if for nothing else, the ability to maintain inspectors in place on their centrifuge system, the one site that we know they have? Is that a good thing? Does that slow up the process? And is time on the side of the United States and those who are concerned about the acquisition of a nuclear capability?

And if it is, how do we push this down the lane so that we move further in the direction of building the prospect -- absorbing the prospect of Iranian discontent with the theocracy growing?

There's a lot of questions in there. But acquisition, what's the impact; impact of the threats and sanctions; and impact of us having as a strategy the delay, the -- enhance the difficulty in terms of time of acquiring the ability to produce their own fissile material? Anybody.

MR. : Let me jump in a little bit, Senator.

I think partly because of what Senator Lugar said and what you said, that the default position is going to be the buying time position. I mean that's kind of where you get led through the logic of, none of the options are great, and the options aren't that great for them, and so we will buy some time.

Let me try to address the other two questions. The impact of acquisition, we can all model ways in which you get a relatively stable outcome or a bad one. But the metaphor for me, which makes me nervous about it, is the Iranians built a new airport in Tehran, the Imam Khomeini Airport. The day it was too open, the Revolutionary Guards took it over. It has been there, built, ready to go, for going on two years now. No revenue, no nothing.

We have an image of the leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who somehow could control everything. This is not something he welcomes. They have this airport sitting out there for two years with nothing.

So a concern would be that they acquire nuclear capability, who controls it, by which lines of authority? It is a very kind of circular difficult governmental structure there to try to figure out. So that would be a worry about acquisition.

Last thing, on the impact of threats, I think you have to have --

SEN. BIDEN: The get the totality of the work? In other words, what's the case you make to the American people as to why this is such in the language we use an absolute disaster, catastrophic, would change our security circumstances in a fundamental way if Iran got a weapon?

MR. : Could I respond to that, sir?

SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.

MR. : I think that Pakistan is a good example of -- perhaps the best piece of evidence in favor of that catastrophic position, of the position that it would be a catastrophe. For years, we were worried about Pakistan itself becoming a nuclear power. And during that time we didn't realize that Pakistan was helping other countries become nuclear powers; that Pakistan was not just a threat on its own, but it was proliferating.

And so we're going to face that problem with Iran also. In fact I would say that Iran's knowledge probably brings us there already. That is, Iran is going to have the ability to extend the ability to make the bomb beyond itself and will probably use it to further its foreign policy goals.

Other countries have. The Chinese have for years. So that's one of the most powerful arguments behind this, I guess you could say, catastrophe rubric.

I think there's a second one. And that is that we tend to think that the delivery capability of a nuclear weapons state is limited by its missiles or its aircraft. I think after 9/11 we'd have to realize that that ain't necessarily so. With Iran's ties to terrorist groups, with the obvious fact that our borders are porous, I think if the Iranians had a dozen bombs and were worried about an imminent war with us, I think they could get one here without putting it on a missile. And that's something --

SEN. BIDEN: Which means we're really in trouble with Korea, aren't we, right now?

MR. : Well, I think we are. We don't know how many SQs, how many significant quantities, how many warhead quantities North Korea really has. And we don't know where any of them are.

SEN. BIDEN: We know they have. We know -- we don't know, we're not sure, we think Iran does not have. We know North Korea does have.

MR. : Well, we know they have enough material to make probably eight or nine bombs.

SEN. BIDEN: Right.

MR. : We know that they have worked on making warheads. We know they have received, probably received a design that works, perhaps from A.Q. Khan. And we know that somebody can figure it out. I mean, after all, we figured it out in the '40s. So if you're just looking at probabilities, you'd have to say that the North Koreans, if they wanted to, could probably get one here tomorrow. So I don't think we could ever assume that that was not possible. And as time goes on, that's going to be with us.

But I think there is a glimmer of hope that if we can continue the freeze, we might see a change in heart in Iran. That's what happened in Argentina and Brazil. We slowed their programs down long enough so that there was a political change in those countries. And instead of becoming nuclear powers, they didn't.

SEN. BIDEN: It seems to me it's the only rational strategy any one of you have proffered thus far that -- if you were president of the United States yourself now. That all the other strategies that are talked about seem to be beyond the ability to accomplish in the near term. The one strategy is if we could accomplish a freeze, that it buys time.

Is there any other suggestion other than that one?

MR. KEMP: Not really. I mean, the other model that has sometimes been used, which I happen to think will not work in the case of Iran, is the -- what's called the Qadhafi model. After all, here's a man who had all the ingredients for WMD and gave them all up, you know, lock, stock and barrel, but in exchange for one very important thing, regime survival.

And I think that the only lesson we can learn from that is that the, that this regime does worry that we are interested in regime change. And therefore, to the extent that they see our strategy as delay, delay, delay until they topple, they're more and more encouraged to accelerate their programs so that they have this insurance card.

SEN. BIDEN: But isn't that argument even more profound when you say to the extent that they see us threaten, threaten, threaten, to the extent that they see us sanction, sanction, sanction, they're -- even more than the other option -- encouraged to move more rapidly.

MR. KEMP: With one caveat, Senator. I think that they are worried about the idea of joint U.S., European -- and possibly joined by Russia and China and Japan -- I think that they'd be very, very worried about the impact of those sort of sanctions on them. They can live with our unilateral sanctions.

SEN. BIDEN: But you don't think that and I don't think that and they don't think that. They're wiser than that. I've not heard a single person suggest that anyone realistically thinks, in Iran, whether they're part of the theocracy or this nascent or recently crushed democratic movement, that there will be genuine sanctions.

They're making their deal with China right now. Pretty darn smart. With Russia. They have their own interests that are related -- unlikely to cause Russia to engage in these overall sanctions. The likelihood -- have you heard anybody -- are any of you seriously suggesting that you think there is even a 20 percent chance that Europe, Russia and China would engage in a full sanction on no purchase of Iranian oil? Anybody think that? What makes you think THEY think that?

MR. KEMP: Well, I don't think you can rule it out completely.

SEN. BIDEN: (Laughs.)

MR. KEMP: If you get into a defiant situation where they're defying U.N. resolutions, you don't know what will happen.

SEN. BIDEN: I'll make you a bet. Maybe I've been around here longer than you. I'll make you a bet.

MR. : It's uncertain, obviously.

MR. KEMP: Well, if there were a global recession, where we didn't need their oil, it would be a different story.

SEN. BIDEN: That's true. That's true.

MR. : There is one alternative, Senator, that follows on what both senators have said. And that is that if we made the focus, in addition to Iran, broader -- in other words, we're not saying just only Iran can't have uranium enrichment or plutonium separation capability, it's a broader requirement -- that would generate a lot more pressure on them.

And for example, ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, has proposed a moratorium, a global moratorium on constructing new facilities. If you could get that, then it adds a lot more pressure on Iran. The problem is, we oppose it, the Japanese oppose it and the Europeans oppose it because our nuclear industries don't want a moratorium on those things. So then we're back to --

SEN. BIDEN: Bingo.

MR. : If I may interject also, that if we look in terms of presidential election, we see that Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president, he actually advocated Iran having weapons of mass destruction back in 1988, so it seems unlikely that if -- the front runner is suddenly going to have a sea change, although he might be a little more discreet about it.

The other conservative leaders for the presidential election -- Larijani, he's dismissed negotiations with the NPT -- with the EU, saying that Iran has given away too much in the negotiation process. Rezaei has pretty much said the same thing. He says that diplomats are trying hard but they're not very good at their jobs.

So it seems very unlikely to me that any of these candidates would give up this nuclear capability.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Biden. I appreciate listening to (the thought ?) of the IAEA solution, NPT, these other situations, which are sort of in the obscure situation right now but might come back to the fore at some point as we are all searching for something that makes some difference in all this.

Senator Dodd.

SEN. DODD (D-CT): Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief here. You've been very patient, all of you.

Let me just quickly ask you to quickly comment on this. I've used the word "engagement," and obviously a lot of things can fall under the rubric of engagement; but I think you all understand what I was driving at here, the question of whether or not you're sort of relying, to the extent we have become reliant, on the Europeans to be the principal negotiators in this entire effort.

Tell me how you feel about this notion of us getting more directly involved with the Europeans; that is, the United States more directly involved. I know what the Iranian reaction has been, but I suspect if we were a bit more aggressive in pursuing our engagement with Iran, there might be a bit more of a positive reaction there. And I'd wonder if you'd quickly give an assessment of that.

MR. KEMP: Well, I quite agree. I think that unless there is more direct American engagement, there will be no deal at the end of the day, because the Europeans cannot come up with enough carrots for the Iranians.

SEN. DODD: Right.

MR. KEMP: Only the United States can.

SEN. DODD: Right.

MR. KEMP: And therefore, what we have to decide is, are we prepared to go the extra yard and provide more than just a few aircraft spare parts. Obviously we have to put much more on the table. I don't think the government has yet decided whether to do that.

MR. : I agree with Mr. Kemp. I think that what we have to do is put the best offer on the table we can put. And the United States has to think about it, work it out with the Europeans and figure out what our best shot is. That is, we have to calculate what it is that we can afford to offer, what it is we think the Iranians will take, and we have to give it our best shot. If that's insufficient, which probably one would say is more likely to be the case than not, than at least we will have shown the world that we're willing to go that route and to explore every possibility short of sanctions or force. And I think even doing that would improve our position.

SEN. DODD: Yeah. And it probably would increase the likelihood -- well, I think your point's been made on -- and the possibility of getting a sanctions regime imposed would increase dramatically with our direct involvement, I think.

MR. : Yes. And without that, it's going to be harder for us to achieve that.

MR. : I would make a distinction between our participation physically in the negotiations with the EU and Iran, which I think is a bad idea, and what my colleagues have said are conveyance to our European colleagues that we would support and are prepared to provide what they need, whether it be presidential statements, economic policies, whatever. Having us in the room --

SEN. DODD: I wasn't suggesting that as -- I'm talking about more direct U.S. involvement here. You're for that? You presume that's correct? Mr. Samii, what are you're thoughts on that?

MR. SAMII: Sir, all I can say is that the Iranian negotiating process, in my opinion, seems to always be one of demanding a great deal, of giving away just a little bit, and when things seem to come to a standstill, then the Iranians will give yet a little more ground.

SEN. DODD: Right.

MR. SAMII: But they seem to be trying to get much more out of it than they're giving up.

SEN. DODD: Mm-hmm.

MR. SAMII: And I think that'll continue to be the process.

Rafsanjani this morning said that basically the Americans should gradually begin to take positive actions instead of misbehaving with Iran. "They should not expect to see an immediate big reaction in return for a small action. When these positive U.S. actions are forthcoming, the people of Iran and its government will feel that the U.S. is giving up its hostility."

So they're always demanding things from us, and they don't seem to be giving any ground at all.

SEN. DODD: No, I understand that. Look, we're not arguing about who we're dealing with here. And obviously, I could show you some of the statements being made by members of Congress in the last month or so on these issues, and I presume they're being read widely by Iranian officials from time to time, too.

I'm trying to get beyond that a bit. And the point here that I think has been made by the chairman, by Senator Biden, by all of you as I've heard you is that the best likely outcome here is to have something happen before the Iranians reach the ability, if they haven't already, to really possess these weapons of mass destruction. That's our greatest hope. That all the other options we're talking about are just rife with problems, serious, serious problems.

And the question I had was, can we rely, can we outsource, in a sense, our participation in that? Will the Iranians accept that and agree on some formulation here that would limit their willingness or ability to acquire these weapons? So I was curious about your comments on the engagement.

Let me ask you one other question if I can, because I'm curious about the change. And by the way, I couldn't agree more. I think, Mr. Kemp, you made this point. I think others have. Certainly there's tremendous what I see as a significant change in the administration's view on the EU-3 effort. And I applaud that. We can go back and people can have fun, if they want, politically about what was going on before. But I think we ought to welcome and applaud our very significant engagement and the comments this morning of Secretary Burns supporting that.

I guess I'm sort of curious, as you're watching this as people who are very astute observers of this situation, what are the motivations here? Is it that -- do we wish success of this effort, or is it more tactical, in your opinion?

MR. KEMP: My view is that I think there was an appreciation both in Washington and in Europe that without this coming together, it would fail; the Europeans would fail in their approach and we'd fail in our options. So it's the only hope. And it's better to go down together rather than to go down divided.

SEN. DODD: Mm-hmm.

MR. KEMP: Because of what follows afterwards.

SEN. DODD: Any other comments?

MR. : I think there was also the factor that the Europeans assured us that if the deal did founder, that they would deliver in the sense that they would be willing to go to the U.N. and they would stand side-by-side with us in demanding whatever action was appropriate. That is, I think we got something in exchange for supporting their position, which was a promise by them that they would support us if the process failed.

MR. : I don't think it was just tactical, because I don't think we have Plan B. So tactical makes sense if you've got Plan B that you think's a great plan, but nobody here has a great idea about how we solve the nuclear problem, to suggest that all of this talk about cooperating with Europe is somehow a ruse because we have a strategy we really think is going to work.

SEN. DODD: Unless you accept the notion that there are those who believe that there is, quote, "a military answer to all this," in which case you've now gone down the road of the political diplomatic approach, if you will, and that has cratered and failed; thus our options are off the table and we're left with what Secretary Burns talked earlier, and that is, saying we never take any option off the table. And there are those, I think, who embrace that view, deal, unfortunately, in the administration but I think it would be naive to assume otherwise.

Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

And we thank each one of you for staying with us and responding to our questions and engaging in dialogue. I suspect that the committee will have additional hearings, because the subject we've been discussing today will be with us, I suspect, for a period of time. And our role is to be oversight but likewise inquisitive and try to be helpful in the formulation of American foreign policy. And you have made great contributions to that with your testimony this morning.

The hearing is adjourned.