SEN. LUGAR: (Strikes gavel.) This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Before I begin, let me just indicate, for the benefit of all senators, all who are watching our hearing, unfortunately, an objection has been filed to this committee meeting more than two hours after the Senate comes in. The Senate came in at 9:30, which means that we will be concluding by 11:30. I'm sad to mention that, but nevertheless, that goes with the circumstances. So we will proceed with Ambassador Burns's testimony and questioning of him, and we will need to restrict our questions, so that we have ample time for our distinguished second panel of witnesses to be heard. And then we'll proceed as long as we can at that point.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to examine issues related to Iran, particularly that country's pursuit of nuclear weapons. For more than 18 years, Iran hid its nuclear activities from the world, despite being a state party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. To avoid punitive measures after the direction of its nuclear program was exposed, Iran reached agreement with the United Kingdom, Germany and France to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. It also signed the Additional Protocol, which provided for enhanced U.N. inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Unfortunately, Iran has failed to ratify the Additional Protocol, it's refused to give IAEA complete access to verify that no weapons activities are occurring, and last week it threatened to restart its uranium conversion program. European officials responded by warning Tehran that they would leave the two-year-long negotiations should any effort be made to resume uranium conversion.

Since then, Iran has agreed to meet with the foreign ministers of the EU-3 next week in Europe. The United States has endorsed these negotiations and has supported the European offer that Iran be allowed to join the World Trade Organization as an added incentive for full cooperation on the nuclear issue. If these talks do not succeed, the next step may be referral of the problem to the U.N. Security Council.

Time is running out, not just for preventing Iranian acquisition of nuclear materials but also for the viability of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. We must recognize that Iran is at a stage in its nuclear development where it can move rapidly toward production of nuclear weapons if it ceases to be hindered by any constraints.

Enforcing the NPT has always been complicated by the relatively short time period required to move from legitimate civilian nuclear power activities permitted under the treaty to building nuclear weapons. The success of the NPT depends on the international community taking decisive action when evidence emerges that a non- nuclear weapons state is illegally pursuing nuclear weapons. As in the Iranian case, warning signs that a country is cheating may come only a year or less before it's capable of building nuclear weapons, absent any constraints.

The efforts of the EU-3 have slowed Iran's progress, but the international community still has not coalesced behind a clear course of action with the potential to stop the Iranian nuclear program.

The U.S. already has sanctions in place on Iran for its decades- long sponsorship of terror. The international community must be willing to join the United States in imposing potent economic sanctions if Iran does not comply with its obligations. Economic benefits could also be offered to reward Iran for good behavior. Essentially, the United States and its allies must present the Iranian government with an unambiguous choice between economic self-interest and pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Even if the EU-3 succeeds in the short run, we will need to apply almost constant diplomatic and economic pressure to ensure that Iran does not continue its nuclear program. Iran will be an enormous challenge for U.S. foreign policy, which can only be met through the sustained focus and attention of our highest officials.

This diplomatic heavy lifting includes convincing European nations -- and even Russia and China -- that their interests in Iranian trade and energy supplies are secondary to the extreme risks associated with a nuclear armed Iran. The possibility of a nuclear- weapons capable Iran is particularly grave because of the Iranian regime's connections to terrorists.

I recently surveyed 85 top international experts in the field of nonproliferation for a forthcoming report, and one of the questions that I asked the survey group was whether a nuclear attack during the next ten years was more likely to be carried out by a terrorist group or by a government. 79 percent of the experts surveyed believed a nuclear attack by terrorists was more likely. Consequently, as we look at nations that are seeking nuclear weapons, their connections to terrorists become an extremely important factor in determining our course.

For the ninth year in a row, the State Department's "Country Reports on Terrorism" has described Iran as the "most active state sponsor of terrorism" in the world. Iran's continued arming of Hizbollah is in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces and disarmament of militias in Lebanon. Iran's support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, also on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, is complicating the fragile advances toward peace by the Israelis and Palestinians.

For the past decade, U.S. policy has attempted to balance between containment of Iranian threats and selective engagement to take advantage of opportunities created by reformist elements. We must be decisive in isolating and pressuring Iran to stop its pursuit of nuclear weapons, but we should also reach out to the Iranian people with hope that more pragmatic, rational voices in Iran will prevail. Iran is holding presidential elections in June of this year. If manipulated by the mullahs as in the past, they are unlikely to result in a representative government. But Iranian citizens -- just like the Lebanese, Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghanis and others -- have a strong desire to choose their own government.

The U.S. supports the Iranian citizens who are desperate for their voices to be heard, yet fearful of the Iranian regime's use of oppressive means to prevent dissent. The U.S. needs to take care when promoting democracy and human rights in Iran, given the regime's ability to taint any individual or group that appears connected to America. But we need to continue to emphasize that freedom and human rights, including the right to a representative government, are universal values that apply to Iran.

Momentum for change is building in the Middle East. Elections in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority elections of President Abbas, and upcoming elections in Lebanon and Egypt present new opportunities. These movements toward reform and democracy can bring even greater pressure on countries like Iran to be more responsive to their people. Our work in Iraq and our efforts to support Israeli disengagement from Gaza and the West Bank, while moving forward on the roadmap may be the most important contributions we can make to democracy in Iran and in the region.

Today, we have two outstanding panels that will provide their perspectives on Iran. First, we will hear from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns. Secretary Burns is a good friend of this committee, and we always look forward to our discussions with him.

We also welcome a second panel of distinguished experts. Dr. Geoffrey Kemp is director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center. Dr. Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. And Mr. George Perkovich is vice president for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And Dr. William Samii is the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty regional analysis coordinator for Southeast Asia and the Middle East. We thank all of our witnesses, we look forward to their insights. We will be joined shortly by the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

But for the moment, we call upon you, Secretary Burns, and we appreciate your coming and look forward to your testimony.

 

STATEMENT OF

NICHOLAS BURNS
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

 

MR. BURNS: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your welcome here. It's a great pleasure to be with you and all the distinguished members of this committee. I have submitted a statement for the record. I will not read that to you --

SEN. LUGAR: It'll be published in full.

MR. BURNS: -- exactly, but I would like to make an abbreviated statement, if that's agreeable to the members.

SEN. LUGAR: Excellent.

MR. BURNS: I'll try not to test your patience in doing so.

Mr. Chairman, Iran remains a very serious foreign challenge -- foreign policy challenge for our country and the democratic world at large. For nearly a quarter of a century the United States and Iran have been without diplomatic relations. We remember the images of our embassy hostages -- that's seared into the consciousness of every American. But it's also easy to forget, when you juxtapose that image against another image, that there were at one point 200,000 Iranians studying in the United States before that tragic episode in 1979.

Our argument is not with the with the Iranian people, it is with the Iranian government. It is with that government's threatening and often very irresponsible behavior. And we have made clear repeatedly our concerns regarding the Iranian government's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems. We've made clear our concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, including its direct support of Hezbollah and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, its direct opposition to the existence of the state of Israel, and we've clear our concern about Iran's appalling human rights and democracy record.

Each of these issues is of vital concern to the United States. In each and every case, Iran has a position that has been inimical to the position of the United States and of the international community. And at a time when countries across the region are moving towards greater openness -- and we have just seen Kuwait enfranchise women in the last few days. We've seen a greater spirit of democracy in the Middle East, willingness to inculcate the principles of freedom and openness, Iran is moving in the opposite direction to nearly all of its neighbors.

Our concerns with Iran are not merely historical. It is the policies and actions of the Iranian government that drive our own policy. And I would just like to comment, Mr. Chairman, on three aspects of those policies: on human rights, on Iran's nuclear ambitions, and on Iran's support for terrorism. Let me start with Iran's freedom deficit, which is appropriate, given the fact that there have been democratic elections in Iraq and democratic elections in many other parts of the world that have been very encouraging in recent months.

The United States believes that the future of Iran should be democratic and it should be pluralistic.

And we support those who wish to see a transformed Iran from a rigid, theocratic state into a modern country. A peaceful and democratic Iran, of course, would be a key feature in a reformed, more democratic Middle East. And we believe Iran is a country in the process of change. Two-thirds of its people are below the age of 35. Many young Iranians support the need for a more positive relationship with the United States. Ironically, the public image of the United States might be more positive in Iran than in many other countries in the Middle Eastern region.

And so we sense that there is sentiment among ordinary Iranians for change; for reform and democracy. And that sentiment should no longer be ignored by the ruling elite of the country.

The regime's human rights record has been abysmal. The government continues to commit numerous, serious abuses, including summary executions, disappearances, torture, and other inhumane treatment. In the late 1990s, elements of Iran's secret services murdered a number of intellectuals and journalists and oppositionists.

In 2000, a courageous journalist, Akbar Ganji, was imprisoned for uncovering what he thought was the truth and reporting it in his newspaper. Since his imprisonment, many journalists and even webloggers have been taken into prison, where they have been abused and threatened. The Iranian government's actions have essentially eliminated the free press in Iran. In 2003, an Iranian-Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi, was beaten to death in detention. The investigation and trial have been a farce, and the Canadian government has taken steps to scale back its own relations with Iran. During student protests in June 2003, 4,000 demonstrators were arrested, and some of them are still held in Iranian prisons.

There are many examples, Mr. Chairman, of Iranian actions against journalists, against young people, against students, who are imprisoned, beaten, tortured simply because they are expressing views that we in our country and in most of the world would find to be our God-given rights.

On the surface, and if you talk to Iranians, Iranian government officials, they will say that they have an active democracy in which Iranians participate regularly in national and local elections; but this is a veneer behind which lies a perverted process whose integrity is severely compromised by the oppressive oversight exercised by the hard-line theocratic leadership.

The most egregious example of this extraordinary political system occurred in the rigging of the February 2004 Majlis elections, in which the Guardian Council disqualified thousands of reformist political candidates, including more than 85 sitting members of the Majlis itself.

We have obvious concerns, given this track record, about the upcoming June 17th presidential elections, which we fear will be another setback for the democratic hopes of the Iranian people. There is every indication that the June elections will not result in a meaningful expression of the popular will because the political process is controlled by an unelected few. And these unelected leaders dominate Iran's political system. They have the power to intimidate then to disqualify political candidates; and through the exercise of that power they have stymied a popular demand for freedom.

A thousand Iranians have registered to run in the upcoming elections, but we believe the Guardian Council may only approve a dozen or so candidates.

Our administration is deeply appreciative of the support of the Congress and of this committee's support for the resources that enable us to implement the president's freedom agenda. We have funded a Persian language website that essentially serves as our "virtual embassy" in Iran. We post information there about United States government policy. We post information that might be helpful to those who support reform in Iran itself. As you know, we also fund Persian language broadcasts on Voice of America and Radio Farda. We very much support -- we don't fund, but we very much support, of course, all the private American radio and TV outlets that have done such a good job of bringing freedom of expression into Iran itself. And we're grateful to funds from the Congress that have allowed us to support the advancement of human rights and democracy in Iran itself. These initiatives and programs do require resources, and the administration will be approaching the Congress for further resources so that in working with the nongovernmental community and the private sector we can make sure that free ideas are entering Iran itself.

That is the first concern, Mr. Chairman, of our government. The second concern is the one that you spent the bulk of your statement talking about. And by the way, I think we agree with everything that you said and the way you said it in your opening statement.

But our critical United States concern is our strong and resolute opposition to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Iran desires to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that threatens the peace and security of its neighbors and of the United States. It has demonstrated a track record of nuclear deception and denial, including an 18-year history of trying to hide from the world a clandestine enrichment program, undeclared plutonium separation experiments, and other suspicious activities. And these have been documented not by the United States, but by the IAEA and its director general, Mr. El Baradei.

Iran failed to report the irradiation of uranium targets and subsequent processing of those targets to separate plutonium. Iran failed to report the use of imported natural UF6 for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company. Iran failed to declare the pilot enrichment facility at Kalaye Electric, the laser enrichment plant at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, and the pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab'ad. The list of Iran's failures is endless, and it represents, in our view, the foundation pillars of a clandestine nuclear weapons development program.

We see no sign that Iran has made the necessary strategic decision to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Its repeated brinksmanship in its negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom is part of its continuing efforts to divide the international community on this very important issue. But we would like to say today that there should be no misunderstanding in Tehran about the position of our government. The international community is united on this issue: Iran must not be permitted to develop the capacity to build or deliver a nuclear weapon.

Many in the United States were skeptical of the chances of success of the EU-3 negotiating effort. But President Bush went to Europe in February; he talked to President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder. He talked to President Putin; he talked to other officials. And he heard a clear commitment from our friends and allies: that they share our goal of denying Iran a nuclear weapon, and they recognize that there must be consequences should Tehran fail to adhere to its declared international commitments.

Our European partners made clear that Iran must provide objective guarantees to demonstrate that it is not pursuing a clandestine weapons program under the cover of a civilian nuclear energy program. On this point, the bar for Iran must be set very high because of its history of deception, which has undermined the trust of the international community. And in that sense, to paraphrase a great American president: if we don't trust, then we really must verify.

During his visit to Europe in February, President Bush heard from our friends of the importance of United States' supporting the European diplomatic effort. And so we decided -- the president and Secretary Rice decided -- that we ought to get behind the European effort. On March 11th, Secretary Rice announced that we are prepared to take tangible, practical steps in support of the EU-3 effort. We would no longer block Iran's application to join the World Trade Organization, and we would consider licensing the export of spare parts for civilian passenger aircraft to Iran.

And since that time, we have maintained a near constant dialogue with the EU-3 countries. Just the other night, the U.K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw spent a large part of the dinner conversation with Secretary Rice updating her on the EU-3's current negotiating round with the Iranian government. I speak on a daily basis with my British, French and German counterparts, and have since I took this job two months ago, to make sure that they are aware of the positions of the United States as we support this negotiation.

And Mr. Chairman, we believe that the EU-3 deserve our support, that they deserve our appreciation for their efforts to resolve this problem peacefully and diplomatically. Iran appears to have maintained its suspension pledge since November 22, 2004, but Iran has asserted -- and you've seen the statements from Tehran from various Iranian officials, including some of the presidential candidates, including Mr. Rafsanjani -- Iran has asserted several times in recent weeks that it intends to resume uranium conversion activities at Isfahan which are covered by its November 2004 agreement with the EU- 3.

This would require the breaking of IAEA seals in place to monitor that suspension. The European governments have made clear their deep concern with this possibility and they have reaffirmed that these activities would constitute an Iranian breach of the agreement, ending the negotiation process and requiring action by the international community. We support the European governments in that conviction. We have communicated that, in fact, as of this morning, to the EU-3 governments. And we will continue to do so.

We believe that if that occurred -- if the seals were broken, if uranium conversion took place -- then obviously the international community, led by the EU-3, would then have to support a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors for referral to the U.N. Security Council.

President Bush, when he has spoken about this issue -- as well as Secretary Rice -- have made very clear we support a peaceful, negotiated settlement of this Iranian nuclear problem, and that is why we support the EU-3 process.

Our message to Tehran today is: adhere to the Paris Agreement, maintain suspension of all nuclear-related activities, and negotiate in good faith the eventual cessation and dismantling of all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. In this sense, the spotlight of the Congress and of our government and the international community has to rest squarely on the Iranian government.

Finally, Mr. Chairman -- and I'll abbreviate this section -- our third concern with the Iranian government has been its constant and persistent support of terrorist groups in the Middle East region. And you are exactly right that our State Department terrorism report has said that Iran is the most active supporter -- state supporter of terrorism in the world today.

We all know that Iran has directed the operation, funded and supported the operations of Hamas, of Hezbollah and of Palestinian rejectionist groups. We know that Hezbollah is responsible for the death of hundreds of Americans. No terrorist group has killed more Americans, with the exception of al Qaeda, than Hezbollah. We remember what happened in 1983, with the bombing of our embassy, with the bombing of the Marine barracks. We remember the imprisonment and torture of Colonel Higgins, who was executed by Hezbollah. We remember all the attacks on America and its allies. And Iran has supported for more than 20 years the operations and the intent of these terrorist groups.

Iran continues to hold senior al Qaeda leaders who are wanted for murdering Americans and others in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. We have sanctioned Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. We have repeatedly called on the regime to cease and desist, and it has not done so.

In November 2004, at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, Iran made commitments to the international community, which it has not honored.

And beyond terrorism, in -- its own treatment of the incipient Iraqi government that has emerged in Baghdad, its own support for warlords in Afghanistan lead us to believe that Iran is also playing a negative role in relations with those two important countries.

So, Mr. Chairman, those are the -- that is the indictment of the American government concerning Iran. We remain separated for (sic) them because of these fundamental convictions that they are going in the opposite direction from the United States and all of our allies on these very important issues. And we will remain resolved -- and I think five presidents have been resolved since 1979 -- to focus the international spotlight on these actions of the Iranian government and to ensure that we have the ability, with the international community, to oppose them, as we must, and to expect that Iran at some point in the future should return to the civilized community of nations.

Thank you very much.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Secretary Burns.

We'll have a five-minute round of questions at this point, and I'll commence by asking you this basic question.

Analysts of the situation in Iran have suggested four possible outcomes in terms of our relationships with Iran, one of which is that we foster regime change; secondly, that we conduct a military attack on Iran in the event that they are not forthcoming in terms of development of weapons of mass destruction; third, that we offer very substantial incentives, along with European friends -- and this would have to be a united front -- so that Iran's economy would be perceived by Iranians as prospering to an extent that they would forego their nuclear experiments; and fourth, some have suggested that none of the above are going to work, that we shall simply have to learn to live with a nuclear weapon in Iran as we have with weapons in various other parts of the Middle East.

Now, the third option I select at least as potentially promising, although without prescribing what our policy ought to be. And I note The New York Times this morning points out that an Iranian negotiator suggests that perhaps 10 nuclear reactors provided by Europeans or others might be an incentive to begin thinking about the economic route. He disparages the spare parts for aircraft situation that we have endorsed as almost disparaging.

Now, is there a route, in your judgment, along the economic front, or is this a situation in which your judgment is the Iranians might pocket any of the economic incentives and proceed in a covert way with development of centrifuge technology and progress toward making a nuclear weapon?

MR. BURNS: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would answer your question by pointing to the normal relations that Iran has with much of the world. Many of our European allies maintain embassies in Tehran. They have normal -- somewhat normal political relations. There is trade between the countries. And none of that economic trade, commercial discourse, has affected the Iranian government in such a way that it would lead the Iranians to conclude that they should live without a nuclear weapons capability. So I don't believe that it stands to reason that if the United States suddenly decided to change the policy of the last five presidents, Democratic and Republican, opened up the trade gates in the hope that that might encourage the Iranians to give up their nuclear weapon aspirations, doesn't stand to reason that would work.

Instead, we have pursued a patient policy over many administrations over more than two decades of encouraging peaceful change within Iran, democratic pluralistic change. And more recently, since February and March of this year, we are on the course of hoping for a peaceful negotiated settlement of the nuclear negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran itself. So I think the policies of our government have been very clear and transparent and that there's no reason to believe that extra incentives offered by the United States at this point would make a real difference.

We believe that Iran needs to face the united will of the international community. And we are there now, because we know that the EU-3 and the Russian government are advising the Iranian government not to break the current accord, not to go into the plant at Esfahan, not to break the seals, and not to begin to convert uranium.

And just to get to the last part of your question, Mr. Chairman, some people have suggested, well, if you'd allow Iran access to peaceful civilian nuclear power, then they wouldn't want to build a nuclear weapons capability. But the problem with that is that the Iranians concealed clandestine nuclear weapons research for 18 years from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

And that's the verdict of the IAEA, not just of our government, and of its chairman. And so, we -- given that record of deception, we believe that Iran cannot be allowed to have enrichment, enriched processing capability and would allow it to produce fissile material, which is the essential ingredient in the nuclear warhead. And we're focused on that, and I think we have the agreement of all of our allies.

And so, our final goal is the cessation and dismantling of all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities in Iran itself.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much for that response.

I wanted to wait until more members were here, but I'm going to ask the staff of our committee to attempt to work with the leadership on both the Republican and Democratic sides on the floor to gain unanimous consent that this committee might continue to meet. This is an extremely important hearing. I cannot imagine any argument going with regards to judiciary matters on the floor that supersedes the importance of what is occurring here. So I'm going to make that appeal publicly, and I'm hopeful that our leaders will respond, because we do have indications that thus far that response has not been forthcoming, which means that we will be shutting down at 11:30, and that will be unfortunate with regard to the hearing as well as our other witnesses.

Senator Dodd, you are recognized.

SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD (D-CT): Mr. Chairman, -- (off mike) -- that the ranking Democrat, Senator Biden, is not here, and I always hesitate to try and speak for Senator Biden on any matter, but on this as well, I would certainly hear your concern on the point you just made and regret as well we're in this situation. But obviously, there's an issue here that looms large on the -- over us, a cloud, so to speak. As we talk about the very issue before us here, there's a nuclear option that is pending before the United States Senate. And my hope is that matter can be resolved amicably within the next number of hours, and -- by creating a little bit of tension institutionally, it may get us closer to that result or not. So I -- this is regrettable, because this is a very important hearing, and I commend you for holding it.

I'm going to defer to my colleague from Florida, who has another engagement, and I'll come back to it --

SEN. LUGAR: Very well.

Senator Nelson.

SEN. DODD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FL): And Mr. Chairman, just in the interest of felicity, if Chuck Hagel were president, I would go on bended knee and ask him to appoint Ambassador Burns to the United Nations. And then we wouldn't have any fights here. (Laughter.)

SEN. CHUCK HAGEL (R-NE): And I would appoint him. Yeah. (Laughter.)

SEN. DODD: You just ruined Ambassador Burns' career by that -- (laughter).

SEN. LUGAR: Best go back to Iran, I think. (Laughter.)

SEN. HAGEL: I believe you might even have Senator Voinovich's support. (Laughter.)

SEN. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH (R-OH) (?): Now you're really -- (laughter).

SEN. BILL NELSON: Just one question. We know that the Europeans have been negotiating with Iran for some period of time. What has caused the sudden change of heart in the United States to decide to work with the Europeans now?

MR. BURNS: Senator, I think there is a fair degree -- there was a fair degree of skepticism within our government and other places about the Paris accords of November of last year when it was announced because of the long track record that we have watched where Iran has hidden many of its clandestine activities.

When President Bush went to Europe in February, he went to NATO, had a long discussion with leaders there; had a dinner with President Chirac; had a day in Mainz, Germany, with Chancellor Schroeder, and this was the leading issue on the agenda.

And it was clear to the president and Secretary Rice at the end of that visit that the European leaders shared the same sentiment that we did; that the end result of these negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran had to be the cessation and dismantling of the nuclear fuel cycle activities, and had to be a place where Iran could not use what they said was a peaceful nuclear energy program, to protect and hide behind it a nuclear weapons program.

And it was really that trip that then led Secretary Rice to have a series of discussions with the EU-4 ministers in late February, early March, and that led to our March 11th announcement that we would support them. And I must say, they have been very, very faithful partners to us since then. Now, we're not at the table. We chose not to be directly involved with the Iranians. We're not talking to the Iranians directly. But we are talking to them every day. One of my jobs, working for Secretary Rice, is to keep in very close touch. They have been transparent with us -- our EU allies. They have been, we think, very tough, as they should be, as they negotiate this issue. There's an important meeting next week, probably in Brussels, next Tuesday, May 24th, where the three EU foreign ministers will meet with the Iranian negotiator. And we have every reason to believe that the EU-3 will retain there a very tough position that will insist that Iran adhere to this accord.

What appears to be happening -- if you look at the public statements out of Tehran -- Iran signed a deal in November: We'll suspend all of our nuclear activities. Now they want to re-begin -- recommence some of those activities and continue the negotiations. And that doesn't make any sense.

SEN. BILL NELSON: Well, this is encouraging, what you're saying now. Is this a recognition or acknowledgement that the former policy of not talking to the Europeans was a failed policy?

MR. BURNS: Oh, I wouldn't say it was a failed policy because I think you have to -- we will both remember that before November 2004, there really wasn't a serious negotiating effort with an agreement in place that would provide objective guarantees, that would suspend the nuclear activities of the Iranian government and, hopefully, lead to something even more rigorous. And once President Bush had a chance to sit down and talk directly to the European leaders, he made the decision on behalf of our government that we'd support them.

SEN. BILL NELSON: Mr. Chairman, thank Senator Dodd for yielding me part of his time so that I could go on to this meeting.

Thank you very much.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Hagel.

SEN. CHUCK HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Secretary Burns, welcome.

MR. BURNS: Thank you.

SEN. HAGEL: I noted yesterday, in stories that appeared in most of our newspapers, that the Iraqi foreign minister -- or the Iranian foreign minister was in Iraq on Tuesday. Could you share with the committee your thoughts about the Iranian foreign minister being in Iraq a few hours after Secretary Rice was there; what you know about that visit, what you might conclude by that Iranian initiative?

MR. BURNS: Senator, thank you. It's true that Secretary Rice was the first foreign minister to visit the new government after it was formed, and she was very pleased to do that in her visit on Sunday.

And she had an excellent discussion with the new prime minister and his entire cabinet. She met with our military leadership. And then, of course, we saw the subsequent visit of Foreign Minister Kharrazi to Baghdad. And I guess, according to press reports, he's going to stay in the country for a few days. It's not surprising, given the fact that many of the Shi'a groups in Iraq have had long-time contacts with Iran, and some of the current political leaders in the Shi'a community in Iraq had refuge in Iran during the Saddam period.

What we would hope is the following: that Iran would play a much more positive and productive role in trying to support Iraq, as we are trying to support Iraq. But our suspicion has been that Iran did not play a constructive role in the many weeks and debates about the formation of the current Iraqi government. And the key to a successful future united Iraq is to see this power-sharing agreement among the Shi'a and Sunni and Kurdish elements, and the Iranians don't seem to have spent much time supporting that goal of multi-ethnicity, of shared power; of a united state that over -- a united state in Iraq that overcomes the ethnic and religious differences that have been so much a part of the fabric of Iraq for a long time. And so our strong advice for Iran would be to be more constructive about what really needs to be done to help the Iraqi government.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you. Picking up a little bit on Senator Nelson's line of questioning: if the next Iranian government -- represented by a new president after the elections next month -- would position themselves so that they would reach out to the United States for the (sic) United States' involvement in some direct conversations. Not negotiations, but direct talks. What would be our position if that occurred?

MR. BURNS: Senator -- and you'll understand it's hard to answer a hypothetical question not knowing who the individuals are, and not knowing the context. But I think I can say that if you look back over the history of our relations, going back to 1979, we have not been without communication. There has been the Algiers process, where for many years the lawyers of the State Department and the lawyers of the Foreign Ministry of Iran have tried to adjudicate some of the claims that have arisen over the closing of the two embassies and complaints by private citizens.

From time to time, over the last -- more than 25 years, various administrations have chosen to have discussions in various capitals with the Iranian government on discrete issues. I think there's a very real sense among those of us currently in government, and those who were in government in the past -- it has not been the United States that has not wanted to see change in this relationship. It has been Iran.

We have to judge them on their policies and on their actions. And on terrorism, human rights, and now on nuclear weapons development, they're going in the opposite direction of all the other states that are making so much progress in the Middle East. So we have not been, for over the past 25 years, against communication. But the Iranian government has pretty consistently refused to have any interest in normal and responsible discourse. And they have not changed their policies.

SEN. HAGEL: Do you think, however, if the United States was more engaged in a more direct way, that would have an effect -- if the climate was better? Obviously, we are relying on our European allies. We're on the outside of that ring. Possibilities -- if the environment would be better, that that might have more of an impact? Or do you think it would not? Or would it matter?

MR. BURNS: Obviously, we've thought about this question. You have to think about all the tactics that are available to any government as you confront a very serious problem, like a nuclear weapons capability in the hands of a theocratic state.

And it's our judgment that on the nuclear question, the EU-3 are pursuing a very tough, resolute course of action, and we have supported them. And I don't -- we don't believe that there's any reason to think that if the United States were at the table, the Iranians would be any more open to further change.

And on the broader question of relations between the two countries, or the non-relations on an official sense, this is really their choice. They have isolated themselves by their actions. And so our government is always going to be willing to look for ways to improve relations with any government in the world, but Iran has given us no reason to think that that will be -- that that will happen anytime soon.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Dodd.

SEN. DODD: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just, if I can, pick up on the question Senator Hagel raised, and then I'm going to take a couple of minutes and just share some thoughts on this. First of all, thank you for being here, and commend you for your fine work you're doing on these issues. They're complicated and terribly important.

I picked up some reports that following the visit by the Iranian foreign minister to Iraq that there's a proposed -- at least I've read about a proposed visit by the Iraqi Energy Ministry to be going to Iran. And there's some speculation about the possibility of some joint-venturing on energy projects, which raises the obvious question of the Iraq/Libya sanctions legislation.

Can you tell us whether or not there is such a proposed visit in the plans, and what more we can -- we might know about that?

MR. BURNS: Thank you, Senator Dodd. We have -- we've seen the press reports about the foreign minister's visit to Iraq. I think we've received some initial, very general reports from our embassy in Baghdad about the nature of that visit. I am not aware of a proposed visit by the Iraqi oil minister to Tehran.

SEN. DODD: Okay. We might want to follow up on that because obviously it would pose some thorny questions here, obviously, in terms of the sanctions.

Mr. Chairman, let me, if I can, just share a couple of thoughts on the matter and come back, the limited time we have here this morning. I don't know of any more important issue; if you had to prioritize the issues in foreign policy, I think this one's right at the top, in my view. So it's very appropriate we're having a hearing to discuss this -- discuss the matter. And, obviously, we thank our witnesses. We've got some wonderful ones here this morning. And my hope is we can actually hear from them, but as you point out, we may not be able to under this setting.

I think when it comes to the Iranian question we know a few things with almost absolute certainty. And I think there's probably universal agreement about this, although some may dissent from it. But the five points -- and there may be others. But the five points that I sort of identify as being -- there's common agreement: Iran is almost certainly attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and it's in our common interest to do everything we can to stop them from doing so. How do we know they're getting the weapons? The country has hid its nuclear program from the world for nearly two decades. It is now reluctant to give up its capabilities for a complete fuel cycle, we know that. And even as part of its offers in negotiations, Iran is insisting on keeping at least a small nuclear research program -- further evidence, I think, that makes the point -- which would eventually provide it with some capacity to develop weapons-grade fuel. These are not actions of a country that seeks only to have a nuclear energy program for civilian purposes.

The second point is, I think that Iran is developing or attempting to develop long-range missiles that would enable it to project power throughout the greater Middle East and beyond. Iran claims that its Shahab-4 missile has a range that would enable it to reach large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe. That places U.S. bases in Turkey at great risk. And Iran reportedly bought 12 X-55 missiles from the Ukraine in 2001, and that would even further extend its firing range, which should be of grave concern to all of us.

If Iran develops the capacity to arm those missiles with nuclear warheads, then, of course, there'd be serious consequences on the global level.

The third point, which I think is (in) general agreement, is that Iran continues to provide material and logistical support for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. It seems quite clear they're doing it. This includes the provisions of weapons and money. Though it seems that Hezbollah is trying to increase its role politically in Lebanon, that group's military activities continue to pose a serious threat to Lebanese stability as well as to the Israeli- Palestinian peace efforts.

Fourthly, Iran is attempting, I think, to extend its influence in the new Iraq. And again, the question by Senator Hagel and others, in the possibility of joint cooperation in some areas certainly should cause us some concern.

Fifth, Mr. Chairman -- and I'll ask unanimous that further comments here, I'll develop these points in a statement here -- the state of democracy in Iran is weak. And despite the clear movement of people in Iran who want to move in a different direction, every time they step forward, they're barred, obviously, from holding office or running.

Having said all of that -- and again, I don't think there's any disagreement about that -- I want to sort of associate myself with the comments by Senator Hagel here, because I -- I'm of a view that as a result of these points, we've got to engage a bit more. I just don't think you want to outsource your foreign policy to the Europeans on this matter. I think it's important, what they're doing, and we ought to be supportive and cooperative. But I do think it's critical that we engage as well.

We have a diplomatic relationship with Iran. We have diplomatic relations with people who are our sworn enemies. I think we make a mistake by assuming a -- some sort of engagement is a sign of weakness, or that we're in some way condoning or endorsing activities here. And I'm not suggesting full diplomatic relations at all, but a far more direct engagement. The very point that a matter of grave concern it would seem to me speak loudly of the importance of having some system by which we can begin to influence these events. And so we're -- unless we're confronted ultimately with the very dreadful choices that the chairman has outlined in his initial question to you, which none of us want to see us have to arrive at if we can avoid them, these questions demand our attention.

And I just think, Mr. Chairman, as one member of this committee, I know I'm at -- probably at odds with most of my colleagues on this committee. And certainly I know, and -- and Secretary Burns has made it quite clear that there is a great deal of reluctance for us to move forward in any kind of direct engagement here. And he cites good reasons about Iranian behavior. But it seems to me despite that, it's in our common interest here to try and find a way to become more directly involved here if we're going to solve any of these five or six issues that I've raised here this morning with any degree of success in the coming years.

And with that, I'll come back with a couple of questions later on, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate the opportunity to express that point of view.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, I thank the senator for a very thoughtful analysis.

Senator Coleman.

SEN. NORM COLEMAN (R-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do note, my colleague from Connecticut noted the nuclear option, and the relevance to, perhaps this conversation. I would also note that the approach taken by my colleagues of this side of cutting off engagement in -- perhaps in -- at about 11:30, maybe perhaps tacit acknowledgement that sometimes you can put pressure on folks by cutting off engagement.

Let me turn, however, to -- and it's again to Senator Hagel's question, which talked about the prospects and the hypothetical of a representative of a new Iranian president reaching out. The fact is Khamenei -- the mullahs rule Iraq -- Iran. So my question to you is, what is the prospect, regardless of who the president is, of having any sort of ability to actually formulate foreign policy?

MR. BURNS: Senator, I think you're right to point to that issue. If you remember back in 1997 when Mr. Khatami was elected, there was great hope in the United States and Europe, I remember at the time, in the Clinton administration, great hope that we might be able to engage a reformist-oriented Iran. And all the promise of his particular government was not borne out in deeds because of this ruling clique that holds the reins of power in Iran itself.

And as we look ahead to the June 17th election, it looks like the Guardian Council will disqualify most of the reformist candidates. And so the people of Iran will be left with a choice of, you know, people who do not represent a drive for reform in Iran. And that would mean that after that government -- the new government is formed on June 17th, we would all be left around the world in trying to communicate or deal with a government that has not wanted to deal with us and that has not changed in any way its support for terrorism, its refusal to recognize even the existence of Israel, and now its support for a nuclear weapons program, and its abysmal human rights record.

So it's a very difficult situation. I was trying to think, preparing for this testimony yesterday, is there another diplomatic relationship like this? And there really isn't. We do sit down with the North Koreans, we're trying to sit down with the North Koreans if they would just come to the table in the six-party talks. We have an interests section in Cuba, we talk to the Cubans, have had for many decades. But we have this very strange relationship with Iran, or non-official relationship with Iran. And the key to it is to see a change in behavior, in policies and actions of the Iranian government. And we've just not seen any improvement.

SEN. COLEMAN: I think -- time perhaps for one other question. In an interview with USA Today, Kofi Annan said he hoped the U.S. and the Europeans would not bring the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons program to the Security Council. I don't know whether you've seen the piece. He, I think, he said he believed it would be too divisive. I take it you don't share this, at least my understanding of your testimony. I'd ask you whether you share that.

And then I'd raise the other issue, what's the likelihood of bringing -- assuming -- if, in fact, what we see with Iran is that they violate -- breach the Paris accord, what's the likelihood of bringing China and Russia on board to get anything through the Security Council?

MR. BURNS: Thank you, Senator.

It's our very strong hope that Iran will not break the Paris agreement. So that means specifically that it will not go into the plant at Estafan, break the IAEA seals and begin to convert uranium. If they do that, then they violate the suspension provision of the 2004 agreement in Paris. And the European countries have said, the three of them, including Secretary Straw the other night when he held his joint press conference with Secretary Rice, that they would take Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in emergency session, and then they believe the IAEA would refer the Iranian violation of the agreement to the United Nations Security Council.

That's what our European partners have said. And of course Secretary Rice has said that we would support that.

Now once it gets to the council, anything could happen. There could be a presidential statement. There could be a U.N. Security Council statement. There could be much tougher actions leading to further international sanctions on Iran.

Our strong hope and our message to Tehran today is that they not take that step to recommence uranium conversion; that they honor the agreement they've had; that they continue the negotiations with the EU-3 on a peaceful diplomatic basis, through the June 17th elections; and if and when a new Iranian government emerges after those elections, the Europeans would continue, and we would continue our support.

But we can't support -- and I think the Europeans have said they can't support -- a process where Iran breaks the agreement, breaks suspension, returns to nuclear activity, but says, "We want to continue the negotiations." That's not sustainable.

SEN. COLEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Feingold.

SEN. RUSSELL FEINGOLD (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Secretary Burns. In your testimony, you suggested that the United States may have a more positive image in Iran than we may think. And you spoke of the youthful population's desire for reform. Say a little bit, if you would, about another factor in Iran's political dynamics. How strong is nationalist sentiment in Iran? What relationship exists, if any, between Iranian nationalism and popular support for Iran's nuclear program? If you could just comment on those. And how much of a factor is this going to be in our ability to support voices speaking out for reform?

MR. BURNS: Senator, I think it's a really important question, because it lies at the heart of whether or not we think Iran can change in the future.

And what I'd like to say, on the first part of your question, is that obviously the Iranians are a very proud people. They have a great history, a very long history. And there's, in our view, a great sense of pride among all Iranians, including the younger generation, about what their culture has achieved over millennia. We're aware of that, and that's not surprising, given the great and rich culture of that country.

There's also a second, new wave in Iran, and that's the under-35 population. That's the majority of the population. They clearly -- in their support for Mr. Khatami in 1997 and subsequent elections, in what they've done in the streets, in what the university students have done in demonstrating, they clearly are signaling their desire for change, for greater rights for women. And women's rights have taken a major hit in the last couple of years. They've actually drawn back some of the advances that have been made. The Iranian government has done so.

These young people want to live in a more pluralistic and liberal society because they have access to the private radio and TV from Los Angeles and from our great Iranian-American community in the United States, which is broadcasting into Iran from Radio Farda and from Voice of America. They know what the outside world is like. They want to be part of it.

So I think you're right to suggest that there are two sentiments among the Iranian people. It seems to us -- and I'd like to get back to you on this, maybe with a more considered answer -- that the drive for a nuclear weapons program has not been a major divisive issue within Iranian society.

And obviously, one would --

SEN. FEINGOLD: Source of pride?

MR. BURNS: Hard to say. We're not there on the ground. And that's why I would like to get back to you with maybe some more considered thought on that. But I think you are right to assert that there are two perhaps conflicting streams of thought here.

SEN. FEINGOLD: When I was in Mali in Africa, in January, I was really struck by the enthusiastic reception that -- it seemed like hundreds of thousands of Malians gave to Iranian President Khatami, who was in Bamako. Thousands of Malians lined the streets to cheer his motorcade, and most of them were children. What can you tell us about Iran's overall strategy of outreach and engagement in the developing world?

MR. BURNS: Well, Senator, we know that Iran -- for a very long time, since the revolution -- has had a very vigorous public diplomacy campaign to popularize their brand of Islam throughout the Muslim world. We know they have been very vigorous in mosque construction, in supporting religious communities, and very vigorous in their outreach to their neighbors. Not surprising; many countries do that.

We also know -- the really interesting thing is that if you look at the Middle East region and look at the trends in the Palestinian community with the elections; in Israel, in Iraq; the trend is -- in the enfranchisement of women in Kuwait that just occurred two days ago -- the trend is for greater openness and greater receptivity to pluralistic ideas. But Iran is marching in the opposite direction. And so we wonder if this Iranian public relations offensive can ultimately be successful in a Muslim world, which we think gradually is going to have to be more open to different types of ideas.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, on the commercial side, how successful has Iran been in building commercially-based alliances with China and India, and Russia? And how much of an obstacle will that be to our diplomacy?

MR. BURNS: Senator, I can't give you off the top of my head the trade figures, but I can tell you that obviously, Iran has a vigorous trade relationship with Russia and China, and with many other countries in the region. We have counseled our European allies, all of whom have diplomatic relations -- most of whom have ambassadors in Tehran -- that they should be very careful, especially on dual-use technologies. The presence of ILSA, I think -- has been the legislation since 1996 -- has been a positive force; an instrument for both the last two American administrations in trying to caution our allies about trade relations with Iran.

SEN. FEINGOLD: What are the next steps if Iran does resume steps towards the uranium enrichment process that were supposed to be frozen, and what, specifically, would the U.S. pursue in the Security Council if that happened?

MR. BURNS: Senator, we've made clear -- but I think more importantly, in this case, the European 3 countries have made clear that if Iran violates the Paris Agreement of 2004 -- so if it breaks the seals and begins to convert uranium; if it seeks an enrichment capability or reprocessing capability -- it's obviously going to be going in the opposite direction. It will have violated the agreement. The EU-3 would want to take action in the IAEA and the U.N, and we would support that. And we've said that quite consistently over the last two weeks.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Have we laid the groundwork so we could be effective on this in the Security Council if this happens?

MR. BURNS: You know, our strong hope is that this is not going to happen. It's very interesting, what has been occurring publicly in the last two weeks. The Iranians have an agreement. They've been saying publicly, in Europe and in Tehran, we might now break the agreement. But they haven't done it. And so, we're using even forums -- fora like today, like this hearing, to say to the Iranians, don't break the agreement, meet your commitment to the Europeans. Find a peaceful, negotiated solution to this problem. That's our very strong hope.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Let me give some good news to the committee, and to all of our watchers. Very able work by Democratic and Republican staff members, with the cold calls by responding -- respective parties, has broad agreement that there will be a unanimous consent request filed for the committee to be able to continue, and that that will not be objected to.

SEN. LUGAR: -- staff members, with cold calls by responding -- respective parties has broad agreement that there will be a unanimous consent request filed for the committee to be able to continue, and that will not be objected to.

And so I just wanted to express publicly my appreciation to Democratic and Republican persons on the floor, and to our leaders, for permitting this to continue, because I believe it's important, and I believe all members feel it's important.

Senator Voinovich.

SEN. VOINOVICH: I'm comforted that you're on a regular communication basis with the EU-3 indicating our interest in what they're doing. I think that this constant communication back and forth is as effective as if we were at the table.

Second of all, I wonder -- I would assess that from what you said that you think we're making progress, as contrasted with some people who think that we're not making progress in terms of Iran and getting them to abide by their agreements.

You've mentioned that the president has talked to President Putin and others. What I'd like to know is, how much communication have we had with other members of the Security Council in regard to what we're doing there?

And the reason I'm asking that question is that by having communication with the members of the Security Council about what's going on, and perhaps trying to influence them to maybe pick up the phone and call some people, that that would put more pressure on Iran to comply with what the EU-3 are trying to get them to accomplish.

MR. BURNS: Senator, thank you.

I would agree with your first two points that we have played an effective role since March 11th through the daily diplomatic contact, even this morning, that we have had with the EU-3. We'll continue that.

I would also agree, there has been progress over the last couple of months in the sense that there is an agreement in place between the EU-3 and Iran. It's very specific and it's very transparent, and it's verifiable by the IAEA. And that had not been the case for many years prior to that agreement.

And that's one of the reasons why President Bush decided we ought to support the EU-3 process.

We have worked very closely with other members of the Security Council. We were in touch with the Russian government over the weekend. There was a visit by a Russian official to Tehran last week on this issue. We have a full debrief. The Russians have been, and we have been also in constant touch about this.

So that if this issue should go to the Security Council we would hope for the broadest possible support of all its members.

SEN. VOINOVICH: How about the Chinese?

MR. BURNS: We've had more limited contact with the Chinese. Because the Russians also have a role here, as you know, because of the relationship that the Russians have had with the Bashir facility in Iran. And we have advised the Russians that here is an opportunity for the Russian government to play a very constructive and useful role.

And our understanding, from a conversation that I have had with the Russian deputy foreign minister, is that they are counseling Iran not to break the agreement, not to begin the process of uranium conversion. And we hope the Russians will continue to insist on that in their talks with the Iranians.

SEN. VOINOVICH: The other question I have is, if we're successful with the peace process in the Middle East between Israel and Palestinian, and we're making some progress on that, what impact do you think that would have on this whole situation in terms of Iran?

MR. BURNS: Well, obviously it would be --

SEN. VOINOVICH: Does Iran want to go back before '48?

MR. BURNS: Obviously it would be a great positive development to see a peace agreement. And we're working -- the secretary and president, are working for that everyday.

Iran is alone among the states of the Middle East in refusing to acknowledge the state of Israel and its right to exist. Iran has funded and directed the operations of three of the major terrorist groups that have inflicted countless casualties upon the Israeli public in Gaza and in the West Bank and in Israel itself. And those groups have killed Americans.

As I said in my testimony, we have not forgotten 1983, and the hundreds of Americans killed in Beirut, and 1984, when Malcolm Kerr was killed, the president of the American University at Beirut; in 1985 when Colonel Higgins was captured by Hezbollah and tortured and then executed.

And Iran has supported these groups consistently, and to this very day, so at a time when you see in Egypt, in Jordan, in the Gulf policies that are designed to support the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Iran refuses and fuels the terrorism designed to stop that peace process.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Are the other nations doing anything to influence them at all?

MR. BURNS: I think we would have to go through the relationship that each of them has. I don't think there's a lot of love lost, frankly, among many Middle Eastern countries for the Iranian government and regime and for the policies that they've pursued.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Thank you.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Dodd, did you have a final question?

SEN. DODD: Just a couple, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate the secretary being here, and I'm glad we were able to work out the situation so we can go forward on the floor.

Just a couple of questions. One is, there was a radio interview done, I guess it was some months, I think January, where the vice president -- I don't have the quotes here -- but at least the impressions were in some quarters that the vice president was suggesting that the United States might be willing to back up -- or back an Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

One, is there is an interpretation within the department that that's what he was saying, on the one hand? Could you share first of all your comments on that? Do you know what I'm speaking about?

MR. BURNS: Senator, I don't recall the specific comments, but I can speak to the issue in general.

SEN. DODD: Why don't you speak to the issue? Put aside for a second whether or not -- the case. Because I think your very interesting interchange with Senator Feingold is very worthwhile one. I think it's important I think to make the point, I think it's been made by others, that this nuclear issue in Iran is not -- there is not a bright line between the reformers and the existing government.

There is a sense of probably collective Iranian pride over this capability, and that they are beyond the capabilities of whether or not you could actually take out the Iranian nuclear program by an air strike is one question I'd ask you. You're very knowledgeable about this. I know others have suggested that this is much more complicated than the Iraqi strike of a number of years ago that the Israelis conducted.

And secondly, what are the political implications of that, should it occur, in terms of trying to build some relationships within that more moderate Iranian constituency?

MR. BURNS: Senator, obviously this is a very sensitive question, and it requires a careful response.

And the way I would respond would be to say that our policy is grounded first and foremost in the conviction that the Iranian people ought to have the same right to a democratic and free future that all people should have; that Iran should not be immune from the more positive changes that we think are underway in the greater Middle East; and that the basis of our policy in funding VOA and Radio Farda and the democratization programs that the Congress has funded is to support that long-term change within Iran itself.

Secretary Rice was asked in her first trip to Europe in the first week of February of this year on countless occasions a variation of the question that you've just asked. And what she said on those occasions was that -- was that's not on the agenda. That type of action is not on the agenda at this time.

Because we have resolved to pursue and to support a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Iran nuclear problem. Secretary Rice and the president and other administrative officials, including the vice president, have also said on many occasions that of course the United States and the American president never take any options off the table as well.

But it is very clear that we are pursuing and supporting a peaceful negotiating process led by the Europeans, and we've been very stalwart supporters of that process.

And all of this lies within the hands of Iran. If they would just continue to honor the agreement they signed in November, then that would lead to a peaceful negotiated settlement.

SEN. DODD: I don't disagree with that.

Let me move to that question, too, because I do think it's worthwhile. And historically, the shift that occurred with the EU-3 efforts. There's been at least the perception of some hostility to that particular effort early on.

It would at least appear to this senator that there was a change in tone, and I welcome that. I think it was a very smart and proper move to make, and we're very hopeful that can prove to be successful.

You're not going to shock me, nor do I believe that you'd be shocked, to hear the Iranians say that as part of this negotiation they would like the United States to be more directly involved. I'm not going to be surprised to hear that request forthcoming.

Are we prepared to answer that when it occurs? And if so, what's our answer going to be?

MR. BURNS: It's interesting that you should raise it. I would have to -- and I will check with some of my colleagues in the government. I just took this job two months ago, so my colleagues who were on this beat before I was, but certainly in my time, for the last few months, we've never received such a request.

SEN. DODD: No, I'm not suggesting we have. I'm anticipating we might get one. I'm curious as to what our response would be if we received one.

MR. BURNS: Our view is that the current negotiating process if the best way forward. And the other thing to keep in mind is, we're at May 19th, there will be elections on June 17th. We can't now predict what type of government, who will be in charge in Tehran, what individual will be sitting across the table.

So I think that's not a question that we can answer right now. So we're content to support the current EU process.

SEN. DODD: Well, I'd be very interested, I'm sure the committee might be, that if that comes up to reengage in conversation about how we might respond to that if it were to occur. That is a request, for our more direct involvement with EU III, that it emerges.

And lastly, if I can just quickly, -- and again, I wish we had more time to hear, because you're obviously have some knowledge about all of this. I've been interested to hear some people comment about the diversity of opposition groups within Iran itself. It runs a rather broad -- er, wide spectrum rather. For those who are out and out hostile to it and would engage in activities that would be more direct and others who are looking to engage in opposing the present government in Iran for the normal political processes in the country, albeit they've had a very difficult time doing that.

Give us a few minutes, if you will, just -- and I -- give us some sort of picture of this spectrum, if you will.

MR. BURNS: Senator, there's no question in our minds, given everything that we know about what is happening within Iranian society at itself that it is a society in ferment. It's a very dynamic time in the history of Iran. We believe there is great disillusionment, particularly among the younger segment of the population about the policies of the current ruling regime. Particularly regarding women, and the discriminatory policies that have gotten tougher over the last few years in denying women basic rights. Certainly in the treatment of journalists and broadcasters by the Iranian government; so many of them have been arrested. And in one case, the one that I talked about in my testimony, tortured and executed. And so we believe t ha the best thing we can hope for is to see that fermentation continue, and to see a gradual -- a process where people will gradually acquire greater rights, and so that they might -- their influence might be felt more strongly.

SEN. DODD: (Inaudible) -- be supportive. Are we being supportive? Can we be more supportive? What are we doing to be supportive?

MR. BURNS: Excuse me. Yes. We are being supportive in some of the funds we receive from Congress. We're funding Voice of America radio programs into Iran, which is vitally important, given the lack of free information. Radio FARDA. We're now considering actually buying some time on private American radio and TV broadcast into Iran to showcase our own programs into Iran itself. We the national Endowment for the Humanities has been active. We have formed a human rights group with some of the other -- with our European allies designed to put a human rights spotlight on Iranian government performance. So, yes, we are involved. We have limits in our ability to be effective because we don't have people on the ground. We don't have and embassy there. There are very few Americans who have access to that society because of the sanctions that are in place. So most of this is done through NGOs, and much of it is also being done by our European allies and other countries that have more normal relationships.

SEN. DODD: (Inaudible) -- quietly supportive of some contacts. I noted the other day that Jim, James Billington, the Librarian of Congress, spent some time in Iran, meeting with people on a cultural level. Obviously did so with the approval of the administration and facilitating that. Are there other such contacts that we're quietly promoting without advertising it to a great extent, to develop some contacts there?

MR. BURNS: There are a few. We have not taken a position that we should not talk in any way, shape or form with the Iranians. There have been diplomatic contacts in decades past, but none recently, and none on the nuclear issue. And I would just point you back -- you remember the Bam earthquake, the terrible tragedy there? I remember Secretary Powell offered assistance. We offered to send a high-level delegation of a member of the Senate with a member of the president's family to Iran, and that was refused.

So we have taken in the past many opportunities to try to signal our interest in reaching out to normal people there on a humanitarian basis, and more often than not have been rebuffed.

SEN. DODD: I appreciate that. The time is up. We've got other witnesses to hear from, and I would hope that you'd pursue -- continue to pursue that because I go back to the point I tried to make at the outset of my comments here: The importance of engaging. And again, I want to emphasize, by that I do not in any way mean that we're sanctioning Iranian behavior, but I think keeping that effort up is very much in our common interest to do so. So I appreciate your testimony. You're very knowledgeable, and I thank you for being here.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Dodd. I join Senator Dodd in thanking you for coming today, Undersecretary Burns.

MR. BURNS: It's a pleasure.

SEN. LUGAR: We ask that the administration furnish a witness at the highest level who was best informed with regard to our policy. And we are grateful that you have been forthcoming in response to our questions. I congratulate you again on your tenure as our ambassador to NATO, and would just mention as all committee members have on many occasions that that was a very important period in terms of the expansion of the membership, but likewise the expansion of the mission of NATO. And the work you have done there has not gone without notice, and we just take this opportunity again to congratulate you and your colleagues who worked with you in that endeavor.

Well, having said that --

MR. BURNS: Thank you, Senator.

SEN. LUGAR: -- we appreciate your coming, and we now call upon our second panel of witnesses.