HELMS: The committee will come to order. These are the closing throes of the session. And both policy committees are meeting today. I'm trying to ascertain whether Joe Biden is out of his yet. I apologize for my tardiness and for (OFF-MIKE).

But we'll wait just a moment. I see no point in my not using the time for my statement. And Joe can make his when he gets here.

Today's hearing is focused on the remarkable unanimous conclusions reached by the Rumsfeld Commission regarding the threat of ballistic missile attacks on the United States and the capacity of the U.S. intelligence community to keep abreast of those developments.

This afternoon's distinguished witness is the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, former secretary of defense under President Ford and chairman of the distinguished commission that was established pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your coming. It's always good to see you. It brings back a lot of good memories that I don't -- not experiencing these days. And with that said, I will observe that there is no greater threat to America's national security than the proliferation of ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.

We had a closed meeting yesterday on this very subject. And I am alarmed about some of the things that I heard. At least 10 countries have operational ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 miles. That's today they have them. That number will grow by half again within the next 10 years. And many of these nations -- for example: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea -- are clearly hostile to the United States.

Given North Korea's recent flight test of a three-staged intercontinental ballistic missile, it is an absolute, irrefutable fact that a hostile power will soon possess missiles capable of exterminating entire American cities. Now I have watched in disbelief as the Clinton Administration and the US intelligence community have willfully and repeatedly ignored the handwriting on the wall. Like many, I was appalled by the national intelligence estimate on missile threats -- NIE 9519 -- which simply made too many intellectual errors, that all of which underestimated the looming threat, to not have been politically skewed.

NIE 9519, as senators may recall, made a number of ludicrous assumptions such as: that concentrating on indigenous development of ICBMs accurately addresses the foreign missile threat to the United States; that foreign assistance will not enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development; and that the missile technology control regime will continue to significantly limit international transfers of missiles, components and related technologies; that no country with ICBMs will sell them; that no country other than the declared nuclear powers capable of developing ICBMs from a space launch vehicle program will do so, nor will -- they decided -- will space launch vehicle programs enable third countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development.

They also decided that: a flight test program of five years is essential to the development of an ICBM; that development of short and medium range missiles will not, in turn, speed ICBM development; that no country will pursue a biological warhead as opposed to a nuclear warhead or an ICBM; and that the possibility of unauthorized or accident launch from existing nuclear arsenals has not changed significantly over the last 10 years.

Well, I continue to shake my head in puzzlement and in astonishment that for the last three years, our national security policy has been driven by these assumptions. Not one of those claims stands up to any scrutiny at all. Now as we established your mission, Secretary Rumsfeld, due to our frustration over the intelligence community's refusal to give us a straight answer -- at least a straight answer on the record -- and true to all of our expectations, your bipartisan commission has served as a breath of fresh air for which I, for one, am most grateful.

In the wake of your report, the intelligence community has begun a long-awaited, desperately needed revision of its estimates relating to the emerging ballistic missile threat. Now certainly, much remains to be done. And the changes in the community's estimation process will leave much to be desired; for example, rather than eating humble pie, the latest national intelligence estimate mainly clings to a variant on formulation first viewed in NIE 9519. The unclassified key judgment of the 1990 NIE is -- and I quote -- "Beyond the North Korean TD-2, we judge it unlikely, despite the extensive transfer of theater missile technology, that other countries except Russia and China, as just mentioned, will develop, produce and deploy an ICBM capable of reaching any point in the United States."

Now it's beyond me why the intelligence community cannot simply say, "Within the next decade, North Korea is likely to join Russia and China as a country that has ICBMs capable of threatening the United States." This second statement is equally inaccurate. But heaven forbid that the intelligence community convey a sense of urgency regarding the emerging ballistic missile threat.

So I'm going to close, Mr. Secretary. I think we should all be agreed that the missile threat is real and that it is threatening. I look forward to your presentation on the commission's key judgments and the chance to discuss the intelligence community's latest NIE with you and the other distinguished members of the commission.

Now, let me ascertain for sure whether Senator Biden, our distinguished ranking member of the committee, is able to be with us. I am informed that Senator Biden has been detained on another committee matter. And he suggests that we proceed. Mr. Rumsfeld?

 

STATEMENT OF

DONALD RUMSFELD
Former Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense Chairman,
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States

 

RUMSFELD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am very pleased that Dr. Barry Blechman and Dr. Bill Graham are able to be with me today to present the unclassified version of our report to your committee. Dr. Blechman is the founder of the Henry Stinson Center and is former assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Carter Administration.

And Dr. Graham is a former science advisor to President Reagan and was also deputy director of NASA. We are hopeful that Paul Wolfowitz -- Dr. Wolfowitz -- will join us as well. Paul is the dean at the Johns Hopkins School of International Affairs, the Nitze School.

Other members of the commission were: Lee Butler, former commander of the Strategic Air Command; Dr. Richard Garwin of IBM, a scientist with a long record of service on federal commissions; Dr. Bill Schneider, former undersecretary of state for security assistance in the Reagan Administration; and General Larry Welch, former chief of staff for the Air Force and currently the CEO of the IDA -- the Institute for Defense Analysis. The last was the Honorable James Woolsey, former director of the CIA in the Clinton Administration.

I must say that we could not have had a more knowledgeable, experienced and talented group of commissioners than the eight names I just read. They certainly deserve my respect and appreciation and have it. As you know and said, the commission was established by Congress. We delivered our report in July, which was a brief, unclassified summary that you will all have before you. It's some 36 pages.

The actual report is some 200 -- 306 pages, I believe, plus a couple hundred pages of classified background. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that the unclassified executive summary be placed in the record at this point.

HELMS: There is no objection. So ordered.

RUMSFELD: The members of the commission were nominated by the House Democratic and Republican leadership and the Senate Democratic and Republican leadership. Our work covered some six months, included some 200 briefings. As General Welch observed at one point, the facts finally overrode all of our biases and opinions that we came into our work with and literally drove it to our unanimous conclusion.

As required by the charter, we looked only the emerging and current ballistic missile threat to the United States, not to other threats such as terrorism or cruise missiles. We concentrated on the threat to the United States of America as opposed to U.S. forces overseas or friends or allies. We examined ballistic missile countries both as buyers and sellers, as well as users of technology, and the state of their capabilities, including biological and nuclear weapons.

We consulted with technical, area, functional and policy experts. We commissioned work to look at technical aspects as to what is possible and the various approaches in missile development. And we examined the availability of nuclear and biological weapons capabilities.

I will summarize briefly our conclusions. First, that China and Russia continue to pose threats, although different in nature. Each country is on a somewhat uncertain, albeit different path. With respect to North Korea and Iran, we concluded that each could pose a threat to the United States within five years of a decision to do so and that the United States might well not know for several years whether such a decision has been made.

We concluded that Iraq could pose a threat to the U.S. within 10 years of a decision to do so and that the U.S. might not know for several years when such a decision was made. That view was based on the assumption that the UNSCOM sanctions and inspections would be in place. It's now increasingly likely that they will not be in place. Therefore, we would place Iraq with North Korea and Iran as capable of posing a threat within five years of making such a decision. And we underline that we might well not know for several years if such a decision has been made.

We concluded unanimously that the emerging capabilities are broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than had been reported and that the intelligence community's ability to provide timely warning is being eroded. We concluded that the warning time of deployment of ballistic missile threats to the United States is reduced. Indeed, under some plausible scenarios -- including re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air-launch options, short development programs that might include testing in a third country, or some combination of these -- we concluded that the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment. All of these possibilities have happened. So they are hardly unlikely.

One important reason for reduced warning is that the emerging powers are secretive about their programs and are increasingly sophisticated in deception and denial. They know considerably more than we would like them to know about the sources and methods of our collection, in no small part through espionage. And they use that knowledge to good effect in hiding programs.

We concluded that there will be surprises. It's a big world. It's a complicated world. And deception and denial are extensive. The surprise to me is not that there are and will be surprises but that we're surprised that there are surprises. In my view, we need to recognize that surprises will occur and take the steps to see that our country is arranged to deal with the risks that the inevitable surprises inevitably will pose.

The second key factor is extensive foreign assistance, technology transfer and foreign trade in ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Foreign trade and foreign assistance are, in our view, not a wild card. They are fact. The contention that there are nations with indigenous ballistic missile development programs is, in our view, not correct.

We don't know of one such nation that, in fact, has an indigenous ballistic missile program. There may not have been a truly indigenous ballistic missile development program since Mr. Robert Goddard. The countries of interest are helping each other. They are doing it for a variety of reasons -- some strategic, some financial. But technology transfer is not rare. It's not unusual. Indeed, it's pervasive.

The intelligence community has a difficult assignment. There are more actors, more programs and more facilities to monitor than was the case during the Cold War. Their assets are spread somewhat thinly across many priorities. Methodological adjustments relative to collecting and analyzing evidence is, in our view, not keeping up with the pace of events.

We approached our assignment not as intelligence analysts but as policy-makers with decades of experience in dealing with the intelligence community and its products. As such, we approached it in a way that was different from the normal intelligence analyst's approach. Therefore, it should not be surprising that our conclusions diverged from early community estimates.

Specifically, Russia and China have emerged as major suppliers of technology to a number of countries. There is the advent and acceleration of trade among second-tier powers to the point that development of these capabilities may well have become self- sustaining. For example, today they each have various capabilities that others do not. As they trade -- whether it's knowledge, systems, components or technicians -- the result is that they each benefit from each other and are able to move forward on development paths that are notably different from ours or that of the Soviet Union. And they are able to move at a more rapid pace.

To characterize the programs of target nations as "high-risks," it seems to me, is a misunderstanding of the situation. These countries do not need the accuracies the U.S. required. They do not have the same concerns about safety that the U.S. has, nor do they need the high volumes the U.S. acquired.

As a result, they are capable of using technologies, techniques and even equipment that the U.S. would have rejected as too primitive as long ago as three decades. Whether called "high risk" or not, let there be no doubt but that they are rapidly and successfully developing the capabilities necessary to threaten the United States.

Since January 1998 when we began our assignment, we have seen the Pakistani Ghauri missile launch, the Indian nuclear tests, the Pakistani nuclear tests, Iran's Shahab 3 test and, most recently, the North Korean TD-1 space launch vehicle effort, to mention but a few events. There has not been a month that has passed where there has not been some event or new information that has reinforced the reality of the extensive technology transfer that's taking place or a new surprise because of the sophistication of these countries' deception and denial and their increasing skill at keeping the U.S. from knowing what it is they are doing and where they are doing it.

The recent Taepo Dong I space launch vehicle test is an object lesson. But it's also a warning. Many were skeptical for technical reasons that the TD-1 could fly at all. It has been the conventional wisdom that staging and systems integration were too complex and difficult for countries such as North Korea to accomplish in any near time frame. Yet North Korea demonstrated staging twice.

The third-stage solid motor and the satellite were both a surprise. The U.S. was aware that a launch was going to take place but not that the TD-1 would have a third stage and certainly not that it would attempt to put a satellite in low-earth orbit. So, while anticipating a flight of the TD-1, none of us anticipated this type of flight.

The question is: does this bring North Korea to an ICBM capability? The intelligence community is estimating that the system tested is somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 kilometers. ICBM range is in that neighborhood.

That means that a three-staged TD-1 might be able to reach Alaska and parts of the western-most Hawaiian Islands. This range, however, was not what was expected of a TD-1. Rather, it was what was expected of the follow-on missile, the TD-2.

How much further might a three-staged North Korean TD-1 fly? That, of course, is a function of the payload type and size, the weight of the materials and the number of stages. It would not be surprising if range/payload calculations suggest that a three-staged TD-1 has a potential greater than that of 5,500 kilometers, the ICBM range. Overcoming the failure in the third stage should be a manageable -- should be manageable. And reentry vehicle technology is on the open market.

Even if calculations indicate that the TD-1 cannot reach beyond Alaska or Hawaii with a nuclear payload, for example, their recent launch does suggest that because of their demonstrated technical proficiency, the TD-2 will be more capable than had been thought. In short, the likelihood that a TD-2 will be successfully tested has gone up considerably since the August 31 flight. The likelihood that a TD- 2 flight will exceed 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers in range with a useful payload has gone up as well. And the likelihood that we will not know very much in advance of a launch what a TD-2 will be capable of continues to be high.

Now what I have said about North Korea is interesting. But given the reality of technology transfer, what happens in North Korea is also important with respect to, for example, Iran. If North Korea has the capability it has now demonstrated, we can be certain that they will offer that capability to other countries including Iran.

That has been their public posture. It has been their private behavior. They are very, very active marketing ballistic missile technologies. In addition, Iran not only has assistance from North Korea but it also has assistance from Russia and from China, which creates additional options and additional development paths for them.

What does all this mean by way of warning? Well, it powerfully reinforces our commission's conclusions that technology transfer is pervasive and that deception and denial work. Further, it points up the fact that the longer range ballistic missiles are increasingly attractive to a number of countries because the world knows from the Gulf War that combating Western armies, air forces and navies is not a wise choice.

This reality makes threats such as terrorism, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles more attractive. They are cheaper than armies and navies and air forces. And they are attainable. And ballistic missiles have the advantage of being able to arrive at their destination undefended.

We concluded unanimously that we are in an environment of little or no warning. We believe that arguments to the contrary are not supported by the facts.

This led us to our unanimous recommendation that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning.

Specifically, we believe the Department of State should: review its policies and priorities, including non-proliferation activities and sanctions; the intelligence community should review U.S. collection capabilities, given their more complex task; and last, that the defense establishment should review both U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities and strategies that are based on extended warning. In short, we are in a new circumstance. And the policies and approaches that were appropriate when we could rely on extended warning no longer apply.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you. And Dr. Blechman and Dr. Graham and I are prepared and available to respond to questions.

HELMS: Mr. Secretary, this is a frightening report. I was sitting here thinking, as you proceeded, that it would be very advantageous if some of the television times lamenting the cavorting of some federal officials -- at least one -- there could be some attention paid to the risk and the threat to the security of this country of ours. Have you offered to make this information available to the administration?

RUMSFELD: We have offered to make the information available to the administration. We have offered to brief the Pentagon and the chiefs and the State Department and the National Security Council. We have a meeting scheduled to brief the senior officials of the intelligence community at the CIA. And the DCI has requested that we do that.

We had a very brief meeting with Secretary Cohen prior to our release of our report and with the chairman of the chiefs, General Shelton. But we have not actually briefed them on the report.

HELMS: Well, I'm particularly interested in all of them, of course, but particularly so in the reaction of a fellow North Carolinian, the chairman of the joint chiefs. Hugh Shelton -- the media refers to him as Henry Shelton. Nobody calls him Henry except the people who don't know what he's called back home.

Now you have offered a full classified briefing on the results of your commission's findings to the chairman. Is that correct?

RUMSFELD: Yes, we have. And I believe we have scheduled a meeting for next month with General Hughes, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

HELMS: And Bill Cohen, with whom I enjoyed serving in the Senate, he has not apparently been interested either?

RUMSFELD: We have not met with him since issuing our report. No, sir.

HELMS: Well, I'm going to defer my further questioning until my colleagues.

RUMSFELD: I should add, if you will excuse me, that we did meet also with the national security advisor to the president, Mr. Berger, prior to issuing our report, to give him a quick review of what we were thinking. And we spent some time with him. But we have not gone in and given a full briefing to him or his staff on our report since it has been issued, nor have we talked to anyone in the executive branch after they have had a chance to read the classified version, which would be the most constructive way to do it, to have them read the classified version and then have us -- the members of the commission -- meet with them.

HELMS: Mr. Coverdell? I'm going to defer to you if you have any questions.

COVERDELL: Well, I apologize for the fact that I had to leave for a moment. Mr. Secretary, we were chatting a little before the hearing. And I'd like to have your observations -- and maybe the chairman's already asked that -- just generally the response in the intelligence community, an overview. It was a pretty shattering report.

And what's the general response among the professionals that you're talking to -- a? And b, how is it that -- and I mentioned it. I can't cite the exact instance. But basically we have had, on the heels of this report, an administration ratification, no requirement to accelerate a timetable dealing with this kind of threat. I'd just like your observations or any or your colleagues' observations to this point.

RUMSFELD: Well, I'll just open by saying that there is a lot of anecdotal information I could provide in terms of people's reaction. You know, I think some people kind of just wish it would go away, the problem. There have been two written documents that have occurred since our report that bear on our report. One is -- was a statement out of the intelligence community -- two, actually, one by Mr. Gannon (ph) and one by Mr. Walpole (ph), both unclassified.

And each reflect that they have read the report carefully. And they reflect a migration away from prior community positions to positions more closely approximating what we have submitted in our report. So I would say that the report is having an effect in the intelligence community.

The other written document was this letter from Senator -- General Shelton, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to Mr. Inhofe -- Senator Inhofe. And it has a series of statements in it. One was that after reading the report, they remain confident that the intelligence community can provide the necessary warning of the indigenous development and deployment by a rogue state of an ICBM threat to the United States.

The problem with that statement, with all respect, is that there aren't any indigenous development and deployment programs in the world. So the fact that they remain confident that the intelligence community can provide the necessary warning of such indigenous development and deployment by a rogue state of an ICBM threat to the United States is not relevant. Second, they point out that -- it says -- the letter says, "The commission points out that through unconventional, high-risk development programs and foreign assistance, rogue nations could acquire an ICBM capability in a short time. And the intelligence community may not detect it."

That's true. We did point that out. And we did point out that the intelligence community may not detect it. They go on to say, "We view this as an unlikely development."

Now the problem with that statement is that it's not an unlikely development. It is not only not unlikely; in my view, all of those have happened.

There have been countries that have purchased entire missile systems. There have been countries that have launched ballistic missiles from shipboard. There have been countries that have tested on other people's soil. There have been countries, including the United States, that have placed their missiles on other people's real estate. I mean, the United States did. The Russians tried -- the Soviets tried to do it in Cuba.

Today, if tomorrow Iran announced they wanted to put a ballistic missile system in Libya to defend -- quote, unquote -- "defend Libya," they would gain something like 1,500 kilometers closer to the United States. So they could abbreviate their development program. But the most disturbing part of this sentence is, it says that "through unconventional, high-risk development programs and foreign assistance" and then it goes on and says, "we view this as an unlikely development."

Foreign assistance is not an unlikely development. It's a fact. It is happening all over the world as we sit here.

Russia is helping India. Russia is helping China. China is helping Pakistan. North Korea is helping Pakistan.

These countries are trading with each other. And they each provide assistance that brings along the other countries faster than would otherwise be the case.

So in answer to your question as to what's the reaction, well this is one of two written reactions. And I find it disturbing.

COVERDELL: It's a denial. It comes close.

RUMSFELD: I mean, if the Pentagon is worried about budgets, if the Pentagon is worried about other threats -- and they have to. They've got to worry about budgets and they have to worry about other threats. They can't look at just ballistic missiles. They have to look at the range of threats -- conventional threats, terrorism, cruise missiles, what have you.

That's fine. But it seems to me the thing to do is then say that.

COVERDELL: Well, only in deference to the rest of the committee, if the others would want to comment on this, I would welcome it. Is that appropriate, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Blechman?

BLECHMAN: Well, that was a very good response. I might only add that I believe the issue of the administration's reaction and so forth is complicated by the intense part of the nature of the debate on this issue. And as a citizen, I find it very unfortunate.

Among the people in the administration that I interact with -- people on the sub-cabinet level -- there is a great acceptance of the report and of the indisputable facts behind it, as witnessed by events like the North Korean launch recently. And I think there is an opportunity in the new year for change in positions and for constructive movement toward more reasonable policies. COVERDELL: Mr. Graham?

GRAHAM: I think it has all been said, Mr. Chairman.

COVERDELL: All right. I yield.

HAGEL: Thank you very much, Secretary. Thank you for being here, gentlemen. Appreciate your opportunity to join us today. When you talked about no indigenous programs -- by the way, I think your report is just another warning signal that we've been receiving of our increased vulnerability of not paying attention to the defenses of this country, which of course is the first and foremost charge, I think, of the federal government, over and above everything else.

You talked about no indigenous programs, technology transfers, partnerships for different reasons -- strategic or economic. Why do you think the Chinese or the Russians would be involved with this? I mean, some of this is posing probably as big a threat to them because today's allies could be tomorrow's, you know, opponent.

But what would cause them to be part -- I can see Iran and Iraq and some of the developing countries wanting to latch onto this technology. But why countries like Russia and China being involved in this type of exchange?

MR. BLECHMAN: I think Russia and China have some different interests and different concerns than ours. And they are reflected in their activities in this area very directly. For example, states that we call rogue states -- Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya -- might better be characterized as client states to Russia and China as well. North Korea certainly fits in that.

So those are states with which they have in the past and I'm sure hope to continue to exercise some political and diplomatic and possibly military influence. But they see them very differently than we do and look to greater interaction and cooperation with them than we would.

Second, of course, in the case of Russia and, to some degree, China and certainly North Korea by manifest statement, there is good money in selling ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technologies and, at least by implication, the technology that supports the warheads for missiles as well, which in their most effective form are weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. This is an area where even a country as backwards as North Korea, as poor and isolated as North Korea can find a significant market in the world for its ballistic missile technology. And for the same reason that Chairman Rumsfeld mentioned that ballistic missiles have an appeal to the developing part of the world, the ability to sell to the developing part of the world has a good economic potential.

So for all of these reasons -- for influence, for economics, for military cooperation and involvement and, in some cases, just to provide the ability for the engineering and scientific cadres to survive Russia today and possibly other countries as well -- North Korea -- why, the potential to transfer this technology looks very appealing.

RUMSFELD: I'd just add, I mean clearly China's interest in helping Pakistan is strategic. They have got a long border with India. And they have had border wars. And they would rather have India occupied on the other side.

The other thing I'd point out is that the United States and western Europe are major technology transferors as well. I mean, we live in a --

HAGEL: Intentionally or unintentionally?

RUMSFELD: Well --

HAGEL: Like the missile technology transfer that's being, maybe in a different hearing, but that type of --

RUMSFELD: I would say both, but mostly unintentionally. I mean, we live in the post-Cold War world, which is relaxed: all kinds of students; training in our country and other countries; the international scientific symposia; leaks of classified information; espionage; the demarches we make end up supplying information to other people as to how they can do a better job of deceiving us. So I think the reality is that these technologies, over time, are going to get in other people's hands.

We ought to try to stop it. We ought to do what we can to delay it.

But the reality is that our country is going to have to recognize that other nations are going to have increasingly sophisticated capabilities. And thinking we can plug all the holes and stop it, I think, is a mistake. I don't think we can plug all the holes and stop it. I think we're going to have to be willing to invest so that we can live with the increased risks that are inevitably going to follow increased sophisticated weaponry in the hands of people who don't wish as well.

HAGEL: Just quickly before my time runs out, former CIA Director Robert Gates had a different conclusion. He said we didn't face any long-range missile threat before the year 2010. Why do you think your commission reached such a different conclusion?

RUMSFELD: Well, I would say, first of all, I think if you talked to him today, he would have a different answer. I shouldn't speak for him and I can't. But I think he would.

Second, time has passed. Third, there have been a whole lot of events that occurred in the world. And we're living in a situation where I think people are going to -- are increasingly aware and will become even more aware over the coming six, eight months. And I suspect you will see the intelligence community evolving in its views. And I can't believe you'll see another letter like this one out of the Pentagon.

HAGEL: But today's facts are better than yesterday's estimates? We know more today than we did then?

RUMSFELD: We do.

HAGEL: Thank you very much.

BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, welcome. And we're all grateful for the good work you have done here. You have advanced a very serious issue considerable ways. And you are continuing to work it. And that isn't, as you know, always the case. So we're all better off for what you're doing. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, would you and your colleagues give me your thoughts on this administration's current ballistic missile defense position, if there is one?

BLECHMAN: Yes, sir. The commission, of course, did not look at this issue and discuss it. We don't have a position as a commission. My personal view is that the US should be deploying a limited missile defense as the technology becomes feasible.

With these deterrents, there is always a weak read. In the case of the Soviet Union, it was the best we could do, given the size of their missile forces. But against these smaller forces now emerging, we can provide effective defenses as a supplement to deterrents.

However, I think we should do this in a way which doesn't jeopardize relationships with the Russians. We need to start talking with them, to have a strategic dialogue and to move to alter the arms control regime, both on the offensive side and the defensive side, to modify the ABM Treaty or replace it with something else. Do this cooperatively, but make clear from the outset we are doing this.

We are deploying this limited defense system. We hope you will move with us in a cooperative relationship so that all of us can live in a safer world.

BIDEN: In your opinion, does that require then changing the 1972 ABM Treaty with -- as Ronald Reagan once said - -a nation now assigned to the dustbin of history? Is that treaty relevant? How can you move forward with a defense system unless you engage the treaty?

BLECHMAN: The treaty is relevant to our relationship with the Russians. Russia is a powerful country militarily and has very large nuclear forces. I think it's only sensible to not tear up the treaty, but rather to change it in a cooperative way with them.

It depends what specific system you want to deploy. If, for example, as has been suggested, we should deploy our national missile defense system in Alaska, that would require a change in the treaty. That shouldn't be an insurmountable obstacle.

UNKNOWN MALE: Yes.

UNKNOWN MALE: Thank you.

GRAHAM: This administration has stated several times that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of our national security. I believe if that is the cornerstone on which the policy is based, then we will never have effective ballistic missile defense, either at the theater level or at the national level. As far as the Soviet or Russian response is concerned, I believe as a practical matter there is no way that Russia or anyone else could construe a light missile defense that we might build in the next few years as being something which would threaten their ability to destroy the United States whenever they wish to do so.

Personally, I think it's a terrible point of national security policy that we grant them the ability to destroy our country anytime they wish to do so and have only the ability to destroy their country as our response to that. But even if you accept that chain of logic, then there is no way anything we're going to build in the next few years will go to that level of defense. Nonetheless, we could defend ourselves against threats from developing countries and China within the next few years. However, the ABM Treaty prohibits us from doing that very explicitly. It says we may not construct a territorial defense.

That treaty was negotiated and written by diplomats. The currency of diplomacy, although I am an engineer, I've come to learn is ambiguity so everyone can agree to it. Once there is a treaty, that is then interpreted, in the United States at least, by our lawyers who deal in precedent and precision in the language. So suddenly this document born in ambiguity is being interpreted in a very precise way, usually with the greatest possible constraints imposed.

So the product that comes from that process is given to the engineers to build. And the currency of their realm is cost, schedule and performance. But if they don't know what they are allowed to do and what they aren't allowed to, it's very hard to make something that has a known cost schedule and performance. And if anything comes out of that process -- and not much has yet -- it's handed to the military to try to operate and defend the country with. I don't think I could invent a worse way to defend the country if I spent all month trying to think about it.

BIDEN: Thank you. I think that was rather clear. Mr. Secretary?

RUMSFELD: Well, very briefly, as Barry Blechman said, we did not take this as a commission assignment. So these are personal views. Weakness is provocative. It encourages people to do things that they otherwise would not think of doing.

The reason ballistic missiles are so attractive is because they can arrive at their destination undefended. Therefore, countries looking around the world and asking themselves, "How can we assert influence in the region and dissuade other nations, the United States included, from involving themselves to our disadvantage in those regions? What can we do that will give us that kind of weight? We know our armies can't do it. We know our air forces can't do it. The answer is ballistic missiles." Now it seems to me by not addressing that as a country, we are encouraging nations. I don't know what the number is today, but it's somewhere between 20 and 30 countries who either have or have had or are acquiring ballistic missiles of various sizes and shapes, ranges of which are going to increase over time and warheads of which are going to become more powerful over time. So I think that I come out right where our recommendation is.

And our recommendation is that -- first of all, I mean, the 3 plus 3 is overtaken by events. That is, you can not be in favor of ballistic missile defense for other reasons, but not for 3 plus 3, in my view. I would think that is terribly important for the administration to study the report, to look at that recommendation, to have a systematic review of their positions. And that's -- and I would hope that they would change and reflect the little or no warning environment we're in.

BIDEN: Thank you. Mr. Chairman?

HELMS: You two gentlemen go ahead and vote and then come back. And Paul Coverdell will be here shortly. And then he can succeed me for a while.

One of the great issues today in the political arena is the very thing we are talking about. There is a tendency among some to say, "Look, nobody is dumb enough to start a war." Well, I think -- I hope that nobody is dumb enough to believe that. Yesterday, we had our third discussion of it.

And the thing that bothers me is that the chief executive in our country is so diverted in terms of his attention by other things that he is not thinking straight on the question of the defense of this country. There are a lot of people who believe that most sincerely.

Now, for my part, Mr. Secretary and gentlemen, my belief is that the Clinton Administration's non-proliferation policy has collapsed so completely that the administration genuinely -- perhaps -- but obviously mistakenly believes that the leaders of foreign countries have at heart the same basic interests we do when they don't. They don't think like we do. Their goals are not the same.

From that assumption flows the belief that if only we could give them all the information they need, they would seek out and terminate the activities of those who are misbehaving. Well, anybody who believes that has overdosed on dumb pills. As a result, the administration has been sharing a deluge of sensitive intelligence information -- I wish I could go into it this afternoon and I cannot -- intelligence information in the form of diplomatic statements and questions with Russia and China.

I want to have your opinion of what effect all of this sharing of information has had upon the U.S. intelligence community's ability to monitor -- to monitor -- missile proliferation. Want to take a crack at that, Mr. Secretary?

RUMSFELD: Sure. I've been told that the United States probably makes more demarches around the world than all the other countries on the face of the Earth. There's no question if you go to another country and tell them you would like them to do something, based on some information you have, it's not surprising they are going to want the information. And to the extent you give them the information and it reveals sources and methods of intelligence collection in a way that enables those countries to know that that channel of communication is now compromised; therefore and they should use a different channel, that that can happen.

So the one effect of a demarche is that the information that you have that's confidential is now in the hands of the other people. And they then use that information, in the best of worlds, to close down that channel. And it forces -- it leads other countries, the people who are doing the proliferating, to follow a different path.

The second point you made, I think, is correct that countries do have different interests. I mean, there are countries that we have intimate relationships with, but we are not going to change because some other country comes over and tells us we should. Every country has countries like that, that they have intimate relationships with, that they're not going to sever relationships with simply because the United States comes and talks to them.

I think that expecting too much -- first of all, I should begin by saying anti-proliferation has been a good thing. That is to say, we have achieved some successes in keeping countries from not developing nuclear weapons and not having ballistic missiles. On the other hand, it is far from perfect. And I think that, over time, we have to face reality.

We're not going to live in a world that's static. Other countries are going to get advanced weapons.

HELMS: I'm going to vote. And I'll be back. And if you'll take over, Senator?

COVERDELL: Fine, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to proceed with the formal questions that were prepared for the chairman. Before I do, now that we have a public demonstration of the launch, it's now in the public sector, the launch of the three-staged ballistic missile by North Korea over the land mass of Japan, subsequent to your report, any observations about the public nature of that demonstration and what particular note the United States and the free world ought to make of that?

BLECHMAN: One of the arguments that was made in favor of it taking 15 years to develop ICBM capability by these developing world countries, such as North Korea -- although in their case, they may be the undeveloping world. They seem to be going backwards in their economic and other dimensions except for missiles. But in any case, one of the points made was that missile staging was difficult and sophisticated and required systems integration and advanced capabilities which they had not yet acquired and not demonstrated.

And it would take them a long time and many tests to show that they could do this stage. What the Taepo Dong I launch, after the U.S. intelligence community finally figured out what the data it had collected meant was, that in fact the missile had not successfully staged once, but it had successfully staged twice. The first-second stage had worked and the second-third stage had worked.

What this meant in terms of the advancement of the program was enormous because it says now they can -- they understand enough about multi-stage missiles to build them and, in this case, have them -- the staging part of the flight -- work the first time they tried it, a very impressive accomplishment. It also gives the Taepo Dong I a capability to shoot a small payload, probably in the tens of kilograms region, to intercontinental missile ranges, which are above 5,500 kilometers but potentially, as the chairman said, up to 6,000 and potentially even beyond that.

These are probably payloads that once you get beyond 6,000 kilometers, at least are small enough that they are not suitable for most nuclear weapons. But they're certainly suitable for biological weapon deployment. Perhaps more ominous yet, the North Koreans have in development a Taepo Dong II missile, which is a much larger missile, which had been estimated to be a two-staged missile by the intelligence community up until now, but if operated and configured as a three-staged missile, would be clearly an ICBM capable of delivering nuclear warheads to central -- any location in the United States.

One way to look at that is that we are one Taepo Dong II, three- staged missile launch away from the North Koreans having clearly demonstrated a nuclear capable ICBM. I think that's of great concern and have no reason to believe that that's in the distant future. And, in fact, there is no reason to believe it couldn't happen with little warning at essentially any time, as we say in our report.

GRAHAM: Right. As the North Korean launch is very interesting. And its impact is perhaps greater on the not-so-free world, in that I understand the Chinese were furious at the North Koreans because the test, of course, pushed Japan forward into developing jointly with us missile defenses for Japan, something the Chinese had hoped to avoid.

But the North Korean program tell us: one, the enormous priority they give to developing these kinds of capabilities -- that's always the country, we're told, is starving, zillions of people are starving and yet, somehow, they find the resources to pour into these programs, which as you know are not inexpensive; secondly, the audacity of launching over Japan, over Japanese airspace and triggering the kinds of reactions that it had in Japan and elsewhere in Asia; and thirdly, risking -- the willingness to risk their relationship with us, in the small sense that had been taken for some cooperation with us, tells us, you know, that they are very serious about this program.

They give it a high priority and have good reasons of their own, which we probably don't understand very well. We knew very little about it. We were surprised, again, you know, at it having a third stage, at the type of engine that the third stage had, at the satellite attempt -- attempt to launch a satellite.

So we know very little about North Korea. We know very little about its programs. And we certainly know very little about its (OFF- MIKE).

RUMSFELD: Three quick comments. One, there is no question but that, to the extent Japan and Korea have, over decades, arranged themselves under the umbrella of the United States and thereby avoided doing certain types of things, including development of nuclear capabilities, the concern in Japan about this is real and it has to raise questions on their part about U.S. intelligence capabilities and U.S. capabilities to defend them because they know ballistic missiles are indefensible. And so, that's a factor that will affect behavior in Northeast Asia.

Second, from the standpoint of the North Koreans, it was a fabulous advertisement. I mean, it told the world visibly that they have an advanced capability that the rest of the world didn't think they had. And it's for sale; meaning Iran or whoever, to the extent they want it, they can buy it. And that is a very important complicating factor.

What's happened in North Korea is interesting and important for North Korea. But it is also exceedingly interesting and important from the standpoint of other nations that can abbreviate their movement towards acquiring those kinds of capabilities. COVERDELL: Mr. Secretary and to the others, now that your report is out and we've had it in the world of debate for a period of time, your report wasn't commissioned to do so but I would be interested if the president or the secretary of defense, congressional leadership (OFF-MIKE) what do you think, as a result of this report, the United States should do or change? What would be your response?

RUMSFELD: We would not have a commission response because, as you say, we didn't address it. We do have one response as a commission and that's our recommendation: that they ought to sit down and look at the world as it really is, not the way they wish it were, and review all of our policies that are anachronisms, that hark back to an earlier time when we had extended warning, when we had overwhelming capabilities, when we had different degrees of deterrent, when we were conceivably somewhat less vulnerable to some of these asymmetric responses.

I think that is the first task. Barry, comment?

BLECHMAN: I was struck by the opportunity afforded to me by service on this commission and (OFF-MIKE) of information on proliferation by the extent of -- the extent to which the knowledge, (OFF-MIKE) technique to develop and build weapons of mass destruction of various types and the missiles to deliver those is spreading, has spread and continues to spread around the world. To my view, there is no threat in the same league to the United States and its security than the threat of weapons of mass destruction on ballistic missiles.

And although we give a lot of rhetoric to this issue, to my mind, this administration already and the administration before it has given that threat the seriousness with which it requires. This is the threat that can kill us -- kill many millions of Americans. And we talk about it. And we take halfway measures. And that's about it.

And it requires comprehensive policies. No defense is going to provide total immunity against these forces. No defense is perfect. But no proliferation, non-proliferation or anti-proliferation policies is perfect. It takes comprehensive policies, including diplomatic approaches, including arms control. It requires defense strategies, requires offensive.

(OFF-MIKE) require conventional actions, military actions. But if you take the threat seriously, you have to begin to look seriously at ways you (OFF-MIKE). In my mind, any administration and any congressional leadership should look comprehensively at these threats and just how we might deal with them in this period.

COVERDELL: Just a comment on that, and then I'm going to turn to you, Mr. Graham. I agree with you that this is one that doesn't rest at the feet of any one administration, with one exception -- and that's your report because your report is changing the dynamics. Everything up and to your report is based on the language that was in General Shelton's letter. And it's parroting what former presidents have been told.

It's a little bit like -- and I agree with you, Mr. Secretary -- Japan's got to be looking at this in a very different way because prior to that missile going over their airspace, they were reading the same reports that foreign presidents, former National Security Councils, et cetera were reading. And you have changed the paradigm. Mr. Graham, do you want to comment on that?

GRAHAM: Yes, Senator. I agree with my colleagues that from the commission point of view, our single recommendation of the course that we would pursue. Beyond that, personally, I agree with Dr. Blechman that the U.S. needs a comprehensive policy to deal with the ballistic missile and, by association, possibly the cruise missile and other external threats to the U.S. That's very clear, well stated and formidable. We don't have such a policy at this point.

In addition to that, I have watched the effect of the various arms control constraints -- and particularly the ABM Treaty -- upon our ability to develop and deploy ballistic missile defense systems, both theater range and longer-range, for both regional defense and for national defense, for many years. I've looked at it when I was President Reagan's science advisor in his second term. I was the chairman of the STIO outside advisory committee three years during the Bush Administration. And I must tell you that the ABM Treaty, as it is interpreted by the U.S. and implemented by both Republican and Democratic administrations, has a corrosive effect upon our ability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.

Just as one example: there is an office in the Department of Defense called the Compliance Review Group -- CRG -- which looks at whether defense systems we're considering developing are, in fact, compliant with the ABM Treaty. It's actually an interagency group chaired by an individual office of the Secretary of Defense.

When you approach them with a ballistic missile defense system concept, what you are told is that they don't deal in conceptual systems. They want to see a specific system designed. And then they will judge whether it's compliant with the ABM Treaty or not.

Now, the Compliance Review Group probably costs a few hundred thousand dollars a year to run. The development of a ballistic missile defense system costs a few hundred million dollars a year to run. And sometimes it's a billion dollars. So what you're doing is you're putting in jeopardy a few hundred million dollars a year in system development while the Compliance Review Group waits until you have a sufficiency well specified system that they have what they consider to be a development program at hand, which they can then judge the compliance on.

This has a completely backward of doing things. What it does is forces the defense system designers to be extremely conservative in how close they approach to the limits of the ABM Treaty. And, in fact, they usually come down quite a way from it so they won't be torpedoed at the last moment by the Compliance Group. This is just one of about a dozen examples I could cite to you of how the not always obvious and not always flagrant but subtle corrosive effects this treaty has on our ability to develop defense systems. And I believe the treaty has made a major contribution to the delay and the cost of building defense systems to this point in time.

RUMSFELD: If I could come back in on that question, if you think about the circumstance of the Japanese and the Korean people -- governments, the defense establishments -- when North Korea launches their missile and the hopelessness that they have to feel about their situation. They do not have the ability to do anything except preemption about the fact that North Korea is developing those capabilities. Similarly, Israel -- if you think of the feeling of helplessness in Israel when the Scud missiles were coming in during the Gulf War, followed by the recent Iranian missile launches of the Shahab 3.

Now when those events occur, those countries decide that's not acceptable. Japan and North -- South Korea are now in the process of manifesting their concerns, discussing and deciding to do something about that. Israel is in the process of doing something about that vulnerability. Does the United States -- it says something about warning. Does the United States need to have missiles reigning down on us like Israel did to decide that they ought to do something about it? Does the United States need to have missiles launched over the continental U.S., as Japan has, to decide to do something about it?

The question of warning is a fascinating subject. What is it? How much do you need of it to have it? What do you do with it? When does it become actionable?

When does something so register in your mind, collectively as a body politic, that you decide that that is warning? I mean, the wonderful book by Roberta Wolstetter (ph) about this subject suggests that there was a great deal of warning, depending on how you define the word "warning" before Pearl Harbor. There was an enormous amount of information. And was there information explicitly they were going to attack Pearl Harbor? No.

But was there just an enormous amount of information that things were happening, that attacks could occur someplace, that there were activities that reasonable people could take as warning? Yes, there was just an enormous amount. And I think it is interesting to ask oneself: what do you suppose it will take for the United States to decide that the major of the threats in the world have changed and that we really ought to do a systematic, thoughtful, constructive, bipartisan review and analysis of how we want to be arranged in this different circumstance.

COVERDELL: Well, I couldn't agree more. For one, I don't need any more warning.

(LAUGHTER)

I think there is a factor here that responds to the question you raised and that is it's my interpretation anyway that a large number of the American people do not realize that there is not an effective -- they have always assumed there was a defense mechanism and don't know, even today, if there is not. And my guess is the answer to your question is, when enough people like yourself or myself build a large enough audience to understand the vulnerability, that the policy will begin to change.

I am perplexed even to this -- as I said to you before the hearing began, that the initial response -- and I don't say this is in a partisan way -- but the original response of the administration is (OFF-MIKE) like that letter that Senator Inhofe got from General Shelton. And that is a question of action. You wonder, well ,you know, what does it take?

My conclusion is that what it takes is a population in this country recognizes the vulnerability. And I suspect when that happens you will really begin to see a momentum to change and to address the issue your report has raised. Mr. Chairman, I became a lone ranger here and got off on some matters that aren't really in the official...

HELMS: (OFF-MIKE)

COVERDELL: So if you're ready to proceed with your questions...

HELMS: They tell you to do like that...

(LAUGHTER)

You know...

(LAUGHTER)

Well, thank you, Paul.

COVERDELL: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will apologize to the panel but appreciate very much the work you have accomplished, the service you represent and continue to do for our country. I will excuse myself at this point. Thank you.

HELMS: Gentlemen, it's good to be with you again. I tell you, walking back and forth is a wonderful thing. And I hope I get to do it again.

(LAUGHTER)

People say, "What's wrong with you?" And I say, " Well, whereabouts do you think?" Having double knee replacement is an interesting experience. Howard Baker told me it would be. And he was exactly right.

Let's talk about DOE's technologies for just a minute. I belong to this type of conservative governments who believes it's folly for the United States to ignore the fact that the increasing availability of dual-use technologies, particularly through space launch programs, will enhance the ability to countries to produce ballistic missiles and re-entry vehicles. As a matter of fact, and we have already mentioned here this afternoon that we particularly discovered this fact with respect to the satellite launches from China.

Well, I wonder how your commission assesses the intelligence community's competence levels in monitoring space launch to ensure that they do not contribute to a ballistic missile program. (OFF- MIKE)

RUMSFELD: Well, we know -- it's a subject we have talked about.

HELMS: Oh, have we covered this?

RUMSFELD: No, no, not today. In our commission hearings we have talked about this. But Dr. Graham was one of the two technical people on the commission. And it seems to me he has, in the commission hearings, has contributed a lot on this subject. So, Dr. Graham?

GRAHAM: Thank you. The space launch rockets and ballistic missile rockets are essentially identical, up to the point that they deploy their payload. In the case of the space launch vehicle, it would be a satellite. In the case of ballistic missiles, it's one or more re-entry vehicles. But all of the machinery to get you into space is the same. And, in fact, I believe all of the U.S. large space launch vehicles today, except for the shuttle, are derived from ballistic missile launchers. And in the case of Russia and China, there are also a number of space launch vehicles which were derived from ballistic missiles.

It's also possible to go the other way -- make the space launch vehicle and then derive a ballistic missile from that. So they are very -- there is a great deal of overlap and similarity in the technology and some of it essentially complete and identical.

Anything that helps a space launch vehicle capability will certainly help an ICBM capability, based on that or similar technologies. If the space launch vehicle doesn't need help, then it's already got the capability. But if it needs help, then probably an ICBM that's similar to that also needs help. If you help the space launch vehicle, it will help the ICBM capability or ballistic missile capability as well.

It's a deeper issue than that because it goes on back through the technology, not only make the launcher but educating the technical and other personnel to operate systems and conduct the launches, monitor the payloads before they are launched and so on. There is a great deal of technical information that has to flow back and forth between the countries; for example, if we're going to launch one of our satellites on another country's boosters, that country has to know a great deal about the mass distribution, the structural response, the way the satellite is put together mechanically so that they can be sure it will survive and the rocket will survive to launch it into space.

Finally, going back even further in the U.S., probably the greatest technical transfer we make is one the chairman mentioned earlier. We have over 100,000 foreign graduate students in the U.S. at any given time -- many, many of them in the fields of advanced technology studying in our universities. And while our public schools -- elementary and high school level -- aren't always the best, by the time you get to our graduate universities, you have the best schools in the world, teaching all of these individuals the most advanced technology in the world.

Some of these people stay here and are very constructive members of our society. And some of them go back to Iran or back to other countries: Russia, China -- many, many from China, where they take these technical capabilities with them. And that's the foundation of any technical infrastructure in a high technology country, the people who understand the field and are competent in it.

Their graduate students are as good as our graduate students. They learn as much as our students do. And unfortunately, when they are given visas to come in to study, the actual field that they end up studying is not tracked by the government so that we don't know what they do once they get through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as far as being university students is a concern.

As far as I can determine, there is nothing reported back to the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the State Department, other than, perhaps, the fact that they are still students. So they can change majors, audit courses, study what they like once they get here And we have no knowledge of it. So it's very hard for us to even know what we're teaching them and follow that, much less control it.

You could make this process too restrictive. But in my view, this has gone completely the other direction at the moment. And we are far, far too unrestrictive in who we educate and what we educate them in and what we know about what we're educating them.

RUMSFELD: You can see why I selected Dr. Graham to answer that question.

HELMS: I was smiling because a memory just has occurred to me, back when George Bush was president, got a call from the White House that said, "What kind of universities do you have there now which major -- which specialize in engineering and other technical things?" And I said, "We've got North Carolina State University, which there is no better anywhere." And that's true.

So arrangements were made. And the president decided me to accompany him to my hometown. And we went to North Carolina State University. And all the students waved to him and blew him kisses and all the rest of it. And then we go over there to a very technical engineering section. And he was asking me, he said, "Who comes all the way -- " he said, "Who attends -- who are the dominant students who attend this university?"

And I told him about (OFF-MIKE), North Carolina and all the rest. We got in there. And I vow that this is correct. We had -- there were nine students, all in their white laboratory jackets, you know, and smiling and waving to the president. And seven of them were Orientals. So you had all this group (OFF-MIKE) North Carolina.

(LAUGHTER)

Let's talk a little bit about dual-use technologies. Particularly with -- I am interested in the space launch program. And you may have covered this while I was gone. We have covered that space launch programs will enhance the ability of countries to produce ballistic missiles and re-entry vehicles. Now tell me, how does the commission assess the intelligence community's competence levels in monitoring space launch programs to ensure that they do not (OFF-MIKE) the ballistic missile program?

GRAHAM: I don't think we looked specifically at the programs that are in place to monitor these cooperative programs as they are launched. And I know, personally, in reading the results of the investigations going on in the other House that this is a good point. I think that this question of cooperation of space projects is a difficult one.

There is absolutely no doubt that space launchers and ballistic missile launchers are based on the same technology and improved if one potentially improves the other for the other side. On the other hand, isolating these countries' space industries infrastructure can in some ways give them -- provide them with more incentive to work with countries that we prefer not to get these capabilities. So you have the Russian program, for example, American aerospace companies, satellite industries, association members have testified as to the benefit the U.S. gets from its cooperation with the Russians, both in terms of cost savings and in terms of technology coming into here.

The Russians are very good at rocket engines, for example, and we are utilizing some of that technology. Also, we are providing work for Russian missile engineers, missile engineers who might otherwise go to work for North Korea or Iran, as the Russians might already be. It's a difficult question.

There is certainly the risk of compromise. And we want to see any American companies or individuals working with Iran, Iraq or North Korea, countries directly hostile to us. Whether there should be (OFF-MIKE) termination, curtailment of our cooperative programs with Russia or China or commercial programs, I really don't know at this point. I think it deserves careful thought.

HELMS: Well, let me ask you another way. Maybe you answered that earlier. Let's say if Russia wanted to construct a space launch facility or facilities in countries already receiving massive Russian ballistic missile assistance like China and Iran, what would be the effect on the speed of the development of those countries' ballistic missile programs? Would it hasten them or have any effect or...

RUMSFELD: Well, there is no question but that it would hasten them. To the extent that Russia assists another country with a space launch activity like Iran or Iraq, as Dr. Graham indicated, the dual- use aspects of so many elements and so much of the knowledge have to accelerate their ballistic missile development programs.

HELMS: What do you think is the intelligence community's ability to monitor such developments that I've described?

RUMSFELD: We really didn't focus on that. We looked at the intelligence community's ability to monitor ballistic missile development itself, but not necessarily directly relating to space launch vehicles and the interplay between the two. Our general view on the intelligence community's ability to monitor ballistic missile developments in the target countries was that those capabilities have eroded and are eroding.

HELMS: The 1998 NIE assumed that -- I'm quoting -- "unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian or Chinese strategic missile is highly unlikely as long as current security procedures and systems are in place." Now I think you touched on this earlier. But I think we ought to elaborate on it.

What do you think and due to the fact that this statement is in odds with the September 1996 CIA report, which according to media articles, concluded -- and I'm quoting -- "the Russian nuclear command and control system is being subjected to stresses it was not designed to withstand and that these command posts of the Russian strategic rocket forces have the technical capability to launch without authorization of political leaders or the general of staff." " Given time," the report said, "all technical security measures can be circumvented, probably within weeks or days, depending upon what is involved." Your analysis to that.

RUMSFELD: We had briefings directly on that point.

HELMS: You did?

RUMSFELD: Sure. We were and are very concerned about that. And we went back and reviewed incidents that we had had in the '79 - '80 timeframe when we had gotten false indications on our warning systems and then took the analysts who are currently responsible for looking at Russian capabilities with us so that they would understand what experience the U.S. had had and so we could discuss that issue in a common framework.

Pursued that. And generally, it was our conclusion from the intelligence data we were presented that the Russians are seriously concerned about the possibility of accidental launch, that they have attempted to configure their systems so that other rockets, ICBMs, could not be launched accidentally or launched capriciously by some lower level of command. And I would say two caveats to that: one, I agree with the general notion that if you have a long enough time with an ICBM in your possession, you should be able to make it launch, particularly if, say, you -- among your personnel are the people who maintain that ICBM and therefore, know a lot about its technical implementation and functioning.

It seems to me possible that one or some ICBMs might be launched that way, but difficult to launch a huge number of them. Nonetheless, one ICBM can take out more than one city. So this is no small matter, even when it comes to one ICBM.

And second, even since we wrote our report, the stresses in the Russian system seem to be increasing substantially. I saw a report in the press this morning that, basically, in which the first deputy minister was saying that -- basically making a threat that the IMF -- he demanded that the IMF pay Russia the next increment of loans. And then, in the next breath, he seemed to say that it was important that Russia continue to make modern and increasingly accurate ballistic missiles.

This is a country which is basically going bankrupt, or perhaps already bankrupt. So I think it's a serious worry. And I think the situation there is very dynamic. And even if we thought they had a reasonable control system three months ago when we wrote the report, I would want to go back and look at the data again before I thought they had one today. And I would watch the pace of change of their social structure as a key indicator as to the stability of that system.

We also have a small section of report, both the classified and unclassified versions, concerning the year 2000 computer problem. And the issue that that could interplay in one way or another, either with the missiles, the control systems, the external infrastructure or the warning system, in a way that could be worrisome. In your question, you used the phrase "as long as current security procedures are in place." Now just to underline what Dr. Graham said, if you're not paying your army salaries and you're not paying the navy salaries, you're not paying the air force or the rocket force a salary, you're not paying custom border guards salaries, it doesn't take a lot of imagination to figure out what's going to happen over a period of time. People are going to feel they're not getting paid; therefore, they're going to be entrepreneurial.

And so it has to be a worry that the salaries are not being paid in the government structure. One would hope that people who are charge in nuclear weapons are being paid faster than people who are not.

HELMS: But (OFF-MIKE) are being paid -- when was it? 1995, I think, -- Norway launched a meteorological rocket, what some have said was the closest call of the nuclear age. In the midst of this crisis, what happened?

The Russian strategic nuclear force control terminals -- I think they call them the nuclear footballs (?) -- were reportedly switched to "alert" for several minutes. Now did your commission look into that? And do you have any opinion about the implications?

RUMSFELD: We did look at it. And it was the instance where the Norwegian sounding rocket was launched. And then a series of events followed.

People are of two minds on it. One view is that the concern about that Norwegian sounding rocket lived too far up the chain to reach Mr. Yeltsin. The other is that the warning system worked and that, in fact, nothing was done that should not have been done. And unfortunately, a good deal of it is classified -- the briefing we received -- and I don't know that I can say much more about it.

UNKNOWN MALE PANELIST: If I might add one thing, that the official U.S. position has been, as far as I can tell, that everything worked as it should have there and that control is maintained. Clearly, they didn't launch anything. The message by which they were -- Russia was notified of this launch was delivered several days in advance to their foreign ministry and apparently didn't make it from the foreign ministry to the missile warning people before the launch occurred.

So that indicates some unraveling of the infrastructure there. But if you compare it with the U.S. situation -- and I believe it was 1979 -- we had a technical problem that resulted in a few minutes of false warning at our North American Air Defense Headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs. The message, the indication of warning, did not go as high as the president in that event.

It did go as high as the commander-in-chief of the strategic air command. And as a result of that, very substantial and widespread changes were made throughout our missile warning and defense system. That was considered a major event and, in fact, a major problem. And to this day, they live with the changes that were made because of that.

So when it happened to us, it was a very big thing. My view is since the message seems to have gotten all the way to Yeltsin in Russia, it was a very big thing in Russia as well.

HELMS: You know, I've kept you folks here, or we have kept you here, too long. But it's been very helpful to me. And I'm going to try to make it helpful to a lot of people who will read our report on what you have said here today. (OFF-MIKE) but maybe enough people will stir up a little interest in something besides what happened at the White House on a certain night.

But so I'm going to submit some written questions. And other senators probably will as well. And I hope that you will answer them as quickly may be possible.

The last question I'm going to ask you, I was concerned to note that one of the commission's key conclusions was that the -- and I'm quoting you -- "intelligence community's ability to provide accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the United States is eroding." Quote, unquote.

Now the Downey (ph) Commission concluded this two years ago, warning the Clinton Administration has imposed policy restrictions on the recruitment of intelligence sources, which -- and I quote -- "may hamper the effects on the efforts of national intelligence agencies and lead to what they call intelligence gaps."

When I asked General Woolsey about this, he warned that the intelligence community has erected formidable barriers to the recruitment of sources having questionable backgrounds. I believe -- if my memory serves me right -- he cautioned that the United States should not think that it can simply recruit more scouts to spy on terrorists. I said this in my statement.

My question to you -- and I want you to respond as extensively as you will. Did the commission find that these arbitrary policy restrictions have had a negative impact on fundamental ability to monitor the ballistic missile programs of rogue nations?

UNKNOWN MALE PANELIST: I couldn't answer that specifically. I would say that we did find that our human intelligence sources needed to be strengthened, that it was increasingly difficult to get and to obtain information by technical means to target North Korea, Iran. Other countries have learned a great deal bout how our technical systems work. They do things underground now or they do them aboveground when satellites are not present.

The don't blab on the phone the way they used to. They go to closed circuits and so forth.

There is no substitute for good human intelligence. And we certainly need a strengthened -- strengthen those sources any way we can.

RUMSFELD: Mr. Chairman, those two countries, Iran and North Korea, are of course closed societies. We know not a lot about the decision-making process in those countries. They are as secretive and successfully so as any countries in the world. We have prepared a letter -- in side letter -- that will be made available to the intelligence committees.

And we'd be happy to make it available to you with some observations on the intelligence community. While it's not a comprehensive review, it's a collection of the observations that we made as a result of our six-month study. And we'd be happy to make it available to you.

It's a classified document at the present time. And we just completed it this morning and will be submitting it to the appropriate chairmen of the committees. And we'd be happy to include you.

The only other thing I'd say is on submitting questions for us to supply answers for the record, our commission is disbanded. The staff is gone. We have all gone back to our day jobs. And I hope that the questions are not too many. And I hope you will not expect a commission response because we're not meeting together anymore.

If you get a response, it might be Barry's or Bill's or mine as opposed to a fully coordinated one.

HELMS: Well, (OFF-MIKE). Do the best you can because your information is (OFF-MIKE) even though I feel that sometimes we're in dire jeopardy. We kept you here for two hours and 15 minutes. And it has been one of the most helpful two hours and 15 minutes that I've spent. I'm sorry that more senators were not here. At least we had three or four on our side.

And I want to thank each one of you for devoting your time to this and devoting your time to the now-defunct commission.

(LAUGHTER)

And I hope it becomes activated January three years from now. I thank you for coming. And before you leave, I see fairly regularly, as chairman of this committee, if we end the committee meeting, the best speeches I ever made are when I'm driving home after the speech.

(LAUGHTER)

And I wish many times that I could go back and say, "Wait a minute folks. Don't leave yet."

(LAUGHTER)

But let me suggest that if you have anything on your mind that we haven't covered that should be covered, will you do that now. Do you have further comment?

UNKNOWN MALE PANELIST: Just thank you very much.

HELMS: Well, I certainly appreciate you coming. You?

RUMSFELD: No, sir. I think we have covered a good deal.

HELMS: It's been a special pleasure seeing you again ...

RUMSFELD: Thank you.

HELMS: ... Mr. Secretary. You're a good guy. I enjoyed our relationship in better political times than we have now. That's the only partisan statement I'm going to make.

(LAUGHTER)

If there be no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess.