Iran's Long Range Missile Capabilities

Appendix III to the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
July 15, 1998

Weapon Program: 

  • Missile


Kenneth Katzman
Iran's long range ballistic missile program has apparently overcome some key bottlenecks over the past year, due primarily to assistance fromRussian entities, possibly with the tacit approval of the Russian government itself. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 28, 1998 that Iran will likely have missiles able to target Israel and Saudi Arabia much soonerthan the ten years he predicted in testimony one year earlier. Tenet attributed the new assessment not only to Russian assistance, but also to indigenous Iranian advances.

Current U.S. attention focuses on two Iranian missile programs. The Shahab (Meteor) 3 has an 800-930 mile range, and can carry a payload of 1,650 lbs. The Shahab 4 reportedly has a 1,240 mile range and can carry a somewhat larger payload of 2,200 lbs. There appears to be a consensus in press reports, quoting U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources, that Iran could be within about one year of fielding the Shahab 3. According to press reports, Iran has conducted successful tests of an engine, presumably for the Shahab 3, although more are needed, and it may conduct a test launch of the missile this year or next.

Russian assistance appears to have benefited Iran not only by supplying components and equipment Iran could not acquire elsewhere, but by imparting to Iranian technicians the needed skills and methodology they previously lacked. Iran has generally been deficient in systems integration and project management, which is why its indigenous missile programs previously met with failure. The Russian training could, in the long run, be the key factor in making Iran self-sufficient in missile production.

Some analysts remain cautious about Iran's prospects. Although Iran is making progress, they note that Iran has repeatedly failed in its indigenous missile production capabilities. Iran's entire inventory is composed of foreign-supplied missiles, except for some assembled in Iran from North Korean-supplied kits. There is no evidence that it has been able to produce a single guided missile of indigenous design. In addition, some Israeli experts believe Iran is still some ways away from being able to indigenously integrate a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead with the missiles under development. Iran's ability to produce sophisticated guidance systems is not known.

There has been much speculation as to whether or not the accession of Iran's moderate new President, Mohammad Khatemi, would lead to a curb or slowdown of Iran's missile or other WMD programs. Thus far, there are no indications that this is the case. Nor have U.S. sanctions on Iran, or threatened sanctions against Russia for supplying Iran, yet slowed Iran's long range missile programs.

Background to Iran's Missile Programs 2

Analysts date Iran's ballistic missile production program to 1987, when it initiated efforts to produce Scud missiles. Iran had begun acquiring the Scud-B in 1985 from Libya and in 1986 from Syria, and used some of them against Iraq as early as 1985. Despite attaching high priority to indigenous Scud production, and technical talent on par with North Korea, Iran's initial efforts to produce the Scud-B indigenously failed, and Iran turned to North Korea for technical assistance and resupply. It bought 200-300 Scud B's from North Korea between 1987 and 1992. 3

At the same time Iran was purchasing the Scud-B from North Korea, it also began investing in North Korean ballistic missile development. The "Scud Mod-B," a missile with a range of about 200 miles, was North Korea's first indigenously-produced missile. Iran reportedly took delivery of 100 Scud Mod-B's in 1987, according to Jane's Intelligence Review. North Korea then helped Iran set up a Scud Mod B plant in Iran, which became operational by the spring of 1988, the height of the War of the Cities with Iraq. However, that plant, according to the Jane's 1995 special report, never produced significant quantities of that missile, apparently due to Iranian technological deficiencies.

Iran may have abandoned the Scud Mod B program for another program it was funding in North Korea, the Scud Mod C. According to the Jane's special report, the Scud Mod-C had a smaller warhead than the Scud Mod-B, and a longer range (over 300 miles). It also had an upgraded inertial guidance system which improved its accuracy. North Korea reportedly began producing the missile in 1989, and began shipping them to Iran in January 1991, the time of the Gulf war between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition. A live firing test was carried out in Iran in May 1991. By 1994, Iran was reported to have 150-200 of the Scud Mod-C's. As it did in the case of the Scud Mod-B, North Korea reportedly helped Iran convert a missile maintenance plant into an assembly facility for the Scud Mod-C. Iranian military personnel also reportedly traveled to North Korea to receive training in the manufacture and operation of the missile. 4 According to the Defense Department proliferation report issued in November 1997, Iran is "now able to produce the [Scud] missile itself. This has been accomplished with considerable equipment and technical help from North Korea." 5

Some reports suggest that Iran and Syria agreed to cooperate in the production of the Scud Mod C. Iran reportedly financed the construction of a missile factory in Syria built by North Korea. This cooperation apparently began in the fall of 1991, after the Persian Gulf war. The following year, U.S. intelligence tracked a North Korean cargo ship reportedly carrying Scud Mod C missiles. The missiles apparently were off-loaded in Iran and some of them were subsequently flown to Syria. 6 The United States did not attempt to intercept the ship before it docked in Iran because it lacked the international legal authority to prevent the shipment.

The Nodong Program

By 1993, analysts were closely watching Iranian interest in a potentially more significant North Korean missile program. The North Korean Nodong-1 missile, with an estimated range of 600 miles, was first test fired across the Sea of Japan in 1993, although not to its full range. 7 Iran reportedly had helped fund the development of the Nodong missile, making its payments primarily in oil shipments. Iran also was apparently interested in acquiring the even longer range Nodong 2, which is made out of lighter materials than the Nodong 1 and would put Israel within Iran's striking range. Iranian officials observed tests of the Nodong 1 in North Korea and some reports suggested North Korea wanted to test the Nodong 1 in Iran's large desert.

The United States, taking advantage of North Korea's economic vulnerability and the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program, pressured North Korea not to make the Nodong available to Iran. In April 1996, the United States and North Korea began talks on missile sales to the Middle East, as an adjunct to the October 1994 agreement on North Korea's nuclear program. No Nodong missiles are known to have been shipped to Iran, although the Nodong 1 apparently has been tested successfully by North Korea and could be exported. Another North Korean missile program has attracted Iranian attention, although it is likely the United States would apply as much pressure as possible to prevent its export to Iran. The Taepo-Dong 2 is said to have a maximum range of 6,200 miles if a relatively small warhead is adapted to it, according to DIA. At that range, the Taepo Dong would be considered an intercontinental ballistic missile. The CIA believes the Taepo Dong would have a range of about 1860 miles, however. 8 The DoD proliferation report issued November 1997 puts the range of the Taepo Dong 1 at about 930 miles and the Taepo Dong 2 at 2500-3750 miles. 9

Iran Turns to China

Iran apparently sought to hedge its best and not become too reliant on any one supplier. In 1989, with its supply of North Korean Scud Mod B's nearly exhausted from firings during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran signed a contract with China for 200 CSS-8 missiles. These are SA-2 (Chinese version, HQ-2) surface-to-air solid fuel missiles modified for use against ground targets. However, the CSS-8 (referred to in Iran as the 8610) had a short range (93 miles) and could not therefore reach too deeply into Iraq. The missile also reportedly had a limited payload and was not too accurate. 10

The M Series Missiles

The limitations of the CSS-8 led Iran to seek from China the M-9 and M-11 missile. The M-9 and the M-11 are single-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles. The M-9 has a reported range of 375 miles, a warhead of 1100-1300 lbs., and a CEP of 1000 ft. The M-11 has a range about half that of the M-9, with a payload as high as 1750 lbs., and a CEP of almost 2000 ft. In March 1989, China was reported to be helping build a facility in Iran to manufacture with a range (500 miles) somewhat greater than the M-9. A launch range and test facilities were built for the program. Subsequent reports indicate that, shortly after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Iran tested ballistic missiles with ranges of about 425 and 625 miles. Later (1992) reports indicated that the China-Iran projects were producing a version of the M-11, 11 with a range of 625 miles. Bermudez and other reports suggested this ballistic missile program could be Tondar-68, but an Iranian announcement in 1996 suggested that the Tondar was an anti-ship missile based on the Chinese C-801 or C-802 cruise missile 12 (see below).

Although it is clear China was helping Iran produce a ballistic missile, China apparently did not ship any complete M series missiles to Iran. In 1992, China agreed to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which would bar shipments of either M series missile to Iran, or any other country outside the MTCR. In 1993 China was sanctioned by the United States for shipping M-11 missile parts to Pakistan; those sanctions expired in 1994 after China pledged to end the transfers.

In mid-1995, new reports surfaced that China was providing ballistic missile technology to Iran. In June 1995, Defense News published information it said was contained in a classified May 1995 CIA report entitled "China-Iran Missile Technology Cooperation: A Time-Line Approach." 13 The Defense News report indicated that unspecified ballistic missile technology had recently been transferred to Iran. Separate press reports said the transfers included guidance system components, computerized machine tools, and rocket propellant ingredients. 14 A November 21, 1996 Washington Times report quoted an October 1996 CIA report as saying China agreed to sell Iran guidance technology and components to test ballistic missiles. 15 The guidance technology reportedly included gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment produced by the China Precision Engineering Institute. However, the report referred to an agreement to sell the technology, and did not indicate whether or not the components had indeed been transferred.

It is not clear from these press reports whether the technology transferred was for a renewed attempt to develop Iranian versions of the M-9 and M-11, to improve upon indigenous Scud programs developed in Iran with North Korean help, or to assist Iran's Shahab (Meteor) ballistic missile program. Analysts have differed on the degree of coordination between China and North Korea in their assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs. There apparently has been some level of coordination, but the two countries seem to be working in Iran independently. Another possibility is that the Chinese technology transfers are supplementing ballistic missile technology being provided, as of late 1996, by Russia (see below).

In response to these reports, the Clinton Administration has maintained that China has not violated its 1992 pledge to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, in March 1998, the Administration was reported to be developing a package of incentives to persuade China to formally join the MTCR and end all missile technology transfers (ballistic, cruise, short-range) to Iran. 16 This reported offer suggests that the Administration might have been downplaying intelligence information indicating that China had violated any commitments to adhere to the MTCR.

Chinese Assistance to Iran's Short-Range Missile Programs

One year later, another Washington Times report indicated that China was helping Iran on one or more shorter range ballistic missile programs. 17 According to the report, Chinese technicians traveled to Iran in May 1997 to monitor a ground test of a rocket for a 105-mile range solid-fuel missile called the NP-110. The report added that Iran was using Chinese X-ray equipment in the program, which is used to study missile casings and to check whether the solid fuel is in proper condition. According to the DoD proliferation report of November 1997, other Iranian short-range solid-fuel ballistic missile programs, which might have been developed with Chinese help, include the Nazeat-10, with a range of 93 miles and the unguided Zelzal (Earthquake), which has a range of about 125 miles. The Nazeat is referred to in some literature as the Iran-130. It has a 330 lb. warhead, but reportedly performed poorly during the Iran-Iraq war. 18 The DoD report does not mention the NP-110 or another program described by some analysts, the Mushak. It is possible that these are all variations of the same program, as they all use solid-fuel and have similar ranges.

During the Iran-Iraq war, China supplied Iran with a Type 83 artillery rocket, which Iran copied and called the Oghab (Eagle). The Oghab has a range of only about 25 miles, a 650 lb. warhead and, because it is unguided, it has a CEP of about .6 miles even at that small range. Launched from trucks, Iran fired about 300 during the war against Iraq, suggesting that Iran manufactured about 250 of them, the others being supplied by China. It was intended to be primarily a battlefield weapon, although a number of Iraqi cities lied within that range. This enabled Iran to use the weapon strategically, as well as tactically. However, press accounts suggest that the Oghab was not particularly effective.

Chinese Assistance with Cruise Missiles

China also has provided vital assistance to Iran in the field of anti-ship cruise missile technology. These weapons do not necessary contribute to Iran's ability to develop a long-range ballistic missiles, but most analysts believe that Iran's experience with cruise missiles contributes to its overall missile technology base of expertise. During the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war, China provided to Iran a number of Hai Ying-2 (HY-2) "Silkworm" missiles, a derivative of the old Soviet "Styx" anti-ship missile. The maximum effective range of the missile is 25 miles and a minimum effective range of about half that. The cruise missile, which has a shaped-charge warhead ideal for piercing warship armor was well suited to Iran's coastal defense needs during the war, and Iran fired a number of them against U.S. reflagged tankers and other targets in Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq war. China reportedly built a facility near Iran's Bandar Abbas port in 1987 where it helped the Revolutionary Guard boost the range of the Silkworm. 19 China itself was believed to have been able to extend the range of the Silkworm to 125 miles.

Of even more concern to the U.S. Navy than the Silkworm has been Iran's acquisition since 1995 of about 100 Chinese-supplied C-802 (surface and ship-launched) and C-801K (air launched) anti-ship cruise missiles. The C series turbo-jet powered anti-ship cruise missiles, first unveiled in 1989, have a maximum range of about 75 miles (C-802) and 25 miles (C-801). Iran tested the C-802 in early 1996, and the C-801K in June 1997, prompting Secretary of Defense Cohen to assert that Iran now poses a "360-degree threat" to U.S. forces in the Gulf. This threat will increase if Iran acquires an over-the-horizon targeting capability of or the missile, according to U.S. military officials.

The C series missiles are considered superior to the Silkworm because the C series missiles are capable of engaging a target at closer range (7 miles) than the Silkworm (12 miles). 20 This gives it a big advantage over the Silkworm in a narrow body of water such as the Strait of Hormuz. The C missiles also cruise at a lower altitude than the Silkworm, reducing warning time to the potential adversary. In addition, a C-802 coastal battery can fire 12 missiles before reloading, whereas a Silkworm battery can only fire four missiles in succession. The C-802 can also be steered in flight to a greater degree than can the Silkworm. However, the C series warhead is considered less effective against warships than the Silkworm, although the C series missiles can easily pierce commercial shipping hulls. In advance of the October 1997 U.S.-China summit, the Clinton Administration apparently succeeded in obtaining from China a pledge not to enter into any new contracts with Iran for anti-ship cruise missiles.

During naval exercises in May 1996, Iran claimed to have fired a new type of long-range missile called the Tondar (see above). Although some analysts believed the Tondar might be a ballistic missile, the announcement in connection with a naval exercise suggests Tondar is an anti-ship missile fired from coastal batteries. 21 If this is the case, it is likely that the Tondar program could represent an attempt to extend the range of the C series missiles. Iran reportedly has been seeking to extend the range of their C series missiles since it began acquiring them. 22 Another press report indicates that China helped Iran develop an indigenously-produced version of the C series missiles, called the Karus,, as well as a medium-range anti-ship missile known as the FL-10. The FL-10 is believed to be a copy of China's FL-2 (31 mile range) or supersonic FL-7 missile (19 mile range). Chinese advisers are said to be in Iran helping with these programs. 23

Russia Enters the Picture

As demonstrated above, North Korea and China imparted to Iran a substantial body of missile technology and training that should have made Iran self-sufficient in ballistic missile production. However, there has been no evidence to suggest that Iran produced any guided missiles of indigenous design 24 , or that it was able, on its own, to improve upon what was supplied by other countries. Iran was not even able to indigenously produce the Scud, which is based on relatively simple 1940's technology, until assembly lines were constructed for it by North Korea. According to Carus, Iran's lackluster progress in the ballistic missile field demonstrates difficulty in systems integration.

Apparently realizing that its indigenous ballistic missile capabilities were lagging, and certainly suffered in comparison to that achieved by Iraq before the 1991 Gulf war, Iran sought help from Russia. Since 1989, Russia has been an eager supplier of conventional arms to Iran, including three Kilo class submarines. In January 1995, Russia agreed to complete a 1000 Megawatt nuclear power plant at Bushehr that had been started by German firms during the Shah's reign. Some analysts considered it inevitable that Russia would cooperate with Iran on ballistic missile technology if Iran wanted such assistance.

According to early press reports (early 1997) discussing Israeli information and concerns, Russia has transferred components and technology associated with Russia's SS-4 medium range ballistic missile. The SS-4 was developed in the 1950's and has been phased out of the Soviet/Russian inventory in accordance with the INF Treaty with the United States. Later reports suggest that the Russian technology could be intended to develop a version of the North Korean Nodong, which was intended to be but was not transferred to Iran (see above). The two are not mutually exclusive; the Nodong is based on Russian Scud technology, and Russian SS-4 technology presumably can be adapted to a Nodong-type program.

Whatever the derivation, the Iranian liquid-fuel missile programs in question are called the Shahab (Meteor)-3 and the Shahab-4. 25 The Shahab-3 has a range of 800-950 miles, and a reported payload of 1,654 lbs.; the Shahab-4 has a range of 1,250 miles and a payload of 2,200 lbs. 26 The Shahab-4 would be capable of hitting targets as far away as Germany and western China, if launched from Iran. Israeli sources have also told the United States that Iran, presumably with Russian assistance, is working on two other unnamed long-range ballistic missiles, one of which would have an intercontinental range of about 6,000 miles. If Iran were to produce a missile of that range, it would be able to strike the east coast of the United States. 27

According to press reports, Russia has provided a broad range of assistance to the Iranian Shahab program. Equipment provided reportedly includes specialty steels and alloys, as well as foil used specifically to shield missile guidance systems, 28 tungsten coated graphite, wind tunnel facilities, gyroscopes and guidance technology, rocket engine and fuel technology, materials for building reentry vehicles, laser equipment, machine tools, and maintenance manuals. In October 1997, Russia admitted that Iranians are being trained in missile construction at two universities in Russia. 29

Several different Russian establishments have been reported to be contributing to the Shahab program, according to various press reports. 30 They include:

* An entity formerly known as NPO Trud has helped Iran build program rocket motors.
* Polyus (North Star) Research has supplied guidance equipment.
* Tsagi has conducted wind tunnel tests.
* Russian Scientific and Production Center at Inor has agreed to provide special metal alloys.
* Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute has helped construct a wind tunnel.

Other contributing institutions include the Bauman Institute, Baltic State Technical University, and NPO Energy Mash. The Baltic State Technical University reportedly has set up a joint missile center with Iran known as Persepolis, with facilities in Iran and Russia.

A major element of controversy has been whether or not the Russian government is tacitly or directly supporting the missile assistance to Iran. Some press reports indicate that the state arms exporting agency, Rosvoorouzhenie, and the Russian Space Agency have provided assistance. There have also been suggestions that the Russian Federal Security Service has coordinated visits to Russian institutes by Iranian missile technicians. 31 The Russian government denies it is involved, it has made some arrests of persons it said were illegally involved in the assistance, and it has reportedly pledged to the United States that it will crack down on private entity involvement in the Shahab program.

Assessments of the progress of the Russian-assisted Shahab program differ, in part because information about the Russian connection remains sketchy amid Russian denials and U.S. pressure on Russia to crack down on entities and persons assisting Iran. When information about the assistance first came to light in early 1997, Israeli officials believed Iran might be six months away from fielding the Shahab-3. The Shahab-4 was believed to be at least three years out. However, as more information has become available, the assessments of Iranian progress have been reduced somewhat. As of early 1998, Israel, apparently with the concurrence of their U.S. counterparts, have been assessing the time frame for the Shahab-3 as "at least one year" away. 32 Iran is believed to have done at least seven static engine tests for the Shahab program, but Iran would need at least ten such tests to develop an operational engine capability. This alone could easily take at least one year. 33

Also in question is Iran's progress in developing an adequate guidance capability. Two press reports, quoting U.S. intelligence, say that the Chinese guidance technology assistance, discussed above, is for the Shahab program. 34 If true, this could suggest a degree of cooperation between Russia and China in assisting Iran not previously noted.

The revelations about Russian involvement in the Shahab program have clearly had an effect on U.S. intelligence estimates of Iran's long-range ballistic missile capabilities. In December 1993, a Washington Times report quoting a CIA study said Iran had the technical capability to indigenously produce an ICBM capable of carrying a chemical or biological weapon within ten to fifteen years from the time a decision is made to begin development. 35 In January 1997, acting Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that it would likely take Iran ten years to develop a medium-range ballistic missile. In testimony before the same Committee one year later, in January 1998, Tenet said that "Iran's success in gaining technology and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a medium-range missile much sooner [than the ten years he predicted the previous year]." Tenet did not specifically address the possibility of Iran's developing an ICBM, however.

Shortly after Tenet's testimony, Air Force Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, confirmed in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 24, 1998) that Iran was working on missiles called the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4. In conjunction with that testimony, officials told Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz that the Shahab-3 could be deployed within two years and that a medium range missile, presumably referring to the Shahab-4, could be deployed "in the first half of the next decade." 36 These assessments will likely be included in a new report on worldwide ballistic missiles produced by the Air Force's National Air Intelligence Center. That report will be released some time in April 1998. 37

Chemical and Biological Warheads

In its discussion of the proliferation threat from Iran, the November 1997 DoD proliferation report (p.8 of the Middle East section) discusses the potential for anti-ship cruise missiles to be outfitted with chemical or biological warheads. The report does not specifically assert that Iran is capable of outfitting the Silkworm, C series, or any other cruise missile with such warheads. However, most analysts believe that chemical warhead technology (converting a Scud warhead, for example) is not too complicated for Iran to master and assume that Iran will, if it does not already, have such a warhead capability. Because fusing for an effective biological warhead is more difficult technologically, Iran is probably a few years away from developing this capability.


Iran is believed to possess ten to fifteen mobile launchers for its missile force. In May 1995, the Senate Intelligence Committee released CIA information that Iran had received at least four transporter-erector-launchers from North Korea capable of launching Scud missiles. 38

Implications and Conclusions

Statements from U.S. and Israeli officials and a wide range of outside experts credit the recent Russian ballistic missile technology assistance to Iran as a providing a potential qualitative leap in Iran's capability. Israeli anxiety about the assistance centers on the possibility that Russia's help will enable Iran to become fully self-sufficient in ballistic missile technology. Up until now, Iran has repeatedly had to turn to China, North Korea, and now Russia to help it overcome its technological weaknesses. Carus points out that Russia might be imparting to Iran the type of skills in systems integration and project management that has accounted for deficiencies in Iran's missile programs to date.

Although Iran appears to be making significant progress, it is useful to approach its ballistic missile capabilities with caution. In contrast to Iraq, Iran appears to have become so dependent on outside assistance that it is difficult to imagine its ballistic missile programs proceeding successfully if that assistance were ended. U.S. pressure on North Korea, China, and Russia have made these countries more cautious in their assistance, to the point where China, for example, never delivered to Iran a complete M-9 or M-11 missile. North Korea did not deliver the Nodong, even though that was the clear intention of both North Korea and Iran.

Some might argue that the caution of outside suppliers has caused Iran to try to become more independent and to become more reliant on its own indigenous capabilities. However, all the evidence available indicates that the outside suppliers are "spoon-feeding" Iran's missile programs, and that these programs would swiftly deteriorate if the outside experts departed and technology transfers dried up. One anecdotal but relevant analogy can be found in the Iranian contract with Russia to complete the 1000 megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. Under the 1995 contract, Iran is to construct the support facilities for the reactor, while Russia builds the reactor itself. During a late February 1998 visit to the site--three years after the contract was signed--Russian atomic energy chief Viktor Mikhailov 39 found that Iran's portion of the work was lagging well behind an the contract had to be amended so that Russia could take over from Iran the supporting work required.

1. Dr. Ken Katzman currently analyzes U.S. policy and legislation on the Persian Gulf region for members of Congress and their staffs. Served in government and the private sector as an analyst in Persian Gulf Affairs with special emphasis on Iran and Iraq.

2. This paper incorporates observations, comments, and papers presented by Kenneth Timmerman, Michael Eisenstadt, and Seth Carus at the Commission's March 23, 1998 roundtable on the ballistic missile threat from Iran and Iraq.

3. "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction." Jane's Intelligence Review. Special Report No. 6, 1995. Pp. 19-22.

4. Bermudez, Joseph. "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World - Iran's Medium-Range Missiles." Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1992.

5. The Middle East and North Africa section. Department of Defense Proliferation Report. November 26, 1997. P.2.

6. Tyler, Patrick. "North Korea Arms Ship Eludes U.S. for Iran Port." New York Times, March 11, 1992. P.A6.

7. Sieff, Martin. "N. Korean Missiles May Be Tested in Iran This Year." Washington Times, June 16, 1994.

8. Gertz, Bill. "N. Korean Missile Could Reach U.S., Intelligence Warns." Washington Times, September 29, 1995. P.A3.

9. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997. Middle East and North Africa, p.7.

10. Eisenstadt, Michael. "Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions." Policy Paper Number 42. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996. P.29.

11. Bermudez, Joseph. "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World - Iran's Medium Range Missiles." Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1992.

12. Bruce, James. "Iran's Long-Range Tondar Causes Concern in West." Jane's Defense Weekly, May 22, 1996.

13. Opall, Barbara. "U.S. Queries China On Iran." Defense News, June 19-25, 1995. P.1.

14. "Chinese Shipments Violate Controls." Jane's Defense Weekly, July 1, 1995. P.3.

15. Gertz, Bill. "China Sold Iran Missile Technology." Washington Times, November 21, 1996. P.1.

16. Gertz, Bill. "U.S. May Help China on Missiles". Washington Times, March 18, 1998. P.1.

17. Gertz, Bill. "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-Range Missile." Washington Times, June 17, 1997. P.3.

18. "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction." Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, 1995.

19. Ibid. P.22.

20. A useful comparison of the Silkworm and the C series missiles can be found in Hough, Harold. "Iran Targets The Arabian Peninsula." Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1996, pp. 458-461.

21. Bruce, James. "Iran's Long Range Tondar Causes Concern in West." Jane's Defense Weekly, May 22, 1996. P.17.

22. Ibid.

23. "China Helping Iranian Missile Developments." Jane's Defense Weekly. July 17, 1996, p.13.

24. Carus, Seth. "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses." Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.2, Number 1, March 1998.

25. Eisenstadt's interpretation is that the Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean Nodong and the Shahab-4 is based on the Soviet SS-4, according to his paper distributed at the March 23 roundtable.

26. Gertz, Bill. "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program." Washington Times, September 10, 1997. P.1.

27. Rodan, Steve. "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year." Defense News, October 6-12, 1997. P.4.

28. Gertz, Bill. "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals." Washington Times, October 20, 1997.

29. Gertz, Bill. "Russians Admit to Training Iranian Missile Technicians." October 3, 1997. P.A17.

30. Defense News, October 6-12, 1997, p.4; Washington Times, October 2, 1997, p.A1, and October 20, 1997, p.A1, and February 24, 1998, p.3; and Washington Post, December 31, 1997.

31. Gertz, Bill. "Panel Chairmen See Russian Firms Inviting Sanctions." Washington Times, February 24, 1998. P.3.

32. Finnegan, Philip and Rodan, Steve. "Israelis Scale Back Iran Missile Estimate." Defense News, February 2-8, 1998.

33. Ibid.

34. Gertz, Bill. "U.S. May Help China on Missiles." Washington Times, March 18, 1998; Gertz, Bill. "Pentagon Confirms Details on Iranian Missiles." Washington Times, March 27, 1998. P.10.

35. Gertz, Bill. "N. Korea, Iran, Iraq Capable of Developing ICBM." Washington Times, December 24, 1993. P.A3.

36. Gertz, Bill. "Pentagon Confirms Details on Iranian Missiles." Washington Times, March 27, 1998.

37. Gertz, Bill. "China's Nukes Could Reach Most of U.S." Washington Times, April 1, 1998. P.1.

38. "Iran Gets Scud TELs From North Korea." Jane's Defense Weekly, May 13, 1995. P.5.

39. Mikhailov was replaced within days of the visit, reportedly for unrelated reasons.