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MR. CASEY: Sue, sorry. Okay, over to Iran.

QUESTION: Over to Iran. I know that you put out some talking points yesterday --

MR. CASEY: Right.

QUESTION: -- on Iran, which were a little scant, I have to say, but --

MR. CASEY: I thought they were the usual full and complete readout of yesterday's conversations that we would normally give you.

QUESTION: Well, in the spirit of this dual-track approach that you're taking --

MR. CASEY: Sure.

QUESTION: -- that was mentioned in the statement, what are you offering the Iranians? Are you coming up with anything new so that diplomatic - there's a lot of discussion about various inducements that are being put on the table, sweeteners for the 2006 deal, so --

MR. CASEY: Sure.

QUESTION: What did you actually discuss yesterday? Because there seem to be quite a few press reports out there.

MR. CASEY: Well, yeah, there seem to be quite a few press reports and in this case, I don't think you should believe everything you read. Look, what was - what was discussed yesterday? Well, the political directors did meet. Under Secretary Burns was our representative there and they had a variety of discussions related to Iran's nuclear program.

First and foremost, they did talk about and just reaffirm the commitment of all the parties to the dual-track approach and to the process that we've been working through. They also discussed the draft Security Council resolution and again agreed that we should be moving forward with that and we look forward to seeing some vote take place on that in the coming days. Again, the nonpermanent members of the Council do have something to say about that, of course, so we are still, I know, working through those issues in New York, but the agreement to the P5+1 is we definitely will be moving ahead with it and look forward to a vote shortly.

They also did discuss putting together a ministers statement that would be issued together with the resolution and this was part of the discussion about the dual-track approach. This is something that's going to simply reaffirm the consensus of the P5+1 on those issues. They also did have a discussion as well about the IAEA report that came out. I know too you can -- the discussion, I think, talked not only about that but also about the technical briefing that the IAEA gave.

And just if I can take a quick parenthesis on that, I would hope that countries, based on that technical briefing, would share the concerns that we feel were reiterated by it. It's clear that Iran, based on that technical briefing as well as what you've seen in the NIE, had a nuclear weapons program that not only includes its ongoing activities of enriching and reprocessing uranium and includes its ongoing missile program, but very clearly it has had a specific program designed to work on the necessary components for putting together a warhead, for putting together that vehicle for transporting a nuclear -- for managing a nuclear weapon. And it's clear to us that while our estimate says they suspended work on that program in 2003, the estimate also says that we can't be certain whether or not they've restarted it. And we also don't have great confidence in -- as I understand it, and you can look at the NIE language -- in if they were to restart it, how quickly we would be able to detect it.

So I would hope that what the IAEA is saying to people in this technical brief, as well as the information that we've made publicly available through the NIE, would give serious concern to people, particularly as Iran, as reported by the IAEA, continues to move ahead with their uranium enrichment activities, including the possible installation and operation of P2 centrifuges, which are much more efficient at producing highly enriched uranium. So again, this was a subject of discussion in terms of making sure we all had a common understanding of what was being said by the IAEA.

In terms of -- and you knew I was going to get to the point you actually cared about eventually, Sue. There are a lot of press reports today talking about a new set of incentives or a new package of incentives. And let me be clear: There's no new package of incentives. That's simply not the case. What there is, is a package of incentives that the P5+1 agreed to at the beginning of this process back in Vienna, and there has certainly been, over time, discussions, including in this meeting, about how you present that package to the Iranians. Because again, we do -- when we talk about a dual-track approach, what we're talking about is not just sanctioning the Iranians. We would, frankly, prefer to be in a position where we're at the negotiating table with the Iranians talking about that incentives package and talking about how we get to a point where Iran can have the civilian nuclear program it says it wants without having to cause great concern in the international community by word and deed that they are, in fact, intending on using that program as a cover to build a nuclear weapon.

So there certainly were discussions and have been discussions over time, about how Mr. Solana, who's our channel for this, can present that set of incentives that have been agreed to, and do so in a way that might make them more likely to get a positive response from the Iranians, particularly in combination with the sanctions that are in place, with the sanctions that are likely to be added to them in the next few days at the UN, as well as the threat of potential additional ones.

QUESTION: So aside from kind of presenting it with music and chocolates and other things, I mean, what on a practical level are you looking at in terms of the channel? Have you concluded that the Solana-Jalili channel is a worthwhile channel, or are you looking at other ways of presenting it?

MR. CASEY: Well --

QUESTION: Maybe if you could just expand on what you mean by, you know, other ways to present it. That's a little --

MR. CASEY: Well, when I say that -- and you've heard Mr. Solana talk about this, too -- there are -- you know, there's a pretty broad range of incentives that are in the package. And certainly there's ways to emphasize different aspects of it, or explore different aspects of it, that, I think, you know, are part of the flexibility within those incentives that are there. But in terms of Mr. Solana, we very much appreciate the role he has played. He has been a good interlocutor for the P5+1 with the Iranians and we believe that that channel should continue to be open.

Again, the goal here isn't to sanction Iran. The goal here is to convince the Iranians to do what we believe is in their best interest, which is to negotiate with us over their nuclear program. And part of the benefit that they would obtain from doing so, if you reached a successful agreement, would be the incentives that are there and that Mr. Solana has to talk about. And that's just part of the normal way of doing diplomacy. You always try and have not only something that people wish to avoid, but something that they might wish to get coming out of the negotiation.

QUESTION: Sorry, just one more thing. So Mr. Solana's going to continue to be the interlocutor?

MR. CASEY: Absolutely. I've not heard anything that would indicate that he would not be the channel for continued official discussions between the P5+1 and the Iranians. Now obviously, other countries do have diplomatic relations with Iran and I know that the individual members of the P5+1 all conduct their individual bilateral diplomacy on that. But in terms of how the P5+1 is approaching the nuclear issue, this is - continues to be a united presentation of our views and the official channel for doing that is, again, through Mr. Solana.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: You said you'll hold a vote in the next few days. What is more important? That the resolution is voted before the Russian presidency of the Council or is it more important to get - to have unanimity on the resolution?

MR. CASEY: Well, you know, we're greedy. We want it all. We would love to have a unanimous resolution passed as soon as possible. We would have loved to have had it passed by now already. You know, look, I think what's important is that we get a good, strong resolution that clearly shows that the international community remains united in opposing Iran's continued defiance of Security Council resolutions, of Board of Governors resolutions, and in many ways, of the common sense of what's in the interest of their people.

So I'm not trying to predict for you exactly when it'll - when the vote will happen and again, I also think it's important that the nonpermanent members who are still reviewing this have the opportunity to have any concerns that they may have addressed too. So whether that happens this week or next week or at some other point, we'll see, but I do think the expectation is we'd be able to do this somewhere in the next few days.

QUESTION: But is the unanimity still an important factor or is it something you think now you can forget?

MR. CASEY: No, we always want - you always want to see resolutions be passed with as strong a consensus as possible. We're very pleased that all the previous resolutions on Iran's nuclear program have been unanimously supported by members of the Council. We'd like to see that happen again in this case as well. But again, I'm not prepared to tell you or try and tell you how members are going to vote on this. That's always an individual decision of individual Council members.

David.

QUESTION: Tom, the crux of some of these stories that I read is that there's sentiment among some in the P-5+1 to add more carrots and - I mean, is your view that there are enough incentives in this already?

MR. CASEY: Well, I think when you look at the package that's there, there certainly are plenty of incentives for a country that legitimately is seeking only to have a civilian nuclear program. And again, I'd also point out people keep on saying, "Well, you know, the United States needs to offer something in this."

Well, the United States is offering something, frankly, unprecedented in the last 30 years of U.S.-Iranian relations, which is a freestanding offer from the Secretary of State to go meet anyplace, anytime, anywhere with her counterpart so long as they meet the very basic and simple criteria of the UN Security Council and suspend their uranium enrichment and that that discussion with her counterpart and the other P5+1 ministers would not only be about their nuclear program, but that would be about any other issues that the Iranians would care to raise in their relationship or lack thereof with the United States right now. It really is a historic offer and it's very surprising, I think, in many ways that the Iranian regime hasn't seen fit to take us up on it.

Sir.

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