Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
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QUESTION: So Doctor, if the Russians are doing billion dollar deals with one member of the "axis of evil," how long till we put them on the same list?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, they -- a lot -- first of all, a lot of countries have relations with Iran, have trade relations with Iran. Iran is actually pretty integrated into the international economy. Some of our best friends have relations with Iran. But I think you will start to see that as Iran is exposed for the activities that it's engaged in, as Iran is under Security Council resolutions, people are going to begin to think twice about whether economic relations with Iran make sense, whether or not the potential damage to your reputation of taking Iranian assets or investing in Iran makes any sense. And I think you will start to see people reconsider.
QUESTION: But at this point, if the Russians are doing business and that kind of business, not just -- you know, they're not just selling foodstuffs and things like that. As I understand it, they're giving the Iranians things that make them more dangerous.
SECRETARY RICE: Well, in fact, they have been pretty responsible in terms of the civil nuclear program. They have this reactor. The Iranians say they want a civil nuclear program. They just want to be able to get energy for their economy.
QUESTION: Should we believe that?
SECRETARY RICE: I don't believe it because the Russians have said to them, fine, we'll give you civil nuclear energy, a power plant, but you have to give the fuel back, which really does diminish the proliferation risk. If your listeners can imagine that you have a power plant but you don't have the fuel which would allow you to divert that fuel to the making of a nuclear weapon, that's the safest way for a country to have civil nuclear power and not have the technology to build a nuclear weapon.
But the Iranians won't accept that. They say they have to have the ability to make the fuel themselves. And that's what makes everybody realize that there's more going on here than just a civil nuclear program.
QUESTION: Because it doesn't make sense that they would need to make the fuel themselves if all they were looking for was electric power plants?
SECRETARY RICE: Exactly. That's precisely the point.
QUESTION: All right. So then with regard to North Korea, North Korea and Iran also do business. How do we know that North Korea hasn't already supplied Iran with a bomb and Iran is simply sitting back saying, "You test it, Mr. Kim," and when we see it working we'll know that what we have in our hands is what Ahmadi-Nejad has been saying he's wanted all along, or is not saying he wants but is not willing to admit that, but that he doesn't already have a bomb and he's just waiting for the North Koreans to show that it works?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, we don't have any evidence of that kind of transfer, but we do know that the Iranians and the North Koreans have had -- have worked together in programs. There's been advice and technical assistance. But I'll tell you, now that we have this resolution that gives people the right to inspect North Korean cargoes and to monitor what is coming in and to detect for radiation, I think we're in a better situation, too, to detect whether or not anything -- or what is going on between North Korea and Iran.
In a sense, the net that we've put around North Korea is also going to help us to capture any transfer of materials or any cooperation between Iran and North Korea.
QUESTION: Even though they still have airplanes going in and out?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, they do, but there is the matter of use of air space. If there's a suspicious cargo, a country can deny air space.
QUESTION: Would we stop it?
SECRETARY RICE: It has happened. It has happened in the past with the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is an initiative, Lars, that 80 countries are signed onto, which means that if you see a suspicious cargo, one of those countries can deny overflight rights. They can stop a plane from leaving. They can hold a ship in port. A lot of that has happened.
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