Press Briefing with Department Spokesperson Tom Casey on U.N.S.C. Resolution 1696 and the P5+1 Group (Excerpts)

August 17, 2006

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QUESTION: You're not going to believe this, but it's going to be Iran and about Lebanon. Mr. Burns, this morning, told several of us that the U.S. will move in the UN in early September for sanctions if Iran continues to defy demands that it stop enriching uranium. And I, for one, didn't have the good sense to ask him what kind of sanctions, there being a wide range, some with teeth and some -- mostly a statement of "We don't like what you're doing."

Can you elaborate on what the thinking is, so far as seeking -- is it punitive sanctions, economic, political, travel, whatever?

MR. CASEY: Well, Barry, I don't want to get too far ahead of ourselves here, but as you know, in Resolution 1696, it explicitly provides for a deadline for Iran to respond to the offers. It makes explicit the demands that have been previously made by the IAEA, by the EU-3, among others, first and foremost that Iran cease all uranium enrichment activity. And that's certainly what we want to see happen.

If, however, Iran doesn't take this last opportunity and doesn't take the opportunity to accept the conditions set by the international community, then they will, as stated in the resolution, face sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter 7. In terms of the specifics of those sanctions, as we've always said, there's a wide range of things out there for people to consider, but the international community is committed to taking steps on this. We certainly, though, want to give the Iranians the chance to take this last opportunity to accept the offer that's on the table to cease all uranium enrichment activity and to agree with the world community that the time's come for them to end their threatening behavior and to come into compliance with their international obligations, which is what we've been asking them to do all along.

QUESTION: Do you link this -- does the Administration link their lack of compliance with the role they've played in backing Hezbollah and all or is it just sort of character?

MR. CASEY: Well, Barry, I think unfortunately, we've got a lot of different issues of concern with the Iranian Government. Their nuclear program is certainly one of them and it's one that's drawn a lot of international attention. Obviously, though, another one that has also gotten attention has been their unhelpful and destabilizing role in the region through their support for terror, for Hezbollah as well as for other organizations that are out there. These are all issues that are of concern to us and of concern to us in the broader issue of our relationship and the world's relationship with Iran. I can't draw any particular linkage between them for you, but obviously, they're both things that we treat seriously and want to see dealt with.

Yeah, let's go down here. David.

QUESTION: The thing that Burns said was that he was confident that -- were Iran to fail to respond by the end of the month, that Russia and China would support the next step to sanctions. But the Russians, the day after the resolution was adopted, insisted that it was not in -- there were no automatic sanctions involved and that there would still be a process of negotiations. How do you see that playing out?

MR. CASEY: Well, again, what the P-5+1 agreed to in the package was a package of both incentives and disincentives and both of which are fairly clear out there. The resolution, which was backed by -- you know, fully in the Security Council, including by Russia, says that in the event that Iran does not respond favorably and does not take up the call of the international community to meet its requirements, including a full suspension of uranium enrichment activity, that the next step will be sanctions. And so I think it's agreed to by the Council, including by the P-5+1, that that would be the next step in the event that Iran fails to comply.

QUESTION: But don't people --

MR. CASEY: Go ahead, Barry.

QUESTION: In that next step, there would be specificity of the kind of sanctions, you suppose?

MR. CASEY: Well, obviously --

QUESTION: Or is there a delay; you say it and then people put their heads together and decide how to implement it?

MR. CASEY: Barry, there's been a lot of discussion on this issue in the P-5+1 as well as with other countries involved, but certainly, we will wait and see the circumstances of where we are, whether Iran responds, how it responds and what the nature of that response is before we get to the position of talking specifically which measures would be taken. And obviously, that is something that will need to be discussed at an appropriate time in the Security Council.

QUESTION: Is it also not correct that it's been pushed down the road? There's been a lot of talk about it, but there's never been any agreement yet about what those sanctions would be if Iran did not comply.

MR. CASEY: Well, what I wouldn't tell you, Charlie, is that on the day that the deadline passes, if Iran has not in fact responded, that someone is going to say, "Here is a previously drafted piece of paper that outlines all the actions that will be taken." Again, we need to see exactly what happens, whether Iran does in fact respond or not, and then we can talk in specific terms about what the next steps are.

Sue.

QUESTION: Could you not provide just a couple of examples of what these may include? I mean, what is the range here?

MR. CASEY: Well, Sue, I think a lot of other people, including Under Secretary Burns, have spoken about some of the possibilities there and I don't want to mislead you and I don't want to add anything more to discussion that's already been --

QUESTION: But this is a shifting issue. It's not static. So your ideas may be changing as to what would be appropriate or inappropriate. Do you think that there should be much more forceful action or stricter action now -- I'm not saying force -- much stronger action because of Iran's role in Lebanon?

MR. CASEY: Well, first and foremost, what we think is that Iran should comply with the terms of the resolution. Remember, the goal here isn't to apply sanctions on Iran. The goal here is to change Iranian behavior. And the change in behavior we want to see is Iranian compliance with this resolution and with previous resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors, with previous agreements that they've signed with the EU-3 among others. And that is principally our focus and we certainly -- there is still time left for Iran to change its mind, to stop its defiance of the international community and to come into compliance. And we think that's where our focus ought to be for right now.

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