Remarks by Assistant Secretary Philip Crowley on IAEA Report and Evidence for Sanctions against Iran (Excerpts)

February 19, 2010

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

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QUESTION: In light of the IAEA report, what's the assessment that the U.S. has on the push for greater sanctions on Iran? Does it appear that globally, there could be more momentum toward the U.S. position?

MR. CROWLEY: Doesn't hurt. (Laughter.) I mean, we are struck by the ongoing failure of Iran to either engage constructively or answer the questions. So we think it was a very strong report from the IAEA. It underscores the ongoing questions and concerns that we have about Iran's nuclear activity. It points out that the secret facility at Qom has no rational place in a civilian program.

And if Iran continues on its current course - fails to engage constructively, fails to answer the questions that the United States has and the international community has - then it is going to face increasing pressure, including increasing sanctions.

QUESTION: Do you think that this - the way that this report is written and the fact that it was more kind of declarative about the intentions about Iran suggests that the IAEA, under this new director general, is going to be tougher, more robust? Because even when confronted with evidence of Iranian behavior, sometimes Director ElBaradei took a more kind of measured tone.

MR. CROWLEY: I'm not sure that would necessarily be a fair characterization. I mean, this has been a very steady process. Iran as a --

QUESTION: You don't think that - I'm sorry, you don't think that --

MR. CROWLEY: Well, hang on. Let me finish --

QUESTION: -- Mohamed ElBaradei was cautious in his reports?

MR. CROWLEY: -- my statement before you disagree with it. Iran has very clear responsibilities as a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty. And as the IAEA has been able to document over a number of years, it has failed to meet its obligations. And that has continued both at the end of the ElBaradei term, with the discovery of the secret facility at Qom, and now into the new term of Director General Amano.

So we think we've - we are continuing to make a very strong case for sanctions. There's been a lot of consensus-building based on our mutual concern about Iran's nuclear activities. And we think that this report underscores not only our determination to pursue this, but it makes a very strong case that now is the time to not only continue to offer engagement, but apply additional pressure.

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MR. CROWLEY: I am simply going to say that we are - we think that this is an appropriate report. It underscores the concerns that we have, the unanswered questions that Iran has failed to address. And there will be consequences for this failure to engage, failure to answer the questions, and failure to fully disclose what nuclear activities are going on inside Iran.

QUESTION: But this predates you. But numerous - for numerous years, the Bush Administration, even when confronted with behavior by Iran that specifically suggests that they were developing a nuclear weapon, the Bush Administration repeatedly criticized the IAEA for not kind of taking the information at face value, that perhaps there was a nuclear - that there was a military dimension to the program.

And so now you have a new director general, and for the first time, suggesting in very declarative sentences that perhaps Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. And you don't attribute it all to the fact that there's a new IAEA director?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I just simply say we're - we strongly associate ourselves with this report. We've taken a leadership role in expressing our concerns and bringing the international community to a stronger consensus that now is the time for decisive action, and we're preparing the way for a resolution before the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: P.J., I --

QUESTION: Specifically on this comment, though, real quick before we - all right. You just said you associate yourself very closely with the report. Just a series of questions: Do you dispute any part of it, specifically the --

MR. CROWLEY: I'm not going - I haven't read the report, so it's hard for me to go through it chapter and verse.

QUESTION: The reason I ask is because you did say you associate yourself with it --

MR. CROWLEY: Mm-hmm. I --

QUESTION: -- because it does --

MR. CROWLEY: I think it makes a strong --

QUESTION: -- it does directly cut --

MR. CROWLEY: -- case of the current course that we're on.

QUESTION: But the only reason I'm asking is because it directly contradicts the 2007 NIE, which said that Iran had specifically left behind its militarization of its nuclear program in 2004.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I'm not going to get into an NIE discussion.

QUESTION: Well, but you - I mean, you've endorsed something that contradicts it. I'm just curious where the U.S. Government stands on this.

MR. CROWLEY: On what?

QUESTION: Well, you've endorsed a report that contradicts the U.S. intelligence estimate from two years ago. I'm curious if the estimate has changed and where the U.S. Government stands on it right now.

MR. CROWLEY: I'm not going to talk about the NIE.

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