Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
Related Country:
- Brazil
- China
. . .
QUESTION: You had - there's been little progress, it seems, in convincing Brazil or China of the need for sanctions against Iran, so I'm wondering what the next step is going to be.
MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, this is a detailed process. I think the Secretary laid out our view on the situation with respect to Iran. I think we were encouraged by what we heard yesterday from the Brazilians in terms of their understanding of the risk of an arms race in the Middle East. I think we see the issue in similar ways, or the danger in similar ways. They, like us, would like to see Iran respond more constructively, engage with the international community to answer the questions that have been raised. I think we had a respectful and detailed and substantive discussion of our respective positions on this, and I think this dialogue will continue as we work through the process.
QUESTION: But their public statements certainly don't seem to be as optimistic as you're trying to paint the picture.
MR. CROWLEY: Well, at the end of this process, there - we are going to present our proposals to the Security Council that makes clear to Iran that there are consequences for its failure to meet its obligations under the IAEA and the Nonproliferation Treaty. At that point, countries within the Security Council will have to step up and vote as to how they see the situation and what action they think is appropriate.
So what Brazil decides to do is ultimately up to them, and what China does is ultimately up to that country as well. But they have to decide whether there should be consequences for Iran's failure to engage constructively in its myriad evaluations. But we've recognized at the outset that this will take patience and persistence and tough, determined dialogue, and that's exactly what the Secretary did yesterday.
QUESTION: Speaking of the UN and a resolution, are you circulating a draft or is - are any of the P-5+1 circulating a draft at the moment?
MR. CROWLEY: There's no draft resolution. We are working within the P-5+1 and with others on - sharing our ideas on possible steps. I think there's a growing understanding that Iran should face consequences for its defiance of international obligations. We've having very serious and high-level conversations, but there is not, as of yet, a draft resolution text.
QUESTION: When do you think there will be one?
MR. CROWLEY: We don't have a timetable. We want to move as rapidly as possible, but at the end of this, we want to have action that is effective, sends the right signal, puts the right pressure on Iran, and we hope ultimately secures Iran's compliance under the NPT and UN Security Council resolutions.
. . .
QUESTION: Are you concerned that Turkey and Lebanon are not going to support sanctions against Iran, especially considering what's going on in Congress with Turkey right now?
MR. CROWLEY: Well, we are having an important dialogue within the UN Security Council on this issue. We've talked at high levels with all of the governments that you mentioned and - I think many governments that will be a part of the Security Council this year - and at the end of this process, we think that we will be successful in stating the case that there need to be consequences for Iran's refusal to engage constructively and answer the questions that the international community have, that all of these countries have.
And for countries like Turkey and Lebanon, they sit in the immediate neighborhood. They're going to feel the effects of whatever choices Iran makes very directly. That was the message that Secretary Clinton received when she had important meetings in Qatar and Saudi Arabia a couple of weeks ago. That's why we're working, we're engaged very significantly with countries in the region. They, in turn, are having their own conversations with countries that will have influence over how this process unfolds. I think there's a very strong consensus that there should be consequences for Iran's failure to meet its obligations, and that's a conversation that we will continue to have within the P-5+1, within the Security Council, and more broadly.
. . .