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QUESTION: All right. Well, even if they didn't, I presume you've seen the Iranian response to the IAEA?

MR. CROWLEY: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: What do you think of it?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, there's - it doesn't contain anything new. We've heard this before. We think that the arrangement that we put on the table in Geneva is the right one. The Iranian response, in essence, is, in our view, a red herring. Under the arrangement that we had proposed, we would accept enriched fuel from Iran and reprocess it for - to make it suitable to the Tehran research reactor to meet the clear humanitarian need that Iran has.

Under the Iranian proposal, there would be an exchange, but that would require the international community to actually front its own fuel to satisfy Iranian need while Iran continues to violate its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

So this response - the Iranian counterproposal is unacceptable, as we've made clear before. And we will continue to work within the IAEA, but also we will continue to consult from the international standpoint on appropriate next steps, including prospective sanctions.

QUESTION: China says that it still wants to see more diplomacy. It doesn't want this rush to the Security Council and perhaps another round of sanctions. Where is the U.S.?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we - our policy envisions a two-track strategy. We have not closed the door to further engagement, but you actually have to have a willing partner to engage. The fact is Iran makes these series of statements day after day, week after week, but it refuses to come to the table and actually negotiate in good faith and address the concerns that the international community has.

In this sense, this issue is not new. We've had concerns about a failure of Iran to meet its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty for a number of years, has failed to really come forward and address the concerns that we all have. And with each passing time with the discovery of the Qom facility, which has no real place in a civilian nuclear program - if Iran says its programs are for civilian purposes, it needs to come forward and make that case to the international community. It is Iran's failure to address legitimate concerns that Iran has had that has brought us to this point.

So we are certainly willing to continue to work on the engagement track, but there - as we've made clear, there will be ongoing consequences for Iran on the so-called pressure track.

QUESTION: Does that imply that the groundwork is now being laid to start any potential discussions of a sanctions framework?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we are discussing, broadly speaking, with the P-5+1 and others, including China, what prospective next steps are available to us, what will be effective. And that process is ongoing, and I would expect that we would hopefully arrive at a point that is - where you've got the same kind of consensus internationally on steps to take towards Iran that we successfully undertook last year with respect to North Korea.

QUESTION: And how much - and my last one on this - how much longer is the U.S. willing to pursue this dual track before focusing solely on sanctions?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we're - I'll try it again. We're not focused solely on sanctions. We have offered to engage directly in that spirit. We came to Geneva last year, put on the table a good-faith offer that would allow confidence to grow on both sides. And from that discussion, we had a preliminary agreement from Iran and it has walked back from that agreement. And it has failed to really seriously reengage and constructively work through these issues.

So it is, in fact, that point that has brought us to where we are still open to engagement, but we are clearly working on the pressure track more aggressively and consulting on prospective sanctions that we might introduce in the coming weeks.

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