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QUESTION: Wait, I got - have you seen the comments from the Chinese foreign ministry and also the - their UN - their ambassador to the United Nations today about how it's not time to talk about sanctions for Iran? And how does this square - if you have, or even if you haven't, I'll tell you that that's what they said. How does that --

MR. CROWLEY: My favorite report. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: How does that square with the grand international consensus that you say that you've formed on the prospect of sanctions?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, first of all, let's recall there are already existing sanctions against Iran.

QUESTION: I'm talking about more sanctions.

MR. CROWLEY: I understand that. And we are in conversation with our partners in the P-5+1 process, which includes China. And now that we're into January, there's a new composition on the UN Security Council. We are talking to those countries. And this is a subject that was discussed yesterday, as the Secretary and foreign minister noted, in our discussion with our counterparts from Qatar.

We are going to continue to have this conversation going forward with lots of countries, including China. It's no secret that China and the United States look at the utility of sanctions differently. Nonetheless, we will continue to work on this, and we would expect - as the Secretary said yesterday, we will continue to work on both tracks. But specifically on that pressure track, we are talking to countries about additional sanctions.

As the Secretary said, one possibility is to focus more specifically on the Revolutionary Guards, the IRGC. We're taking a much more prominent role within Iran. We want to do this in a way that can target specific entities within the Iranian Government but not punish the Iranian people, who are clearly looking for a different relationship with their government.

So this is an ongoing process of dialogue. At any particular time, a country might say this is a good idea, this is a bad idea. We are going to continue our discussions and we would expect to move forward with this in the coming weeks.

QUESTION: Does the U.S. have a plan? I mean, does the U.S. feel that China's participation in any proposed sanctions, either within the UN framework or outside of it, is imperative for the sanctions to work? Or is there a plan - are you guys working on a plan to move forward with sanctions which wouldn't include China?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I think part of this is a discussion of what the current situation is. I mean, perhaps others might have this hope that Iran will at some point respond differently than it has in the past four or five months. We continue to look at this with a very sober focus. Iran has been unable or unwilling to respond to the offers on the table. This is not a static situation, so whether or not today a particular minister within the Chinese Government has a view, whether that is still the case two weeks from now, four weeks from now, after we have further discussions, after we start to attain some clarity and some consensus on the nature of future actions, the nature of potential steps, the likely impact on a country like Iran, views can change.

QUESTION: But could a sanctions policy work without China?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, at some point, if this is going to be an effective global effort reflecting the will of the international community, it will have to be presented to the UN. And obviously, China has an important role within the UN.

QUESTION: So no?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, but then this ultimately - if at some point in the future something is presented and something is voted upon, China has a number of options: It can vote yes, it can vote no, it can abstain.

QUESTION: But how much --

MR. CROWLEY: That will be a decision for China to make, but we are going to continue to talk about China and continue to talk to other countries and make the case that while the door to engagement remains open, to the extent that we see recalcitrance on behalf of the Iranian Government, that there will be a cost that Iran will pay for that unwillingness to respond to the international community's concerns.

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