Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
. . .
QUESTION: On Iran, I want to ask you, would you think the Iranians are closer to a nuclear weapons capability today than they were when the Obama Administration took office?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, it's difficult to place timetables or milestones. We believed that their pursuit of nuclear power included a program that was aimed at producing the potential for nuclear weapons. We still believe that.
But it's not just the United States. The International Atomic Energy Agency, in the most recent report by Director General Amano, raised the same kinds of questions: If their pursuit of nuclear power is only for peaceful purposes, why were they building a secret facility at Qom? If their pursuit is only for peaceful purposes, why would they not accept the joint Russian-French-American proposal to assist them in getting the nuclear fuel they're entitled to for their research reactor that produces medical isotopes?
There is a series of questions like that. It's very difficult saying how far were they a year ago, two years ago, three years ago; were they further ahead seven years ago, then they backed off - because they're such a closed and secret society. But the bottom line is we believe that their actions raised serious questions about their intent. And that intent to pursue nuclear weapons is what the international community is responding to.
QUESTION: Well, I think one of the keys about timing is the fact that we seem to be at a tipping point at this point over the pressure track and the effort to build up some strong sanctions to discourage Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Now, General Petraeus was up on the Hill this week testifying, saying that an Iranian nuclear weapon was not inevitable. So if it's not inevitable, how do you get China, Turkey, perhaps even Russia, some countries that have been hesitant about backing strong sanctions - how do you get them to cross the finish line if they don't see it as an imminent threat?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think we're making progress. I think that the constant efforts that not only the United States, but our other partners have undertaken to make the case about the impact that a nuclear-weaponized Iran would have in the region and beyond is getting a receptive audience. It certainly is here in Russia, and I think increasingly, these questions are becoming important for the Chinese to also confront.
We're in the process in the United Nations of trying to design the appropriate mix of pressure on this second track that you referred to, and I think we're making progress, because there is no one who disagrees with our goal. The goal is to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons because of the consequences that that would present to the region and the world.
The discussion is: What is the best way? There are some who still believe that Iran can be dissuaded; that they'll never admit that they stopped their program, but they could be convinced to stop their program, which would have the same effect that we're seeking through sanctions. Others of us believe that the diplomatic efforts that we engaged in have not produced sufficient evidence of a change in behavior by the Iranians, and therefore, we need to put more pressure on them. But everyone shares the same goal. No one believes that a nuclear-armed Iran is in the world's interests.
. . .