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Q Yeah. Do you have any comment on the apparent agreement reached between the IAEA and Brazil? It doesn't require a hundred percent transparency on the part of Brazil. And doesn't this set a bad precedent, given your quest for a hundred percent transparency and cooperation on the part of Iran with the --
MR. BOUCHER: Did they announce some kind of agreement?
Q No. Well, you know -- people are talking --
Q (Off mike.)
Q -- people are talking about it in Vienna.
MR. BOUCHER: Our understanding from the Brazilians -- they have had discussions with the IAEA. They felt that they have made progress in sort of establishing the principles by which they can do this inspection in a way that's very consistent with what the IAEA has done elsewhere, that they're going to have visits by IAEA technical experts or team in about 10 days or so, that that needs to be done in order to work out the details. But as we have pointed out, the International Atomic Energy Agency has worked out agreements around the world that ensure transparency and yet ensure protection of proprietary technology and things like that.
So we're confident this can be worked out. We're confident the Brazilians want to work it out, and we're confident the International Atomic Energy Agency wants to work it out. So we'll just have to wait and see and let them do the work that they know how to do and that they need to do.
Q Do you know whether the secretary has raised his concerns about Iran in his discussions with the Brazilians?
MR. BOUCHER: We discussed -- the secretary discussed in public as well his -- the issues involved for the IAEA. He made clear that we saw no comparisons between Brazilian nuclear power programs and the kind of covert weapons program that Iran has been undertaking for years, or the kind of renunciation of inspection, the kind of renunciation of the IAEA that North Korea has been engaged in. Those are not comparable situations, and nobody should confuse them.
Q But you don't want to give the Iranians anything they can seize onto.
MR. BOUCHER: No. But the board has made very clear to the Iranians what the requirements are, and that when it comes to Iran, given their history, given their history of covert activities, which we think can only be intended to make nuclear weapons, the board has said to the Iranians, you shouldn't have any uranium enrichment at all. It's -- for the Iranians, it's not a question of proprietary technology, it's a question of what Iran has committed to, what the board has asked them to do, and what makes sense in their own environment. And there is no reason for Iran to have uranium enrichment activities, and that has been made clear.
Q Richard, I presume, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that this building has now fully digested the Duelfer report?
MR. BOUCHER: It's fairly large. I think we're still chewing on some of the pieces, but -- what do you need to know about it?
Q Is it -- well, I just want to know if you agree with its findings, if the department agrees with its findings. Do you accept them?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think -- we've always accepted the judgments of the intelligence community when it came to what Iraq was up to. We have our own, as you know, analysis with the INR, and they are part of the intelligence community. This report done by Mr. Duelfer on behalf of the -- I guess it's for the DCI, right? He's a special adviser to the DCI -- I think represents a step forward in terms of the understanding. It confirms many of the things that have been -- become known over time, that Iran -- Iraq, excuse me, did not have stockpiles of weapons, but that they maintained -- that Saddam Hussein maintained the intent, was trying to preserve his capabilities, that he wanted these weapons and he had used these weapons, and that he was just looking for the opportunity to get back in the business once sanctions had been lifted.
The report also shows the extent that he was going to to try to subvert the sanctions regime and to make sure that sanctions and controls like that were not effective. And it also makes clear, I think, some of the difficulties that we faced at the beginning of this administration. If you remember, one of the first tasks that the president asked Secretary Powell to undertake was to take a totally crumbling sanctions regime and try to put it back together with smart sanctions.
So, I think basically the Duelfer report adds to our understanding. We certainly accept what it says about Iraq's intentions and activities, and believe that we need to use it to understand what went on.
Q Okay. So in -- you accept this as -- you said you -- "We always accepted the judgment of the intelligence community." You also accepted the previous reports that were done on the same subject by Mr. Kay, the judgment that was -- .
MR. BOUCHER: I think Mr. Kay said his report was preliminary.
Q Right.
MR. BOUCHER: This report is not described as final, but I think has been described as more comprehensive.
Q Well, I'm wondering if you agree with the comments that Mr. Kay made this morning, that the administration is in denial about this, and that intent without capability is not an imminent threat. And if you don't agree with those comments, why not?
MR. BOUCHER: I didn't see Mr. Kay's comments. I don't know that I want to get into a back and forth with him.
Let me try to --
Q Well, I'm just curious, if you do -- if you say you've always accepted the judgment of the intelligence community --
MR. BOUCHER: That doesn't mean that I've accepted everything David --
Q I know.
MR. BOUCHER: -- David Kay has ever said or might say some day on television.
Q Well --
MR. BOUCHER: He produced a report.
Q Right.
MR. BOUCHER: That report looked pretty solid to us. Mr. Duelfer has now produced a more extensive report, a larger report. I haven't, frankly, compared the two to see if there are any things that are corrected or elaborated or different from one to the second. But this generally goes in the same direction. And we take this as probably the best statement out there right now as to what Iraq, what Saddam was up to and what he wanted.
Does that mean I endorse everything that David Kay may say now and in the future, or everything that Mr. Duelfer may say now or in the future? No, I can't make that commitment. David Kay's report is not everything David Kay says on TV. So let's let the man be himself, let's let him have his own opinions. That's true of everybody.
Now, you want to talk about substance?
Q No, I want to talk about your judgment of -- your accepting the judgment of the intelligence community.
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think that's the issue here. If you want to talk about whether Saddam was a danger that had to be dealt with -- which is what you're implying by citing that quote -- I think this administration made very clear that if you have a leader like Saddam Hussein who, as Mr. Duelfer points out, was the sole determinant of Iraqi behavior, and was the be-all and end-all of Iraqi policy; if you have a leader like this who has a history of using chemical weapons, who gassed people in Halabja, killed 5,000 on a Friday morning; who used gas in the Iran-Iraq War, who wanted to keep these -- who wanted these weapons and had all sorts of weapons programs in the past, and who was just looking for the opportunity to develop them again; he's trying to maintain the intellectual capital, at the very least, and some of the other capabilities; and he was trying to do everything he could to break out and erode the sanctions regime so that he could get back to work on his weapons -- that is a danger.
The lesson, I think, the main thing to understand about that danger is also -- that 9/11 should have taught us -- that if you have a danger that's not going away and that is only likely to grow, you have to deal with it. And that's why the president felt we had to deal with it. He didn't want to take the risk that Saddam would succeed some day.
Q So the short answer to my question is no, you don't agree with what Mr. Kay said this morning? Correct?
MR. BOUCHER: I did not see what Mr. Kay said this morning. If you are quoting it accurately, I don't agree with what you just said.
Q (Off mike) -- the secretary regret that some of the things that he said at the U.N. on February 5th, 2003, have proved so grievously wrong.
MR. BOUCHER: The secretary in February -- February 5th of 2003 presented the case that was known, as it was known at that point to the U.S. intelligence community, in fact as it was well known to many internationally, as well. Many of the things the secretary presented were the violations, the areas where Saddam Hussein had failed to come clean, failed to account for stocks that the U.N. had pointed out, and that sort of thing. So the extent of Saddam's violations of U.N. resolutions, I think, was clear then and is still clear now.
He also presented a lot of evidence about -- that we had at the time, the evidence that we knew at the time, of what the regime was doing in various areas, including the idea that they had stockpiles. This was at the time the best intelligence we could get from the U.S. government. It was the intelligence that people agreed very strongly on. And where there were elements, like the aluminum tubes, where there was still debate within our intelligence community, the president -- the secretary made that clear, as well. So he presented on behalf of the U.S. government the best judgments of our intelligence community.
Now, he has expressed since then his disappointment and sometimes regret that some of the elements did not prove true. But we need in all this discussion of particular details not to forget who we were dealing with. We were dealing with a man who had a history of using chemical weapons, who had a clear desire to have weapons of mass destruction, who had multiple, multiple programs to have weapons of mass destruction, who had done everything he can to deceive and deter inspectors and others from finding out what he really had. And there was no reason to assume that he had somehow abandoned these programs, nor is there today any reason to assume that he had abandoned his intention to develop these capabilities once he could break out of the sanctions.
Q But Richard, couldn't the same thing have been said for somebody like Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, that nobody could have imagined -- many in this administration have said the same thing -- that he would willingly give up his weapons of mass destruction program, but based on --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, as you know, the United States for a long time --
Q Sorry, I didn't quite finish. And the fact that the same argument could be made, not 100 percent parallel but similar enough, between Iran and North Korea, that they have -- and this administration has certainly talked about it enough -- that they pose a danger to the international community based on what the U.S. alleges are secret nuclear weapons programs.
So, it's just the U.S. seems to cherry-pick whenever the case, you know, suits -- suits whatever is the policy --
MR. BOUCHER: No. I think there's -- there are similarities, but there are clear differences as well. I mean, I'm -- if you know, I don't make it a habit to come out here and defend Muammar Qadhafi's behavior per -- when he was developing weapons of mass destruction. And, in fact, I think you've heard us say that as much as we were trying to call attention of the world to the fact that Libya had programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, even we were somewhat surprised when he made his decision, and somewhat surprised -- well, quite surprised when he made his decision and somewhat surprised by the extent those programs had gone forward, even farther than even we had thought. But the bottom line is, Muammar Qadhafi had not gassed 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. He had not gassed a foe in battle on the Iranian border, nor, for that matter, has Iran or North Korea.
The history of Saddam Hussein, his intentions, his violations of multiple U.N. resolutions time and time again, made clear this was a danger that had to be dealt with and a danger that only could be dealt with in the way it has. And by dealing with it, we no longer have to worry about that. We no longer have to worry about his ability to break out of sanctions or suborn foreign entities. We no longer have to worry about when he's going to be able to do what he's always wanted to do: develop weapons of mass destruction.
But that doesn't mean we're neglecting Iran and North Korea. As you know, we have very active efforts underway with other countries, multilaterally, through diplomacy, peacefully, to try to bring about situations where Iran and North Korea no longer pose any threat to their neighbors and to the world in terms of their programs or weapons of mass destruction. So, you may need to deal with all these things, but you don't necessarily deal with each of them in the same way.
Q Well -- (off mike) -- Mr. Qadhafi -- Colonel Qadhafi, while you're right to say he didn't gas 5,000 people in Halabja, he did blow up two airliners and killed a lot of Americans, blew up a disco in Berlin, which killed two. So -- which I think is probably more Americans than were killed by Saddam before the war, either or both -- both of them.
That said, your new friend, Mr. Qadhafi, today has come out and said that resistance to the government in Iraq, the Interim Government, and the coalition is legitimate. I'm wondering if you have any comments on that.
MR. BOUCHER: I hadn't seen the statement. I certainly don't agree that it's legitimate. And I reject the characterization of Qadhafi as our new friend.
We have said -- the president has said that we believe that Libya made the right decision. We are willing to move forward with Libya as we can in each of the areas. We're willing to reciprocate good faith that's shown by the Libyans, and they have indeed done a lot in terms of changing their relationship with the world and getting rid of these programs that so scare everybody and that have strained and distorted their relationship with the world. But at the same time, when it comes to terrorism, for example, they're still on the U.S. terrorism list, and we will deal with that matter as appropriate under our law when when we feel our concerns have been satisfied.
Q Could you check and see if anyone in your -- let's just -- I'll take back the "new friend" line. Relations are certainly friendlier than they were, say, 18 months ago. You now have, you know, near direct diplomatic ties. And so could you look into whether anyone in Tripoli has asked for a clarification of Mr. Qadhafi's comments?
MR. BOUCHER: I'll see if -- (inaudible) -- had occasion to talk to them about it.
Q It was on the -- (off mike) -- news agency -- (off mike).
Q I also wonder, if he's been accurately quoted here, if you regard this as defending the legitimacy of the insurgency, which you've routinely described as terrorists and conducting acts of terrorism; if Qadhafi defending the legitimacy of their acts is in effect supporting their -- what you certainly regard as their terrorism.
MR. BOUCHER: That's about three steps down the road after we find out what he said and what we consider its implications are. But I would certainly say we do not agree with statements that say that military action against coalition forces or Iraqi forces or Iraqi civilians waiting in line to become policemen is in any way justified.
Q No, just to get this on the record, he did say that while resistance is legitimate, that they should not resort to terrorism. That was in his comment. Just so you --
Q (Inaudible) -- off the list.
MR. BOUCHER: If you're blowing up people who are there to help Iraq become a more peaceful and democratic place, I don't think how you can justify that in any way.
Q No, no. He said that you should --
MR. BOUCHER: All right. I'm not trying to quote Qadhafi here. I haven't read Qadhafi's statements.
Q Well, I have one more.
Q Could we go on?
MR. BOUCHER: There's about five people in the back who are interested too. He's coming down close to 1:30, so you can -- we can keep talking here for, you know, forever, but he'll be lonely if you don't finish up.
Let's go on to somebody who hasn't asked a question for the last 25 minutes.
Q You keep saying that Saddam was looking for the sanctions regime to crumble. Given the fact that the Security Council was in charge of that regime and that you are one of the five permanent members, do you have any reason to believe that the sanctions regime actually was indeed about to crumble before the war, or any time soon at that point?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, crumble in terms of repealing the sanctions? No, I don't think that was what the fear was. The fear, well documented by Mr. Duelfer, is that the sanctions were not being respected the way they should have been and that Iraq was making every means -- using eery tool possible, through its deception, front companies or sweetheart deals on oil and other things, to try to suborn the sanctions regime and try to acquire things it was not supposed to be buying under the sanctions regime. That was certainly the state of affairs that we found when the secretary embarked on the effort to get smart sanctions that could tighten up on sanctions on things that truly mattered and prevent him from acquiring many of those things that Mr. Duelfer has now documented he was actively trying to get.
I think it's fair to say also the Duelfer report says that -- doesn't note any particular change under the smart sanctions regime and that the effort to have a better regime, a better set of sanctions, did not stop Saddam from continuing his efforts to try to undermine sanctions as a whole.
Q Doesn't the Duelfer report really confirm that the sanctions regime was working perfectly, as a matter of fact; there was no call to go to war?
MR. BOUCHER: No.
Q You don't think so?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think that's what it says. And at great length, that's not what it says. It's much more complicated than that, and I think it offers a lot of insights into what the Iraqi regime was up to. But it certainly does say he wanted these weapons, he had a desire to develop them further when he could, and that he was only willing to get rid of his programs under the pressures of the sanctions regime. And he was doing everything possible to get rid of the sanctions regime and, second of all, to keep his powder dry until he could develop these weapons further.
Q Richard, on --
MR. BOUCHER: Let's -- there are still a few that have had their hands up for a long time.
Q (Off mike) -- comment.
Q No --
Q Following up on that --
MR. BOUCHER: Okay. It's on this.
Q Yeah. Does the U.S. believe that it shares any responsibility for not going public perhaps sooner with its suspicious about the corruption that was taking place in the oil-for-food program?
MR. BOUCHER: We have been, I think, very supportive of the effort that's been under way to look at the oil-for-food program. We've cooperated with Mr. Volcker, the head of that team that's working on it for the United Nations. The Iraqi government has cooperated with him. I think you remember one of the last acts of the Coalition Provisional Authority was to help safeguard and secure the records that were needed by the Iraqis and by the investigation to go through it. So I think we have been very supportive of this effort. We certainly want it to succeed in full and great detail. And Mr. Duelfer's report, too -- we've supported the release of a lot of material on what Iraq was up to at the time. So no, I think we've been very supportive of this effort to disclose the facts.
Q (Off mike.)
MR. BOUCHER: Before the war -- first of all, we were quite upfront about the sanctions regime. Look at how the secretary described his effort on the smart sanctions and where we were and what was happening. We were quite upfront when we found some of these cases where we could intervene diplomatically, and we did. And governments often, in many of these cases, took action to prevent sales or to follow up on sales that might have occurred.
We were quite frank about the fact that Saddam was using his -- manipulating his oil sales to amass $1 (billion) to $2 billion a year that he was then using for illicit purposes, sometimes to buy palaces, sometimes to buy whiskey and sometimes to buy equipment for his military establishment.
So I think if you look at the record of the United States going back many years, we were quite frank on how Saddam was trying to manipulate and suborn the sanctions regime.
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