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QUESTION: Can we change the subject to Iran?
MR. ERELI: Mm-hmm, sure.
QUESTION: There are Russian news agency reports sourced to the Kremlin today that show Moscow taking a pretty hard line saying that Russia opposes Iran acquiring the technical know-how to become a nuclear power. Do you have a reaction to that?
MR. ERELI: I've seen those reports. I'm not -- I haven't seen exactly what's been said. But clearly I think what it underscores, the reports underscore, is what we've been saying for some time, that there is a growing international consensus that Iran's nuclear program is inconsistent with its professed commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy, that it has been flagrant in its refusal to abide by calls of the IAEA and the UN Security Council to suspend enrichment and return to negotiations, and that as a result the international community, as represented in the near term by the P5 + Germany is going to look at ways that it can effectively respond to an Iranian regime that seems hell-bent on defying the international community and pursuing a nuclear program that is of growing concern.
To review the bidding, we are looking forward to a report by the Director General, ElBaradei, at the end of this week on Iran's actions since the presidential statement at the end of March, the UN Security Council presidential statement. We expect -- we certainly expect that to be a negative report given that the presidential statement called on Iran to suspend enrichment activity and return to negotiations and Iran's answer has been to announce that it has completed a 164-centrifuge cascade and produced enriched uranium.
There is a P5+1 meeting scheduled May 2nd to review not only the Director General's report but to consider the next steps that we should take in response to what we expect to be a negative report. And then, obviously building on that, we will be developing a Security Council strategy as well as a strategy for dealing with Iran's defiance in other ways.
QUESTION: Saturday morning story surfaced where an Iranian official, I think a delegate to the IAEA -- I may be wrong about that -- showed new interest, says there's basically a deal for joint enrichment -- here we go again -- which seemed to have been deep-sixed by the Iranians just a couple of weeks earlier.
MR. ERELI: Right.
QUESTION: What is the U.S. handle on this? Is that still a live proposition? Have you heard from the Russians that they're entertaining -- the Iranians are entertaining the idea still?
MR. ERELI: I think all of us involved on this issue, the EU3, the Russians, the Chinese and the other members of the P5 and the IAEA Board of Governors also have grown pretty skeptical of repeated Iranian statements that there's a deal with Russia. Because as you say, one day they'll say there's a deal and then the other day they'll say there's no deal and the next day they'll say there is a deal but it's only on these terms.
The bottom line is this, that all of our efforts to address Iran's nuclear program are premised on the agreement or on the common view, that Iran shouldn't have an enrichment capability in Iran because they would use enriched uranium and develop a nuclear weapon. So any aspect of fuel cycle, whether it be plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment, has to be outside of Iran and that's what the Russian proposal on uranium enrichment is. So every time, you know, Iran says, oh, we'll accept the Russian proposal, you always see this qualification -- you always see the qualification that part of it has to be on Iranian territory. So there's not been a consistent message from Iran. The only consistent -- on that score -- the only consistent message from Iran has been that they refuse to give up enrichment and that they refuse to negotiate with the Europeans, which is what the Security Council called on them to do, what the Board of Governors called on them to do and which the international community will hold them to account on.
Yes.
QUESTION: President Ahmadi-Nejad also says that now he doesn't see there's any need for talks with the U.S. about what's happening in Iraq since the new Iraqi Prime Minister has now been designated. Is that the same way you feel?
MR. ERELI: I hadn't seen those comments. I think, you know, we have this channel open to us to talk to the Iranians on Iraq. I expect that it'll be used when necessary and appropriate. I don't want to get into speculations about timing, but I can tell you that, again, it will deal with Iran's actions in Iraq. We'll see. If the Iranians feel there's a use for it, if the Iranians want to engage, we'll do it. I would note we've had these kinds of conversations before in Afghanistan, so it's not a radical departure from past practice.
QUESTION: So the bottom line is you still think there are things you need to discuss with Iran or you'd like to discuss with Iran about their behavior in Iraq.
MR. ERELI: Yeah. There are still issues on the table to be presented.
QUESTION: The Secretary is going to visit Greece tomorrow.
QUESTION: Can we stay on Iran? Sorry.
MR. ERELI: Sure. Saul, we'll get back to you.
QUESTION: What about -- what is your understanding of whether Iran did or did not, has or has not, threatened to quit the NPT?
MR. ERELI: I don't have anything definitive on it. I've seen the reports. Frankly, they've been reported to -- the IAEA Board of Governors reported them to the Security Council because of their noncompliance with their safeguards obligations. I don't want to speculate on what Iran is going to do. I can tell you what -- and you know very well what the international community has called on them to do and so far they've refused to do it.
QUESTION: But by mentioning that they were reported for their noncompliance, are you saying that there's not really any reason for them to stay in, since (inaudible)?
MR. ERELI: No, of course not. I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that their record of performance as a responsible member of the NPT is not very good. Does that mean they should withdraw from the NPT? Of course, not. They should, to the contrary, endeavor and take every action to be a member in good standing with the NPT, because why, that's the way Iran can, frankly, be an accepted member of the international community, rather than isolate itself, which all its action to date have done. And actions which go against the NPT only serve the purpose of isolating them further.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) to put you through this drill more than three times a week, but some of us had a session with the head of Germany's international relations committee this morning. He said, "It wouldn't be a bad idea. Be patient about Iran." "It wouldn't be a bad idea" was his phrase to have a Board of Governors take another look at the situation. So I have to keep sort of a clock on this, I think. Should the Administration change its mind about wanting action by the Security Council following the report from ElBaradei? The U.S. posture remains a report is due on the 28th --
MR. ERELI: Right.
QUESTION: -- and the Council should take up what to do about Iran?
MR. ERELI: Right.
QUESTION: You're not looking for more IAEA --
MR. ERELI: Well, the IAEA -- first of all, the Director General will report both to the IAEA and to the Security Council so -- and the work of the Security Council, as stated in the presidential statement of March 28th, is to support and reinforce the role of the IAEA in answering the outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear program and in ensuring Iranian compliance with its safeguards obligations. So there is obviously a symbiotic relationship between what actions the Security Council is taking and the role of the IAEA. So the way we look at it is both are working in concert towards a common goal, which is to uphold the integrity of the UN system and to reinforce the power and authority of those institutions to deal with a threat to the international community.
QUESTION: And your position has been action is necessary to accomplish that goal.
MR. ERELI: Right, right.
QUESTION: You're not -- well, you know, I don't want to grill you here, but the Administration --
MR. ERELI: That's why I'm here, sir.
QUESTION: Well, you're not backing off from maybe we'll have another turn at looking at maybe a travel curb imposed by the Dominican Republic and, you know, a trade sanction imposed by Belize. You're still looking for the Security Council to weigh sanctions again --
MR. ERELI: Sanctions are -- sir, as Under Secretary Burns told you on Friday and the Secretary has said, sanctions are very much an issue of discussion among all of us in a variety of contexts, both multilateral within the UN as well as outside the UN if the UN can't decide to take action.
QUESTION: Just one more quick one on Iran. Back to Russia. Are those comments out of Moscow anything different than what you've been hearing? Did you see -- haven't you always believed that Russia supported adamantly preventing Iran from getting knowledge on a complete fuel cycle? Or why do you think --
MR. ERELI: Russia has always been -- I shouldn't say always, but for the past several years, Russia has been very firmly with the program in terms of seeing Iran's nuclear program as unsettling and being firm in taking action to prevent Iran from getting the capability to develop a nuclear weapon, which is the whole idea behind the fuel take-back agreement on Bushehr.
QUESTION: So what's your read on why they're saying something today as if it's -- as if it's a new position?
MR. ERELI: Who says it's -- that's not -- they're reiterating what has been a common position. You're characterizing it as something new. I don't know if I'd agree with that.
QUESTION: I actually think it's old. That's why I was asking. I don't know, it was big headlines this morning.
MR. ERELI: Yeah, there's sometimes not a direct connection between headlines and news, but -- yes.
QUESTION: Back to the German lawmaker's comments. I wonder if you can say that in your government-to-government discussions with Germany you're hearing the suggestion that the United States should have direct talks with Iran over the nuclear issue.
MR. ERELI: There have been public statements about that but, frankly, our -- I think our common position is that the EU3 framework is currently the most viable way to deal with this and the one that we continue to support.
QUESTION: They're not saying there's anything wrong with the frame -- they're not saying there's anything wrong with the framework. They're saying -- well, apart from -- well, my friend here just said, they also said the U.S. should be at the table. And you've said this many times. Fischer has said it, Hagel has said it, Lugar has said. So it's not a weird idea.
MR. ERELI: I didn't say it was.
QUESTION: No, I know you didn't. You can do that with the framework. Can the U.S. join the framework?
MR. ERELI: That's not an issue under active discussion.
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