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QUESTION: I wanted to talk about Iran and the torpedo tests over the weekend and today, which follow on the missile tests from last Friday. Can you react to that and do you think that this is showing off a significant new military capability or new military capabilities that Iran has?

MR. ERELI: It certainly is of concern. It is a further reminder of an aggressive program of development of weapons systems and -- development and deployment of weapons systems that many of us see as threatening, I think first and foremost those nations of the Gulf that are most immediately connected to or in most immediate proximity to Iran. The fact that in three days you've had the test of a missile as well as the reported test of a torpedo of new capabilities is -- demonstrates a weaponization program by Iran that does not -- that does nothing to reassure Iran's neighbors or the international community, and when coupled with its support for terror, its clandestine nuclear activity, its repeated failure to respond to the demands of the IAEA and now the Security Council, just goes to show why we're also worried about the policies and actions of the Iranian regime.

QUESTION: It also might go to show that there's a need to negotiate. Hans Blix, who isn't always in agreement with Washington, spoke in Oslo and he said, for one thing, they're five years away from turning out nuclear weapons. It gives you a lot of time to negotiate and that's what you ought to be doing. And he also expressed concern. He said he didn't think the U.S. was about to invade Iran, but he says there's a chance -- his words: The U.S. will use bombs or missiles against several sites in Iran and would increase - this would accelerate terrorism.

How about his five -- I know you don't like to estimate -- engage in estimates, but five years is a long time to approach Iran with negotiations. Do you agree with that sort of scenario?

MR. ERELI: Well, you've thrown a lot of things out there.

QUESTION: Sure.

MR. ERELI: I think that experts can differ about timelines, but what's clear is there is a concerted effort underway, but what's clear to us is there's a concerted effort underway by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon and any time is too soon, as far as we're concerned, which is why our diplomacy is guided by a sense of urgency. The fact of the matter is Iran has broken the seals on its enrichment technology, it is moving forward to develop an enrichment capability which would provide it fissile material for a nuclear weapon, which is a key and some might say critical stage in developing a nuclear weapon. So we've got to act, I think, quickly and unanimously in response to a very real and present danger, and that's why I think you've seen the IAEA speak so -- in such a united fashion in so many Board of Governors resolutions and why the UN Security Council is now -- has now taken up the issue and has in its presidential -- last presidential statement told Iran in no uncertain terms that it needs to suspend this activity and return to negotiations.

Now, you mention the issue about negotiations. Well, it's all well and good, but the fact of the matter is the EU-3 had negotiations with Iran. They walked away. They continue to refuse calls to return to negotiations. So one has to ask oneself: Is the problem the unwillingness of -- is the problem the fact that they're not -- we're not offering Iran enough or Iran isn't even taking what we're offering? I think the answer is the latter.

QUESTION: And the U.S. refuses to participate in the negotiations --

MR. ERELI: No, that's not --

QUESTION: -- even though it participates in similar negotiations with North Korea.

MR. ERELI: U.S. participation in negotiations is not for us or for our partners an issue. The fact of the matter is --

QUESTION: The Germans have said you ought to --

MR. ERELI: No, no, they haven't.

QUESTION: Oh yes, they have.

MR. ERELI: The EU-3 is, I think, comfortable with where things are in the sense that there is a process that has been put in place, and that process should be able to lead to the desired solution, which is objective guarantees that Iran is not using its nuclear program to develop nuclear weapons.

There is not the suggestion that the process is so flawed that the United States needs to jump into it. Rather, I think the issue -- and here again, I think it's very important -- let's put the onus where the onus should be. The reason we're at a standstill is not because the United States isn't in negotiations. The reason we're at a standstill is because Iran, with single-minded purpose, is thumbing its nose at the international community and rejecting the offers of the EU-3 and rejecting the proposals of Russia and moving with apparently great determination to an enrichment capability. So don't try to -- don't suggest that the way to solve this is for the UN -- the U.S. to jump into negotiations. The way to resolve it is to get Iran to cease and desist from its active refusal to be a responsible member of the international community.

QUESTION: I just said -- I just brought it up because there's intransigence, it seems to me, on both sides, not probably equivalent but there is some --

MR. ERELI: Certainly not equivalent --

QUESTION: No. But --

MR. ERELI: And I wouldn't call it intransigence. I would call it multilateral diplomacy with our international partners.

QUESTION: Oh, but a quick one on security assurances. Does security assurances go beyond assurances the U.S. has no intention of invading Iran? Does it go to the kind of things Hans Blix is talking about?

MR. ERELI: The United States has made clear, the Secretary made it clear as recently as yesterday, that we are committed to a diplomatic solution because we believe a diplomatic solution can work.

Carol.

QUESTION: You know, you referred to Iran as a real and present danger, which sets off bells in my mind. And I wondered if you really meant to go that far, because real and present danger usually is a term that is only used when U.S. officials are looking towards some sort of military action.

MR. ERELI: I didn't mean to suggest that. What I meant to suggest is they are moving forward with an enrichment program that has the potential to give them a breakout capability, which is a -- reaching a stage that everyone would find alarming and threatening. And it's that determination and consistency on the part of Iran that we find so disturbing; that despite every offer and every opportunity to meet the concerns of the international community, they steadfastly refuse to do so and proceed forward in their enrichment program, which can lead to a nuclear weapon and which represents a danger for us.

QUESTION: And to join the two issues: Last week there was a report that the Indians had provided some sophisticated naval training to the Iranians. And it seemed to me a rather curious time for India, which the United States sees as its strategic partner going forward, is giving military advice to a country we're --

MR. ERELI: I think those reports were overwritten. We looked into those and our understanding is that there were two ship visits -- or there were ship visits by two ships with naval cadets from Iran into Indian ports. They were not training programs. They were ship visits with naval cadets. That's a much more limited type of event and doesn't suggest Indian training or Indian contribution to Iranian military capabilities.

QUESTION: You're confident?

MR. ERELI: Yes.

Yeah.

QUESTION: But the timing is still sort of awkward, don't you think, at best? I mean, you're trying to get this deal through Congress and India goes off and --

MR. ERELI: Yeah, there are Iranian naval ships that visit a number of countries with whom we have good and close relations. I don't think that one undercuts the other. I don't think that visits by two Indian naval ships should call into question India's (a) firm commitment to nonproliferation; (b) strong record as a responsible international actor and (c) let's remember, who voted to refer India on the Board of Governors to the -- report India's -- sorry, who voted to report Iran's safeguards agreement violations to the UN Security Council? India. So India has a very responsible record in this regard that I don't think should be doubted.

Yes.

QUESTION: Adam, another country years ago was developing nuclear capabilities. That was South Africa. And President Abbas has visited Nelson Mandela. And Nelson Mandela, obviously at the time he was Prime Minister of South Africa, initiated a program to have peaceful relations with Israel as well as with the Palestinian Authority. Now because they disarmed, would that be a model with the South Africans talking to the Iranians --

MR. ERELI: No, I think that the way to deal with the Iranians is as I described at length to your colleague.

QUESTION: On Iran?

QUESTION: Sorry. Are you --

QUESTION: Yes, yes.

MR. ERELI: He who speaks loudest gets --

QUESTION: Just on the -- is there any update at all on the direct talks with Iran over Iraq?

MR. ERELI: No, no.

QUESTION: None at all?

MR. ERELI: No.

QUESTION: Can I segue then to --

MR. ERELI: And again, direct talks makes it sound as if we're negotiating the fate of Iraq. The fact is what these would be, were they to take place, would be Zal [Zalmay] Khalilzad meeting with Iranian officials in Baghdad to convey our concerns about Iranian activities in Iraq. That is, I think, the way to characterize any such potential meeting, the way we did with -- the way Zal did when he was Ambassador in Afghanistan, the way our Ambassador Afghanistan can do, should the need arise, rather than talks because that implies that somehow we are negotiating the future of Iraq, which isn't the case at all.

QUESTION: And can I just segue into Iraq?

QUESTION: No.

QUESTION: No? Okay. Iran?

QUESTION: Iran.

MR. ERELI: Yeah.

QUESTION: On Friday, you -- well, Burns called the Ambassador and offered U.S. aid for the earthquake.

MR. ERELI: Right.

QUESTION: Did you receive any answer?

MR. ERELI: We did. On Saturday, Ambassador Zarif called Under Secretary Burns. He said -- he read a reply from the Iranian Government, said that they were very appreciative of the offer of assistance and the condolences, but that they did not need the assistance at this time.

QUESTION: But they accepted one assistance from Japan. They requested it, apparently.

MR. ERELI: Yeah. They said they did not need our offer of assistance at this time.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. ERELI: Yes, ma'am.

QUESTION: Back to Iran? The second torpedo.

MR. ERELI: Yeah.

QUESTION: Okay. Iran has tested a sonar-evading missile yesterday, with hundred meters speed per second. And official Iranian media agency controlled by the regime says that the maneuvers were too slow -- sorry, to show Iran's defensive capabilities. My question is: Is it technically feasible to detect and counter a missile with that speed?

MR. ERELI: I'd ask a defense expert on that, not little old me who knows very little about that sort of stuff.

QUESTION: Can I just follow on that though?

MR. ERELI: Yes.

QUESTION: But along those lines, is the Administration actively trying to ascertain whether Iran does have significant new capabilities or if these really don't expand their arsenal that much?

MR. ERELI: Yeah. Well, obviously, we follow Iran's weapons development and deployment very closely -- not only us, but a variety of other nations that have a presence in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea. And it's important to remember that this is, number one, a vital international waterway and, number two, that there are a number of nations that have -- that contribute to multinational forces in the area.

So as I said in response to the earlier question, this reported missile test, or torpedo test, is something that I think we all look at with concern. And we all have a stake in, frankly, a responsible and peaceful Iran, which is why the policies of the present government across the board are so alarming to so many of us.

QUESTION: Regardless of what the actual technical span may be of this missile?

MR. ERELI: Well, I'm not a -- again, I'm not in a position to give you technical details on this latest test. But clearly, it comes in the context of an ongoing and aggressive weapons development program by Iran, whether it be in surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, warhead development, or sea-launch missiles.

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