MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, everybody. How are you? Good. Well, we don't have any opening statements. I don't have any opening statements, so we can get right into your questions.
QUESTION: Do you have any indications possibly from the European Union, Mr. Solana, whether or what Iran might say as the deadline comes down on them tomorrow?
MR. MCCORMACK: We'll see, Barry. Thus far, they haven't given any indication that they are going to meet the just demands of the UN Security Council, the IAEA Board of Governors. In fact, they've gone off in the other direction. It seems as though they have made it a point to try to defy the international community up to this point. We'll see what happens in the run-up to the deadline which is tomorrow and we'll also take a look at what the IAEA report has to say about their compliance.
We don't expect it to say at this point anything other than that they have not lived up to what the UN Security Council has demanded that they do, required them to do. And if they do not meet the requirements of the UN Security Council resolution then we would expect that the parties would immediately begin formal discussions about a resolution that would call for sanctions. That is what was agreed to as a passage of 1696 as well as what was agreed to in Paris, among the P-5+1 and we would expect that process to begin. It would be triggered if we don't get the kind of answer from Iran saying that they are going to comply with what 1696 has asked them to do.
QUESTION: Small question.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
QUESTION: Clarification -- UN sanctions?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
QUESTION: Because there are other ways to apply sanctions.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. You can go through -- we talked about that --
QUESTION: Sure, many --
MR. MCCORMACK: -- the individual countries can take actions on their own. But no, this would be -- well, you know, what the agreement, if you look back at Paris what the Security Council resolution talks about, it talks about Chapter 7 under Article 41.
Yeah.
QUESTION: What then are Ambassador Bolton's marching orders at the UN tomorrow, should there be a Security Council meeting?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think what you'll see first, Anne, is that you'll see probably a political directors meetings of the P-5+1. Nick Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, is going to be traveling to Europe, I believe next week, early next week. That would probably be the first convocation of that group looking at specific language for a resolution. We, of course, have some of our own ideas in terms of language and what would be in the resolution. But of course, we have to begin those discussions. So early next week, Nick will probably travel to Europe, then I would expect you'll really see the focus shift to New York with John Bolton negotiating specific language of the resolution. I'm sure that John will probably start consultations among his counterparts up in New York after the 31st, but the first formal meeting I think will probably be Nick Burns with P-5+1.
QUESTION: Is there a fixed date and place for that meeting?
MR. MCCORMACK: I'll check for you. I think it's early next week.
QUESTION: And where?
QUESTION: But it's a place, it's not a tour?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, place, yeah. It's a meeting. He's not doing a circuit.
QUESTION: Is this meeting going to take place regardless of whether Iran complies with the demands of the UN or not? Or is this just sort of the worst case scenario?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think this -- well, I think everybody's reasonable expectation, based upon their actions up to this point that they don't intend to comply. They have said that they don't intend to comply. And we'll see if they pull a rabbit out of the hat before the 31st. I don't expect -- I don't think anybody expects that at the moment. But look, we remain hopeful that they will take up the Security Council, the P-5+1, on its offer for negotiations. They have to meet the conditions for those negotiations. It addresses the - this approach addresses Iran's stated concerns and we'll see what their reaction is.
QUESTION: Before the deadline, is the U.S. privy to any meetings leading up to it among the Europeans perhaps a last minute back channel discussions to get them to do something before the deadline?
MR. MCCORMACK: You can talk to various countries involved, whether or not --
QUESTION: I mean, we would be monitoring that, I'm thinking of --
MR. MCCORMACK: Monitoring -- we're certainly in touch with the P-5+1, of course we are. As for what contacts they may be having with Iran, you can talk to them. Many of these states have diplomatic relations with Iran, so I would imagine that they probably are encouraging Iran to respond positively. But thus far we have not seen any result of those entreaties.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Sean, are U.S. officials in possession of the upcoming IAEA report?
MR. MCCORMACK: I'll check for you, James. I don't know. I don't know when it's -- if it's been distributed or not.
QUESTION: Does the U.S. have any reason to believe, regardless of what that report finds, that Iran has continued to enrich uranium at whatever levels --
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I know that there have been news reports out there about Iranian activities concerning enrichment of uranium. That, I think, would be a topic addressed by the IAEA report. I'm going to let that report come out and then -- because they would be the ones on the ground actually doing the observations and inspections there, so I'm going to let that rest until we see the report out in public.
QUESTION: So you have no idea what's in the report, aside from the press reports --
MR. MCCORMACK: James, we're going to wait to see and withhold any public comment until we have the IAEA report publicly released.
Yeah.
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QUESTION: If we can go back to the meeting of Mr. Solana with Mr. Larijani next week, do you see that as useful since it will be after the deadline?
MR. MCCORMACK: One thing about the deadline; what it is, it's a trigger for the Security Council to begin discussions about sanctions resolutions. It doesn't mean, at any point along the line here, even while those discussions are ongoing, that Iran can't come to the P-5+1 and say: We are going to meet the conditions of the Security Council Resolution 1696. We are going to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities. And if that is, in fact, confirmed and verified, then there can be negotiations. So the 31st deadline doesn't mean that those things can't happen.
Our approach all along has been to try to increase diplomatic pressure, other kinds of pressure on the Iranian regime to get it to change its behavior. We've been doing this over the course of working with the P-5+1 and the Europeans over the past year, year and a half. So the idea is to try to get them to change their behavior. That's what we want to happen.
And we are now at the next step where we believe that sanctions are merited and we hope that sanctions will send a clear, strong signal to the Iranian regime that this is a matter of utmost concern and serious concern to the international community and that they need to change their behavior, and that if they don't change their behavior that they are going to become more and more isolated, which is not something certainly that we would want to see for the Iranian people. But again, it would be their government, the unelected few, who would be leading them down that pathway. We don't want to see that, but that is the pathway that the Iranian regime is now choosing for their own regime as well as for their own people.
Yeah, James.
QUESTION: How aggressive does the Secretary believe the first round of sanctions should be?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we talked -- again, I talked a little bit about the fact that we want to increase pressure. We think that the first resolution should send a substantial signal to the Iranian regime that this is serious business and that the international community means what it says.
As for the specific list of what might be included in that resolution, I'm not going to prejudge what might be in there. That will be a matter of some discussion, I would expect intensive discussion, in the coming month among the P-5+1 as well as the Security Council. The agreement among the P-5+1 was that there was an agreed upon list -- menu -- of sanctions that they would consider employing but what was left for further discussion and negotiation was at which point -- which sanctions at what point would be implemented and included in the resolution. So that's going to be really the focus of discussion, James, you know, what exactly is in that resolution. But we think that this should be a real resolution sending a substantial signal to them.
QUESTION: Do you sense any backpedaling on the part of any other P-5 members in terms of their willingness to review that menu and select some items at all?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, James, you've seen -- there are all sorts of public comments out there. In terms of formal discussions, I wouldn't say that formal discussions had begun on this. Let's wait to see. Let's wait the extra day to see what the, I guess, final answer for this phase of the diplomacy is from the Iranian regime, then we can talk about who stands where with respect to what sanctions.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) a strong statement but containing no specific sanctions.
MR. MCCORMACK: No, I said sending a substantial signal. But --
QUESTION: With action in it, not just another call --
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, this has to be a real resolution. Yeah. What we're talking about, Barry, and again what the agreement was -- Chapter 7 Resolution -- under Article 41 of Chapter 7. And that's the article that governs economic sanctions kind of activities. But this -- you know, this does. It has to be a real action, Barry. I mean this is serious business. I mean, we are talking here about a regime that has, we believe, broached its international obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
They made a deal that they would get assistance from the international community with their civilian nuclear power program in exchange for not seeking nuclear weapons. Well, we believe that they broke that bargain. And let's just think about for a second an Iranian -- this Iranian regime in possession of nuclear weapons. That is a terrifically destabilizing of -- that would be a terrifically destabilizing event in the Middle East. I don't think anybody wants to see that happen, certainly not among the P-5+1 and members of the Security Council. I think there is unanimity among the P-5+1 that nobody believes that Iran can be allowed to develop and possess nuclear weapons. Everybody agrees that that is a destabilizing event. We're working the diplomacy to make sure that that does not happen.
And we believe that at this point we have reached a point that there needs to be a real action by the Security Council, Barry. I'm not saying that this would be the final steps or actions with regard to sanctions. There could be further steps. We would hope that there wouldn't be. We would hope that the Iranian regime would get the message, get the signal and change its behavior because that would be in the interest of the Iranian people. And if they're truly there to act in the best interests of the Iranian people, they would take up the offer of the international community and they would meet the demands of the international community.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Are you looking at a range of action outside of sanctions when you say that there could be further steps? What are you referring to there?
MR. MCCORMACK: What I was talking about there -- I'm not saying -- I'm not trying to lay out for you that this resolution would employ all the possible sanctions that are on that menu. Again, the approach has been to increase the pressure on the Iranian regime. So there could be -- if we do get -- look down the road -- if you do get to the point where let's say tomorrow they don't meet the demands of the international community and there is passage of a sanctions resolution, those sanctions are applied and you still have continued defiance, again, you could go back again for more sanctions. So I was just trying to lay out a process for you.
QUESTION: So --
MR. MCCORMACK: Now in terms of we've always talked about the fact that there can also be other tracks where individual states or individual states banding together to take other individual actions that might increase pressure on the Iranian regime. There's been certainly a lot of reporting done, and the Department of Treasury has talked about the fact that they are looking at what the possibilities are with respect to the international financial system and how you might use some of those levers to get the Iranian regime to try to change its behavior. And I would expect that those -- again, if we continue to see this kind of Iranian behavior, I would expect that those discussions among individual states would probably progress. You'd probably see more of those discussions.
QUESTION: Do you see this likely scenario as being you have one load of sanctions to begin with and then there's another deadline set, but if you don't do so, so then these sanctions would be imposed? That it's a sort of turntable of ratcheting up the pressure?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I don't want to get into whether or not there would be a deadline in this resolution and what might follow it. I'm just trying to lay out the process for you that it is a process of increasing, building the pressure. I'm trying to set it out for you so you don't expect to see that whole list of sanctions that was on that menu agreed upon by the P-5+1 all in this resolution. I don't expect that that's what you'll see.
QUESTION: But taking a step back, I mean, you have been, as you say, pursuing this graduated approach, increasing the pressure. So far, apparently, to utterly no avail. I mean, they haven't stopped doing any of the things you've asked them to stop doing. What gives you any confidence that this next stage in that graduated approach will have any different effect?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I guess I would differ in the way the question is posed. There has been a lot accomplished in the past year and a half. Let's look at where we began when back in, what, 2005, winter of 2005, or January 2005, February 2005. We had a position where you had politically and on the diplomatic scene you had the United States on one hand, you had Iran on the other hand, and there was this sense among the Europeans that they were somehow interposed between the U.S. and Iran. You know, we've talked a lot about how we changed that -- the decisions that President Bush took, Secretary Rice and her diplomatic activity -- and how we now have a coherent approach among the European powers and now including Russia and China. And what you have is a coherent international group that is speaking with one voice to the Iranian regime, "You need to change your behavior."
We also now have the Security Council on record demanding, requiring Iran to change its behavior. Now at some point we hope and we believe that that approach will work, that that diplomatic approach will work. Clearly we have not reached that point yet and the Iranian regime has done everything that it possibly could over that period of time to try to break off individual states from that group, from the P-5+1, from the Security Council, to try to convince them, try to peel people away. They have engaged in, you know, a really extraordinary road show in which their officials have been traveling around the globe trying to gin up support for their position, one of continued defiance of the international community.
And frankly, if you look at the results of what they have been trying to do on the diplomatic front, they have failed. They failed on the Board of Governors, they failed on the Security Council, and they now find themselves very, very isolated. So we are -- we believe we're working the right track in terms of working diplomacy. We are fully aware of what the stakes are here. I think the other countries involved in this are fully aware of what the stakes are and we take it very seriously. But we think we're following the right approach right now.
QUESTION: Can you, at this point, say what you think the tipping point would be? I mean, you said if we were on the right path and eventually, now that everyone is arm in arm pursuing the same goal, that will work. Well, when? I mean, what is it that makes the --
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, again, you have to get inside of the decision-making processes of the Iranian regime and that is not somewhere where I am at this point. I couldn't tell you what it is that would do it for them. But I think that if the Iranian people had a clear sense of the cost/benefit -- the opportunity costs involved here of what is being offered to them, I think that they might have a different opinion. But I'm pretty sure that they don't have a clear view of what exactly has been offered to them.
Yeah.
QUESTION: You said that you're expecting intensive discussions in the coming month. Does it mean that any sanction wouldn't be applicable for a month?
MR. MCCORMACK: No. What I'm trying to -- what I was trying to hint at in saying that is that we have all seen the diplomatic sausage-making process in putting together these resolutions. It's hard-fought, tough diplomacy because the issues are important and people want to take them seriously, so I'm not trying to predict how long discussions might take in the Security Council. We would certainly be ready to do something very quickly and we would hope that the Security Council would be ready to act very, very quickly.
But I think that if you look at the history of these kinds of things and these kind of topics and even just the history of negotiations over this particular topic in the Security Council, it takes some time. But like I said, we're prepared to move immediately. That doesn't -- you know, that reality certainly, in no way, diminishes our sense of urgency in taking up this matter and coming to closure on a resolution.
Yeah.
. . .
QUESTION: I want to clarify some earlier points made. You were talking about the menu of possible punishments and sanctions. It's my understanding that that menu was shown to Iran when the incentives were shown; when the package of incentives was shown, the package of disincentives was also shown. Is that correct?
MR. MCCORMACK: You can check with Mr. Solana. He was authorized to, within the bounds of what he thought was appropriate, and he's had a couple of meetings with them, to talk about the incentive side and the disincentive side. I'll check for you, Farah, to see in what level of detail he went through. There's been plenty of reporting on the possible sanctions in there, but I'll check for you to see what exactly he discussed with them.
QUESTION: Okay. And going then, you're -- there's a lot of talk about sort of assembling a coalition of the willing outside of the Security Council to --
MR. MCCORMACK: That's your term, not mine.
QUESTION: Sure. To impose sanctions outside the Security Council.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: That's always been talked about, in my understanding, in the case -- in the event that the Security Council wouldn't pass a resolution. But you seem to be saying today that that might be in addition, that states individually could impose additional sanctions or would be encouraged to impose additional sanctions outside of the framework of the --
MR. MCCORMACK: We've -- all throughout this process, if you go back -- I can't even -- months, when we started talking about the P-5+1, the U.S. joining this effort, we always talked about the fact that there were different tracks. There was the IAEA track, there was the UN Security Council track, there was also the track of individual states. And that has -- that remains open and viable regardless of what may be going on on the Security Council track or the IAEA track.
QUESTION: And then my final question is about the Iranian counterproposal. It doesn't seem like there's going to be an official response to them, but there are a lot of sort of analysts who say that there might be a third solution in that proposal, the door might -- you know, that the Iranians might have some kind of door open in that proposal and that the fact that the U.S. and everyone is examining it might, you know, prove that some are still interested in whether or not the Iranians --
MR. MCCORMACK: It's real simple. It's very simple. The conditions for them. You know, we're not going to start negotiating about negotiating. The conditions are very clear, laid out for them. And I have made the point repeatedly this is not -- what is being asked of the Iranian regime is not a final answer on the package, a yes or no, yes we accept this package, no we don't accept this package.
What is being asked of them is to suspend their uranium and reprocessing -- plutonium-based reprocessing activities and in exchange you can have a negotiation in which Iran could realize all those things that it has publicly stated it is seeking -- the peaceful civilian nuclear energy program -- and to start to rebuild the level of trust with the international community. That is what is being asked of them. It is only: suspend those activities and get into negotiations. And that the P-5+1, the international community, will not -- will suspend activities in the Security Council, will not seek further action on sanctions or any further measures while those negotiations are going on. That's what's being asked of them.
So you know, they're going to want to try to -- repeatedly you've seen this -- they're going to want to try to game this out, try to give very clever responses that may appear to respond to what the international community has asked them to do, but when you actually look at it and read it, it doesn't. And you know, that's -- you know, again, that's what we've seen again. What we need is for them to - we, the international community, needs for them to do is to meet the demands very clearly outlined by the Security Council in order to begin that negotiation process. Otherwise, they're going to go down the pathway of further isolation.
QUESTION: Why not make their counter-proposal public then?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think they have.
QUESTION: I don't think it's been out there.
MR. MCCORMACK: Okay. I'll check for you. I'll check to see if it's been made public.
. . .