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By the time the leaders meet later this week in Russia, we expect that Iran will have responded to the offer made by the EU3 that would provide Iran with broad political, economic, and technological benefits in return for practical guarantees that Iran's nuclear program will be solely for peaceful purposes. This offer by the EU3 has the backing of Russia, China, and the United States. We hope Iran accepts the EU3 offer, which would ensure, among other things, that Iran has access to peaceful civilian nuclear power.

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Q: Iran is widely expected not to be ready to give a final answer to the Europeans in time for the upcoming deadline. If this, indeed, happens -- I think over the weekend they said they need -- if this happens, would Secretary Rice be gearing up to move this to the U.N. Security Council when she meets with her counterparts in Paris on Wednesday? Or will they move --

MR. HADLEY: We've heard a number of statements out of Iranian officials about when they will be ready for an answer. We won't really know until we hear on Wednesday what kind of answer we get. One of the reasons why the meeting of the so-called P5 plus one foreign ministers is scheduled the next day in Paris is so that the foreign ministers can evaluate the Iranian response and see whether it is enough to move towards negotiations, or whether we need to reopen a process at the Security Council. And we'll have to see. It will depend really on the Iranian response. But we're in a position through that meeting for the foreign ministers to, if you will, make an initial determination. And then, of course, the leaders of heads of state and government for the G8 countries will be in a position to look at the issue later in the week.

Q: Also, in the last couple of weeks, we've heard some tough rhetoric from some of the administration's biggest supporters, saying that the administration essentially has gone soft on its foreign policy in relation to Iran and North Korea. What do you say to that? How do you respond to that?

MR. HADLEY: Well, we'll see. Both of them have been in the Security Council with some pretty tough resolutions, and I think both of them are coming to the point where we will have some sense of the way ahead. So I would say that we have pursued a diplomatic approach. We have gotten a whole range of countries with influence on Iran and North Korea respectively to take a common position. We, I think, have had some pretty good success making these international issues where the international community is expressing its views both to Iran and North Korea. But in the end of the day, what we're going to need to see is the response of North Korea, whether it's willing to come back and try to -- and implement a joint statement that the North Koreans have already agreed to, and whether the Iranians are prepared to take a very generous offer from the EU3 and the prospect that if they suspend their enrichment program, we would join the negotiations. We'll have to see. I think the diplomacy has set it up well. We'll have to see what these countries decide.

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Q: Can you say, in connection with that, why we haven't had a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia when we've had one with China? What has been the problem why we've not been able --

MR. HADLEY: One of the concerns that has been, really for almost a decade, has been Russian policy on Iran's nuclear program. And you may remember, at the early -- early in the administration, Russia was pursuing constructing Bushehr nuclear -- completing the Bushehr civil nuclear power reactor, and talking about additional reactor construction, without, really, any regard towards what we thought were the serious proliferation concerns. Since that time, Russia has adopted a regime with respect to those -- construction, which requires a number of very good proliferation safeguards, including that fuel supply to the reactor would have to be taken back to Russia.

Russia has come on board with the rest of the, as we call them, the P5 plus one -- the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany -- to endorse the common approach we have to Iran. And, finally, they made a very helpful and creative idea of suggesting an enrichment facility in Russia, in which Iran could participate from a management and financial, but not a technical standpoint, that would provide nuclear fuel to Russian -- to Iranian civil nuclear power programs.

These were helpful and constructive suggestions that put Russia pretty much on the same page with us on Iran, and eliminated a major barrier to being able to start these negotiations. On the other hand, we have also made it very clear to Russia that if those negotiations are going to be successfully concluded, and if an agreement is going to pass muster with the Congress, we will have to continue to be knit up on Iran, it's such an important issue.

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