THE MINISTER - I've just spoken at the United Nations Security Council to Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whom I thank for being alongside me. I thank him for informing the Council about the risk of proliferation, i.e. the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons.

It's the first time in more than 15 years that the Security Council has met in this format. I convened this meeting today because the situation is serious, since the risk of nuclear proliferation has never been so great. And as the Director General said, "“nuclear proliferation is like building campfires in a dry forest, raising the risk of uncontrollable blazes". And our responsibility as members of the Council is precisely to prevent fires.

If the international community has managed to prevent fires until now, if the world has been spared nuclear crises and conflicts, it's because our collective security has been assured for 55 years by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

This treaty prohibits the five nuclear-weapon nations, which include France, from transferring military nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States, and requires them not to restrict civil nuclear cooperation. It bans all other countries from possessing nuclear weapons.

The principles of the treaty are currently being challenged. Consequently, I repeat, the risk of nuclear proliferation has never been so high.

First of all because Iran is in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten years ago, Iran pledged to the international community to contain its nuclear activities. Today Iran has crossed all the thresholds it pledged to respect. According to the IAEA's reports, Iran has 6,000 kilos of enriched uranium, 30 times more than the limit set by the agreement 10 years ago. Likewise, whereas the time necessary for building a bomb, for enriching uranium, was set in the agreement at one year, it's now just a few days. Added to all this are the development of long-range ballistic capabilities and support for the non-state actors who continue to destabilize the Middle East.

So what can we do? There's no military solution to the Iran nuclear problem. A diplomatic path exists to get there, but it's a delicate one. My British and German colleagues are in close contact with Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State. We welcome, support and encourage the dialogue initiated by the United States with Iran. We'd like it to succeed.

But it goes without saying that when the Iran nuclear agreement expires in a few weeks' time, if European security interests are not guaranteed, we won't hesitate for a single second to reimpose all the sanctions that were lifted 10 years ago. Those sanctions would then close, in the long term, Iran's access to European technologies, investments and markets, with devastating effects on the country's economy. That's not what we want, and it's why I'm formally calling on Iran to take the required decisions today, to avoid the worst.

In the face of this danger, I pay tribute to the key role being played by the IAEA and its Director General, Rafael Grossi, who will soon be delivering his report on Iran's nuclear programme. In his speech behind closed doors to the Security Council today, he asked us to take urgent and decisive action.

We've no right to fail because we know the cost of failure.

North Korea is continuing its nuclear programme unchecked, with absolutely no inhibitions, in complete violation of all the Security Council's resolutions and injunctions. This race to build a bomb that threatens the whole of Asia's security must have heavy sanctions imposed on it.

As for Russia, it's turning a blind eye to North Korea's nuclear programme in exchange for North Korean military support in its war of aggression against Ukraine. It's unworthy of a permanent member of the Security Council, unworthy of a nuclear power, a signatory and guardian of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - unworthy and irresponsible.

With this treaty, multilateralism - now disputed - has totally proved its worth in terms of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation.

As we get ready for its review next year, I call on everyone to show responsibility.

Q. - What is the view of France of having a bilateral Iran agreement instead of a multilateral one, does it serve the European Union?

THE MINISTER - What serves the interest of Europe is for Iran never to have a bomb. That's why we support and encourage the ongoing discussion between the US and Iran. We are coordinating closely with Marco Rubio and Steve Witkoff because, as you know, we are getting closer and closer every week to the expiration of the JCPoA. Europeans that remain within the framework of the JCPoA will have an important decision to make by the summer, the decision to reapply the sanctions that were lifted 10 years ago, and this of course will depend on the commitments that Iran is willing to make. What we are sensing is willingness on both parts to reach an agreement that would lead to a concrete, tangible and verifiable rollback of Iran's nuclear programme. We also call upon Iran to stop its regional destabilization actions. And we hope that the ongoing discussion will be fruitful and will lead to concrete decisions.

Since you mentionned the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, I also want to commend the IAEA for the outstanding work they have been doing to secure what is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and that has been the target of Russian strikes in recent months and that will need to be, sort of, curated in order for it to start back, because this will be a key component of Ukraine's sovereignty going forward.