Additional Explanations by Ambassador Gharibabadi on Cilicide Fuel

July 8, 2021

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Annually, more than 800,000 patients in Iran are in need of radiopharmaceuticals produced by the AEOI at TRR. Fuel for the TRR is normally enriched uranium of up to 20%. With upgraded Cilicide fuel of up to 20%, the quality and quantity of radiopharmaceuticals will be remarkably enhanced. In this process,  the production of uranium metal in one of the transient stages of the production of Cilicide fuel, is an unavailable requirement. Although in accordance with the JCPOA if Iran seeks to begin with R&D on the fuel based on uranium metal for the TRR on a small scale after year 10 and before year 15, it should present its plan to the JCPOA JC for its adoption; however, it should be noted that Iran declared in January 2019 that in line with its 5th step for the cessation of some of its commitments under the JCPOA, its nuclear program is no longer bound by any restrictions in operational areas and as of then will be followed based on its technical needs. Even at the time of implementation of the JCPOA, such a limitation could not be interpreted as if when Iran needs such fuel, those who have the capability should not provide Iran with it. The issue of ensuring Iran’s access to Cilicide fuel was also raised by Iran in recent JCPOA negotiations, but none of producing countries of such fuel was ready to provide Iran with such a definite guarantee in this regard. Accordingly,  although there are some references in JCPOA to the assistance to be provided to Iran by other parties on the enhancement of the quality of its radiopharmaceutical products, they also refrained from adhering to this commitment, and have taken no step in the most peaceful nuclear application field. On the other hand,  with the progress achieved in the nuclear field, and thanks to the efforts made by its tireless scientists, Iran has now gained the technology for the production of Cilicide fuel. The concerned countries should now respond that while they themselves are not ready to provide such fuel for Iran, and at the same time, when Iran itself, which has no commitment at this stage, has achieved the necessary technology for the production of such fuel, why and on what rational basis, it should not proceed with such production?!