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All six outstanding issues identified by the Agency in the mutually agreed "Work Plan" (INFCIRC/711) were resolved and reported to the Board of Governors by the former Director General (GOV/2007/58 and GOV/2008/4).
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A. Design Information (Modified Code 3.1 of Subsidiary Arrangement)
Iran voluntarily implemented the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements starting from 2003, but suspended its implementation pursuant to the adoption of illegal United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions against Iran's peaceful nuclear activities. However, Iran is currently implementing code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements.
B. Additional Protocol
1. The Additional Protocol (AP) is not a legally binding instrument and is voluntary in nature. Many Member States (57 as reported by SIR 2012) including Iran are not implementing this voluntary protocol. It should be reminded that Iran implemented AP for more than 2.5 years (2003-2006) voluntarily as a confidence-building measure. In spite of Iran's voluntary implementation of AP as a confidence-building measure, illegal and politically motivated resolutions were adopted against Iran in the Board of Governors meetings. According to the established international law, no sovereign State can be forced to adhere to an international instrument, in particular an instrument like AP, which is voluntary in nature, in any circumstances. It is not acceptable that a voluntary instrument to be turned into a legal obligation without consent of a sovereign State. As it was reaffirmed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) and the IAEA General Conference relevant resolutions including (GC (57)/ RES/13), "it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol."
2. The Agency is not required, according to the safeguards agreement, to seek to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities (i.e. completeness) in a Member State. In fact, the safeguards agreement spells out the Agency's "right and obligation to ensure that the safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material." In this vein, Agency's access to open source information does not authorize it to require a Member State to provide information or access beyond its safeguards agreement.
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II. New Developments:
1. As the Director General reported, Iran has implemented voluntarily six practical measures, which were specified in "Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation" (GOV/INF/2013/14).
2. It should be reminded that the Agency agreed to continue to take into account Iran's security concerns, including through the use of managed access and the protection of confidential information. In this regard, it is a source of concern that a few NGOs and news agencies widely distributed some information claimed to be disclosed by "knowledgeable senior officials close to the IAEA." Therefore, the Agency is requested to investigate this serious matter as soon as possible.
3. Following implementation of the first set of practical measures under "Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation," Iran and the Agency agreed to proceed with seven additional measures that would be implemented by 15 May 2014. Iran has already implemented one of the practical measures agreed between Iran and the Agency on 8 and 9 February 2014.
4. Under the "Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation," the Agency and Iran agreed "to strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA." As it was agreed, "Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues." There is no reference in the Joint Statement with regard to the so-called "Possible Military Dimension (PMD)" or "Alleged Studies." Therefore, we have a strong reservation on inclusion of any agreed practical measures to be implemented by 15 May 2014 under Section H of the report.
5. The Islamic Republic of Iran expects that the implementation of confidence building measures, beyond its safeguards agreement commitments, under "Geneva Joint Plan of Action" and "Framework for Cooperation" would lead to resolution of all ambiguities regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear activities and to implementation of safeguards in routine manner.
6. It is hoped that the cooperative atmosphere and constructive engagement created between Iran and the Agency would lead to removal of any ambiguities regarding the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme in a step-by-step manner.
