Dear Madam Chairperson,

We have carefully read the Director General's report "NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran" and would like to note the following.

It is clear from the Director General's report that the adoption of another anti-Iranian resolution pushed through by European countries at the Board of Governors session in November undermined the understandings that were reached between the Director General and the Iranian side during his visit to Tehran on the eve of that session. All this testifies to only one thing - there is no need to undermine the Director General's efforts. We warned about such a development. However, the authors of the resolution deliberately escalated, as if this was their ultimate goal.

The contacts between the Director General and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, recorded in the report, deserve a positive assessment. We regard this as a step in the right direction. This demonstrates the interest of both parties in maintaining regular interaction with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable result, including in the context of the Joint Statement of the Heads of the Agency and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran of March 4, 2023.

At the same time, we are concerned about the artificial alarmist tone of the report prepared by the Director General. As is clear from the document, no significant negative events occurred during the reporting period in the direction of the agenda item under consideration. Nevertheless, the report unreasonably paints an overly alarming picture compared to the previous quarterly report.

New impetus is given to issues related to the sites in Lavisan-Shian and Marivan. These stories were closed by the Secretariat, and nothing happened during the reporting period that would give grounds to re-excite them. An unfounded conclusion is made regarding the modified Code 3.1. We understand that the views of the Iranian side and the Agency on this issue diverge, but to conclude that this creates obstacles to verifying the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program is too far-reaching a conclusion. The Secretariat is also digging deeper into a thirty-year-old issue related to a minor discrepancy in the accounting of nuclear material.

We consider it necessary to emphasize that none of these issues poses direct non-proliferation risks. There are simply no such risks. Everything must be resolved in a dialogue between the Secretariat and Iran. Iran has the right to do so, as does any other IAEA member state. However, in reality it turns out that Tehran is being sent a clear signal - no matter what it does, it will not be enough for the Agency, and each issue removed from the agenda can either be reopened at any time or will entail a galaxy of new ones.

Dear Madam Chairperson,

Iran complies with its obligations under the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement. The report also reflects that Iran has allowed the Secretariat to adapt its approaches to the implementation of safeguards in view of the increased rate of production of uranium enriched to 60%. Against this background, the expression of the Director General's "serious concern" in the document that Iran is the only state within the meaning of the NPT that enriches uranium to 60% is puzzling. We usually hear this thesis in the speeches of Western delegations. The Agency's task is not to make value-based political judgments when informing the Board of Governors, but to verify, within the framework of its technical mandate, the non-diversion of nuclear material for prohibited purposes. The IAEA's continuous monitoring of uranium enrichment in Iran predetermines the absence of threats from the point of view of proliferation. The production of 60% of uranium is ensured by the Agency's reliable and effective verification mechanisms.

It is important to note that preserving the prospect of Iran applying the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement would help remove most of the existing questions about Iran and find a way out of the impasse into which we have been led by the destructive actions of the US and the E3. However, Western countries deliberately "killed" this option by committing gross violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Against this background, we call on the IAEA not to get involved in political games. On the contrary, the Secretariat and the Director General still have the opportunity to play a constructive role. To do this, they do not need to succumb to manipulations by biased countries - including in the preparation of the future "comprehensive report".

Regarding the forthcoming "comprehensive report", we would like to note the following. All remaining questions regarding Iran’s nuclear program were closed in December 2015 by the Board of Governors’ resolution (GOV/2015/72), which is still in force. The Secretariat’s conclusions on this matter were supported by Iran’s voluntary application of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement for five years – until the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and even after it. At the same time, in the absence of the Additional Protocol, the Agency cannot provide an assessment regarding the presence of undeclared nuclear activities. And information from third parties, which the Secretariat presents under the guise of "all available information relevant to safeguards", is not a reliable source and basis for conclusions by the IAEA. Another major omission is the Secretariat’s lack of agreed goals and guidelines for developing such a document. We call on the Agency to act strictly within its technical mandate when preparing the "comprehensive report", rely on the results of its own verification activities and ensure the objectivity of technical assessments. We must not succumb to the influence of forces that intend to use the future report to abuse the IAEA safeguards system for their own selfish purposes and for yet another politicized attack on Iran with far-reaching consequences.

Dear Madam Chairperson,

The release of the "comprehensive report" will be a turning point - either the dynamics of interaction between Tehran and the Secretariat will continue in the interests of clarifying the remaining issues, or everything will lead to an uncontrolled escalation with unpredictable consequences. It is up to the Director General to decide which scenario awaits us. We hope that the head of the Agency Secretariat understands this perfectly well and will act with extreme caution, within the framework of his mandate in the interests of creating favorable conditions for working with Iran. For our part, we are ready to facilitate this.

Thank you, dear Madam Chairperson.