Dear Madam Chairperson,

We express our gratitude to the Director General and the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA Secretariat for their efforts to implement verification activities in Iran.

Having carefully read the relevant report of the Director General, we consider it necessary to express our vision of the current situation around the Iranian nuclear program and regarding further steps in this direction.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is the product of a complex diplomatic compromise and, as a result, the obligations of the parties included in it are a thoroughly tuned balance of interests that should not be violated under any circumstances. It was for this purpose that protective mechanisms for each of the parties were included in the Plan.

As is known, the legally binding provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 under Article 25 of the UN Charter were violated in May 2018 by the United States, which unilaterally withdrew from the Deal, imposed unilateral sanctions and declared a policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran. The United Kingdom, Germany and France, in turn, first indirectly, by implementing unilateral American restrictions, allowed a significant failure to fulfill their obligations under the Deal, and then simply followed the bad example of the United States, in violation of the same Article 25 of the UN Charter, translating into national legislation in the form of sanctions the restrictions under Resolution 2231, which expired in October 2023.

In response to the US policy of "maximum pressure", Iran showed maximum patience - for a year it continued to conscientiously and fully fulfill its obligations under the JCPOA, and the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement and the modified Code 3.1 - until February 2021. Thus, Tehran did everything in its power to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis around the Nuclear Deal that arose through no fault of its own.

Is it justified in such a situation for Tehran to use the protective mechanisms provided to it by the JCPOA? In our opinion, the answer is undoubtedly positive.

In this regard, we would like to emphasize that the overwhelming majority of claims made against Iran, which were reflected in the Director General's report, are only a consequence of Tehran's exercise of its right granted to it by UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This concerns both the reduction of the Agency's verification and monitoring activities and the termination of Tehran's application of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement and the implementation of the modified Code 3.1. At the same time, as follows from the Director General's reports, the increase in uranium production by 60% during the reporting period was a direct consequence of the irresponsible actions of the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France to deliberately undermine, with the help of yet another anti-Iranian resolution, the agreements reached by the Director General during his November visit to Tehran.

Iran remains the most verified IAEA Member State, unlike the non-nuclear states that criticize it, in some of which, by the way, socio-political circles are openly discussing the issue of creating their own military nuclear program. The high level of expenses envisaged by the Secretariat, amounting to over 10 million euros per year for JCPOA verifications alone, speaks to the continuing intensity and scale of the Agency's verification activities in Iran. All these figures are contained in the Director General's report.

Dear Madam Chairperson,

We have drawn attention to the threats of Great Britain, Germany and France to use the "snapback". We consider such rhetoric not only irresponsible, but also unlawful. Think about it, this group of countries, having violated their obligations under Resolution 2231, its Annex B and the JCPOA - documents in the development of which they took the most direct part - now intends to punish Iran for their own inability to negotiate, negotiations with which on restoring the Deal these countries themselves broke off at their final stage in August 2022.

In contrast, Tehran has long signaled its readiness to return to the parameters of the JCPOA, provided that Washington and European capitals make a synchronized move in return. The stubborn reluctance of Western opponents to move in this direction has highlighted the opportunistic and far-fetched nature of their claims, as well as their lack of a real desire to resolve the issues they have identified on the merits.

The Russian Federation has repeatedly stated its principled position - a state party to the Deal, having violated Resolution 2231 and refused to fulfill its obligations under the JCPOA, loses the opportunity to use its mechanisms, in particular the snapback. The legitimacy of this approach is based on the 1971 International Court of Justice opinion and was confirmed by the UN Security Council in 2020 when the United States attempted to launch the snapback. In this regard, we recommend that Berlin, London and Paris stop giving in to phantom pains over the snapback and focus their efforts on finding a political and diplomatic way out of the situation they have created.

There are just over six months left until the JCPOA Completion Day - October 18, 2025. In this regard, our recommendation to all parties involved is to choose the path of establishing constructive interaction with Iran for the period before and after this date. The diplomatic resource remains, but political will is needed to use it. The IAEA Director General can also play an important constructive role here. At the same time, endless claims against Iran are unacceptable, and even more so threats to use military force - such an escalation will bury any possibility of a diplomatic settlement of the situation and will inevitably lead to a military-political escalation, not to mention irreparable radiological and humanitarian consequences, and not only for Iran and the Middle East region.

History shows that all successful and lasting agreements, including in the area of ​​non-proliferation, are the fruit of diplomatic compromise, and not «maximum pressure».

Thank you, dear Madam Chairperson.