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Chairman Menendez: I want to go to Iran. I read an article yesterday that is entitled, in the Wall Street Journal, “Obama Administration Shows Optimism on Iran Nuclear Talks.” And despite significant political hurdles and vastly different stated positions with reference to Iran’s nuclear programs, in public comments there is the sense of progress and optimism. And I am trying to glean where that is from.

And I am worried when I read this and other articles where it says, quote, some officials who have worked on developing the Obama administration’s negotiating position towards Tehran have acknowledged that major concessions are needed by both sides for a deal to be reached. The complete dismantling of Tehran’s uranium enrichment facilities and the Arak reactor, initial demands of the West, is no longer achievable. The West is unlikely to get a complete accounting from Tehran of the secret nuclear weapons work the West believes it conducted in the past.

And it goes on to say that the suggestion is that the P5+1 should instead focus on extending the time it would take for Iran to break out and produce nuclear weapons to between 6 and 12 months.

Now, I do not think that we did everything that we have done to only get a 6 or a 12 months’ lead time because a deal that would ultimately unravel the entire sanctions regime for a 6- to 12-month lead time is not far from where we are today. And with no sanctions regime in place and understanding that every sanctions that we have pursued have needed at least a 6-month lead time to become enforceable and then a greater amount of time to actually enforce, that the only option left to the United States to this or any other President and to the West would be either to accept a nuclear-armed Iran or to have a military option.

So I want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, whether that is where we believe success lies, or is the success, as outlined by a letter by 83 members of the Senate to the President, where we say that we believe that we need to dismantle Iran’s nuclear weapons program and preventing it from having either a uranium or plutonium path to a nuclear bomb, where we believe that there is no enrichment facility needs like Fordow and Arak, and where we must get evidence of what happened in Parchin. I am trying to get a sense of these parameters because, to the extent that the administration has asked for forbearance, part of it is going to have to be based on having an understanding of what is the parameters.

And I would assume — and I ask you this question specifically. Does the administration, if it strikes a deal, ultimately believe that it needs to come back to the Congress for the approval of such a deal in terms of the elements of the law that exists today that would have to be repealed?

Secretary Kerry: Well, Mr. Chairman, good questions, all, and entirely appropriate for us to try to dig into that a little bit.

Let me begin by saying, first of all, I am not expressing optimism one side or the other. I remain agnostic and questioning even as we are just about halfway through. I talked with our team on the ground in Vienna yesterday. They are having serious expert, in-depth, detailed conversations about what it takes to achieve our goal, proving that this is a peaceful program. I think it is fair to say that I think it is public knowledge today that we are operating with a time period for a so-called breakout of about 2 months. That has been in the public domain. So 6 months to 12 months is — I am not saying that is what we would settle for, but even that is significantly more.

Remember, “breakout” means that they make a decision to race, to sort of move out of the regime that has been put in place and overtly move to enrich sufficiently to create enough material for one weapon. That is what breakout means. It does not mean they have gotten to a warhead or to a delivery system or even a test capacity or anything else. It is just having one bomb’s worth, conceivably, of material but without any necessary capacity to put it in anything, to deliver it, to have any mechanism to do so and otherwise.

We have amazing capacity that is being built into this system to understand what they are doing. During just the JPOA implementation, we are inspecting in Fordow. We have never been in there before. We are inspecting in Natanz. We have not been in there. We are occasionally, I think several times a month, once or twice a month, inspecting in the Arak facility. They cannot move anything into the Arak facility to complete its commissioning. We are inspecting their storage of centrifuges. We are inspecting their mining and their milling and so forth. We have a huge track here of what they are doing.

And so the greater likelihood is at the end of this, we hope to be able to come to you with an agreement that has the most extensive and comprehensive and accountable verification process that can be achieved in order to know what they are doing.

So when we talk about the number of months, we do not know what they are yet, but if you know — I mean, you have to think about this. If they make a decision to break out, sanctions are not going to be what make the difference. If they are overtly breaking out and breaking an agreement and starting to enrich and pursue it, they have made a huge, consequential decision. And the greater likelihood is we are going to respond immediately.

Chairman Menendez: I gather what we are doing now — I have to be honest with you. If the end result is a 6- or 12-month window for which the sanctions regime will have fallen — and it is true that if they decide to break out. But the only question is the reason they are at the table is because of the sanctions regime. The reason that they, depending on how we act, will calculate as to whether or not to make that decision is the consequences internally to their economy and the concerns that the Ayatollah has about regime change either from without, which is his constant concern, or from within because of the economic catalyst that can be created in Iran.

And so if 6 to 12 months is where we end up — I know that you have not said that, but since you said that would still be more significant than 2 months, the bottom line is it is not, I would hope, where we end up because with their research and development capacity still moving forward as we speak, which only allows them to create more sophisticated centrifuges which closes the window for them even more quickly with their missile development as well, these are all elements of a worrisome — it is far different from where we started off and what we were told to where I believe we are heading.

And this is why so many Members joined us in staking out a ground so that the administration understands. Does the administration intend to come back to the Congress if you have a final deal for ultimately lifting some of the elements that would be needed to be lifted under law?

Secretary Kerry: Well, of course, we would be obligated to under the law, Mr. Chairman. We would absolutely have to. And so clearly, what we do will have to pass muster with Congress. We well understand that.

But let me just say very quickly all of the things you just raised are very much contemplated. I mean, these are all part of the conversation, the research, what kind of research, warheads particularly. There has to be a huge level of transparency.

Now, you mentioned the Arak reactor. We have been very clear that there is no legitimacy to a full-on heavy water plutonium reactor, none whatsoever, in any scheme that they have articulated for private sector use. So that has to be dealt with in the context of the negotiations. It will be.

Chairman Menendez: I agree. But originally we were told that is going to be dismantled. Now we are told we are going to find a different purpose for it. It continues to morph into different areas.

Let me ask you one final question.

Secretary Kerry: Actually, let me just clarify, Mr. Chairman. First of all, it is written in the Joint Action Plan.

Chairman Menendez: Nothing is agreed to —

Secretary Kerry: Correct. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This is a mosaic that is going to have to be put together, and I can assure you that we are going to strive to get the longest period we can get in terms of breakout. There are a number of different options as to how it can be managed. But the important thing is that it is not a heavy water plutonium reactor. That is critical.

Chairman Menendez: One final question. The Russians — we have seen consistent iterations of a barter deal which clearly, if it was consummated, would be sanctionable. So my question is, number one, if such a deal actually comes into fruition, is it the administration’s intention to sanction those actions?

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Such a deal would clearly violate the regime that has been set up. And I assume that we need to make it very clear to the Iranians, as well as to the Russians, that such a deal would be sanctionable if it happened.

Secretary Kerry: Mr. Chairman, we have made it clear to both sides our deep concerns about the reported “oil for goods” deal. It would raise serious concerns, as you have said. It would be inconsistent with the terms of the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action, and yes, it could trigger U.S. sanctions against the entities or individuals that are involved in that deal.

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