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The nuclear issue is at the core of America's current policy concern with Iran, but it is at the periphery of Iran's strategic calculus. The rational explanation for Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability is the desire to be able to deter an American or Israeli attack on Iran once and for all. That is a defensive objective whose primary aim is to enable other operations to achieve Iran's goals throughout the region. Iran's nuclear program is meant to be a strategic enabler, not a strategy unto itself.

What would happen, then, if Iran actually abandoned that program? The international sanctions regime would be unwound, large amounts of money and human capital would flow into Iran, the regime would be able to stabilize itself internally and would have enormously greater resources with which to pursue its regional goals. A nuclear agreement would advance the regional interests of the U.S. only if it led to a fundamental change in the nature of Iran's attitudes toward and relationship with the U.S. and its allies.

Such a shift seems most unlikely, however. The entire ideological foundation of the current Iranian regime rests as much on anti-Americanism as it does on anti-Zionism (without much distinction between the two). One could imagine a nuclear deal in which Iran yields almost all of its enrichment capability in exchange for full sanctions relief, but the tone of the agreement would be like the tone of US-Russian relations after the signing of the SALT treaty in 1972. There might well follow a period of détente, but there is no reason to imagine a wholesale change in the fundamental thinking, strategy, and approach of the Islamic Republic. The history of arms treaties amply demonstrates the degree to which the spirit of cooperation in which they are negotiated can be separated from an overall atmosphere of hostility.

But even a total reversal of Tehran’s attitudes toward the US would not be enough to bring Iran into alignment with US interests in the region. I began this testimony speaking about Iraq because Iran’s strategy there and in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and throughout the region has shown the enormous damage the Islamic Republic does to regional stability through the methods by which it pursues its aims. Iran relies mainly on sub-state Shi’a militant groups combined with overt bribes to individuals and regimes to shape the strategies and policies of its neighbors.

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A nuclear agreement that verifiably eliminated Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons capability would of course be desirable, although I do not believe that it is achievable. Certainly Tehran has not put anything on the table thus far that comes even close to meeting this standard. The Iranian penchant for pursuing secret nuclear and weaponization programs and admitting to them only after the U.S. finds them does not bode well for full transparency, particularly considering the Iranian conviction that the International Atomic Energy Agency is an espionage network for the West. There is also the question of how to ensure continued Iranian adherence to any agreement in the absence of sanctions. Sanctions have been absolutely essential in bringing the Supreme Leader to the negotiating table at all. Once lifted, they will not be easily or quickly restored. Without the credible threat of the rapid restoration of crippling sanctions, pressure on Tehran to abide by any agreement will be considerably less than the pressure that has been required to bring Iran to the table. Even a deal could only work, then, if the Iranians really undergo a fundamental change of heart on the nuclear issue—something for which there is no evidence whatever to suggest.