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1. Verification undertakings by Iran

Consistent with the obligations of all members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran will implement fully its obligations under the IAEA Statutes, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA [INFCIRC/214], and adheres to the modified Code 3.1. of the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Iran ratifies and implements expeditiously the Additional Protocol.

Iran implements fully the verification and clarification requirements of the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.

Iran will provide an expanded declaration on all aspects of its past and current nuclear program.

Iran will provide information on the production source material, which has not yet reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material.

Iran will provide information on imports and domestic production of single and dual-use items listed in the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Iran will provide the IAEA with unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, people, materials including source materials, which are deemed necessary by the IAEA to fulfill its requirements under the safeguards agreement, and to verify Iran’s declarations made under the items above. These are needed both to understand the scope of the nuclear program as well as address the possible military dimensions (or PMD) aspects. The purpose of these measures would be to re-establish Iran’s non-proliferation records, and not to lay the basis for further punitive measures.

Iran will support proactively the initiative to establish a Middle Eastern Zone that is free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Vehicles.

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The IAEA has a well-established safeguards approach at Iran’s uranium conversion and enrichment plants provided for under the CSA. To further effectiveness and improve timeliness of detection, remote monitoring should be established at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. For the same reasons, uranium stockpiles - natural and low enriched uranium hexafluoride and oxides – should also be subject to remote monitoring. This approach should also be extended to cover yellow cake and its production facilities. It is necessary to add these measures as they do not fall under the AP.

Iran should permit the IAEA to verify the production or import of key centrifuge components and materials in addition to routine access provisions of the Additional Protocol. During the period of confidence-building until the IAEA has reached the conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use, Iran will declare at agreed intervals the numbers and locations of centrifuges and key components and materials that it has and those newly produced. The IAEA will have the right to short-notice visits to centrifuge component and key material production sites to verify the number of centrifuges and major components and materials produced and that they are being shipped only to declared sites.

Under the AP, the IAEA has the right to ask for information about imports of single use items. An arrangement should be made to seek automatic reporting to the IAEA. The reporting should follow the guidelines established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group mentioned above. As indicated in my paper with Mr. Albright and Ms. Stricker, it is important also to monitor imports of dual use items and technologies, noting at the same time that Iran has been building its own indigenous equipment production capabilities. To limit the supply of sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related exports to Iran, a list of goods than includes additional items not found on typical dual-use lists but critical to Iran’s nuclear program, would also be necessary for some duration of time.

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