CONDITION (10)(C) ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
This report is submitted consistent with Condition (10)(C) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). The convention was ratified by the United States April 25, 1997, and entered into force (EIF) on April 29, 1997.
Condition (10)(C) provides as follows:
Annual reports on compliance: The President shall submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete classified and unclassified report setting forth—
(i) a certification of those countries included in the intelligence community’s (IC) monitoring strategy, as set forth by the Director of Central Intelligence’s Arms Control Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) that are determined to be in compliance with the convention, on a country-by-country basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to adherence of the country to its obligations under the convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction with another state party:
(I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(iv) a determination of the military significance and broader security risks arising from any compliance issue identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the United States described in clause (iii).
For its part, both as a matter of national policy and as a guide to national policy, the United States undertakes its own independent review – based upon the best available information, including intelligence information – of the compliance of CWC states parties with their obligations under the convention. The United States believes CWC states parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places a high premium upon their compliance both with specific detailed declaration and implementation provisions (e.g., Articles III, IV, V, and VII) and with the “general obligations” of Article I. Information and assessments in this report are current as of December 31, 2014. This report highlights new developments since the last Condition (10)(C) Report, and refrains from repeating much older information found in previously submitted reports.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat (TS) reported, as of July 31, 2014, that there were:
- Two CWC states parties that had yet to designate a National Authority: Somalia and Timor-Leste.
- Eighty-four CWC states parties that had not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures (scheduled chemical transfers, prohibitions, penalties, extraterritorial obligations, legal basis of regulations, and establishment of national authority): Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
- Seven CWC states parties that had not yet submitted their required initial declarations pursuant to the convention. Five of these states parties had not yet submitted any initial declarations either under Article III or Article VI: Haiti (April 23, 2006), Somalia (June 28, 2013), Timor-Leste (July 6, 2003), Tonga (July 28, 2003), and Vanuatu (November 15, 2005). Two CWC states parties—Kiribati and the Solomon Islands – had yet to submit their initial declarations under Article VI. The OPCW TS is unable to fulfill its verification tasks with regard to these states parties.
As of December 31, 2014, there were 190 CWC states parties, the most recent to accede to the CWC was Syria, which became a state party October 14, 2013. Six other states have not joined the CWC (two signatory states, Israel and Burma, and four non-signatory States, Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan).
This report addresses the following five countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia and Syria.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)
Based on available information, the United States cannot certify whether Iran has met its chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) declaration obligations, destroyed its specialized chemical weapons (CW) equipment, transferred CW, or retained an undeclared CW stockpile.
The convention entered into force for Iran on December 3, 1997. Iran made its initial declaration in three separate submissions (June 1998, January 1999, and March 1999).
The United States does not have sufficient information to ascertain whether some Iranian facilities are involved in or intentionally retain the capability to produce CW agents, and likewise the United States possesses insufficient information about the disposition of specialized CW equipment used in former CWPFs. The United States also has insufficient information about possible CW activity prior to EIF of the convention for Iran, activity relevant to its riot control agent declaration and activity involving highly potent pharmaceutical compounds. There are reports that Iran transferred CW munitions to Libya in the late 1980s.
On the margins of OPCW Executive Council (EC) meetings in 2001 and 2004, the United States engaged the Iranian delegation about Iran’s CWC compliance. The outcome of the discussions did not resolve any of the issues. Since 2004 through the end of the reporting period, there have been no compliance discussions between the United States and Iran.
Due to a combination of irregularities in the Iranian declaration and insufficient clarification from Iran, the United States cannot certify that Iran:
- has met its CWPF declaration obligations because of possible CW-capable infrastructure, including the possibility of a clandestine production-on- demand capability dispersed among industrial chemical plants and at military-owned facilities;
- has fully declared and destroyed its specialized CW equipment (it is possible that Iran has failed to meet its CWC obligations by failing to declare and destroy some of its specialized CW production equipment);
- does not maintain a suspected undeclared CW stockpile;
- has fully declared those chemicals it holds for riot-control purposes; and
- has declared all CW transfers; of particular interest are any it might have made to Libya.
The OPCW TS has reported that Iran has fully implemented legislation under Article VII of the CWC that includes penal provisions and measures to control transfers of scheduled chemicals. As part of its obligations under paragraph 4 of Article X of the CWC acknowledging that it has a national protection program, Iran has submitted declarations annually. Iran has also committed to support, by bilateral agreements, as well as through unilateral offers, assistance measures under paragraph 7, Article X.