MR. BOUCHER: Okay. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any statements or announcements, so I'd be glad to take your questions.

Q Do you have any new review of the proposal the Europeans are going to make to Iran? Some goodies to get to them to do what they promised to do a long time ago, halt the enrichment of uranium --

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't.

Q Tomorrow's the day --

MR. BOUCHER: That's our understanding.

Q Yeah.

MR. BOUCHER: They told us on Friday they would be making their --

Q Right.

MR. BOUCHER: -- they would be talking to the Iranians this week. And it's a European proposal. You have to ask them about it.

Q Well, but what's your view of the European proposal, which I presume that you -- well, what's your view of it? Is it the same as it was on Friday --

MR. BOUCHER: Our view is that it's a European proposal; that it's for them to describe, for them to make.

Q Right.

MR. BOUCHER: We haven't bought on, signed on or endorsed it. But we know they're going to do it, and they like -- and as allies, we've kept each other informed of what we're doing, what our views are. Our view remains the same: that Iran has shown, unfortunately, no sign of compliance with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors. They have shown a long-term effort to -- (pauses) -- a long-term effort not to comply with the requirements and the safeguards in other agreements, and therefore they need to be referred to the U.N. Security Council.

Q Right. But in this package that the Europeans shared with you, there is the provision for -- if -- for giving Iran light-water reactor technology and other assistance in that way if they come into compliance. And this appears to be strikingly similar to the kind of deal that you guys had with the North Koreans, which didn't work out. So I'm just wondering if you -- do you have similar concerns about the Iranians following through on their end of the bargain with the Europeans as you obviously had with the North Koreans in the Agreed Framework?

MR. BOUCHER: A couple things to say. First of all, to repeat once again, this is a European proposal.

What's in it, what they're going to propose, what they're going to say is up to them; and they're going to tell you, if anybody is going to tell you.

Second of all, I don't think the two circumstances are comparable, North Korea and Iran, because the histories are different and -- although the pattern, to some extent, the pattern of violations of commitments and agreements is similar, but they are -- the situation in each has to be handled on its own merits and its own fashion based on a lot of different factors.

But third of all, I would say that the fundamental premise of the question is true, that we have long had concerns about Iran's acquisition of nuclear capability, of nuclear technology because for many years we have seen a confirmed pattern of noncompliance with safeguards. We have seen the use of nuclear exchanges, nuclear technology in order to develop what we can only describe as a nuclear weapons program. And therefore, we have been concerned and would remain concerned about Iran acquiring new capability and -- new capability in nuclear technology areas.

Q Okay. So your general proliferation concerns, though, are not or are spiked by the prospect of Europeans running around handing out light-water reactor technology?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, if you think the Europeans are running around handing out light-water reactor technology, first you'll have to get that confirmed by the Europeans. I'm not --

Q I'm not asking for your confirmation. We already know this out of Vienna. So I'm not asking for you to confirm it.

MR. BOUCHER: You're asking me to comment on something that I don't think --

Q I'm asking you to comment on something that you were presented with last week on Friday --

MR. BOUCHER: And we're not going to be the vehicle for talking about what they presented to us.

Q I'm not asking -- they've already talked about it, Richard. It's out.

MR. BOUCHER: They have not talked about it, as far as I can tell. I think there was a --

Q You have not seen the reports out of Vienna?

MR. BOUCHER: I've seen a wire service report that pretends -- purports to quote from a paper that the Europeans have. Okay. Now, the wire service in this case may be correct and it may not be, but --

Q Well, I think you've probably seen several wire service reports.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I've only seen one. I'm sure all the wires have it by now.

What I'm trying to tell you, Matt, is -- is I'm not here to comment on something the Europeans may be presenting, because what the Europeans present versus -- you know, drafts versus thoughts, versus things they talk to us about, versus things they might actually present tomorrow to the Iranians may -- I don't know exactly what they are going to present. We'll hear back from them after they do it.

But the bottom line for us has been and continues to be that the problem is Iran, the problem is Iran's noncompliance, the problem is that Iran, whatever the Europeans present, has had a consistent pattern of noncompliance and shows no inclination or effort to break that pattern of noncompliance, and that the issue needs to remain in focus. That the issue is not what might the Europeans be prepared to do if Iran were to comply fully, but is Iran going to comply fully or not? And I'm afraid the U.S. view is, based on experience, based on the history of Iran, our view is that any discussion at this point of what might happen if the Iranians complied is probably pretty hypothetical because consistently the Iranians have shown a pattern of not being willing to comply and of not being willing to be transparent and open about their intentions and programs.

Q Do you think it's possible that the Europeans are going to go in tomorrow and present the Iranians with something different than they told you they were going to do? Because that strikes me as being a bit distrustful of --

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know what their final proposal's going to be. I would expect it to be very similar to what they briefed us on, yes. But I can't confirm on their behalf what they're really going to present.

Q In your saying that it's strictly a European proposal, are you suggesting that the United States has no interest in this?

MR. BOUCHER: We obviously have an interest. We're friends and allies. We're cooperating in all these matters. But it is a European proposal and not one that we have --

Q Right, so I don't understand how you can say that you don't have any opinion about it.

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't say we didn't have any opinion. I said that our opinion is the problem is with the Iranians still and that we're not at the point of trying to comment one way or the other on what the Europeans might provide.

Yeah, Sara?

Q I mean, one likely scenario is that the Iranians could agree in principle to some parts of the proposal, but not comply once again. How do we avoid the merry-go-round of not complying?

MR. BOUCHER: Because the issue, as framed by the International Atomic Energy Agency board in September, is that Iran needs to comply and show evidence of real compliance before the next board meeting in November. Otherwise, the board will have to make a decision of referral to the U.N. Security Council. That's the decision that we have put forward, one that we long ago supported. And therefore, we realize there may be varying statements coming out of the Iranians in this up and coming period. I think what the Europeans have made clear, what we have made clear, what we all have made clear together as the G-8 in Sea Island was that the Iranians must bring their program into conformity with all the NPT safeguards and obligations that they have and all the IAEA board requirements. And in September we made clear in the resolution at the board Iran had to do that before the next meeting in November.

Q So regardless of what happens with the European proposal, the Iranians still have to do that?

MR. BOUCHER: The United States, the Europeans, the board of the IAEA remain united that the Iranians still have to meet all the requirements of the board and remain united behind the resolution that was passed in September that that needs to be done, the Iranians need to do that before the November meeting. So regardless of what people might say or regardless of what people might offer or float with the Iranians, the issue fundamentally comes down to: Is Iran going to meet all these requirements by the next board meeting? And that's something that, as I said, history and experience guide us in our predictions.

Q If U.S. policy toward Iran is eventually successful and Iran comes into compliance, does the U.S. in principle accept that they can have a light-water reactor?

MR. BOUCHER: That is so hypothetical that I would not want to say anything at this point.

Q Hypothetical about the U.S. policy being successful? That's what your goal is.

MR. BOUCHER: (Laughs.) I realize that's what our goal is, but we are also realistic enough to understand that Iran has shown no willingness or indication that it would comply with these requirements, and unfortunately that noncompliance persists to this day.

Q So your message to them is that they can't have -- you object to them having a light-water reactor?

MR. BOUCHER: Our message has been twofold -- threefold -- fourfold. I don't know.

Anyway, all those things that I just said to you.

First of all, that the issue is Iranian compliance. Whatever they say, whatever is offered, whatever is discussed, the issue is Iranian compliance, with all the requirements. Second of all, that we have been and remain concerned about Iran acquiring new technologies and capabilities in the nuclear area. Third of all, I think we made clear over the years that we don't see the economic or any other rationale for a country like Iraq to try to generate power with nuclear energy given that they, you know -- we've often said, they flare off way more gas every year than they could get energy from nuclear power plants, the kind that they're talking about.

So we fundamentally have concerns about Iran acquiring more nuclear technology and capability. But the issue to be faced is if Iran is going to comply, and at this point, Iranian compliance doesn't seem likely or in the cards, based on Iran's history and their current expressions and things that they're saying and doing right now. So if they do comply, then we'll face that situation and deal with it accordingly.

Q So it sounds as though the United States does not believe that Iran should have even a civilian power program, because you say that it doesn't need it. Correct?

MR. BOUCHER: We have said they don't need it.

Q Right. And so therefore they shouldn't have one. Right?

MR. BOUCHER: No, we've -- I've said exactly what I just said, and I'm not going to try to start speculating about things that are not coming to pass at this point.

Q Well, but your comment suggests that you would be opposed to them getting -- you have concerns about them acquiring any kind of nuclear technology, including -- and that would include things that are for civilian power production. So I'm just -- which would necessarily include a European offer, were there one, for a light- water reactor, which then means that you are opposed to the Iranians having any kind of nuclear power program.

MR. BOUCHER: As usual, I think -- I'm not -- you're taking this four steps down the road. If one day we can stand up here and say, look, the Iranians have complied with all the requirements of the IAEA, that they have met the requirements of the board, that they have ended their nuclear enrichment programs, that they have, you know, done everything that they ever promised people and then broke promises on, then I'll be happy to entertain questions about what kind of nuclear technology they should or should not acquire. But I just think we're so far from that point that it doesn't do us a whole lot of good to speculate on that at this point.

Q Just to understand the U.S. policy, is the U.S. policy goal limited to only having Iran comply, or is it broader; that Iran should be denuclearized, the way that's your policy with North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER: The U.S. goal has been and continues to be that Iran should comply with all the requirements of the NPT in terms of obligations and safeguards; that Iran should promptly and fully comply with its commitments and with all IAEA board requirements. It's not only the U.S. goal, that's the G-8 goal that we stated together at Sea Island.

Q And it's no broader than that?

MR. BOUCHER: That's the exact terms that we put it in.

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