[...]

MS HARF: Ask a good first question, Matt. Come on.

QUESTION: Well, I’m afraid it’s not particularly good.

MS HARF: No pressure.

QUESTION: But it is – it is an important question.

MS HARF: Okay.

QUESTION: And it – but it goes back to this IAEA report and the Iran and the --

MS HARF: What better place to start today?

QUESTION: Yes. And the uranium. So I don’t know if you’ve seen this two-page thing that ISIS --

MS HARF: David Albright?

QUESTION: Yes.

MS HARF: Yes.

QUESTION: The good ISIS.

MS HARF: The good ISIS, yes. I actually have it right here.

QUESTION: Okay. So --

MS HARF: I briefly looked at it earlier.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, the main point other than the stuff about shooting messengers is not going to make the issue go away, blah, blah, blah --

MS HARF: Right.

QUESTION: That the crux of this is that they say, as they were cited in this story that you took issue with, that they are skeptical about whether Iran is actually going to be able to --

MS HARF: Correct.

QUESTION: -- take this problem, to deal with it. And --

MS HARF: Right, right. They say that sort of the notion that they have to get back down there at a certain time – they sort of agree with many of things we’ve said. I think they’re skeptical --

QUESTION: Right.

MS HARF: -- that Iran technically can do it.

QUESTION: But they say given the stridency of their criticisms, meaning this Administration’s --

MS HARF: Meaning ours. Yes.

QUESTION: -- of those who have raised the oxidation issue, the State Department should explain the basis for their confidence. Can you do that?

MS HARF: Well, again, as we’ve said, in both the original JPOA and in the first extension, Iran converted enough of this material, this LEU, from uranium hexafluoride, the form that it was in as it was produced in the centrifuges, to another chemical form such that Iran reduced the overall stockpile back under the limit. The other chemical form of uranium is much for difficult for Iran to use in a breakout scenario. Our experts anticipate Iran will have no problem converting the excess uranium hexafluoride produced during the second extension in the same way.

So again, we have seen them do this twice. The IAEA has taken note of this process before. And we and our experts anticipate Iran won’t have challenges doing that. I understand that David Albright is skeptical. And again, if we’re standing here on June 30th and Iran hasn’t done it, then they would be in violation of the JPOA.

QUESTION: But can you explain the reason – is the basis for your confidence – is that – is your confidence based on the fact – on only the fact that they’ve managed to do it --

MS HARF: No -- to do it before.

QUESTION: -- before?

MS HARF: I think it’s based on two things, primarily. One is that they have done it before, which shows that they know how to do it and they’re capable of doing it. And also, we’ve had technical discussions at an expert level with them about this process, and that is why our assessment is that we believe and anticipate they will be able to get back down where they need to.

QUESTION: Okay. But I’m still – that doesn’t really explain the – I mean, I can understand why you would say that the basis for your confidence was that they have done it in the --

MS HARF: In a process that’s been --

QUESTION: – that they’ve managed to do it before.

MS HARF: -- outlined publicly.

QUESTION: But I don’t get the second part of why that’s – I mean, you’re basically taking them at their word that --

MS HARF: No, because --

QUESTION: No?

MS HARF: -- we’ve had technical discussions with them about how they are going about doing this and will go about doing it. They’ve proven they can do it technically and from a technological perspective. And I’m not exactly sure what the skepticism is on David Albright’s side from a technical perspective. I’m happy to get one of our nuclear experts to debate the finer points of this with him. But having talked to our team, the fact is they know how to do this, they’ve done it before. We’re talking to them about the current stockpile and how they’re going to get it down to the form that is acceptable and the level that’s acceptable.

QUESTION: Wouldn’t it be – wouldn’t it be in the best interests of the deal and the Administration and the rest of the world who are watching this – these negotiations unfold if you were to be a little bit more skeptical of Iran’s intentions and abilities in this?

MS HARF: Well, I’m – look, Matt, on this one – one issue, which is a – one smally defined issue, right – this isn’t about their intentions overall, this isn’t about their capabilities overall – on whether they can get down under 7,850[1], on that very narrow issue, technically they know how to do it, technically they’ve demonstrated twice before that they can, and we’ve talked to them about how they’re going to. So it’s not that we just take them at their word; we’ve seen their actions to do so. And again, if they don’t, that will be a problem.

The bigger technical question when it comes to a final deal, right – this a question for JPOA implementation; this actually isn’t really a question for the final negotiations – is how they will get down to 300 kilograms. And so these are both important issues, but they’re just a little separate, and the discussions are ongoing about how they’ll get down to 300 kilograms. There’s several ways they can do it. They can down-blend it, they can ship it out of the country, they can sell it on the open market. But those are two separate processes from getting down to 7,850[2]. That is something, quite frankly, technically we’ve seen them do. We don’t have reason to think they won’t be able to do it now when they could six months ago.

QUESTION: Can I follow on this?

MS HARF: Yes.

QUESTION: Can I go on this? Sorry. There’s just – I want to --

MS HARF: You can both ask questions about this.

QUESTION: Yeah. I want to concentrate on the process of turning it from the uranium hexafluoride into the oxide.

MS HARF: Into the other chemical form. Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Yeah. So what is – you – in previous days this week you have said that your experts fully understand why it is that Iran has not – why it is that the amounts have gone up and down --

MS HARF: Right, correct.

QUESTION: -- that the LEU has gone up and down. What ultimately is the reason for the increase – not so much for the increase, but for their apparent inability or choice not to convert the increased amounts of low enriched uranium into the other form?

MS HARF: Well, they are doing that. I think, again, going back to the IAEA report, it’s a snapshot of its stockpile on one date. So it’s not – this isn’t stagnant. That – it’s not that they have an inability to convert it; in fact, they have been. And we’ve seen them – because in a basic – very basic level, the reason the stockpile goes up and goes down is because they are allowed to enrich this very small stockpile and type of uranium hexafluoride. And so this is the product of that. But under the JPOA they have to convert it before the end of the time. And they’ve been able to do that. Again, I would not – I would venture to guess that the stockpile today probably isn’t the same as it was on that snapshot and time the IAEA reported, and they have said publicly and to us that by June 30th they will get where they need to be. And our experts anticipate they’ll be able to do so.

QUESTION: The question that I still don’t understand, though, is – and I fully understand that they’re allowed to enrich --

MS HARF: Right.

QUESTION: -- up to --

MS HARF: Right.

QUESTION: -- 5 percent, right?

MS HARF: Right.

QUESTION: And I fully understand that they’re under an obligation by the six monthly deadlines to have converted --

MS HARF: Right.

QUESTION: -- beyond the January 2014 levels. So my real question is: What is it – what is your understanding of why the conversion has happened at a – at such a pace that there has been the buildup? You say that it’s not an inability; is it just they’re just choosing not to convert at the --

MS HARF: This is a good question. So I would have to go back and look at the numbers for what the up and downs where, the highs and lows during the previous two time periods. But I guess I can’t stand up here and make the assumption that this is being converted at a slower rate. This may have been the exact same way they did it earlier. And I’m not sure – we would have to all go back and look at the numbers. It’s an interesting question. I don’t think, though, I have the evidence in front of me. I don’t think any of us – I don’t think we’ve seen any evidence that they are converting it more slowly. Now, I can check on that.

QUESTION: Could you? And then --

MS HARF: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- if it does happen --

MS HARF: Sort of when it went up and down and at what point they converted it.

QUESTION: Well, the reason I’m trying to get at it is it’s not just how much uranium they’re enriching, but it’s also the speed at which they are converting that enriched uranium. And you said that you guys, that your technical experts understood all of this.

MS HARF: Yes, they do.

QUESTION: And so I’m particularly interested in their understanding --

MS HARF: The speed.

QUESTION: -- of why it is that the conversion process has been at a pace that there have been – that there’s been this buildup in the LEU.

MS HARF: Right. And my – and yes, and I understand the question. I’m happy to check with our team. To follow up on that, though, I’m not sure it’s a different pace than it was before. I just don’t --

QUESTION: I’m interested in both. I’m interested in both questions.

MS HARF: I – right. I just don’t know that.

QUESTION: Okay.

MS HARF: So I will check on that.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MS HARF: Yes, James.

QUESTION: Speed matters, but also timing matters. And so the question I have for you is whether the two previous instances you keep alluding to, where the Iranians successfully came down to the levels they were expected to come down to, involved timeframes similar to the one we see now, or --

MS HARF: In what way?

QUESTION: -- is the current timeline less than the time they had to reduce the stockpile previously?

MS HARF: Right. It’s the question I just – I don’t know the answer to. And I’m happy to check.

QUESTION: You have twice in recent days – today and one previous day this week – acknowledged that if the Iranians fail to reduce their LEU stockpile by June 30th to the required level, they would indeed be in violation of the JPOA. From where Secretary Kerry sits – and we know he’s just sitting right now --

MS HARF: He’s been up today.

QUESTION: Okay. From where Secretary Kerry sits, would the fact that the Iranians would be in violation in such a scenario, as you yourself have raised, on the 30th of June prevent the United States or any of the P5+1 from going forward with an agreement?

MS HARF: That’s a good question. I think there are so many things that could happen on June 30th. Look, the goal of June 30th is to get to a comprehensive agreement, and in an ideal world, we would have an agreement on that day that says what their stockpile is on that day – 7,650 is where they need to be – and how they are going to get very quickly, early in implementation, down to 300 kilograms.

QUESTION: You yourself from the podium have stated that it would be a problem if they’re not at that level --

MS HARF: Yes.

QUESTION: -- by June 30th.

MS HARF: That is true. What that might --

QUESTION: So it’s --

MS HARF: How that might impact, I’m just not going to speculate.

QUESTION: But in other words you’re not prepared to say that if the Iranians are not in full compliance on the 30th of June with all of their JPOA obligations, that that presents any particular impediment to going forward.

MS HARF: I think I’m just quite honestly not going to speculate on how that would impact exactly what happens on that day. There’s a --

QUESTION: One different way --

MS HARF: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- if I might. It is not a condition for going forward with an agreement – it is not a condition for finalizing an agreement that Iran be in compliance with all JPOA terms at the end of the negotiating period?

MS HARF: Well, let’s just – first, to make a few points: Iran has, and continues to be, in compliance. So as of today they are in compliance with all of their obligations under the JPOA, as are we and all of our other parties who are party to the JPOA. What we are trying to do is translate the parameters document, which is separate from the JPOA, translate that into a comprehensive agreement and all the detailed annexes.

So of course Iran needs to be in compliance with the JPOA. That’s very important to us. What is equally as important to us is getting a comprehensive agreement that they will also live up to. So those things are working at the same time right now.

QUESTION: But it’s not a deal-breaker if they’re not fully in compliance?

MS HARF: I just don’t want to speculate on what this might look like on June 30th. We can have that conversation wherever we are in the world on June 29th. Let’s say that.

QUESTION: So can I --

QUESTION: One --

QUESTION: -- ask you a real quick question real quick?

MS HARF: Yeah.

QUESTION: A snapshot in time? What does that mean? Is that just --

MS HARF: The IA --

QUESTION: Particular to that particular moment in which it --

MS HARF: Yeah, so the IAEA reports, the monthly reports – they also do quarterly reports and others – are a snapshot on that day that they issue the report of what the stockpile is. It’s not a snapshot of where it’s been or where it’s going necessarily. But when we look at that number, it’s a fixed date in time.

QUESTION: Okay. And so when you see the snapshot, you tell the Iranians and they can rectify or fix this situation or whatever it is?

MS HARF: This isn’t a mystery to anyone.

QUESTION: Okay.

MS HARF: It’s – they just need to – they need to fix it by June 30th.

QUESTION: And I wanted to ask you: There are reports that the Israelis are now saying – an Israeli army general, in a closed meeting, said that the --

QUESTION: Can we stick with the Iranian hexafluoride stuff just to get it out of the way?

QUESTION: It’s on Iran.

QUESTION: Oh, sorry. Well --

QUESTION: I know it’s on Iran; I’m talking about hexafluoride. (Inaudible.)

MS HARF: Let me just finish this one and then I’ll go back. Yeah.

QUESTION: Okay. No, I just wanted to see if you have coordinated with the Israelis or are they beginning to sort of reduce their opposition to the Iran deal?

MS HARF: Well, I’m certainly not going to comment on reports of closed-door meetings. What I would say is that we have had a very large number of conversations and briefings and discussions with the Israelis throughout these nuclear negotiations with Iran, at the both political level and the expert level, and the intelligence level and a number of other levels – diplomatic level. So those conversations have certainly been ongoing.

And I’ll go back to Arshad now.

QUESTION: Just – according to the good-ISIS report, Iran has not fed any low enriched uranium hexafluoride into the EUPP plant that converts it into the other form --

MS HARF: Right.

QUESTION: -- since November of 2014. If that’s correct, then it means that they have not done any conversion for the first five months of this year.

MS HARF: Unless there are other ways to convert it, which I just don’t know.

QUESTION: Okay. I thought that they had to do it that way.

MS HARF: Let me check with our experts.

QUESTION: Okay, so that’s --

MS HARF: We’re getting --

QUESTION: No, no --

MS HARF: -- another level down in the weeds here where --

QUESTION: I hear you, but it’s – if one’s talking about the question of pace, then one also has to look at, well, gee, in the previous six-month periods did they in fact do nothing or do it in some different way, or not?

MS HARF: Well, and that’s why I said there are two reasons, I think, having talked to our experts, that they believe Iran will be able to – not only the fact that they’ve done it in the past, but also the technical conversations they’re having now about how they’re going to proceed. So even if, hypothetically – and I don’t know this to be the case – the pace is different, our experts, based on the conversations now, believe they will be able to do this.

QUESTION: Great. Thanks.

QUESTION: So I also wanted to follow up on that. You did say that the – your confidence is based on these technical discussions taking place. Is that discussion on the stockpiles happening now?

MS HARF: I – on the 7,650 or on the --

QUESTION: Yeah.

MS HARF: -- how to get to 300? Because the how to get to 300 conversation is absolutely an ongoing one --

QUESTION: Right.

MS HARF: -- as part of the comprehensive negotiation.

QUESTION: And 7,650?

MS HARF: I know we’ve discussed with them. I’m not sure how ongoing it is, given we believe they have a path forward here to do this.

QUESTION: Is it – two things brief – very briefly. Is it your understanding that this U – EU – this whole thing is loaded with acronyms --

MS HARF: Yes.

QUESTION: -- that are completely impossible --

QUESTION: Bear with it, Matt. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: The EUPP, is there something wrong with it?

MS HARF: Not that I’ve heard of. I’m happy to check and see if there are more technical details to share.

QUESTION: All right.

MS HARF: There may be, there may not be. A lot of this also I would say Iran can speak to. Iran can and should speak publicly to how they plan to do this. It’s not --

QUESTION: Well, as you noted, they don’t do a daily briefing. So --

MS HARF: I know. But they do have a female spokesperson at their ministry of foreign affairs --

QUESTION: And then the second thing --

MS HARF: -- I would point out.

QUESTION: The second thing in your response --

MS HARF: But they – but really, I mean, all joking aside, they also can speak and should speak publicly about how they plan to do this. This is their stockpile they have to get down. Our purpose in defending what’s happening here is solely to make people understand that the JPOA, which we negotiated, is being upheld and is – currently everyone’s in compliance.

QUESTION: Right. And one of your responses to one of James’ questions – you said something about in an ideal world you would have this deal – you’d have everyone in compliance on the 30th and the deal would get done.

MS HARF: Yep. That is my ideal world.

QUESTION: But as we all know that we don’t live in an ideal world --

QUESTION: What?

QUESTION: -- right?

MS HARF: I’m holding out hope, Matt.

QUESTION: Maybe James might live in an ideal world. But the most of the rest of us don’t, including --

QUESTION: And it’s open late --

QUESTION: Yes.

MS HARF: (Laughter.)

QUESTION: It’s open 24 hours. But --

MS HARF: Yes.

QUESTION: -- the rest of us don’t have that luxury.

MS HARF: That is true.

QUESTION: And so wouldn’t – that’s -- which is why I’m going to go back to my question before is: Wouldn’t it be better and more responsible – not to say that you’re being irresponsible, but wouldn’t it be more responsible to approach this from the standpoint of the skepticism that this ISIS has about whether they can actually do it?

MS HARF: We approach our – and we calibrate our level of skepticism based on the technical underpinnings of the assessments, Matt. And I’m going to go with my nuclear experts who are out there, who have talked to the IAEA and the IAEA’s nuclear experts who have eyes on this program, who know – David Albright knows quite a bit about it, but our experts who have been talking to the Iranians and dealing with them every single day for all of these years – many months and years now – their assessment is – it’s not based on an ideal world, it’s based on technical facts, technical realities, technical capabilities, and those conversations they’re having with the Iranians. It’s not --

QUESTION: Okay.

MS HARF: Believe me, our experts have a healthy dose of skepticism about many, many issues, I can promise you that, for those of you who’ve met them.

[...]

[1] 7,650

[2] 7,650