U.S. Statement – As Delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate – Agenda Item 4 – Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Vienna, Austria, November 21, 2024

Chair,

The United States extends its appreciation to the Director General for his November 19 report on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231.  We thank the Secretariat for its continued dedication and professionalism in implementing the Agency’s critical JCPOA-related responsibilities in Iran and we are grateful for the Director General’s ongoing personal engagement to address the international community’s longstanding concerns with Iran’s nuclear program.

Chair,

The Director General’s latest report contains new developments that warrant close attention, and, to put it simply, Iran’s nuclear activities during this reporting period remained deeply troubling overall.  As the report makes clear, Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, to install additional advanced centrifuge cascades, and to accumulate greater quantities of highly enriched uranium.

Iran has already amassed a substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium for which it has no credible peaceful purpose.  As Iranian officials have themselves noted, the only other states enriching uranium up to 60 percent are those with nuclear weapons.  If Iran is truly interested in building confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, it should not only stop further production of 60 percent enriched uranium, but also downblend its 60 percent stockpile entirely.

In addition, we deeply regret that Iran continues to stonewall the Agency on longstanding safeguards concerns and refuses to implement its legal obligations under modified Code 3.1.  As we have made clear, and as we encourage all Board Members to clearly affirm, Iran must implement its legal safeguards obligations in full and without further delay.  If Iran is interested in demonstrating the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program, it should do much more than take easily reversible steps.  It should provide greater assurance, including resuming implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provide full transparency regarding centrifuge component production.

Chair,

We again note with concern that Iran’s politically motivated decision last year to de-designate experienced Agency inspectors has seriously affected the Agency’s verification activities.  These actions were deeply counterproductive.  In this regard, we note the DG’s report that Iran has agreed to consider, at the Director General’s request, the acceptance of four additional experienced inspectors.  We hope this consideration results in their formal acceptance.

We recall that Iran’s de-designation of experienced inspectors began last year following Iran’s undeclared modification of advanced centrifuge cascades at its underground Fordow facility, in violation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, and the Agency’s detection there of uranium particles enriched to more than 80 percent.  Such actions intensified tensions and pushed unprecedented boundaries.

In this context, Iran’s level of cooperation with the Agency remains far short of the expectations outlined by the Director General and the Board.  While steps in the right direction in terms of engagement with the Director General and his team would be welcome, if Iran hopes to build meaningful confidence moving forward, Iran must fulfill entirely its safeguards obligations and enable the Agency to provide assurance that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

Chair,

With these comments, the United States takes note of the DG’s report in document GOV/2024/61 and requests it be made public.  Thank you.