Chair,

The United States extends its appreciation to the Director General and the Secretariat for their continued efforts to implement verification and monitoring activities in Iran pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Regrettably, as the Director General’s May 27 report makes clear, Iran’s decision more than three years ago to cease implementation of its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, and subsequently to remove JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment, undermines the IAEA’s efforts.  Moreover, its refusal to implement its obligations under modified Code 3.1 and its decision to cease provisional application of the Additional Protocol severely constrain access to information and locations that the IAEA needs to carry out its critical verification mandate assuring the absence of undeclared activities.

In particular, the Director General’s report reiterates that the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge over Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges and related components, all while Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent continues to grow.  Let me be clear, there is no credible, civilian justification for Iran to amass a stock of highly enriched uranium and these actions run counter to the behavior of all other non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT.

In light of these continued challenges, it is imperative that Iran provide the IAEA with the information and access needed to verify Iran’s centrifuge enrichment-related activities.  However, Iran instead chose last year to withdraw the designations of several experienced IAEA inspectors, including those with enrichment-related expertise.

Chair,

We reject any assertion, as has been made by Iran and several other Member State, that the United States somehow stands in the way of Iran’s return to implementation of its JCPOA nuclear-related commitments, and in particular that we and the E3 lacked the political will to conclude a JCPOA deal in 2022.

Twice in 2022 viable deals were put on the table after great political effort.  On both occasions, Iran responded to these deals with unacceptable demands beyond the scope of the JCPOA.  The idea that the remaining issues could be resolved within a few days, when Iran’s nuclear program has, and continues to, significantly expand, when continuity of knowledge has been lost, and when Iran’s cooperation with the Agency has reached new lows, is absurd.  Iran refused a deal when it was possible, continued with activities that negated the chance for that deal, and now makes baseless statements to obfuscate the history.  It is a tired and transparent gambit.

We once again call on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA to implement Agency verification and monitoring activities, including by implementing measures associated with the March 2023 IAEA-Iran Joint Statement, to reverse its decision to withdraw Agency inspector designations, and to resume provisional application of the Additional Protocol and implementation of modified Code 3.1 without delay.   Iran must reverse course, rather than continue to make its nuclear activities even more opaque.

Chair,

With these comments, the United States takes note of the Director General’s report in document GOV/2024/26 and requests it be made public.  Thank you.