Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
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Chair,
The United States extends its appreciation to the Director General for his report on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231. We thank the Director General and his staff for their continued dedication and professionalism in undertaking the Agency’s critical JCPOA-related responsibilities.
As the DG’s report makes clear, despite a very modest reduction in Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium, Iran’s nuclear activities remain deeply troubling. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, to install additional advanced centrifuge cascades, and to produce highly enriched uranium for which it has no credible peaceful purpose. Let us be clear: we continue to have serious concerns related to the stockpile of highly enriched uranium that Iran continues to maintain. No other country today is producing uranium enriched to 60 percent for the purpose Iran claims and Iran’s actions are counter to the behavior of all other non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT. Iran should downblend all, not just some, of its 60 percent stockpile, and stop all production of uranium enriched to 60 percent entirely.
The Director General underscores that Iran continues to act in a manner that, I quote, “directly and seriously affects the Agency’s ability to conduct effectively its verification activities in Iran, in particular at the enrichment facilities.” Iran’s actions have severed the Agency’s continuity of knowledge regarding its production and inventory of centrifuge components, which is essential to the international community’s confidence in the absence of undeclared enrichment activities in Iran, particularly in light of Iran’s past track record of hiding enrichment activities and facilities. Especially as Iran continues to stonewall the Agency on other safeguards-related issues of concern, Iran’s lack of transparency with respect to centrifuge production is seriously concerning and raises significant questions with respect to the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities.
Iran’s continued nuclear escalations are especially concerning given that Iran ended its application of the Additional Protocol and refuses to implement its obligations under modified Code 3.1. Iran is the only State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and significant nuclear activities that refuses to implement its obligations under this Code. In this context, we note with increasing alarm the Director General’s conclusion that Iran’s actions continue to undermine the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran’s September decision to de-designate experienced Agency inspectors has seriously affected the Agency’s verification activities. Such actions are deeply counterproductive, and we reiterate the Director General’s call on Iran to reverse them. This move follows Iran’s undeclared modification of advanced centrifuge cascades at Fordow last year, in clear violation of Iran’s safeguards obligations, and the Agency’s subsequent detection at the facility of uranium particles enriched to more than 80 percent. Iran’s actions have intensified tensions and pushed unprecedented boundaries. Iran should take steps to build international confidence rather than continue to undermine the Agency’s essential assurances.
Iran’s level of cooperation with the Agency remains unacceptable, and far short of the expectations outlined by the Director General and the Board. As we will make clear under the safeguards item, the Board must be prepared to take further action should Iran’s cooperation not improve dramatically.
With these comments, the United States takes note of the DG’s report in document GOV/2024/7 and requests it be made public. Thank you.