Chair,

The United States extends its appreciation for the Director General’s May 30 report on JCPOA verification and monitoring in Iran. We appreciate the extensive efforts and continued dedication and professionalism of the DG, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, and their staff in carrying out the Agency’s critical JCPOA mandate in Iran. The DG’s thorough, factual, and timely reporting on these matters remains essential for the international community’s understanding of the status of Iran’s nuclear program.

As the DG’s report makes clear, and despite our sincere and continued efforts toward a mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA, Iran continues to expand its nuclear activities, including by installing additional enrichment capacity, deploying advanced centrifuges, and accumulating enriched uranium far beyond JCPOA limits. Iran’s production of highly enriched uranium up to 60 percent in particular has no credible peaceful purpose. No other country today utilizes uranium enriched at 60 percent for the purpose Iran claims. The rest of the world has almost entirely moved to low enriched uranium for isotope production – precisely to avoid the proliferation risks Iran is now demonstrating.

Despite Iran’s escalations, Chair, we have remained steadfast in our efforts toward a mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA, which is a vital instrument in addressing the international community’s longstanding concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. We have made clear we stand ready to quickly implement a mutual return to the JCPOA. What we need is a willing partner in Iran. In particular, Iran would need to drop demands for sanctions lifting that clearly go beyond the JCPOA and that are now preventing us from concluding a deal. Should Iran choose to join us, a mutual return to JCPOA implementation would be a significant achievement of international diplomacy and mark a new opportunity for creating the necessary assurances about Iran’s nuclear program going forward. We are prepared to provide the sanctions lifting necessary to return to full implementation of our JCPOA commitments in order to secure this achievement. We remain committed to working with our allies and partners to fully achieve that outcome if Iran is willing to do so.

Chair,

IAEA verification and monitoring is the foundation on which a return to full implementation of the JCPOA must be built. In this regard, the United States again commends the Director General and his team for their continued efforts to engage Tehran on JCPOA-related verification and monitoring issues, as well as on the urgent and outstanding safeguards issues to be addressed later in this agenda.

The DG has confirmed his understanding that surveillance data from all JCPOA-related monitoring and transparency measures will continue to be stored in order to be made available to the Agency if and when Iran resumes implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. To reestablish a baseline and enable the Agency to fulfill its monitoring and verification mandate under the JCPOA, it is essential that Iran provide the IAEA all declarations, data, and access identified by the Agency.

Chair,

We have long highlighted the importance of ensuring adequate resources in support of the IAEA’s essential verification and monitoring role in Iran, and we welcome the continued contributions of financial support for these important efforts and were pleased to announce earlier U.S. contributions helping to ensure requisite funding. A mutual return to JCPOA implementation would lead to expanded work for the IAEA in resuming the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the deal. We fully appreciate the financial demands of these increased responsibilities and will continue to join other Member States in providing the IAEA the necessary resources for this important mission.

With these comments, the United States takes note of the DG’s report contained in document GOV/2022/24, as well as the DG’s interim reports contained in GOV/INF/2022 documents 8, 10, and 11, and we request that these reports be made public, consistent with longstanding practice, so there may be a clear international understanding of the facts reported by the Director General.

Thank you, Chair.