Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and BNP Paribas SA (BNPP) Regarding BNPP's Processing of Iranian Financial Transactions

June 30, 2014

Related Country: 

  • United Arab Emirates

This Settlement Agreement ("the Agreement") is made by and between the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") and BNP Paribas SA ("BNPP").


II. Factual Statement

3. For a number of years, up to and including 2012, BNPP processed thousands of transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions that involved countries, entities, and/or individuals subject to the sanctions programs administered by OFAC. BNPP appears to have engaged in a systematic practice, spanning many years and involving multiple BNPP branches and business lines, that concealed, removed, omitted, or obscured references to, or the interest or involvement of, sanctioned parties in U.S. Dollar ("USD") Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT") payment messages sent to U.S. financial institutions. While these payment practices occurred throughout multiple branches and subsidiaries of the bank, BNPP's subsidiary in Geneva ("BNPP Suisse") and branch in Paris ("BNPP Paris") facilitated or conducted the overwhelming majority of the apparent violations of U.S. sanctions laws described in this Agreement. The specific payment practices the bank utilized in order to process certain sanctions-related payments to or through the United States included omitting references to sanctioned parties; replacing the names of sanctioned parties with BNPP's name or a code word; and structuring payments in a manner that did not identify the involvement of sanctioned parties in payments sent to U.S. financial institutions.

14. On June 12, 2007, BNPP Paris opened an account for a company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") with an address listed in Dubai, UAE. An organizational chart submitted to BNPP Paris indicated that the company was part of a network of eight companies—four of which were incorporated in Iran—^that comprised an Iranian energy group owned and controlled by an Iranian citizen ordinarily resident in Iran, who was also the sole beneficial owner of the company maintaining an account at BNPP Paris. According to BNPP Paris' account opening materials (and a report the company produced to BNPP Paris in 2007), many of the company's activities involved selling and transporting petroleum products to, from, or through Iran, and the company's General Business Plan described its goals to increase a number of Iran-related activities over the following three years (2007-2010). Based upon the available records, BNPP's outbound transactions through the United States on behalf of the company appear to have violated the prohibition contained in § 560.204 of the ITSR because the benefit of these transactions was received in Iran.

15. The company referenced above utilized its account at BNPP Paris to receive payments related to its sale of Turkmen liquefied petroleum gas to Iraq. Between November 2008 and November 2012, BNPP processed 114 transactions totaling approximately $415 million on behalf of the company to or through the United States. Although the messages related to the transfers sent through the United States did include references to the company's name, they did not include references to Iran or to the company's Iranian ownership or connections. Most of the USD transfers BNPP initiated on behalf of the company reached their intended beneficiary. On January 9, 2012, however, BNPP Paris originated a $500,000 wire transfer on behalf of the company, destined for a refinery in Turkmenistan, and an unaffiliated correspondent bank located in the United States stopped the transaction and requested additional details from BNPP New York. BNPP New York informed BNPP Paris that the unaffiliated correspondent bank was holding the payment "due to OFAC concem" and requested information about the payment, the company, the company's owners, and "anyway [sic] the transaction is related to Iran directly or indirectly." BNPP Paris contacted the company directly to relay the questions, and the response—^which came from an email address belonging to the Iranian energy group noted above—denied any association between the company and Iran. A BNPP Paris compliance officer reviewed and approved the response for transmission to the unaffiliated correspondent bank without verifying the information or consulting the customer profile form ("CPF") for the company. At the time of the transaction, the CPF included a handwritten note for the company that read "Iranian ownership." In light of the available information, BNPP appears to have had reason to know of the company's connection to Iran, and it failed to pass any of that information on to the unaffiliated correspondent bank in response to its inquiry. Even after the rejected transaction described above, BNPP failed to subsequently investigate either the payment or the company, and BNPP Paris processed 64 additional transactions valued at over $292 million on behalf of the company through the United States between January 2012 and November 2012, at which time BNPP Group Compliance first learned about these transactions (BNPP closed the company's account on November 27, 2012).