Executive Summary

In accordance with Section 5593(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Pub. L. No. 117-263; the Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022; 22 U.S.C. § 8701 note), this assessment and classified annex is provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and examines Iran’s efforts and advancements in its nuclear enrichment program and any information related to potential weaponization and delivery systems. The report further looks at Iran’s support for regional and global terrorism.

Iran's Nuclear and Missile Activity

There has been a notable increase this year in Iranian public statements about nuclear weapons, suggesting the topic is becoming less taboo. Since 2020, Iran has repeatedly stated that it is no longer constrained by any Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limits, expanded its nuclear program, reduced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, and undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.

• Iran uses its nuclear program for negotiation leverage and to respond to perceived international pressure. During the past year, it has modulated its production and inventory of 60-percent uranium. Tehran has said it would restore JCPOA limits if the United States fulfilled its JCPOA commitments and the IAEA closed its outstanding safeguards investigations.
• Iran continues to increase the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at multiple facilities, if it chooses to do so.
• Iran probably will consider installing more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, or enriching uranium up to 90 percent in response to additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program. Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region and continues to emphasize improving the accuracy, lethality, and reliability of these systems. Iran probably is incorporating lessons learned from its missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attack against Israel in April. Meanwhile, Iran’s work on space-launch vehicles—including its Simorgh—probably would shorten the timeline to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile, if it decided to develop one, because the systems use similar technologies.