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Q    Iran’s I guess foreign minister has sort of rejected the claim that it was Iran that was the result of the failure to reach an agreement in Geneva recently, and has said that divisions among Western nations were the cause of the failure of the talks.  Can you comment on that?  Is it really up to the West to --

MR. CARNEY:  Well, what I can tell you is simply that the P5-plus-1 were unified on the proposal that was put forward, and that the Iranians did not accept that proposal, and that’s a statement of fact.  There was important progress made at these negotiations, and they were cordial and substantive and serious.  But as I said, the P5-plus-1 were united there and we remain united in our proposal to Iran and our approach to these negotiations. 

Gaps remain, and there are still important issues to be addressed between the P5-plus-1 and Iran, and that is why there will be a break, as you know, and the P5-plus-1 will resume negotiations with Iran on November 21st and 22nd. 

I want to caution everyone, because there’s been a substantial amount of speculation about the details of the proposal, against believing rumors and incorrect reports or prejudging outcomes.  Both the P5-plus-1 and Iran have been very disciplined in keeping the details of the negotiations private, and that is a sign of the seriousness of what is taking place, and it has also allowed us to make the progress that we have made.

So we’re not going to get into details about our negotiating positions.  But to be clear, the purposes of these negotiations is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.  And I think that’s important.  There’s one objective here.  The reason why we are here, the reason why negotiations are taking place, is because of the very focused effort in building an international consensus and building a punitive sanctions regime around Iranian behavior and Iran’s refusal to comply with its international obligations.  Because of that effort, over the several years since it’s been in place, we now have a diplomatic opening.  We have a willingness, because of the concentrated effect of these sanctions, by Iran to pursue the possibility of resolving this diplomatically. 

Resolving this diplomatically is the best way to resolve it; it is the responsibility of the President to pursue a diplomatic opening.  Because the best way to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon is to achieve an agreement through diplomacy -- an agreement that’s verifiable, that’s transparent, and that requires Iran to take concrete steps. 

The alternative is military action.  The President has never taken any option off the table, and he does not now and will not.  But it is his responsibility as President to pursue a diplomatic opening, to see if it is possible to resolve this issue peacefully.

Q    Is there any assurance that Secretary Kerry can provide lawmakers on the Hill when he speaks to them that would persuade them to hold off on tightening sanctions?

MR. CARNEY:  Secretary Kerry and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman are briefing the Senate Banking Committee tomorrow.  That’s part of a broader effort to consult with Congress and update them on the P5-plus-1 negotiations, as well as our consultations with our allies.  But when it comes to the issue of new sanctions legislation, it’s important to remember no one is suggesting an open-ended delay for new sanctions, because there may come a point where additional sanctions are necessary.

At the same time, it is important for Congress to reserve its ability to legislate for the moment when it is most effective in order to give the current P5-plus-1 negotiations the best chance to make real progress in achieving our shared goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

So again, this is not about being for or against sanctions.  This administration has imposed the most crippling sanctions in history against Iran, and we appreciate the leverage those sanctions have given us and we appreciate the partnership that Congress has given us in that effort.  But this is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue.  The American people, justifiably and understandably, prefer a peaceful solution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  And this agreement, if it’s achieved, has the potential to do that.  The American people do not want a march to war.  And it is important to understand that if pursuing a resolution diplomatically is disallowed or ruled out, what options then do we and our allies have to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

We’ve said all along, as we have ratcheted up sanctions and increased the isolation and pressure in Tehran, that the window for resolving this diplomatically was open, but that it would not remain open forever.  And short of an agreement, Iran will continue to make progress in its nuclear program.

So we need to pursue this.  We need to see if Iran is serious.  And any deal that we and the [P5-plus-1] might reach with Iran will be one that absolutely meets our standards that would be verifiable and concrete.  Any initial relief as part of the first phase would be reversible and modest.  It would not in any way change the sanctions architecture that’s in place, but it would allow for essentially putting some time on the clock, because it would halt [progress on] Iran’s program and roll back aspects of its program.  And if it doesn’t do that, the United States won’t agree to it.

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Q    It sounded here, Thursday, as if you had rhetoric to describe what you thought might happen, and it didn't happen.  And the theory behind what was trying to be accomplished in Geneva was sort of a cap on a cap -- the Iranians cap where they are and the P5-plus-1 agrees to cap sanctions.  That's a general formulation I've seen as describing what was being sought.  Is that still the goal?  Or did this experience in Geneva make the U.S. and the P5-plus-1 reconsider this idea of an initial agreement that would come before a much bigger one?

MR. CARNEY:  It is our approach, and the P5-plus-1's approach, to essentially phase this in, in two phases.  The first phase would halt progress on Iran's nuclear program and roll back key aspects of the program.  The second component of that, the relief component, would -- the only relief we would consider would be limited, it would be temporary, and it would be reversible.  We would take no steps -- and this addresses the cap on sanctions -- it would take no steps that undermine the architecture of our sanctions regime.

I think I described it last week as essentially a spigot that you could turn down a little bit or turn up, but it would be something that would be easily reversible.  It would be temporary, and it would require steps taken by Iran to halt progress on its nuclear program and to roll back certain aspects of it. 

And I can tell you that the areas that we are concerned about, our most serious concerns are the possibility of Iran producing a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon, which is commonly referred to as a “breakout capability.”  Two, the possibility of Iran stockpiling centrifuges or increasing the efficiency of those -- of the centrifuges they have.  Also, Iran's ability to produce plutonium using the Arak reactor.  And finally, bringing unprecedented transparency and monitoring of Iran's program.

 So those are the four areas around which the negotiations are focused when it comes to actions, concrete actions that the P5-plus-1 is asking Iran to take.  And again, when it comes to the relief component of this, it's very important to be clear:  The sanctions regime stays in place.  We built the regime working with our allies, the most punishing regime in history.  And it has had a profound effect, and it has created this opportunity potentially for resolving this international challenge diplomatically.  We ought to pursue that option, pursue that opportunity.  But as Secretary Kerry and the President and others have made clear, we will only reach an agreement, we and the other members of the P5-plus-1 with Iran, if it's a good deal that ensures concrete Iranian actions that are verifiable and transparent.

Q    You asked a rhetorical question a few months ago:  What options then do we have?  This is the Chief Executive -- the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief.  He knows the answer to that question.

MR. CARNEY:  No question.  And the President has made abundantly clear throughout his presidency that he takes no options off the table, and that remains true today when it comes to dealing with the potential for Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon.  But it is his responsibility to pursue a diplomatic resolution of this problem if one is available, and we have to test whether or not it is available.  It is in the interest of the American people that we do that.

Alternatively, if pursuing a diplomatic opening is something that some say we should not do, they ought to be explicit about the fact that they're suggesting the only alternative is use of force.  The President believes that we should never take the use of force off the table, but that it is his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief, his responsibility as President to take advantage of the impact of this comprehensive sanctions regime and the opening it has created to see if Iran is serious about resolving this peacefully.

Q    One last question.  It was credibly reported last week that already the administration had slightly eased up on some of the financial sanctions.  Josh Rogin reported that last week.  Can you categorically say whether or not any softening or easing of the sanctions has been undertaken in order to signal to the Iranians that this would be a worthwhile endeavor for them to engage in?

MR. CARNEY:  I’m certainly not aware of that, and I would refer you to Treasury when it comes to financial matters.  The fact is the sanctions regime is in place and it is extremely broad and punishing and effective.

Q    It’s not going to alter it in a way?

MR. CARNEY:  Again, the specific programs function in different ways.  So for specifics about those programs that especially deal with financial matters and institutions, I would refer you to Treasury.  But there has certainly been no agreement reached that would provide any kind of relief with the Iranians.  As you know, there was not an agreement in Geneva; there was progress, and it was a productive and substantive, cordial series of negotiations, and very serious.  But there’s only even moderate, modest relief if the Iranians agree to concrete actions.

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