Q    On Iran, today President Rouhani said that the Geneva agreement means "the surrender of the big powers before the great Iranian nation."  I’m wondering if you have any reaction to that statement, and do you find it helpful?

MR. CARNEY:  Jim, it's not surprising to us, nor should it be to you, that the Iranians are describing the agreement in a certain way for their domestic audience.  They did the same thing following the agreement of the Joint Plan of Action in November, and we certainly expected they would do the same thing this time.

The fact is the agreement marks the first time in a decade that Iran has agreed to specific actions that halt progress on its nuclear program and roll back key aspects of the program, stopping the advance of the program and introducing unprecedented transparency into Iran's nuclear activities while we negotiate a long-term comprehensive solution.

So, again, as I said yesterday, it doesn’t matter what they say; it matters what they do.  And the Joint Plan of Action and the implementation agreement are concrete documents that commit Iran to take specific steps in a verifiable, transparent way.  And the coinciding moderate relief comes in tranches, specifically as the adherence to its commitments -- Iran's adherence to its commitments is verified along the way over the course of the six months.

So, again, I think the issue here is the agreements that Iran has made, the fact that it has committed itself to halting progress on its nuclear program, rolling back key aspects of it, and engaging in further negotiations in pursuit of a comprehensive solution to this problem.

Q    So you reject his statement that this agreement is an admission by the world of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, again, I would just point you to what I said before, which is that we fully expected Iranian leaders to describe the agreement in ways -- in a certain way for their domestic audience.  They did that in November.  What matters to us, to the P5-plus-1, to the international community, is what Iranian leaders do, what Iran does in keeping its commitments in this agreement.

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Q    Thanks, Jay.  White House officials including yourself have likened a vote in Congress to adopt new sanctions against Iran to “a march to war.”  And you now have Democrats pushing back against that.  You’ve seen that from the Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, and just a short time ago, Steny Hoyer said that it’s “an irresponsible assertion and ought to be clarified and retracted.”  What is your response to that?

MR. CARNEY:  Brianna, I think I took questions on this for the last couple of days.  Our view is that Congress has --

Q    He just said this today so I’m asking you specifically to refer to Hoyer's comment. 

MR. CARNEY:  Well, as I will now, as I have referred to others and I'm happy to do so again, the President believes that Congress has been an excellent partner in the effort to construct the most comprehensive, effective sanctions regime in history, a sanctions regime that was designed specifically to try to change Iranian behavior, to try to compel Iran to the negotiating table. And what we have seen in the last several months is that that effort has produced progress.  It helped lead Iran to the negotiating table.  It helped the P5-plus-1 reach the Joint Plan of Action agreement and the implementation agreement.

And now we will see whether or not Iran is serious about reaching a comprehensive resolution so that we can, in a verifiable, transparent way, be confident that Iran is not pursuing and will not obtain a nuclear weapon, and to do that peacefully.  That is certainly the President's preferred course of action.  Our view is simply that Congress ought not pass new sanctions now because doing so could inadvertently, no doubt, actually compromise the potential to reach the shared goal that we have by, instead of strengthening the sanctions regime, weakening it; instead of bolstering the P5-plus-1's position in negotiations with Iran, fraying the unity that has been established and the consensus that has been established around the world as regards Iran's need to uphold its international obligations and to come into compliance with international obligations. 

So our view is not one that says sanctions are bad.  Quite the contrary.  This President has led the way in constructing the most comprehensive and effective and punitive sanctions regime in history.  And he has done so because he has rallied the international community behind a consensus view on the need to prohibit Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.  So our view is simply that Congress ought to hold in abeyance any action on further sanctions pending action by Iran, progress or the lack of progress by Iran in the negotiations. 

And I think to the point you made in the beginning, the issue here isn't motive or intent.  It's that the consequence potentially of sanctions legislation, which would have the negative, unintended effect of destabilizing the sanctions regime or fraying the consensus, would be that it might limit the options available to the President in achieving his commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

So I know that was a long answer, but I think it gives the full view of how we are looking at this and how we are having these conversations with lawmakers about our shared view that we need to take the necessary steps, at the right time, to achieve our objective.

Q    Is that the clarification, then, on “a march to war”?

MR. CARNEY:  Well, it’s the answer I’ve been giving for several days, and it is consistent with what we said in the past.

Q    But do you stand by that or --

MR. CARNEY:  I’m not sure to what you are specifically referring.  I know others have characterized what we said in that regard, and I would simply say that --

Q    You said in I believe November, “Americans don’t want a march to war.”

MR. CARNEY:  I don’t think Americans want a march to war.  What I’m saying about actions in Congress or potential actions in Congress is that we share the objectives that leaders on this issue have in Congress.  We certainly share a commitment to the efficacy and effectiveness of sanctions.  Our position has simply been that now is not the time to potentially and inadvertently fray the coalition that has assembled behind a position that has forced Iran to the negotiating table or undermine the actual sanctions regime that has been so effective thus far. 

Surely nobody in Congress wants that as an objective, and we share the desire to make sure that Iran is held to account.  But we need to do so in a way that allows maximum flexibility to achieve a resolution here peacefully.

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Q    Coming back to Iran, the President has been very clear, you’ve been very clear, there have been multiple veto threats, you’ve said over and over again that this sanctions bill would derail these talks.  Why, then, are so many Democrats willing to defy the President on this?

MR. CARNEY:  I would say that the President shares with every member of Congress who has made this issue one of special attention and focus the same commitment to depriving Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, the same commitment to building a comprehensive and effective sanctions regime, which includes sanctions levied -- leveled by the United States through legislation passed by Congress.  We have worked very closely with Congress and Congress has been an excellent partner in that effort, and the senators who have been discussing action in the current time period have been leaders on this issue. 

So we have shared their objectives.  We have shared their commitment.  Our view -- very strong view is that passing new sanctions now would be counterproductive.  It would actually undermine the goals that we share potentially.

Q    And I feel like you’ve been crystal-clear on that point.  But ever since the White House issued that first veto threat and said it in exactly those terms we’ve had more Democratic co-sponsors of this bill.  So I’m just wondering, this is a top -- correct me if I’m wrong -- this is a top foreign policy priority for the President if not the first this year, and yet you have had several top Democrats simply say, no way, we’re going ahead anyway. 

MR. CARNEY:  Look, I think that you also have --

Q    I mean, why aren’t they giving the White House the benefit of the doubt?

MR. CARNEY:  -- and there have been a number of Democratic senators who have come out strongly today urging this bill not to be voted on, urging this bill not to -- senators, their colleagues, not to support this legislation now precisely for the reasons that the President has said.  So you’ll have to interview and talk with each individual member to learn from them their reasoning behind their actions here and what they support.

Our point is that we actually share the same views on these matters with those who have been pushing further sanctions.  We simply think, as a matter of maximizing the potential for resolving this conflict with Iran peacefully, Congress should not pass legislation that introduces new sanctions at this time.  Now is not the time to do that.  There may be the time, and if and when that time arises, Congress can be most effective by holding in abeyance new sanctions until then.  And so we will work with Congress if that time does arrive.

I don’t think anyone doubts, given the shared views on this, the commitment that Congress has demonstrated, the support for depriving Iran of obtaining a nuclear weapon, the support for the security of our allies in the region, that if Iran were to fail to meet its commitments, if it were to violate the terms of the agreement, the Joint Plan of Action, or if it were to scuttle or walk away from the negotiations over a comprehensive resolution, Congress could and would act very quickly to impose new sanctions.  And even better, given that that would have been triggered by Iranian behavior, our partners around the world would be much more likely to follow suit. 

And building that international consensus has been what allowed us -- has to this point been what has allowed us to make this sanctions regime so effective, because unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States can achieve only so much, as you know.  And it has been the broad international consensus that has been constructed here with the leadership of the United States that has made this sanctions regime so effective, having the impact it has had on the Iranian economy, on the views of the Iranian people, which in turn have led to the moment where Iran decided that they ought to get serious apparently about negotiating with the P5-plus-1 over the disposition of its nuclear program.

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Q    Is it still the administration's position that Iran should not enjoy a right to enrich uranium

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MR. CARNEY: -- that has never been what we've said.  It's not enshrined in the agreement.  In fact, it's explicitly stated otherwise.  So I think that’s important to note.

Q    So during these negotiations, they can enrich?

MR. CARNEY:  I would point you to the agreement and what commitments Iran makes in terms of the level of enrichment they're allowed to meet.  But the assertion, often misstated in various quarters, that the agreement recognizes a "right to enrich" is false.

Q    On the deal in general, you've said several times earlier that the importance of this deal is that it's verifiable and it's transparent.  In the interest of transparency, why didn’t the State Department this weekend, why didn’t you yesterday and today as you discussed this talk about what's now reported to be a secret side agreement, a 30-page secret annex dealing with this agreement that the Iranian side has revealed.  Is that true?

MR. CARNEY:  No, and it’s another indication of reporting that’s not accurate.  There is no secret agreement.  The documentation associated with the implementation arrangements tracks completely with what we have described, which are technical plans submitted to the IAEA.  The technical understandings clarify how the provisions of the Joint Plan of Action -- the publicly-released Joint Plan of Action -- will be implemented and verified in the timing of implementation of its provisions. 

Now, I remind you, this is not solely a U.S. process.  This is not an agreement negotiated solely between the United States and Iran.  These are understandings that were reached with our P5-plus-1 partners, the European Union, the IAEA and Iran.  And we will make the text available to the Congress and the public, but we must work with the parties on when and in what format the information will be released.  And we hope to do that soon.

Q    So why would the Iranian side be out there suggesting there’s a side agreement?  Is it just --

MR. CARNEY:  I think -- well, again, what Iranian leaders say for their domestic audience purposes is far less meaningful than what they do and what the agreements commit them to.  So I would point you to that, and point you to the fact that we will be making the text available both to Congress and the public.

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Q    Jay, there's been some reports in the last few days that the Russians are negotiating an oil-for-goods swap with the Iranians.  Your colleague said yesterday that Secretary Kerry had raised this issue with the Russian Foreign Minister.  I'm wondering whether you've gotten an explanation from the Iranians and the Russians about what this is, and whether you're satisfied with it, or whether you're worried that it, in fact, raises questions about whether it's at odds with the terms of the interim nuclear deal.

MR. CARNEY:  We remain very concerned about these reports, as Secretary Kerry expressed directly to his Russian counterpart. And if the reports are true, such a deal would raise serious concerns as it would be inconsistent with the terms of the P5-plus-1 agreement with Iran and could potentially trigger U.S. sanctions.

Again, this is about action, not about words; not about how things are characterized, but how things are done.  And that last statement I think reflects our views.  It could potentially, if true as reported, trigger U.S. sanctions because it would not be consistent with the agreement negotiated between the P5-plus-1 and Iran.  So we're concerned.  We're continuing to look into this and we're expressing those concerns.

Q    And the format we're expressing those concerns?

MR. CARNEY:  I don’t have a specific additional readout on that meeting except to confirm that our serious concerns were raised.

Q    Just one thing.  You've talked a lot about the unity of the partners in dealing with Iran.  Wouldn’t one of the key partners negotiating a deal with the Iranians that would be serious enough to warrant sanctioning represent a splintering of the coalition you described?

MR. CARNEY:  Again, I think that if the reports are true that it would be a serious concern because of the fact that it would be inconsistent with the very agreement negotiated by the P5-plus-1 with Iran, so one of the P5-plus-1 plus Iran, if this is true, would be working on a deal that would be inconsistent with that agreement.

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Q    About the Iran-Russia potential oil deal.  You said that there's basically a threat of sanctions if it turns out this report is true.  Is that sanctions against Russia, or Iran, or both?

MR. CARNEY:  I think we're talking about U.S. sanctions in the context of the sanctions regime with Iran.  And again, that’s if reports are true.  So there's conditions here.  Such a deal would raise serious concerns, as it would be inconsistent with the terms of the P5-plus-1 agreement with Iran.  So this is -- but I think that is meant to convey the seriousness of the matter and how we view it.