European Parliament Resolution on the 2005 NPT Review Conference

March 10, 2005

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Related Country: 

  • North Korea

The European Parliament,

  • having regard to Rule 103(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. taking into account and reiterating its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament, and in particular its resolution of 26 February 2004(1) on the Preparatory Committee meeting for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005,

B. underlining that the European Security Strategy and the EU's Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as adopted by the enlarged EU, emphasise the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

C. recognising that all the Member States are States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that two Member States are nuclear-weapon states as defined in the NPT,

D. recalling the statement in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by the UN Secretary-General, that 'we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation',

1. Reaffirms its position that the NPT is of vital importance to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament;

2. Recalls that the EU's and the NPT's ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and expects both declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon states to engage actively with this issue and to make further progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons;

3. Calls on the EU and its Member States - in a spirit of 'effective multilateralism' and solidarity and in pursuit of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD - to form a common front at the NPT Review Conference in 2005 and make a positive contribution to the discussions; urges that their statements attach special importance to new initiatives on nuclear disarmament and the revitalisation of the UN Conference on Disarmament;

4. Calls on the Council and the Member States to add further substance to their common statement that NPT 'must be preserved' and - in support of the EU's Common Position on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-Proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery - to make a statement on the EU's Common Position and Strategy at the NPT Review Conference;

5. Calls on the Council and the Member States to work towards the effective implementation of point 15.3 of the section entitled 'Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12' of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a treaty effectively banning the production of all weapons making use of fissile materials;

6. Calls on the EU to work with its international partners, including NATO, to develop and promote the principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction; asks the States Parties to fulfil their commitments made in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-state actors and proliferation of nuclear weapons;

7. Calls on the Council and the Commission to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge in the world;

8. Calls on all states, and nuclear-weapon states in particular, not to provide assistance or encourage states which may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular those states which are not parties to the NPT;

9. Stresses its strong belief that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium by terrorists; urges the EU to support the new international initiative on new nuclear dangers, as proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which points to the need to secure nuclear disarmament by both declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states;

10. Urges the EU to work hard for the adoption of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention that has already been deposited at the UN and which could provide a framework of steps within a legally binding disarmament process;

11. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency and the Council to provide further substance by outlining how they aim to achieve their common objective in the EU's WMD Strategy to 'foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation', and, specifically, how the States Parties to the NPT might retain the unique verification and inspection experience of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, for example by means of a roster of experts;

12. Calls on the Council and the Commission to come forward with a proposal to persuade third states and the Member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocols;

13. Calls on the Council and the Member States to clarify and step up their commitment to releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA;

14. Calls on the EU to propose, at the NPT Review Conference in 2005, that the appropriate subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament be established by the UN Commission on Disarmament without further delay;

15. Calls on the EU to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;

16. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay, without conditions and in accordance with institutional processes of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to ensure its earliest possible entry into force; calls on the Council and the Commission to insist on this in the dialogue with those partner states which have not yet ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;

17. Reiterates its call for the USA to stop the development of new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons (bunkerbusters) and to sign and ratify the CTBT; also calls on the USA to clarify the situation as regards the quantity and strategic objectives of its tactical nuclear arsenals stationed on European bases;

18. Calls on Israel, India and Pakistan to become States Parties to the NPT;

19. Welcomes the appeal, signed by 25 Nobel Prize Winners, calling on the governments of the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe; supports the proposal made by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the establishment of a 'nuclear-free zone' in the Middle East, and calls for an effort to be made to this end;

20. Renews its support for the international mayors' campaign - initiated by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - on nuclear disarmament, and recommends that the international community carefully consider the campaign's 'Project Vision 2020', urging a scheduled programme of elimination of all nuclear weapons;

21. Welcomes the inclusion of Non-Proliferation of WMD clauses in the latest EU agreements with third countries and actions plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all the EU partner countries without exception ;

22. Stresses that the prevention of any threat to the security of any country requires a commitment by the international community; emphasises the need for stronger regional and multilateral security structures in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and North-East Asia in order to reduce the pressure towards nuclear proliferation and to achieve the abandonment of nuclear programmes;

23. Calls for all political and diplomatic avenues to be explored in order to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflicts linked to nuclear proliferation;


24. Notes with concern that Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, reiterated on 27 February 2005 that Tehran would not give up its 'right under the NPT to enrich uranium', and calls on the Iranian authorities to stop making confusing and contradictory statements;

25. Takes note that, on 27 February 2005, Russia and Iran signed a nuclear fuel supply agreement paving the way for Iran to start up its first atomic reactor in Bushehr next year and obliging Tehran to repatriate all spent nuclear fuel to Russia;

26. Calls on the Council to open an initiative with the Government of the Russian Federation to obtain guarantees that its recent agreement with Iran on the delivery of nuclear material is solely intended for civilian use and to ensure support for EU diplomatic efforts; counts on the IAEA to monitor closely the fuel transfers between Russia and Iran;

27. Welcomes IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei's declaration at the end of January 2005 as to the progress made by the agency's nuclear safeguard inspectors over the last 15 months in understanding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme;

28. Reaffirms its full support for the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004, in which Iran made the commitment to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, and to the EU 3 approach of dialogue with the Iranian authorities in order to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues concerning that country; calls for objective guarantees from the Iranian Government as to the non-military nature of its nuclear programme;

29. Calls on Iran to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to make permanent its decision to suspend uranium enrichment, thus providing lasting confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's intentions and paving the way for a cooperative partnership between the EU and Iran; insists that negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement should be linked to a satisfactory conclusion to the nuclear issue and the establishment of reassuring verification measures;

30. Calls on the Council and the Commission to enter into negotiations with the Iranian authorities on the transfer of technology and know-how, as well as on financial support for renewable energy;

31. Calls on the Iranian Parliament to conclude the parliamentary ratification of the Additional Protocol to the NPT;

32. Calls on the US Government to fully support the EU diplomatic approach to resolving this problem, considers this question essential to a renewed transatlantic agenda and welcomes the recent US statement on this matter, as well as earlier assertions that it would not engage in preventive military action against Iran;

North Korea

33. Is deeply concerned that North Korea declared on 10 February 2005 that it possesses nuclear weapons and suspended its participation in the six-party talks on its nuclear programme for an indefinite period of time;

34. Notes North Korea's statement that its 'end objective is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' and urges it to abide by its obligations under the NPT, and urges its government and the other parties involved to take concrete steps in negotiations and adopt a constructive approach;

35. Urges North Korea to rejoin the NPT, to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks and to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula;

36. Urges both North Korea and the US to enable a speedy resolution of the current crisis, initially by the US offering to recommence the supply of heavy fuel oil in exchange for the verified freezing of the Yongbyon plant, to avoid further deterioration of the current situation;

37. Urges the Council to consider once again paying EUR 4 million of the costs of suspension of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation to South Korea, taking into account the fact that this initiative played a significant role in the recent past, and recognising that it could well serve to supply conventional energy in the future;

38. Believes that the EU should support renewed efforts to enable North Korea to renounce the further use of nuclear energy in exchange for guaranteed energy supplies;

39. Calls on the Council and the Commission to offer financial support for heavy fuel oil supplies to remedy North Korea's primary energy needs, and asks the Commission and the Council to make the necessary approaches regarding EU participation in future six-party talks while at the same time making it clear that 'No Say, No Pay' is a principle which the EU will follow in its dealings with the Korean Peninsula;

40. Is aware that central to the ongoing crisis are the claims that North Korea has a full fledged highly enriched uranium programme and has supplied uranium to Libya; considering, however, that neither of these claims has been substantiated, asks for a public hearing in the European Parliament to evaluate the claims;

41. Calls on both the Council and the Commission to present a progress report to Parliament on the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference in due time;

42. Recommends that an official Parliament delegation attend the NPT Review Conference;

43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Presidency in office of the Council, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the governments and parliaments of Iran and North Korea, all States Parties to the NPT and the IAEA.


OJ C 98 E, 23.4.2004, p. 152.