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Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran
You have before you my report on the Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, Iran has not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is essential - as in all countries - for the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
There remain a number of outstanding issues, relevant to the alleged studies and associated questions identified in my last report to the Board, which give rise to concerns and need to be clarified in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to IranÂ´s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not been able to make substantive progress on these issues. Iran needs to clarify as a matter of transparency the extent to which information contained in the relevant documentation is factually correct and where, in its view, such information may have been modified or relates to non nuclear purposes. Iran should also provide the Agency with substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals. Unless Iran provides such transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the Agency will not be able to make progress in its efforts to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. I also still regret the fact that the Agency has not been able to share with Iran documentation provided by Member States. I call upon the Member States concerned to authorize the Agency to do so.
As I have stated before, the Agency does not in any way seek to intrude into IranÂ´s conventional or missile-related military activities. Our focus is on nuclear material and activities. We have, however, a responsibility under comprehensive safeguards agreements to clarify the veracity of all available information to be able to confirm that all nuclear material is being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. I remain confident that arrangements can be developed which enable the Agency to do its work while ensuring that IranÂ´s legitimate right to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information and activities is respected.
I continue, therefore, to urge Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Likewise, I still hope that conditions will be created soon for direct negotiations between all concerned parties, which are indispensable for establishing the necessary confidence building measures and developing the trust that is key to a solution to the Iran issue and stability in the Middle East.
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