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Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
You have before you my report on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since my last report, the Agency has continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at the Fuel Enrichment Plant and in providing the required access to the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak for purposes of design information verification.
On all other issues relevant to IranÂ´s nuclear programme, however, there is stalemate. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council, nor has Iran implemented the Additional Protocol. Likewise, Iran has not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues, detailed fully and completely in the AgencyÂ´s reports, which need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to IranÂ´s nuclear programme.
In this context, I should repeat that all information made available to the Agency relevant to IranÂ´s nuclear programme which has been critically assessed by the Agency in accordance with its standard practices has been brought to the attention of the Board. I am dismayed by the allegations of some Member States, which have been fed to the media, that information has been withheld from the Board. These allegations are politically motivated and totally baseless. Such attempts to influence the work of the Secretariat and undermine its independence and objectivity are in violation of Article VII.F. of the IAEA Statute and should cease forthwith.
In my view, there are three key areas relevant to IranÂ´s nuclear programme that need to be addressed.
First, and specifically, Iran needs to respond fully to all the questions raised by the Agency in order to exclude the possibility of there being military dimensions to its nuclear programme. To this end, it is essential that Iran substantively re-engage with the Agency to clarify and bring to closure all outstanding issues, including the most difficult and important questions regarding the authenticity of information relating to the alleged weaponization studies, by granting the Agency access to persons, information and locations.
I also call on those who provided the information to enable the Agency to share with Iran as much information as possible to assist the Agency in moving forward with the verification process.
Second, and more generally, Iran needs to implement the Additional Protocol. Without the Protocol, the Agency will not be able to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, especially given IranÂ´s past record of failing to declare material and activities.
Third, IranÂ´s future intentions concerning its nuclear programme need to be clarified to respond to the concerns of the international community. This is essentially a question of confidence-building between Iran and the international community through comprehensive dialogue and other measures. I call on all parties to begin this dialogue as soon as possible and urge Iran to respond positively to the recent US initiative in this regard.
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