Statement by Director General Mohamed Elbaradei to the IAEA Board of Governors (Excerpts)

September 11, 2006

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

Related Country: 

  • Iran

. . .

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Regarding the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran: on 31 July 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1696, in which it called upon Iran to take the steps required by the Board in its resolution of 4 February 2006. These steps included the necessity of the Agency continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, and the re-establishment by Iran of full and sustained suspension of all its enrichment related and repossessing activities. As requested by resolution 1696, you have before you the report that I submitted to the Board and in parallel to the Security Council, on 31 August, regarding Iran´s fulfillment of the requirements of that resolution.

As you can see from the report, Iran had not suspended its enrichment related activities. I should note that - although the inspectors´ findings indicated that there had been little qualitative or quantitative buildup of Iran´s enrichment capacity at Natanz - due to the absence of the implementation of the additional protocol, the Agency is not able to assess fully Iran´s enrichment related research and development activities, including the possible production of centrifuges and related equipment.

As I have indicated in the past, all the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency has been accounted for - and, apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, there have been no further findings of undeclared nuclear material in Iran.

But as I have also stated before, gaps remain in the Agency´s knowledge with respect to the scope and nature of Iran´s current and past centrifuge enrichment programme. Because of this, and the lack of readiness of Iran to resolve these issues, the Agency is unable to make further progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. This continues to be a matter of serious concern.

I should also reiterate that it is counterproductive for Iran to link its cooperation with the Agency to its ongoing dialogue with its European and other partners. Increased cooperation and transparency are indispensable to resolve these gaps in knowledge regarding Iran´s past nuclear programme, and would assist greatly in overcoming concerns regarding Iran´s nuclear programme.

. . .